Skerston v. Sheehan
N
This is appellant Paula Skerston’s third trip to the Court of Appeal to protest a restraining order issued against her in 2007, and in favor of respondent Linda Sheehan.[1] In October 2010, Skerston, an attorney, filed a complaint against Sheehan and her attorney, Robert Newman, purportedly based on the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 52.1.[2] Actually, the complaint was based on Sheehan’s restraining order and on allegations regarding Newman’s activities while representing various clients, including Sheehan, in cases against Skerston.
The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the acts upon which Skerston based her complaint were all acts in furtherance of Sheehan’s and Newman’s rights of petition or free speech, and Skerston had not shown a probability of prevailing. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and Skerston appeals.
We affirm. The complaint clearly implicates Sheehan’s and Newman’s rights of petition. Because of the absolute privilege afforded to litigants by Civil Code section 47, Skerston cannot possibly prevail on her claims against either Sheehan or Newman. The statements made in the course of the litigation are absolutely privileged. The act of applying for a restraining order itself is protected by the constitutional right to petition the courts and cannot be a basis for a lawsuit except one for malicious prosecution. This remedy is unavailable to Skerston because the restraining order process did not terminate in her favor. This should therefore be the last of the appeals by Skerston regarding the Sheehan restraining order.
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