Cal.
Assn. v. Santa Ana
School Dist et al.
Filed 5/29/13 Cal. School Employees Assn. v. Santa Ana Unif. School Dist et al. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al.,
Appellants,
v.
SANTA ANA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, GOVERNING BOARD OF
SANTA ANA SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,
Respondents.
G047078
(Super. Ct.
No. 30-2010-00336248-
CU-PT-CJC)
O P I N I O
N
Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of
County, Thierry Patrick Colaw, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Michael R. Clancy,
Christina C. Bleuler, and Charmaine L. Huntting for Appellants.
Law Offices of Eric
Bathen, Eric J. Bathen and Jordan C. Meyer for Respondents.
The California School
Employees Association, the association’s Santa Ana chapter, and a member of the
association (collectively referred to as CSEA) sought a peremptory writ of
mandate compelling the Santa Ana Unified School District, its governing board,
and two of its superintendents (collectively referred to as the District) to
rescind the District’s partnership agreement with THINK Together, Inc. (THINK)
for the provision of after-school program management services because the
partnership agreement allegedly violated Education Code section 45103.1.
classified employees to the after-school tutoring positions they held prior to
the District’s agreement with THINK, and an order directing the District to
compensate the purportedly displaced classified employees for their losses due
to the THINK partnership agreement. The
trial court determined the after-school tutoring positions held by the
classified employees prior to the District’s agreement with THINK were extra
duty assignments “at-will,†rather than permanent classified school employment
positions, and the employees who held those positions never obtained permanent
status for the extra duty hours they worked.
Consequently, the trial court held the District’s agreement with THINK
did not violate the provisions of section 45103.1, and denied the peremptory
writ of mandate requested by CSEA. We
need not consider CSEA’s appeal with regard to the trial court’s ruling on the
substantive issues. Instead, we dispose
of the appeal on procedural grounds by concluding CSEA failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. We reverse the
trial court’s order and remand the matter with directions to stay the
proceedings until CSEA exhausts administrative remedies.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For more than a decade,
the District, a K-12 public school district, has operated after-school tutoring
programs at many of its schools to provide students with supplemental
instruction and supervision. From as
early as 2003 to 2008, the District and CSEA, the labor union which represents
classified school employees in California’s
school systems, collectively bargained the hours, wages, and benefits received
by the classified employees who staffed the District’s after-school
programs. In 2003, the District and CSEA
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the creation of After
School Instruction Provider (ASIP) positions to provide instruction to students
attending the District’s after-school programs.
In 2005, the District and CSEA entered into a separate MOU recognizing
the creation of After-School Site Coordinator (ASSC) positions to coordinate
the District’s after-school programs.
The District also created job descriptions for the ASIP and ASSC positions. Furthermore, in 2005, CSEA and the District
jointly filed a petition with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) to
add the ASSC position to their bargaining unit, and PERB approved the addition
soon thereafter.
The District recognized
serious issues with the operation of its after-school programs over the course
of numerous school years prior to 2008.
For example, the after-school programs were consistently over budget,
were sometimes discontinued prior to the end of the school year, and often
failed to comply with the requirements of regulatory agencies. In January 2008, to address and correct these
issues, the District approved the negotiation of a contract with THINK, a
private nonprofit organization, to provide management services for the
District’s after-school programs. The
District was interested in pursuing a partnership agreement with THINK because
the nonprofit organization was already administering successful after-school
programs at 12 of the District’s schools, and the nonprofit possessed expertise
with regard to program management, regulatory compliance, and private
fundraising.
In January 2008, the
District sent a letter to each of its ASSC employees to inform them of the
District’s decision to proceed with the negotiation of a partnership agreement
with THINK for the provision of program management services, and to invite the
employees to an informational meeting.
At the meeting, the District explained the proposed partnership
agreement with THINK to the employees and described the expectations and
responsibilities that were likely to be assigned to the ASSC positions.
In March 2008,
representatives from the District and CSEA met to discuss the potential
partnership agreement with THINK. The
District told CSEA the purpose of the proposed agreement was not to contract
out the District’s after-school program services to THINK and the District
anticipated the classified employees would have the opportunity to continue to
work in their after-school program positions.
