Ansari v. Khan
Filed 10/8/13 Ansari v. Khan CA2/5
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
HASHIM ANSARI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ABDUL KALIQ KHAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
B241519
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. YS022930)
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Irving Shimer, Judge.
(Retired judge of the L. A. Sup. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal.
Const.) Affirmed.
Franklin P.
Jeffries for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices
of Omer Rangoonwala and Omer Rangoonwala for Plaintiff and Respondent.
>
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant,
Abdul Kaliq Khan, appeals from a Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] The restraining order was secured by
plaintiff, Hashim Ansari. Defendant was
ordered to stay away from plaintiff and the Inglewood
Jamat-e-Masjid-ul Islam (the mosque).
Mr. Ansari is the mosque’s prayer and religious leader. The trial court granted plaintiff’s
petition. Defendant contends the trial
court erred by not hearing testimony from witnesses considering hearsay and
extending the scope of the restraining order to the mosque. We affirm the order.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Restraining Order Petition And Allegations
Plaintiff
is the mosque’s imam. Plaintiff’s
verified injunctive relief request
filed October 21, 2011,
states the following. Defendant was a
former member of the mosque. Defendant had
assaulted, threatened, and harassed plaintiff.
Defendant published false and defamatory statements against plaintiff
and the mosque’s board members.
Defendant had disturbed the mosque’s congregation by using loud, profane
discourse, rude and indecent behavior and unnecessary noise.
Defendant
left defamatory flyers on cars in the parking lot defaming plaintiff. On April
25, 2010, during a board meeting at the mosque, defendant entered
uninvited. Defendant shouted threats
against plaintiff and the board members, including getting a gun to kill
them. Defendant stated he would remove
the board members from the mosque and was unafraid of the police. Defendant made aggressive moves towards
plaintiff and another board member.
Later that afternoon, defendant and three other people walked past
plaintiff’s house. They walked by to see
if plaintiff lived there.
Defendant
had previously accused plaintiff of stealing the mosque’s funds. The board reviewed the allegations and
determined there was no evidence to support defendant’s claims. Defendant continued to harass the board and
plaintiff afterwards. In October 2010,
the board’s counsel sent defendant a cease-and-desist letter to informally
resolve the matter. On September 12, 2011, defendant came to
the mosque and threatened people with his cane.
Defendant was angry and looking for plaintiff. Several board members witnessed this
incident. The police were called. The police advised the mosque leadership that
a temporary restraining order be sought against defendant. Plaintiff concluded all other means of
resolving this issue were exhausted.
On October 21, 2011, plaintiff filed a
request for an order to stop harassment.
Plaintiff submitted in support his verified restraining order request: an Inglewood police report regarding the
September 12, 2011 incident; an April 26, 2010 letter to the court signed by
several members of the mosque stating they witnessed defendant’s harassment
against plaintiff; an October 26, 2010 letter from plaintiff’s and the mosque’s
attorney, Omer Rangoonwala, to defendant; Mr. Rangoonwala’s October 26, 2010
letter requested defendant cease and desist from future harassment; and
defendant’s flyers accusing plaintiff and the board of stealing from the
mosque.
B. Answer To Request For Order To Stop
Harassment
On November 10, 2011, defendant filed a
verified answer to plaintiff’s request for orders to stop harassment. Defendant denied threatening any board
members with his cane. Defendant denied
looking for plaintiff on September 12,
2011. Defendant argued a
security camera recorded the incident.
Defendant denied threatening plaintiff or anyone else at the mosque with
a gun. Defendant stated, “The reason for
the petition is to get me out of the [mosque] because I have reported and
publicized stealing and other
malfeasance . . . .â€
C. Civil Harassment Petition Hearing And Order
On March 15,
2012, the hearing was held regarding plaintiff’s request to stop
defendant’s harassment. No witnesses
testified. No request to call any
witnesses was made. Defense counsel made
a limited offer of proof about defendant’s long service as a member of the
mosque. Additionally, defense counsel
referred to witnesses who were present.
