500 matching results for "ravimor":
From CA Unpub Decisions
Beck also appeals, asserting error in the court’s refusal to grant a new trial on his other claims. He also challenges a prior order granting summary adjudication of his claim of breach of oral contract and the subsequent award of attorney fees in the judgment. We agree with Shalev that a new trial was unnecessary as to any of Beck’s claims, because his underlying demurrer to those causes of action was properly sustained. We therefore reverse the order only as to the grant of a new trial on the fraud and accounting claims.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Plaintiff Mordechay Beck appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendants NoBug Consulting, Inc., Moshe Shalev, and Irit Shalev on Beck’s lawsuit seeking damages, declaratory relief, and an accounting on his claims of breach of oral contract and fraud, which he brought together with plaintiff Luca Bovio Ferassa.[1] On appeal, Beck asserts error in the superior court’s grant of summary adjudication on his contract claims and the sustaining of defendants’ demurrers on one of his claims of fraud and one of breach of oral contract, along with his request for declaratory relief. Finally, Beck challenges the award of attorney fees to the three defendants. We find merit in the last contention and therefore will modify the judgment.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
In May 2016, plaintiff April Mulvihill sued defendants Norway Maple Holdings, LLC and Plum Healthcare Group, LLC for elder abuse and negligence. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration shortly thereafter. Plaintiff then consented to arbitration and the petition to compel arbitration was granted.
Plaintiff, however, was dissatisfied with the contemplated pace of proceedings in arbitration. Citing her advanced age and health issues, she moved for calendar preference (see Code Civ. Proc., § 36)[1] in the arbitration. She was unsuccessful. She then applied ex parte to the court to set aside its prior order compelling arbitration and to set a trial date with calendar preference. The court granted plaintiff’s application, setting a jury trial for December 5, 2016. Defendants appealed the court’s order. (§ 1294, subd. (a) [order denying petition to compel arbitration is appealable].) Their 31-page opening brief primarily argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to iss |
From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted defendant, Thuong Hoang Nguyen of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code) after it found defendant stole a laptop from his neighbor’s apartment. The jury also found true allegations a nonaccomplice of defendant was present in the residence during the commission of the residential burglary. The court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison. Defendant appeals, contending statements he made to police and the fruits of a search of his home were obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
In January 2010, J.M., then just over three years old, was taken into protective custody at the behest of county social workers. Their reason was mainly (but not entirely) the continued false allegations of child abuse lodged by J.M.’s mother, Melissa, against his father, Gregory. In May 2010, the juvenile court declared J.M. a dependent of the juvenile court and also made a dispositional order removing J.M. from the custody of both his parents. Gregory appealed from the dispositional order as it applied to him and won. In an opinion handed down by this court in late February 2011, we held the juvenile court lacked the necessary clear and convincing evidence of danger to J.M.’s physical health required to affirm his removal from his father’s custody. As to J.M.’s emotional health, we noted that if Gregory was no longer required to interact with Melissa, the emotional distress created by his parents’ open custody battle would be ameliorated, if not entirely eliminated.[1]
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From CA Unpub Decisions
In January 2010, J.M., then just over three years old, was taken into protective custody at the behest of county social workers. Their reason was mainly (but not entirely) the continued false allegations of child abuse lodged by J.M.’s mother, Melissa, against his father, Gregory. In May 2010, the juvenile court declared J.M. a dependent of the juvenile court and also made a dispositional order removing J.M. from the custody of both his parents. Gregory appealed from the dispositional order as it applied to him and won. In an opinion handed down by this court in late February 2011, we held the juvenile court lacked the necessary clear and convincing evidence of danger to J.M.’s physical health required to affirm his removal from his father’s custody. As to J.M.’s emotional health, we noted that if Gregory was no longer required to interact with Melissa, the emotional distress created by his parents’ open custody battle would be ameliorated, if not entirely eliminated.[1]
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From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted defendant Jesus Damian Zapata of felony false impersonation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3);[1] formerly § 529, subd. 3, hereafter former section 529(3)), but found him not guilty of carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle, and street terrorism. The trial court thereafter found true the allegations Zapata had 11 prior serious or violent felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A)) and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It dismissed the allegations of two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and sentenced Zapata to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, plus a one-year term under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Zapata challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his false impersonation conviction. Alternatively, he contends the prosecution should have charged him with misdemeanor section 148.9, rather than former section 529(3), because it is a more specific st |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Appellant Jerome L. Humphrey entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of violating Penal Code[1] section 269, subdivision (a)(1), rape of a child under the age of 14 years. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of 30 years to life and issued a 10‑year restraining order pursuant to section 136.2, prohibiting any communication between Humphrey and the victim. Humphrey challenges the 10-year restraining order. We affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
The juvenile court found that appellant/defendant Angel M. (Angel) assaulted Jose P. (Jose) and his mother with a firearm during a drive-by shooting. After the incident, Jose identified Angel as the shooter to law enforcement. However, at trial, Jose claimed he did not remember whether Angel was the shooter. In fact, Jose responded that he did not remember the vast majority of questions posed to him at trial. However, his prior identification of Angel was brought into evidence by the testimony of law enforcement officers recalling their prior conversations with Jose. After all the evidence had been presented, the juvenile court found true the allegations that Angel had committed two counts of assault with a firearm.
Angel contends that Jose’s recalcitrance prevented Angel from being able to meaningfully cross-examine him. As a result, he argues the evidence of Jose’s prior statements should have been stricken to protect his Confrontation Clause rights. Without J |
From CA Unpub Decisions
On appeal, the Attorney General contends the trial court abused its discretion in concluding the counts were time-barred because: (1) the party who reported two of the fraudulent loans to the district attorney’s office (loans 12 and 14b) is not a “discoverer” for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations; (2) assuming the reporting party is a discoverer, there are triable issues of fact as to whether he knew or should have known about the mortgage fraud as to loans 12 and 14b prior to October 27, 2006; (3) alternatively, if the reporting party is not a discoverer, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the district attorney’s office knew or should have known about the mortgage fraud as to loans 12 and 14b prior to October 27, 2006; and (4) the undisputed evidence fails to show the reporting party or the district attorney’s office knew or should have known about the mortgage fraud as to all other loans prior to October 27, 2006. We reverse the judgment of the
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant and appellant Daniel Raymond Stith filed a notice of appeal challenging the validity of his plea. A trial court granted his request for certificate of probable cause, which stated that defendant’s plea was taken despite his lack of knowledge of the consequences of the plea. We affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Donald Lee Condon appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. According to defendant, he is entitled to have two one-year prior prison term enhancements stricken from his current sentence because those prior convictions were reduced to misdemeanors after the passage of Proposition 47. Because defendant’s sentence became final well before the passage of Proposition 47, and because the resentencing provision of Proposition 47 only applies prospectively to nonfinal prior prison term enhancements, the trial court correctly denied defendant’s petition. We therefore affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Francesca T. and Marvin F. are the parents of Michael F., who was born in April 2016. Francesca and Marvin are intellectually disabled and receive services from the San Diego Regional Center. When Michael was born, nurses observed that the parents needed prompting to feed and change him, and Francesca struggled to understand what the nurses told her. A nurse said she did not believe the parents were capable of understanding and properly attending to an infant's needs. In one instance, Michael began choking during a feeding and the parents did not respond until a nurse intervened.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Angela A. appeals from an order denying her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order against her ex-husband, Marvin A. Angela argues: (1) the trial court utilized an improper standard by requiring her to establish further abuse since issuance of the original restraining order, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Marvin to have joint legal custody of their children after the court issued the original restraining order against him. We reject Angela's arguments and affirm the court's order.
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