Following the meeting, the District believed CSEA was in agreement as to
the benefits of the potential partnership with THINK.
In May 2008, the
District approved a public-private partnership agreement with THINK for the
purpose of authorizing the nonprofit to oversee and coordinate the District’s
after-school tutoring programs beginning with the 2008-2009 school year. The partnership agreement required THINK to
provide full-time site coordinators to oversee after-school programs that were
not already supervised by a District ASSC.
Furthermore, the partnership agreement authorized the District to
designate specific after-school programs, which should be overseen by both a
THINK site coordinator and a District ASSC.
With regard to the staffing of the other after-school program positions,
such as the ASIP positions, the partnership agreement states the positions
should be filled by staff employed by either the District or THINK, or by
volunteers.
The present dispute
arose during the 2008-2009 school year, when the parties’ conflicting positions
with regard to whether the ASIP positions were classified, whether the District
impermissibly eliminated both the ASIP and ASSC positions because of the THINK
partnership agreement, and the scope of the partnership agreement became
evident. During the 2007-2008 school
year, the District’s after-school programs were staffed by more than 300
classified employees who held ASIP or ASSC positions, and these employees
provided students with supplementary instructional services at 43 of the
District’s schools. CSEA contends the
District, without providing notice to CSEA or any of the District’s employees,
eliminated all ASIP positions by June 2008 and all ASSC positions by July
2008. One classified employee, who
previously held an ASIP position, learned his ASIP position had been eliminated
when he received a job flyer from THINK advising him to apply for an
after-school tutoring position in the employ of the nonprofit. The job flyer, which he found in his District
mailbox in June 2008, states the new THINK positions were created to replace
the District’s ASIP positions.
CSEA asserts both the
ASIP and ASSC positions have always been considered and treated as classified
positions by the District. Thus, CSEA
contends the District’s purported elimination of these positions following the
execution of the partnership agreement with THINK was impermissible.
The District disputes
this claim, arguing the ASIP positions were never considered permanent
classified positions. The District contends all of the classified employees who
served as ASIPs during the 2007-2008 school year held separate classified
positions with the District during regular school hours, and these separate,
regular positions established the employees’ status as classified employees. The ASIP positions, the District asserts,
were “at-will†positions, rather than permanent classified positions, and
merely provided the employees with the opportunity to earn “extra dutyâ€
pay. As the ASIP positions were
purportedly “at-will†positions, the District argues these employees had no
continuing right to receive these extra duty hours. In support of its argument, the District
notes these classified employees would have remained classified employees even
if the District had decided to completely discontinue the after-school programs
because they held separate, regular classified positions. Thus, the District maintains the classified
employees were not displaced and did not lose any of their permanent wages,
hours, benefits, or seniority when the District formed the partnership
agreement with THINK.
Furthermore, the
District rejects CSEA’s contention all ASSC positions were eliminated by July
2008. First, the District asserts it
still employs some of the same ASSCs it employed prior to the execution of the
partnership agreement with THINK.
Second, the District maintains the employees who staffed the District’s
ASSC positions were never forced to leave their positions. Instead, the District attributes the increase
in the number of vacant ASSC positions to employees’ dissatisfaction with
regard to the additional job responsibilities assigned to the ASSC positions
needed to ensure the
after-school
programs were complying with administrative regulations. As evidence for this assertion, the District
points to the fact many employees voluntarily left their ASSC positions when
the District explained the additional responsibilities that would be assigned
to the positions. Third, the District
argues it continues to interview applicants for vacant ASSC positions; thus, it
contends CSEA’s assertion the ASSC positions have been eliminated has no
merit. Finally, the District
acknowledges some employees were dismissed from their ASSC positions since the
District entered into its partnership with THINK because the employees were not
able to keep their assigned after-school programs in compliance with applicable
regulations or their performance of the position was otherwise ineffective.
CSEA asserts THINK,
pursuant to its partnership agreement with the District, began to use its own
employees to perform the same services that had previously been performed by
the District’s employees in their ASIP and ASSC positions. CSEA argues the District’s partnership
agreement with THINK has caused the classified employees who previously held
ASIP or ASSC positions to suffer: (1) a
reduction in their hours of District employment (if they held a separate
classified position with the District during the regular school day); or (2)
being laid off from their classified employment entirely (if they did not hold
another classified position with the District).