Those witnesses would testify as to plaintiff’s belief that defendant
had been stealing. Plaintiff’s request
for a civil harassment restraining order was granted. No objection was interposed when the trial
court ruled even though no witnesses testified.
On March 22, 2012, the trial court
issued its written order. Defendant was
ordered to: not harass, intimidate,
assault, or threaten plaintiff; not contact plaintiff directly or indirectly;
not take any action to obtain plaintiff’s address or location; and stay at
least 100 yards away from the mosque and plaintiff. The order specifies no expiration date,
meaning it expires three years from the date of issuance. (§ 527.6, subd. (j)(2).) Plaintiff subsequently appealed the order
under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Overview
Defendant
argues the trial court erred by not taking oral testimony during the hearing
and admitting hearsay. Defendant also
contends plaintiff did not have standing to bring the section 527.6 request on
the mosque’s behalf. We disagree.
B. Section 527.6 Requirements
Section
527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides, “A person who has suffered harassment as
defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an
injunction prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.†Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3)
provides: “‘Harassment’ is unlawful
violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must
actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.†Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(6) states: “‘Temporary restraining order’ and
‘injunction’ mean orders that include any of the following restraining orders,
whether issued ex parte or after notice and hearing: [¶]
(A) An order enjoining a party
from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning, including,
but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls, as described in Section
653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly
or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of,
or disturbing the peace of, the petitioner.
[¶] (B) An order enjoining a party from specified
behavior that the court determines is necessary to effectuate orders described
in subparagraph (A).â€
C. No Evidentiary Error Occurred
Defendant
contends the trial court erred by not taking oral testimony. Defense counsel referred to witnesses who
could testify defendant had accused plaintiff of stealing. Defendant never requested that oral testimony
be presented. Defendant never objected
to the absence of oral testimony. An
offer of proof was made but no request to call any witness was made by any
litigant. Thus, the issue is not
properly before us.
Defendant
argued during the hearing that plaintiff’s request for a restraining order was
based on hearsay. As noted, plaintiff
submitted: a cease and desist letter;
the April 26, 2010 letter from several mosque members attesting they witnessed
defendant’s harassment of plaintiff; and flyers from defendant regarding
plaintiff’s alleged misconduct. There is
no merit to defendant’s hearsay contentions.
The language of section 527.6, subdivision (i), allows a trial court to
receive any testimony that is relevant.
This provision authorizes a trial court to consider hearsay
evidence. (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 728-729;
1074, 1085, fn. 5 [finding section 527.6 is statutory exception to general rule
that a written declaration is hearsay].)
The trial court did not err by considering hearsay evidence.
D. Plaintiff Had Standing To Request Restraining
Order Which Includes The Mosque
Defendant
also argued plaintiff lacked standing to request the restraining order which
included the mosque. Defendant relies on
Diamond View Limited v. Herz (1986)
180 Cal.App.3d 612, 618. In
of Appeal held section 527.6 did not protect partnerships, corporations, or
associations, only natural persons. (
Plaintiff
filed the restraining order request for himself. Plaintiff is a person within the meaning of
section 527.6. There is substantial
evidence defendant harassed plaintiff.
Ordering defendant to stay away from the mosque furthered the goal of
the restraining order. Plaintiff is the
mosque’s imam. (See § 527.6, subd.
(b)(6)(B) [permitting court to enjoin party from specific behavior to effectuate purpose of restraining
order].) By specifying the mosque, the
trial court effectuated the restraining order’s purpose—the protection of
plaintiff who works at the mosque.
IV. DISPOSITION
The civil harassment restraining order is affirmed. Plaintiff, Hashim Ansari, is awarded his appeal
costs from defendant, Abdul Kaliq Khan.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TURNER,
P. J.
We concur:
MOSK, J.
KUMAR, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1]
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
name="_ftn2" title="">* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
