A.W. v. Super. >Ct.>























Filed 2/21/13 A.W. v. Super. Ct. CA1/3

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.







IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
THREE




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A.W., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY Respondent, ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES BUREAU et al., Real Party in Interest,	A137046 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ12019038)

A.W.
(Mother), mother of one-year-old A.W., petitions this court pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, to set aside the juvenile court’s
order bypassing reunification services
and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 (section 366.26 hearing).href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">>[1] She contends:
(1) there was no substantial evidence supporting the finding that
she failed to make reasonable efforts to alleviate the problems that led to the
removal of A.W.’s sibling, A.A.href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2];
and (2) the juvenile court erred in failing to order reunification
services because reunification was in A.W.’s best interest. We reject the contentions and deny the
petition on the merits.

Factual and Procedural Background

The
Alameda
County Social Services Bureau (the Bureau) filed an original petition on
May 31, 2012, with allegations pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b) [failure to protect], (g) [no provision for support], and
(j) [abuse of sibling]. The petition
alleged that A.W. was “a product of an incestuous relationship between [Mother]
and [the] maternal grandfather” and was “born with a number of genetic
disorders, including cerebral [palsy], lung disease, poor oral-motor
coordination, abnormal EEG tests indicating a possible neurological disorder,
and increasing hearing loss_[._]” A.W.’s sibling, two-year-old A.A., was also
the maternal grandfather’s biological child, and was “also classified as
medically-fragile, having been born with a number of genetic disorders.” Mother’s reunification services as to A.A.
had been terminated on or about April 30,
2012, “primarily because of her repeated failure to protect herself
and [A.A.] from contact with the maternal grandfather, notwit[hs]tanding the
existence of a restraining order prohibiting such contact.” Mother continued to have a relationship with
the maternal grandfather, said she loved him, and failed to take A.W. to all of
her medical appointments, “ostensibly because she was instead spending time
with the maternal grandfather.” Mother
had no stable residence and moved around between hotels. For approximately six weeks, Mother thwarted
the Emergency Response Worker’s attempts to make contact with her and A.W. by
regularly giving the worker incorrect addresses and failing to keep
appointments with the worker.

According
to the detention report, A.W. was in a foster home. On April 1,
2012, the maternal grandfather (Father) was arrested for driving
under the influence while Mother and A.W. were in the car. In April and May, the Emergency Response
Worker made numerous efforts to get in touch with Mother, including calling or
going to motels at which Mother said she was staying, going to Father’s home,
and calling her on her cell phone, which was later disconnected. Mother was evasive and gave the worker
incorrect or invalid addresses, said she was staying at certain motels when she
was not, and refused to provide information requested by the worker. The Bureau eventually obtained a search and
seizure warrant pursuant to which A.W. was taken into protective custody on
May 29, 2012. The juvenile court
detained A.W. on June 1, 2012.

According
to a jurisdiction/disposition report filed June 14, 2012, A.W. was doing
well in her foster family’s care. She
was receiving “sufficient . . . interpersonal stimulation, follow-up
on medical appointments, and nurturing.”
During an interview with the Emergency Response Worker, Mother was
untruthful “regarding medical appointments, residence, or visitation with
[Father].” She reported she suffers from
depression but is not taking any medication for it. She said she understood that she “los[t] [her]
kids” because she “kept dealing with [Father].”
When asked about her relationship with Father, Mother “predictably
stated that she is no longer seeing him.”
However, “after being presented with evidence,” she admitted having
contact with him. Mother “present[ed] as
being younger than her age” and “d[id] not see herself as a victim” “in a
psychologically abusive and complex sexual relationship with her biological
father.”href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] Father “presented as sickly” during an
interview with the worker and said, “ ‘I’m not feeling well. I don’t have nothing to do with [Mother]. I haven’t seen her. I’ve been in South San Francisco for three
days now. This stuff is raising my blood
pressure. I’m done. She don’t live here.’ ” There was no known criminal action pending
against Father, although records indicated that an investigation was initiated
when Mother reported that A.A. was conceived when Father raped her. Mother had apparently “failed and/or refused
to revisit the matter and either press charges or provide further information
that could lead to criminal prosecution.”