Moreover, CSEA contends the employees who previously held ASIP or ASSC
positions and are now employed by THINK to staff the after-school programs receive
less total compensation because of the partnership agreement. Specifically, CSEA asserts these classified
employees no longer earn sick leave, vacation leave, and retirement service
credit accrual at the same rate they did when they held ASIP or ASSC positions. Furthermore, CSEA contends these classified
employees receive lower wages as THINK employees than they did in their
previous ASIP or ASSC positions because their THINK wages are not subject to
contractual salary increases.
The District maintains
it did not contract out personnel services when it entered into the partnership
agreement with THINK. Instead, the
District asserts the partnership agreement was necessary to improve the
District’s after-school programs and ensure the programs were in compliance
with agency regulations.
CSEA claims to have sent
two letters, dated September 5, 2008, and February 3, 2009, to the District
requesting information about the after-school programs, the partnership
agreement with THINK, and the alleged displacement of classified employees
holding ASIP positions. The letter dated
February 3, 2009, also asserts the District’s alleged conduct in contracting
out the personnel services previously provided by classified employees in ASIP
positions may be in conflict with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and
constitute a violation of section 45103.1.
The District maintains that it never saw either letter from CSEA.
On January 14, 2010, CSEA filed a petition for
a peremptory writ of mandate against the District. The petition alleged the District violated
section 45103.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and (a)(3), by entering into a
contract with THINK to provide after-school tutoring services previously
performed by classified employees. To
remedy the alleged violation, the petition requested the trial court compel the
District to: (1) rescind the District’s
partnership agreement with THINK; (2) reinstate the classified employees to the
after-school tutoring positions they held prior to the District’s contract with
THINK; (3) make the allegedly displaced CSEA classified employees whole for
their losses due to the District’s agreement with THINK; and (4) comply with
section 45103.1 in the future.
On February 16, 2010,
the District filed a demurrer on various grounds, including the grounds CSEA
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before PERB. The trial court overruled the demurrer on
March 24, 2010.
On February 8, 2012, the
trial court issued its ruling denying CSEA’s petition for writ of mandate. The court concluded the District’s partnership
agreement with THINK did not violate section 45103.1 because the ASIP and ASSC
positions were extra duty assignments “at-will,†rather than permanent
classified school employment positions, and the holders of those positions
never obtained permanent status for the hours they worked during the
after-school programs.
DISCUSSION
The Education Employment
Relations Act (EERA), Government Code section 3540 et seq., regulates
employer-employee relations within California’s public school systems.
conduct which a public school employer, such as the District, is prohibited
from doing. For instance, pursuant to
Government Code section 3543.5, subdivision (c), public school employers are
barred from refusing or failing to meet and negotiate in good faith with the
representatives of its classified employees, such as representatives from CSEA.
To ensure the
implementation and enforcement of EERA, PERB was established with the enactment
of the statute. (Gov. Code, § 3541.) The powers and duties of PERB are set forth
in Government Code section 3541.3, and they include, among many other things,
the power “[t]o investigate unfair practice charges or alleged violations of
[EERA], and take any action and make any determinations in respect of these
charges or alleged violations as the board deems necessary to effectuate the
policies of [EERA].†(Gov. Code, §
3541.3, subd. (i).) Importantly, EERA
also provides PERB with the “exclusive
jurisdiction†to make “[t]he initial
determination as to whether . . . charges of unfair practices are
justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to effectuate the purposes of
[the statute].†(Gov. Code, § 3541.5,
italics added.) “PERB’s exclusive
jurisdiction extends to all alleged violations of the EERA, not just those
which constitute unfair practices.
[Citation.]†(
Dist. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 871, 885 (Barstow
Unified School Dist.).) The
Legislature’s decision to give exclusive
initial jurisdiction to PERB allows the board to carry out its duty to
effectuate and implement the purposes and policies of EERA (i.e., “to promote
the improvement of personnel management and employer-employee relations within
the public school systems in the State of California†(Gov. Code, § 3540)). (International
Federation of Prof. & Technical Engineers v. Bunch (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 670,
675-676.)
