Cotton v. Cotton
Following the death of her husband, Marie Cotton sued her stepson, Soul Cotton, for, among other things, unfair business practices regarding the family-run automotive body repair shop.[1] Soul, together with co-workers, Michael Gonzales, Jay Hillard, and Duane Mertle (cross-complainants), countersued Marie for various Labor Code violations, among other causes of action. Soul and his co-workers alleged in an amended cross-complaint that Marie had (1) threatened to prevent Gonzales from retrieving his personal property and threatened to take his and his parents’ money unless he changed his position in the underlying lawsuit; and (2) unlawfully took possession of and destroyed personal property belonging to Soul and Gonzales. Cross-complainants alleged that Marie’s demand constituted intimidation and threats (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b)(3) [ninth cause of action]) and that her unlawful possession and destruction of their personal property constituted conversion (Civ. Code, §§ 1965, 1993.03; Code Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (e) [tenth cause of action]). Marie moved to strike the ninth and tenth causes of action in the cross-complaint. She contended that the ninth and tenth causes of action were based upon protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., [2] § 425.16) and that cross-complainants could not establish a probability of prevailing because Marie’s communications were subject to the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The trial court denied Marie’s motion.
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