Filed 2/7/18 Baxter v. Cal. State Teachers’ Retirement System CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


WILLIAM BAXTER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Defendant and Respondent.
H043276
(Monterey County
Super. Ct. No. M127193)

In the underlying administrative mandamus proceeding, eleven retired teachers (Teachers) contested attempts by California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) to recoup retirement benefit overpayments that had resulted from a years-long miscalculation of Teachers’ monthly benefits. Teachers prevailed below in contending that the statute of limitations barred CalSTRS’s efforts to recoup prior overpayments and to adjust downward all future monthly benefits, and judgment was entered in Teachers’ favor on June 3, 2015 (Judgment). CalSTRS appealed the Judgment. In that appeal, this court, on December 12, 2017, filed its opinion reversing the Judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. (See Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340 (Baxter I).)
After entry of Judgment (and shortly after the notice of appeal was filed by CalSTRS in Baxter I), Teachers filed a motion for award of attorney fees with the trial court. They based the motion on Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, arguing that, through the litigation, they had enforced an important right affecting the public interest in which they had conferred a significant benefit upon the general public or a large class of persons. The court denied the motion for attorney fees by order filed January 14, 2016 (Order). Teachers appealed the Order. (Baxter v. California State Teachers’ Retirement System, H043276 (Baxter II).)
In light of the disposition of Baxter I, we conclude that this appeal is moot, and will order it dismissed.
DISCUSSION
After an administrative decision rejecting the contentions by Teachers and the Salinas Unified High School District (District) that CalSTRS was time-barred from recouping prior overpayments or reducing Teachers’ future pension benefits (Baxter I, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 347), Teachers, on March 24, 2014, filed a petition for a peremptory writ of administrative mandamus under section 1094.5, naming CalSTRS as respondent and the District as real party in interest. (Baxter I, supra, at p. 351.) After a trial, the court entered a Judgment in which it granted the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate “(1) reversing the administrative decision . . . , (2) barring CalSTRS from further withholding or reducing Teachers’ monthly defined benefit retirement payments, (3) directing CalSTRS to reimburse Teachers all retirement amounts previously withheld, plus interest, and (4) directing CalSTRS to reimburse the District for any amounts the District paid to CalSTRS under the administrative decision, plus interest.” (Ibid.)
On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court, in holding that CalSTRS’ recoupment of past benefits paid and adjustment of future benefits was time-barred, had erred in its interpretation of Education Code section 22008. (Baxter I, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 340.) This court also found—contrary to the trial court’s Judgment—that the continuous accrual theory applied in the case. This court therefore held that, although CalSTRS was time-barred from recovering overpayments made to Teachers for certain monthly pension benefits, under the continuous accrual theory, “[Education Code] section 22008 d[id] not preclude any such action for past or future monthly payments to Teachers accruing on or after July 6, 2009.” (Baxter I, supra, at p. 382.) And since the trial court (because of its finding adverse to CalSTRS) did not decide the merits of Teachers’ claims that CalSTRS was also precluded from any recovery under principles of equitable estoppel and laches, this court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of these issues. (Ibid.)
While the appeal in Baxter I was pending, Teachers filed a motion for attorney fees in the trial court. Teachers asserted they were the prevailing parties in the action, and that they satisfied the three requirements of section 1021.5 for an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. Citing Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142 (Baggett), Teachers urged that attorney fees were recoverable because, through their lawsuit, they “(1) ha[d] enforced an important right affecting the public interest; (2) ha[d] conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons; and (3) ha[d] imposed [sic] a financial burden on the plaintiff out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Teachers sought a total of $593,639.25 in attorney fees. CalSTRS opposed the motion. After hearings conducted on September 18, 2015, and December 4, 2015, the court filed its Order on January 14, 2016, denying the motion for attorney fees.
In their appeal of the Order here, Teachers contend that the trial court erred in denying attorney fees based upon the conclusion that Teachers’ litigation efforts did not satisfy the second Baggett element, namely, conferring a significant benefit upon the general public or a large class of persons. (See Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 142.) Citing Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1413 (Beasley), Teachers argue that (1) their efforts enforced several important rights, (2) the litigation conferred a benefit on both the public and a large class of persons, and (3) “ ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement [were] such that an award [was] appropriate, and, in the interests of justice, the fee should not [have been] paid out of the recovery.’ ”