“This statutory scheme
has been consistently interpreted to confer limited jurisdiction to PERB.†(California
Teachers’ Assn. v. Livingston Union School Dist. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d
1503, 1510 (Livingston Union School Dist.).) Although “PERB does not have exclusive
jurisdiction where a pure Education
Code violation (as opposed to an arguably
unfair practice) is alleged†(Dixon
v. Board of Trustees (1989)
216
Cal.App.3d 1269, 1277, italics added), it is well settled the board retains
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes which “arguablyâ€
constitute an unfair labor practice claim under EERA. (Barstow
Unified School Dist., supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at pp. 885-886; Livingston
Union School Dist., supra, 219
Cal.App.3d at p. 1510.) When determining
whether a public school employer’s conduct may give rise to an unfair labor
practice claim, a court “must construe the activity broadly.†(Livingston
Union School Dist., supra, 219
Cal.App.3d at p. 1511.)
In Barstow Unified School Dist., the court explained appellate court
decisions considering PERB preemption of superior court jurisdiction can be
divided into four categories. (
Cal.App.4th at pp. 886-892.) “In the
first category are cases in which the plaintiff alleges only a violation of the Education Code, and no arguable EERA violation is evident. In these cases, the courts find no preemption. (See, e.g., Dixon v. Board of Trustees, supra,
216 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1277; Wygant v.
Victor Valley Joint Union High School Dist. [(1985)] 168 Cal.App.3d 319,
323; United Teachers of Ukiah v. Board of
Education (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 632, 638.)â€
(Barstow Unified School Dist.,
supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 886, second italics added.)
“In the second category
are cases in which the plaintiff alleges only
conduct constituting an unfair practice or other violation of the EERA. In these cases, the courts find
preemption. (San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 1, 14;
Newlin [(1979)] 88 Cal.App.3d 254, 257.)â€
(Barstow Unified School Dist.,
supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.)
“In the third category
are cases in which the plaintiff alleges both
a violation of the Education Code and an unfair practice or other violation of
the EERA. In these cases, the courts
again find preemption. (
Education Assn. [(1983)] 33 Cal.3d 946, 951-952, 961; Los Angeles Council of School Nurses v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. [(1980)] 113 Cal.App.3d 666, 669, 672.) In such cases, however, at least in the view
of PERB itself, PERB may consider only the alleged EERA violation, not the
alleged violations of the Education Code.
(Grocey v. Oxnard Educators Assn.
(May 5, 1998) PERB Dec. No. 664 at pp. 7-8 [12 PERC ¶ 19067].)†(Barstow
Unified School Dist., supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at pp. 886-887.)
In the fourth
category—which is exemplified by the facts and procedural history of
in which the plaintiff alleges only a violation of the Education Code; however,
an arguable EERA violation is evident from the controversy presented to the
court. (Barstow Unified School Dist., supra,
43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 887-892.)
Such cases are preempted by PERB’s exclusive initial jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice claims. (
In Barstow Unified School Dist., the complaint filed by CSEA in
superior court alleged the school district violated provisions of the Education
Code by contracting with a private company for the provision of student
transportation services, which purportedly caused the displacement of more than
two dozen classified employees. (
887.) Like the present case, the
complaint filed by CSEA in the superior court stated nothing with regard to
whether the district’s contracting constituted an unfair labor practice under EERA. (Id.
at p. 887.) However, in
also brought a separate, concurrent action before PERB, which contended the
district’s contract was an unfair labor practice under EERA. (Ibid.)
The appellate court
applied a three-part inquiry to determine whether, in light of PERB’s exclusive
initial jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice claims, the superior court
had jurisdiction to rule on CSEA’s Education Code claims prior to the
exhaustion of the administrative action before PERB. (Barstow
Unified School Dist., supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at pp. 888-892.)