The
report further stated that the Bureau had provided Mother with various services
between December 2011 and April 2012, including transportation, case
plan support and referrals to various service providers including psychological
and medication evaluation, visitation services, follow-up with the police
department and district attorney’s office regarding “their investigation of
[Father],” assistance with locating housing and housing programs, and
development of a “safety plan.” All
medical personnel who had treated A.W. and A.A. had reported that “[M]other
ha[d] been consistently nurturing and loving in . . . her interaction
with them.” They . . . also
reported consistent follow-up on medical appointments with only a few exceptions.” Mother had visited A.W. twice since the
removal. They were very happy to see
each other and A.W. had “a nicely-bonded relationship with [Mother].” A.W. had also established a close bond with
the foster mother and regularly looked to see if she was around. The foster mother reported that A.W.’s
development had “improved markedly in the short time she [had] been in
placement.” A.W. had learned to sit up,
was smiling more, making sustained eye contact, and eating much better than she
was before. The foster mother was
keeping up with all of A.W.’s appointments.
The Bureau concluded, “This case is one of many complexities and
layers. However, . . . it is
primarily a matter of the safety and protection of [A.W.] and [Mother’s]
inability and/or unwillingness to ensure her protection.” The Bureau noted that while it was “deeply
sympathetic to the circumstances of [Mother]” and had worked with her in an
attempt to keep her and her children safe, Mother had “repeatedly thwarted [the
Bureau’s] efforts to assist her and her children” and continued to maintain a
relationship with Father while evading the Bureau for six weeks while it sought
to verify A.W.’s safety and whereabouts.
The Bureau recommended that A.W. not be returned to Mother and that Mother
not be provided with reunification services.


On
July 27, 2012, the Bureau filed an addendum
report stating that Mother was having supervised visits with A.W. and that
A.W. responded to her well. Mother missed
a visit on June 26. She also
cancelled an orientation for sibling visitation that the social worker had
scheduled for June 28. A
July 17 visitation did not take place because A.W. had a doctor’s
appointment that was scheduled at the last minute. Neither the foster mother nor the Bureau was
able to reach Mother about the cancellation because Mother’s phone had been
disconnected. When Mother, unaware of
the cancellation, appeared for the visit that day, she was “disheveled, her
hair was not groomed, and her clothes were dirty and had an odor.” She appeared “more depressed than she had
presented before, and appeared to be trembling a little.” She said she had been staying at a hospital
at which A.A. was staying and had “just been walking around” since he was
discharged. She showered at the
hospital, which “allow[ed] her to come whenever she need[ed] to.” When asked where her medication and clothes
were, she responded that they were in a bag at her therapist’s office, and that
she “just goes there when she needs them.”
She said she was not seeing her therapist regularly.

When
the worker asked Mother why her phone had been disconnected, she said she had
spent her money on throwing a birthday party for A.A. This was the second time since A.W.’s removal
that Mother’s phone had been disconnected for failure to make payments. The first time, A.W.’s attorney had to obtain
an ex parte order for A.W. to undergo a medical procedure because Mother had
not called the hospital to give consent for the procedure as instructed, and
her phone was disconnected when the hospital tried to reach her.

The
foster mother reported that Mother had not attended any of A.W.’s medical
appointments since A.W. was placed outside the home, despite the fact that
Mother had requested, and obtained, a court order on June 14, 2012,
allowing her to attend all appointments.
Mother had provided the foster mother with a list of all of the
appointment dates so she knew when the appointments were, and the foster mother
also contacted Mother whenever there was an appointment coming up. The foster mother had also given Mother the
dates and times of all new appointments that had been made. A.W. continued to do well in the foster
mother’s care. She was eating more solid
food and had gained significant weight, and she could almost sit up on her own,
could keep herself standing while holding onto something, and was trying to
crawl. At a July 24 visit, “it was
evident how much physical, emotional and developmental progress” A.W. had made.
On July 17, Mother reported that
she had obtained housing at Covenant House, a transitional housing
project. On July 31, the juvenile
court sustained the petition as amended.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">>[4] Disposition was continued for a contested
hearing.