After briefing was completed in Baxter II, this court filed its opinion in Baxter I. Based upon this opinion, this court advised the parties in writing that it believed the appeal in Baxter II might be moot and requested that the parties brief the question. (See Bullis Charter School v. Los Altos School Dist. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1032 [appellate court may raise mootness issue on its own motion].) We have received and considered the letter briefs subsequently filed by Teachers and CalSTRS.
In general, an appeal that poses only academic or abstract questions should be dismissed as moot. (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547.) “It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only actual controversies and that a live appeal may be rendered moot by events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed. We will not render opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions, or declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter at issue on appeal. [Citation.]” (Daily Journal Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.)
Appellate courts in a number of cases—having procedural postures similar to the posture here—have applied the doctrine of mootness to a challenge to an attorney fee order in which the underlying judgment was later reversed. For instance, in Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1195, upon reversing a trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court dismissed as moot the plaintiff’s appeal from a postjudgment order denying its motion for attorney fees. Likewise, in another case, after concluding that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was improper and reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings, the appellate court dismissed as moot the defendants’ cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of their motion for attorney fees. (Venturi & Co. LLC v. Pacific Malibu Development Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1424; see also Costa Serena Owners Coalition v. Costa Serena Architectural Com. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1206 [reversal of judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered its cross-appeal from order denying motion for attorney fees moot]; Irwin v. City of Hemet (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 507, 527 [reversal of judgment in favor of defendants on summary judgment rendered defendants’ cross-appeal from order denying motion for attorney fees moot]; San Bernardino County Sheriff’s etc. Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 602, 616 [reversal of judgment granting petition for writ of mandate rendered plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of order denying motion for attorney fees under § 1021.5 and Gov. Code, § 800 moot].)
The appeal of the Order denying attorney fees here has been rendered moot by the decision in Baxter I. The Judgment upon which Teachers moved for their fees under section 1021.5 has been vacated and the matter has been remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. (Baxter I, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) Like a postjudment order awarding attorney fees that “falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based” (Merced County Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Cardella (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 396, 402), the Order denying fees here similarly cannot stand with the underlying Judgment being reversed. In so concluding, we note Teachers’ argument that, given that it has petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of the opinion in Baxter I, it is conceivable that the Judgment may be ultimately reinstated if review is granted, and if the Supreme Court determines that the portion of the opinion in Baxter I adverse to Teachers must be reversed. But as the matter presently stands, the Judgment has been reversed and, upon remand, will be vacated and the court will conduct further proceedings resulting in the entry of a new judgment. After the entry of such new judgment, the parties will be free to seek any recovery from the trial court of costs, including attorney fees, as may be appropriate given the ultimate outcome of the case.
In determining that this appeal is moot, we also acknowledge Teachers’ claim that “even if the Supreme Court were not to review [Baxter I], the remaining [trial] proceedings in [that case] could still result in the need for this Court’s guidance as requested in Baxter II.” From a review of the briefing in Baxter II, it is apparent that there are legal issues concerning the propriety of awarding section 1021.5 attorney fees based upon the circumstances presented in Teachers’ motion. But, assuming there is a new judgment entered below and a new motion for attorney fees, it is likely that a resolution of those legal issues will be based upon a set of facts different from those presented to the trial court in deciding the original attorney fee motion. Therefore, we deem it inappropriate and premature to decide such issues at this time. (See Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1179 [policy behind mootness doctrine is that “courts decide justiciable controversies and will normally not render advisory opinions”].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal from the January 14, 2016 order denying Teachers’ motion for attorney fees is dismissed as moot. In reaching this disposition, this court expresses no opinion concerning the merits of Teachers’ appeal. Each party shall bear his/her/its own respective costs on appeal.






___________________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.






WE CONCUR:






__________________________
ELIA, ACTING P.J.






__________________________
MIHARA, J.








Baxter et al. v. California State Teachers’ Retirement System
H043276