Alonzo
v. County of Los Angeles
Filed
2/26/13 Alonzo v. County of Los Angeles CA2/1
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
ADRIAN ALONZO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.
Defendants and
Respondents.
B240191
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. BC468250)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County.
Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge.
Affirmed.
______
David Haas
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Collins
Collins Muir & Stewart, Melinda W. Ebelhar, Catherine M. Mathers, and
Christie Bodnar Swiss, for Defendants and Respondents.
______
Adrian Alonzo appeals from the judgment of dismissal
entered against him on his complaint for battery and violation of his
basis of the judgment against Alonzo in a prior federal court action arising
from the same incident, and the superior court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2011, Alonzo filed a
complaint in the superior court
against the County of Los
Angeles (the County), its sheriff’s department,
and Michael Kennard, a sheriff’s deputy.
Alonzo alleged claims for battery and violation of his civil rights
under Civil Code section 52.1, subdivisions (a) and (b).
Defendants
demurred to the complaint on the ground that it fails to state a cause of
action because of the preclusive effect of the judgment against Alonzo in a
prior federal court action arising from the same incident; defendants also
argued that the claims were barred by certain
requested that the superior court take judicial notice of the order granting
Kennard’s motion for qualified immunity in the federal action.
The
superior court granted defendants’ request for
without leave to amend on the basis of collateral estoppel and the tort
immunity statutes, and entered a judgment of dismissal. Alonzo timely appealed.
The
complaint alleges the following facts:
“On or about the afternoon of January 14,
2010, [Alonzo] was walking on the sidewalk near his Gardena,
California residence. Suddenly, a car containing . . .
Kennard pulled up close to [Alonzo]. . . . Kennard leaped out of
the car and pointed his firearm at [Alonzo].
Kennard demanded [Alonzo] turn around.
[Alonzo] began to comply. He did
not make any threatening statements, gestures, or actions toward
. . . Kennard. [Alonzo] was
unarmed. Kennard fired a bullet into
[Alonzo] striking him in his left shoulder/neck area. [Alonzo] collapsed in a pool of his own
blood.â€
As regards
the procedural background, the complaint alleges that Alonzo originally filed
suit in federal court, apparently alleging both federal and state law
claims. The federal district court
stayed the state law claims, resolved Alonzo’s federal claim against him, and
then declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.
The federal
district court order of which the superior court took judicial notice describes
the factual background and the federal litigation as follows: Kennard shot Alonzo during an encounter
relating to “an alleged hand-to-hand drug transaction.†Kennard and another sheriff’s deputy, Mat
Taylor, testified that “they observed [Alonzo] engaging in a hand-to-hand drug
transaction, then attempt[ed] to flee when instructed to turn around and put
his hands in the air.†Kennard testified
that “after giving up on climbing the fence, [Alonzo] subsequently spun
suddenly towards the [d]eputies while drawing his right hand from his pocket as
if he were drawing a gun from a holster.
At this instant, [d]efendant Kennard fired his gun.†Alonzo and his girlfriend testified that he
“never engaged in a hand-to-hand drug transaction, complied with all commands,
and had his hands in the air when [d]efendant Kennard shot him in the neck.â€
The federal
jury found that Kennard used excessive force in violation of Alonzo’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
The federal district court judge then “submitted four additional factual
interrogatories to the jury:
(1) Did plaintiff Alonzo try to scale the fence; (2) Did plaintiff
Alonzo spin towards the deputies before he was shot; (3) Was plaintiff Alonzo
pulling his hand out of his pocket before he was shot as defendant Kennard
described; and (4) Did plaintiff Alonzo comply with the [d]efendants’ commands
to show his hands. . . . The jury answered ‘YES’ to the first
three interrogatories and ‘NO’ to the last interrogatory.†On the basis of the jury’s answers to the
four special interrogatories, the federal district court determined that the
force used by Kennard was reasonable as a matter of law and thus did not
violate Alonzo’s constitutional rights, so Kennard was entitled to qualified
immunity.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In
reviewing a judgment after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we
“must assume the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual
allegations†and “must also consider judicially noticed matters,†and “we
determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a cause of
action.†(Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074,
1081.) If not, we also must determine
“whether there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect
with an amendment,†an issue on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof. (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
Alonzo
argues that the trial court erred by concluding that collateral estoppel bars
his state law claims because of the judgment against him on the federal claim in
the prior federal litigation. We
disagree.