According
to a second addendum report filed August 28, 2012, Mother failed to attend
a case review for A.A. that was scheduled to take place on August 2. She did attend an orientation to set up
sibling visitation, but the visitation center said that Mother would not be
allowed to schedule sibling visitation there because she had too many
“ ‘no shows’ to scheduled visits with [A.A.].” The center reported that Mother had attended
only four out of 17 scheduled visits with A.A. between May 9 and
July 11; four visits were canceled due to A.A. being sick, or “due to an
emergency,” and nine visits were canceled due to Mother’s failure to show up
and call. On August 20, Mother’s
therapist left a voice mail message for the social worker, stating Mother had
asked her to inform the worker that Mother was not going to attend a visit with
A.W. that had been scheduled for that day.
The worker found the message puzzling because there was no visit
scheduled for that day.

The
worker also called the transitional housing project at which Mother said she
was staying in order to verify her residence.
The project, which was also a homeless shelter, “would not verify
[Mother’s] residency there,” so the worker was unable to determine whether
Mother was staying there as a homeless resident or a transitional resident, or
whether she was staying there at all. In
an attempt to verify Mother’s address, the worker also conducted a review of
Mother’s financial assistance benefits.
The worker learned that Mother had applied for food stamps on
June 28 using a different birthday and social security number, and that
Mother had not provided a residence address.
Records showed Mother received $200 in expedited food stamp benefits and
had a pending application for general assistance cash benefits. The Bureau stated, “The evidence continues to
demonstrate that, while [Mother] continues to state that she is attempting to
establish a lifestyle that would safely and sufficiently support caring for her
medically-fragile child, the facts . . . reveal that she is unwilling
and/or unable to consistently and reliably engage in the most basic required
activities, such as visitation.”

The
contested dispositional hearing took place over four dates between August and
November 2012. Leslie Calhoun
testified she was the family reunification worker for Mother and A.W.’s
sibling, A.A., for approximately one year.
She outlined what Mother’s case plan was in A.A.’s case, which included
developing a positive support system with family and friends, not having
contact with Father, obtaining stable housing, attending domestic violence
support groups and individual therapy, having regular visitation, working with
an infant-parent therapist, and attending A.A.’s medical appointments. The Bureau offered numerous services to
Mother, including providing her with a therapist and an infant-parent
therapist, providing transportation and visitation, calling housing shelters
and transitional homes, moving her to her new placements, working with case
managers at her inpatient program, referring her to various programs and to a
psychological and medical evaluation, and assisting her in obtaining a
restraining order against Father.
Calhoun also followed up with law enforcement regarding a possible
criminal prosecution against Father, but Father was ultimately not prosecuted
due to Mother’s lack of cooperation.

Calhoun
testified that she ultimately recommended services be terminated in A.A.’s case
because, despite the Bureau’s effort in “doing everything [it] could to support
[Mother] in getting [A.A] back,” Mother consistently failed to follow up with
referrals and misrepresented her relationship with Father. She did not follow through on the referral
for a psychological evaluation or for a medical evaluation, and had
participated in only one domestic violence class session. At Harrison House, where Mother stayed for
some time, her attendance at classes geared towards gaining independence was
reported to be low, as was her commitment to the community. She would leave first thing in the morning
and come back “just at curfew,” or at times after curfew. Harrison House staff also suspected that
Mother was giving her supplemental security income to Father because she was
receiving payments but was not saving any money and not paying rent on time. After approximately four months, Mother
abruptly left Harrison House and later called Calhoun to say that she had moved
to San Jose. She provided Calhoun with
an address in San Jose, but Calhoun could not verify the address because it
“didn’t exist.” Mother continued to
assert that it was a “real location.”