Specifically, the court asked:
(1) whether the controversy presented to the superior court was “an
arguable EERA violationâ€; (2) whether the legal controversy presented to
the superior court was “fundamentally the same†as the controversy presented to
PERB; and (3) whether “PERB could furnish relief equivalent to that which could
be provided judicially.†(
The court answered all
three questions in the affirmative. (
888-892.) First, the court found CSEA’s
contention the district displaced classified employees by contracting out
services to a private company clearly indicated an arguable EERA violation was
involved in the dispute, especially in light of the fact CSEA alleged the
district rejected its requests to not contract out the services and to delay
the decision to enter into the service contract. (Id.
at p. 888.) According to the court,
these allegations supported a claim the district violated Government Code
section 3543.5, subdivision (c), by failing to negotiate the service
contracting decision in good faith. (
Second, the court found
the legal controversy presented to the superior court was fundamentally the
same as the controversy presented to PERB—the legality of the district’s
actions in eliminating the classified employee positions and contracting out
the same services to the private company.
(Barstow Unified School Dist.,
supra,
43
Cal.App.4th at p. 888.) The fact the
claims brought before the superior court and PERB alleged violations of
different laws did not preclude the court’s application of the administrative
exhaustion doctrine because the essence of the offending conduct constituted an
unfair labor practice under EERA, which must be resolved by PERB. (Id.
at pp. 888-889.) “Indeed, to hold
otherwise would permit a party to avoid exhaustion merely by avoiding any
express claim of unfair practice or other EERA violation in its
complaint.†(Id. at p. 889.) “‘[W]hat
matters is whether the underlying conduct on which the suit is based--
fall within PERB’s exclusive jurisdiction.’
[Citation.]†(
“‘Sophistication of pleading actions is not the key to
jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]†(Id.
at p. 890.)
Finally, the court found
PERB could furnish the same relief the superior court could provide CSEA for
the purportedly wrongful actions of the district. (Barstow
Unified School Dist., supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) Specifically,
the court held, pursuant to the provisions of Government Code section 3541.5,
subdivision (c), PERB has the authority to compel a school district to rescind
a contract with a private party for the provision of services, refrain from
entering into such a contract in the future, and make displaced classified
employees whole for their lost wages and benefits. (Ibid.)
Additionally,
if a school district ignored a PERB ruling, it could “bring an action in a
court of competent jurisdiction to enforce any of its orders, decisions, or
rulings.â€
(Gov.
Code, § 3541.3, subd. (j).)
We determine the
directly applicable to the jurisdiction issue we are confronted with because
the underlying factual disputes are essentially the same. Administrative procedures enacted by the
Legislature are important components of the legislative process, and the
legislative process is left incomplete if a plaintiff does not exhaust administrative
remedies. (Barstow Unified School Dist., supra,
43 Cal.App.4th at p. 891.) “‘A judicial
action before the legislative process has been completed is premature and a
court is without jurisdiction until administrative remedies have been
exhausted. [Citation.] To hold otherwise would be to permit the
courts to engage in an unwarranted interference with the legislative
process.’ [Citation.]†(Ibid.)
The present controversy
clearly indicates an arguable EERA
violation was involved in this dispute because CSEA contends the District: (1) eliminated all the purportedly classified
ASIP and ASSC positions in June and July of 2008, after it entered into the
partnership agreement with THINK; and (2) failed to adhere to the collective
bargaining agreement’s layoff procedures by not providing CSEA or any of the
classified employees with notice of the District’s elimination of the ASIP and
ASSC positions. Moreover, it is
undisputed representatives from the District arranged a meeting with CSEA on
March 14, 2008, to, among other things, assure CSEA the classified employees
would continue to hold their after-school program positions after the District
entered into the partnership agreement with THINK. CSEA also claims the District ignored two
letters requesting information about the after-school programs, the partnership
agreement with THINK, and the alleged displacement of classified
employees. In fact, the second letter
CSEA sent the District specifically asserts the District’s actions may have
violated the collective bargaining
agreement. These allegations,
especially in light of CSEA’s contention all the after-school tutoring
positions were eliminated by the District following the THINK agreement,
undoubtedly indicate this dispute arguably
involves a violation of Government Code section 3543.5, subdivision (c), which
requires the District to negotiate in good faith with CSEA.
