P. v. Godinez
Defendant Hugo Godinez appeals from his conviction for violating a county ordinance that made it a misdemeanor for a registered sex offender to enter a county park without the county sheriff’s written permission. Godinez argues state law preempts the county ordinance and therefore his conviction is void. We agree. The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the daily life of sex offenders to reduce the risk of an offender committing a new offense. As explained below, we conclude the state statutory scheme imposing restrictions on a sex offender’s daily life fully occupies the field and therefore preempts the county’s efforts to restrict sex offenders from visiting county parks.
We also conclude state law preempts the ordinance’s requirement that sex offenders obtain the county sheriff’s written permission before entering a county park. This regulation is simply a de facto registration requirement. But state law has long occupied the area of sex offender registration to the exclusion of local regulation and the county ordinance’s written permission requirement amounts to an additional registration requirement imposed on sex offenders who wish to enter county parks. We decline to sever the written permission requirement from the county ordinance. To do so would result in an outright ban on sex offenders entering county parks. But taking this step would substantially alter the meaning of the county ordinance as originally enacted because nothing in the language of the county ordinance or its history suggests the county intended to bar sex offenders under all circumstances from county parks.
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