Dr.
Jill Miller, Mother’s therapist, testified she began working with Mother in
October 2010. Mother had a “history
of complex trauma,” sexual abuse, and traumatic bonding to Father, who was the
perpetrator of much of the abuse. That
history made rehabilitation difficult without ongoing support. Dr. Miller’s treatment plan for Mother
included reducing symptoms associated with depression, creating a coherent
narrative about the past history and ongoing impact of her trauma, and tracking
goals around what Mother could do in the community to keep herself safe. Dr. Miller believed Mother had made
various efforts since A.A.’s removal to rehabilitate herself by disclosing
Father as the perpetrator of abuse and seeking a restraining order against
him. Mother made an effort to engage
consistently in therapy and had, over time, made progress in opening up during
sessions. Mother had also made efforts
to stabilize her living arrangements and was staying at Covenant House at the
time of the hearing. Dr. Miller had
no knowledge of ongoing contact between Mother and Father but believed what
Mother told her—that she was staying away from Father. Dr. Miller acknowledged she was aware that
Mother and A.W. were in Father’s car when he was arrested for driving under the
influence. At that time, Mother
explained that she had just happened to run into Father—who lives in Oakland—at
a gas station in Stockton, where she was visiting a friend. Dr. Miller concluded it would take time,
additional support, and practical resources to eliminate the causes that led to
A.A.’s removal. When asked for a
prognosis as to how long Mother would need to be treated in order to eliminate
the various risk factors, Dr. Miller responded that she could not predict
exactly how long it would take because “[y]oung people or individuals who have
this level of sexual abuse and trauma history are in a healing process for a
very long time.” When asked whether
Mother was at a point where she could keep A.W. safe, Dr. Miller
responded, “I think that she continues to make steps forward in order to do
that,” and that she was “on track to being able to do that.”

Kelvin
Dunn, a case manager at a hospital in Oakland, testified he met Mother in late
2010. As part of his job, he worked with
homeless families and families at risk, and had been assigned to work with
Mother. In late 2011 or early 2012, he
began to suspect that Mother was continuing to have contact with Father,
against whom she had a restraining order, because she would give “conflicting
stories” and did not give clear answers when Dunn asked her what she was doing
or where she was. In late January, when
he called Mother to remind her of an appointment that was scheduled for that
morning, Mother said she was just leaving Harrison House on her way to the
hospital. Dunn was surprised to see
Mother at the hospital just minutes later because Harrison House was seven
miles away and Mother did not have a car.
After the appointment, Mother acted suspiciously by “just
. . . flying down the hall,” so Dunn got in his car to look for
her. He saw Mother driving a white car,
so he followed her to a location where he saw Father—whom he had met many times
and recognized—get inside the car that Mother was driving. Dunn further testified that A.W. looked
healthier since she had been in foster care and that because of her improved
health, the number of required appointments had been reduced.

A.W.’s
foster mother testified that A.W. was placed with her on May 31, 2012,
when she was six months old. At the
time, A.W. could not sit or roll over, ate very little, and weighed only
13 pounds. Over time, A.W. ate more
and gained significant weight and mobility.
A.W. was scheduled to receive hearing aids and was being treated with
inhalers for her asthma. Her
gastrointestinal problems were being controlled, although her vomiting episodes
increased after visits with Mother.
Concerns regarding a neurological disorder had been dismissed. A.W. had two to three appointments per
week. Mother had attended one
appointment with the feeding therapist and one with the neurologist.

Mother
testified she came to live with Father in Stockton when she was 17 years
old and lived with him there, and later in Oakland, for a total of three
years. At the time of her testimony,
Mother had been living by herself in a studio apartment in Oakland for two
months. When asked why she had
previously moved to San Jose, she said she did so in order to distance herself
from Father. She admitted she gave a
false address in San Jose and said she did so because she was moving from motel
to motel and believed A.W. would be removed from her care if she did not have a
stable residence. Mother also admitted
she was with Father in April 2012 when he was arrested for driving under
the influence. She explained that she
had coincidentally run into him at a gas station and got in his car because he
asked if he could take her out for her birthday. Mother testified this was the only time since
the restraining order was issued in 2011 that she had contact with Father. She denied seeing Father in late January as
Dunn had testified and believed Dunn did not testify truthfully because he “may
have something against [her].”

