P. v. Scroggins
A jury convicted Leonard Earl Scroggins, Jr., of a committing a forcible lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1);[1] count 1), attempted kidnapping for purposes of committing a lewd act on a child (§§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 664; count 2), assault with a knife (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23); count 3), robbery (§ 211; count 4), kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 5) and two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664; counts 6 and 7). As to counts 1, 2, 5 and 6, the jury found true allegations Scroggins used a knife in the commission of the crimes (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to counts 5 and 6, the jury also found true allegations Scroggins inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Scroggins additionally admitted having two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), two prior prison commitment convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and a prior sex crime conviction (§§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c) & (d), 667.71, subd. (a). The trial court sentenced Scroggins to an indeterminate sentence of 150 years to life plus a determinate sentence of 45 years.
Scroggins appeals, contending: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); (2) the trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial; (3) the trial court erroneously denied his motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) for substitute counsel; (4) there was insufficient evidence to establish the requisite lewd intent for counts 1 and 2; (5) the jury instructions on the union of act and intent were incomplete as to count 1; (6) the prosecutor erred during closing argument by asserting the jury should first reach conclusions as to the greater offenses before deliberating on the lesser included offenses; (7) his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance; and (8) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of due process of law and a fair trial.
The People concede and we agree the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error as to count 1. We, consequently, exercise our discretion under section 1260 to reduce the conviction in count 1 to attempted forcible lewd act with a child (§§ 288, subd. (b)(1), 664). In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
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