As
explained by the federal district court, “‘[q]ualified immunity shields
federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads
facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established†at the time of the
challenged conduct.’ [Citation.]†The court found, at “the first step of the
qualified immunity analysis,†that Alonzo’s “constitutional right to be free
from excessive force†was not violated, because Kennard’s “use of force, based
on the facts found by the jury, was objectively reasonable.†Having found no violation of a constitutional
right, the court did not (and could not) proceed to the second step to determine
whether a “clearly established†constitutional right had been violated, because
no constitutional right had been violated at all.
“Collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior
proceedings. [Citation.] Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine
only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually
litigated in the former proceeding.
Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former
proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the
former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is
sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding. [Citations.]†(Lucido
v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. omitted.)
Because the
issue of the reasonableness of Kennard’s use of force was actually litigated
and determined against Alonzo in the federal proceeding, collateral estoppel
precludes him from relitigating the issue.
First, the issue of the reasonableness of the use of force in Alonzo’s
federal claim is identical to the issue of the reasonableness of the use of
force in Alonzo’s state law claims. The
superior court correctly stated that Alonzo concedes the point (“Both parties
acknowledge that the federal civil rights claim and the state law claims for
battery and violations of civil rights share the same elementsâ€). Second, the issue was actually litigated in
the federal action, on Kennard’s motion for qualified immunity. Third, the issue was necessarily and
expressly decided in the federal action when the federal district court
expressly determined that Kennard’s use of force was reasonable. Fourth, the federal district court’s decision
was final and on the merits. And
finally, Alonzo was a party to the federal action.
Alonzo’s
arguments against the application of collateral estoppel to bar his claims are
not persuasive. First, Alonzo argues
that he “may proceed with his state causes of action in state court when the
federal court has declined to exercise jurisdiction over his state
claims.†Although it is true that in
certain circumstances a plaintiff may pursue state law claims in state court
after a federal court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
them, the point is irrelevant. Having
litigated the issue of the reasonableness of Kennard’s use of force in federal
court, Alonzo cannot relitigate that issue in state court—the doctrine of
collateral estoppel prohibits it. And
because the federal court determined that issue in Kennard’s favor, that
determination is fatal to Alonzo’s state law claims. The foregoing analysis is not undermined by
the proposition that sometimes state law claims that a federal court declines
to hear may be heard in state court.
Second,
Alonzo argues that qualified immunity is not a defense to state tort claims
against government employees. Again, the
point is correct but irrelevant. The
superior court did not rule, and we do not hold, that Alonzo’s state law claims
are barred by qualified immunity.
Rather, the superior court correctly ruled that (1) because the federal
district court determined that Kennard’s use of force was reasonable, Alonzo
cannot relitigate that issue in the present action, and (2) because Kennard’s
use of force was reasonable, Alonzo’s state law claims fail as a matter of
law. Neither the superior court’s
decision nor ours depends upon an application of the qualified immunity defense
to state law claims.
Third,
Alonzo attempts to distinguish Hernandez
v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, which the superior court
relied upon. Again, the argument is
irrelevant. Assuming for the sake of
argument that Hernandez v. City of Pomona
is distinguishable in various respects, it does not follow that the
requirements for the application of collateral estoppel have not been satisfied
in this case, or that the application of that doctrine is not fatal to Alonzo’s
state law claims. For the reasons we
have already given, collateral estoppel does apply, and Alonzo’s state law
claims consequently fail as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall
recover their costs of appeal.
NOT TO
BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD,
J.
We concur:
MALLANO,
P. J. JOHNSON,
J.
of the collateral estoppel issue makes it unnecessary for us to address the
other arguments raised by the parties on appeal.