On
November 2, 2012, three days before the final day of the contested disposition
hearing, the Bureau filed a third addendum report. According to the report, A.W. continued to
gain weight and had received hearing aids as scheduled. Mother was visiting with A.W. and A.A. for three
hours on a weekly basis. The foster
mother reported that A.W. had returned home from a number of these visits with
“some kind of injury” and was more difficult to feed for days after the visits. Visitation staff reported that A.W. hit her
head during a visit on two separate occasions and had a two-inch scratch around
the right side of her hairline. Because
of these injuries, the foster mother was concerned that Mother might not be
capable of looking after both of the children at the same time. The foster mother also reported that she
became nervous when Mother came to a medical appointment on October 30,
2012, because there was a man who “kept smiling at [A.W.]” and tried to come
along when A.W. was called to the examining room. When the foster mother asked Mother who the
man was, Mother quickly said, “I don’t know.”


Child
welfare worker Kathrina Rashid testified as a href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">rebuttal witness and as “an expert in
psychology with an emphasis on domestic violence and sexual abuse.” She testified she filed a petition on A.W.’s
behalf and worked on A.W.’s case for approximately five months. She agreed with Dr. Miller that Mother
was traumatically bonded to her Father, which meant it would be very difficult
for Mother to leave him. She spoke of
the dynamics of a relationship in which a victim is traumatically bonded to an
abuser, and how they played out in Mother’s relationship with Father. Rashid believed that obtaining a restraining
order was a positive step but that Mother had not addressed her trauma and had
not reached her treatment goals, which would take “years and years and years of
treatment” to reach. Rashid further
testified that Mother was meeting her visitation goals and that the bumps and
scratches seen on A.W. were not of concern, as “frankly, . . . [k]ids
get scratched.” She also did not
believe, based on the information available to her, that the man who showed up
at A.W.’s appointment on October 30, 2012, was Father. Rashid was concerned about the feeding issues
that occurred after visits but was not sure whether Mother was causing those
issues.

The
juvenile court found there was clear and convincing evidence that reunification
services should be denied to Mother because Mother had failed to make
reasonable efforts to treat the issues that had led to the removal of A.W.’s
sibling, A.A. The juvenile court stated
that Mother had far to go, and “little babies can’t wait for parents to catch
up.” The juvenile court scheduled a
section 366.26 hearing for February 25, 2013, and ordered visitation
between Mother and A.W. as frequently as possible consistent with A.W.’s
well-being.

Discussion

>Bypass of reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)

“There
is a presumption in dependency cases that parents will receive reunification
services.” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87,
95.) However, section 361.5 sets
forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed
altogether. These bypass provisions are
“a legislative acknowledgement ‘that it may be fruitless to provide
reunification services under certain circumstances.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 96.) “ ‘Once it is determined one of the
situations outlined in subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring
reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services
would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]’ ” (In re
Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 65.)

The
juvenile court in this case bypassed reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), which seeks to address “ ‘the
risk of recidivism by the parent despite reunification efforts’ ” (>Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra, 139
Cal.App.4th at p. 96) by authorizing the juvenile court to bypass
reunification services to a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that: (1) the parent
previously failed to reunify with the child’s sibling resulting in a
termination of reunification services or parental rights; and (2) the
parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that
led to removal of the sibling. (>Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, >supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 95;
see also In re Albert T.
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217.) Courts
“do not read the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass provisions to mean
that any effort by a parent, even if
clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will constitute a
reasonable effort and as such render these provisions inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile
court to consider the duration, extent
and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors relating
to the quality and quantity of those
efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not the >focus of the inquiry, a parent’s
progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be
considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness
of the effort made.” (>R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
908, 914.) Thus, “although success alone
is not the sole measure of reasonableness, the measure of success achieved is properly considered a factor in the
juvenile court’s determination of whether an effort qualifies as
reasonable.” (Id. at p. 915.)

When
a juvenile court’s decision to bypass reunification is challenged, we apply the
substantial evidence rule. (>In re Brooke C. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 377, 382.) “We review the
record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine
whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could make the necessary findings based
on the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re
Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694.)

