500 matching results for "abundy":
From CA Unpub Decisions
In this dispute between a law firm and its former client, the trial court imposed terminating sanctions against defendant Sue Tsang due to her recalcitrance during discovery. It then entered judgment awarding a portion of certain settlement funds to plaintiff Franceschi Law Corporation (the law firm) and the balance to Tsang. Tsang appealed the judgment. Acting without an attorney, Tsang did not provide a complete clerk’s transcript and her briefs do not adequately address the salient issues or include sufficient citations to the record. Because she failed to carry her burden to demonstrate reversible error, we affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Petitioner David Sanchez is charged with murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and various drug and firearms offenses. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court challenging respondent superior court’s order setting his bail at $1,000,000. The Attorney General agrees that Sanchez is entitled to a new bail hearing. As we explain, we will treat the petition as one for a writ of mandate and order issuance of a peremptory writ.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Appellants Richard C. (Father) and W.H. (Mother) challenge the finding that their teenaged daughter Alexandria C. was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after she tried to commit suicide and testified that she felt unsafe in her home. The parents also argue that the case should be remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., ICWA) even though neither one has ever claimed Indian ancestry. We reject the parents’ arguments and affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Arvan Hernandez appeals after the trial court revoked his probation and executed a previously imposed sentence. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
A jury convicted defendant of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664) and found true an allegation that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant admitted an allegation that he was previously convicted of a serious felony. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant John David Johnson drove while intoxicated at twice the legal blood alcohol limit, with his six-year-old son in the backseat. Nobody was hurt when he ran into a truck in an intersection on the city streets of Vallejo, California, nor thereafter when he drove away from the scene, inebriated, with his child still in the car. Johnson was subsequently convicted after a jury trial of felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), and he now appeals.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports his conviction. We also reject his other two claims of error: that the trial court failed to respond properly to several jury questions about one element of that offense, and also that, in response to another jury question, it misadvised the jurors about the order in which they were permitted to deliberate on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor child endangerment. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendants Joseph and Michele Alioto (the Aliotos) appeal from several orders entered in this unlawful detainer action and the judgment. We shall affirm the orders and the judgment.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Appellant Bryan Mazza appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36 or the Act). (Pen. Code, § 1170.126.) The court found Mazza was not eligible because his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm brought him within the provisions of section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), which makes defendants who were armed during the commission of their current offenses ineligible for resentencing under the Act. We reverse and remand for the trial court to consider whether Mazza is eligible for resentencing under the standards set forth in People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225 (Frierson).)
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From CA Unpub Decisions
This action arises out of a physical altercation occurring on August 9, 2014, in which Daniel Gunther (Gunther) allegedly assaulted Henry Pinheiro (Henry) and damaged the truck owned by Henry and his wife, Cindy Pinheiro. (Collectively, Henry and his wife are referred to as the Pinheiros.) The incident occurred as Gunther was leaving the San Jose residence of his girlfriend, Shirley Williams (Williams), the Pinheiros’ next door neighbor. In November 2014, the Pinheiros brought suit against Gunther (as a Doe defendant) and Williams. As against Williams, the Pinheiros asserted a claim for negligence, alleging that she (1) invited Gunther to her home, (2) knew or should have known of his propensity for violence, (3) was aware of previous conflicts between Gunther and Henry, (4) was aware of Gunther’s having previously threatened Henry, and (5) stood by and watched as Gunther assaulted Henry.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted defendant Marcus Casillas of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding the prosecution did not commit any discovery violations and by denying his requests for various sanctions for the claimed discovery violations. Defendant also contends the trial court erred by precluding him from introducing evidence of third party culpability. Further, defendant contends this court should remand the matter to the trial court so he can “have an opportunity to make a record for a youthful offender parole hearing.” |
From CA Unpub Decisions
A.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to her now two-year-old son, Joshua A., at the permanency placement hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother maintains the court erred by finding the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), parental bond exception did not apply to avoid termination of parental rights. After failing to reunify with Joshua after 22 months, Mother maintains they share a “substantial positive emotional attachment,” and the minor should not be adopted by the family he has bonded with. Mother also appeals the juvenile court’s denial of her petition for modification under section 388, asking the court to return Joshua to her custody or provide her with additional reunification services. We conclude Mother’s contentions on appeal lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted defendant Maria Del Carmen Uribe of second degree robbery; attempted kidnapping; attempted carjacking; felony elder and dependent adult abuse; and misdemeanor elder and dependent adult abuse, as a lesser offense to felony elder and dependent adult abuse. The jury also found true sentence enhancement allegations that the robbery was committed against vulnerable victims.
The court found true sentence enhancement allegations defendant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony (“strike”) convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A), all undesignated statutory references are to this code); two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)); and three prison prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). |
From CA Unpub Decisions
The parties to this appeal, appellants Suzanna and Jason Haughey, and respondent Henry Flores, are all involved in the T-shirt industry. The other participants in this dispute also make and sell T-shirts.
There is an empty chair, which should be occupied by one Chad Schoeman. Schoeman has disappeared, leaving a trail of debts and unsatisfied judgments behind him. Flores has a substantial judgment against Schoeman that he has been unsuccessful in collecting from the judgment debtor himself. Flores therefore directed his collection efforts against entities that owed Schoeman money. The appellants in the present appeal, the Haugheys, became involved in Flores’ collection efforts when they unwisely joined forces with Schoeman in 2011. At that time, the Haugheys incorporated a new business, MM4U, Inc., and engaged Schoeman to sell T-shirts designed by Jason Haughey. In June 2012, Schoeman sold a trademark he owned – Mob Inc. – to MM4U and the Haugheys for $1,500. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Jose Sotero Gonzalez was convicted of 10 counts relating to sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl, A.L. He challenges three of the counts under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) on the basis of lack of evidence of specific intent. He also asserts that the sentences imposed for another three counts should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. And he wants the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the fact that the court imposed only one $1,000 victim restitution fine on him, not two.
The Attorney General does not dispute Gonzalez’s position regarding the application of section 654 to the three counts he has identified for this appeal. The Attorney General also does not dispute that the court imposed only one victim restitution fine. The only disputed issue on appeal is, therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence of specific intent for three of his convictions under section 288, subdivision (a). |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Plaintiff Bann-Shiang Liza Yu appeals from a judgment entered by the court in favor of defendant West Bend Mutual Insurance Company despite her demand for a jury trial. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract, bad faith, and equitable contribution, indemnity, and subrogation, all based on assignments of rights by parties and their insurers with whom she had settled an underlying construction defect action.
Plaintiff claims the court violated her right to a jury trial by entering judgment in favor of defendant without using a proper procedural vehicle. She also argues the court erroneously interpreted the underlying settlement agreements and assignments of rights. Finally, she contends the court erroneously dismissed her peremptory challenge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6; all further statutory references are to this code.) We agree there was no proper procedural vehicle for the court to enter judgment in favor of defendant. |