Likewise, the legal
dispute that was presented to the court and which could be brought before PERB
is “fundamentally the sameâ€â€”whether the District acted improperly with regard
to the purported elimination of the ASIP and ASSC positions and execution of
the partnership agreement with THINK. We
agree with the court in Barstow Unified
School Dist., that the fact that the claims presented to the court and
which could be brought before PERB would allege the violation of different laws
does not preclude the application of the administrative exhaustion
doctrine. (Barstow Unified School Dist., supra,
43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 888-889.) As we
noted above, “‘[s]ophistication of pleading actions is not the key to
jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]†(Id.
at p. 890.) What is most relevant to
this inquiry is whether the purportedly offensive District conduct—“
practice under EERA, because the Legislature has established that such conduct
must be initially reviewed by PERB. (
jurisdiction given to PERB by EERA, CSEA may not avoid PERB’s initial review of
this dispute by simply avoiding the inclusion of an express claim asserting an
EERA violation in the complaint it filed with the court. If, as CSEA suggests, we were to focus this
inquiry to the express claims asserted in petitions filed in the superior
courts, we would take the unpermitted step of expanding the courts’
jurisdiction to the detriment of the statutory exclusive initial jurisdiction
the Legislature bestowed upon PERB. We
refuse to circumvent the Legislature’s undisputed power to establish
jurisdictional boundaries through the enactment of statutes.
Finally, it is clear the
remedies CSEA requested from the court could be furnished by PERB. CSEA’s petition requested an order compelling
the District to rescind its partnership agreement with THINK, pay retroactive
wages and benefits to the displaced classified employees, and reinstate the
classified employees to their ASIP and ASSC positions. EERA authorizes PERB to order “an offending
party to cease and desist from the unfair practice and to take such affirmative
action, including but not limited to reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the polices of [EERA].†(Gov. Code, § 3541.5, subd. (c).) Thus, PERB can grant CSEA “relief
functionally equivalent to that available in a court action.’ [Citation.]â€
(Barstow Unified School Dist.,
supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.)
CSEA argues
inapplicable to the present case because the appellate court’s reasoning should
be limited to instances where a petitioner has a concurrent unfair labor
practice charge pending before PERB.
Although the pending PERB action in the Barstow Unified School Dist. case made the appellate court’s application
of the three-party inquiry quite simple, its reasoning and the legal principles
it relied upon are not restricted to circumstances where separate, concurrent
claims are before both a superior court and the PERB. As we noted above, a court’s inquiry when
presented with a question as to whether PERB has initial jurisdiction over a
dispute is whether the purportedly offensive conduct arguably constitutes an unfair labor practice under EERA. (Barstow
Unified School Dist., supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at
pp.
888-889.) A petitioner may not avoid
PERB’s consideration of an EERA dispute by way of procedural gamesmanship or
sophisticated pleading. (
questions relating to the exclusive initial jurisdiction bestowed upon PERB by
the provisions of EERA.
We hold the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to proceed on CSEA’s Education Code claims because CSEA
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before PERB, which may resolve the
underlying dispute. Therefore, we direct
the court to issue a stay as to these proceedings, rather than dismiss the
petition, until CSEA exhausts pertinent proceedings before PERB. “‘The stay protects the status quo of the
contract issues pending the resolution of PERB of the unfair practice issues
which are within its exclusive jurisdiction and subject to review only pursuant
to the limits provided in [Government Code] section 3542.’ [Citation.]â€
(Barstow Unified School Dist.,
supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p.
exhaust administrative remedies before the PERB with regard to this dispute,
absent adequate administrative relief for the harms allegedly caused by the
purported Education Code violations, the court should lift the stay on the
proceedings to permit the pursuit of judicial relief before the court by CSEA
on grounds the partnership agreement violates provisions of the Education Code.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the
court is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to stay the
proceedings as to the Education Code claims asserted by CSEA until it exhausts
bear their own costs on appeal.
O’LEARY,
P. J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM,
J.
IKOLA, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory
references are to the Education Code, unless otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The Legislature enacted
EERA “to promote the improvement of personnel management and employer-employee
relations . . . by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of
public school employees to join organizations of their own choice, to be
represented by the organizations in their professional and employment
relationships with public school employers, to select one employee organization
as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, and to
afford certificated employees a voice in the formulation of education
policy.†(Gov. Code, § 3540.)
