Rosenberg v. Springpoint Senior Living
Jordan Rosenberg (appellant) appeals from “judgments†of dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction against respondents. Appellant’s briefs present an unintelligible compilation of disjointed historical facts, accusations, and claims which fail to comply with many fundamental rules of appellate procedure. Those deficiencies include the failure to: (1) present legal analysis and relevant supporting authority for each point asserted, with appropriate citations to the record on appeal (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856); (2) support references to the record with a citation to the volume and page number in the record where the matter appears; and (3) state the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, the judgment or order appealed from, and summarize the significant facts, but limited to matters in the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (2)(A), (C)).
These are not mere technical requirements, but important rules of appellate procedure designed to alleviate the burden on the court by requiring litigants to present their cause systematically, so that the court “may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.†(Landa v. Steinberg (1932) 126 Cal.App. 324, 325.)
Perhaps most importantly, the incomprehensible nature of appellant’s briefs makes it impossible for this court to discern what precise errors he is claiming were made by the trial judge, and how such errors were prejudicial. We are not required to search the record on our own seeking error. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
We note that appellant appears before us in propria persona. While this may explain the deficiencies in his briefs, it in no way excuses them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “[T]he in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney†’ â€].) Appellant’s self-represented status does not exempt him from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve him of his burden on appeal. Those representing themselves are afforded no additional leniency or immunity from the rules of appellate procedure simply because of their propria persona status. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
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