Mother
does not dispute that the first prong has been satisfied, as the record shows
her first child, A.A., was declared a dependent of the juvenile court and her
reunification services as to A.A. were terminated. She contends instead that there was no
substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that she failed to
make reasonable efforts to alleviate the problems that led to A.A.’s
removal. We disagree.

Here,
the Bureau provided Mother with numerous services in connection with A.A.’s
case, including therapy, transportation, referrals to various service providers
including psychological and medication evaluations, assistance with locating
housing and housing programs, visitation services, assistance in obtaining a
restraining order against Father, and follow-up with law enforcement regarding
a criminal investigation against Father.
At the time of the contested dispositional hearing, Mother was generally
in compliance with her visitation plan as to A.W. and was attending therapy sessions
regularly. However, she had participated
only marginally in the various other services the Bureau had provided to her
throughout A.A.’s case. For example, she
had attended only one domestic violence class session, had not followed through
on referrals for psychological and medical evaluations, and had failed to
attend required classes or comply with her curfew at Harrison House. She thwarted the Bureau’s efforts to get in
touch with her and A.W. and was evasive about her residence, requiring the Bureau
to do such things as obtain a search and seizure warrant and contact housing
facilities, motels, and the social security office in order to obtain
information regarding her residence.
Mother also failed to attend medical appointments for A.W., a medically-fragile
child, on any regular basis after A.W. was removed from her care.

Mother
asserts she “made reasonable efforts to find stable, safe, and suitable
housing,” but the record shows she left Harrison House abruptly and without
notice, moved around between hotels in San Jose, misrepresented her living
situation and gave a false address to the social worker, and otherwise failed
to make her whereabouts known. Mother
also asserts she made reasonable efforts to distance herself from Father by
disclosing and reporting he had sexually abused her and by obtaining a
restraining order against him. While
these were commendable and positive steps for Mother, she negated the efforts
she made by continuing to be untruthful about her relationship with Father and
seeing him on at least two occasions after the issuance of a restraining
order. As both her therapist and child
welfare worker Rashid testified, it was going to take a long time for Mother to
be able to work on addressing her traumatic bonding to Father and to recognize
the danger Father posed to her and the children. There was substantial evidence to support the
juvenile court’s finding that Mother had not made reasonable efforts to
alleviate the problems that had led to A.A.’s removal.

>Best interest of child under
section 361.5, subdivision (c)

Section
361.5, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: “The court shall not order reunification for
a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (10)
. . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the
child.” Thus, while section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10) gives the juvenile court authority to bypass reunification services, the court can
nevertheless order reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that ordering services is in the best interest of the minor. A juvenile court has broad discretion when
determining whether reunification services would be in the best interests of
the child. (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523.) An appellate court will reverse that
determination only if the juvenile court abuses its discretion. (Id.
at pp. 523-524.) It is the parent’s
burden to “affirmatively show that reunification would be in the best interest”
of the child. (In re Ethan N., supra,
122 Cal.App.4th at p. 66.)

Mother
contends that even if section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) was established, the
juvenile court should have ordered services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (c) because A.W. had a positive bond with her and because
Mother had shown a “willingness and capacity to engage in services.” Mother points out that she regularly visited
A.W. and that they “had a nicely bonded relationship” according to the Bureau’s
reports. However, the reports also
stated that A.W. had a close bond with the foster mother and regularly looked
to see if she was around. A.W.’s
development had “improved markedly” while in the foster mother’s care, and the
foster mother was keeping up with all of A.W.’s medical needs, including taking
her to all of her many appointments. In
contrast, even though Mother had permission to attend all medical appointments,
she had attended only two appointments at the time of the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">dispositional hearing.

Mother
also asserts she was in compliance with part of her case plan and that she was
taking “steps to be in a position to protect A.W.” However, “children should not be required to
wait until their parents grow up.” (>Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73.) As noted, it was
going to take a long time for Mother to address the trauma she had experienced
and to be in a position to protect and care for A.W. There was no abuse of discretion.

Disposition

The
writ petition is denied. Our opinion is
final as to this court forthwith.







_________________________

McGuiness,
P.J.





We concur:





_________________________

Siggins, J.





_________________________

Jenkins, J.