500 matching results for "mk":
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Rakesh Paul Singh was convicted of aggravated mayhem and sentenced to life in prison for having hired men to commit an attack on his ex-wife. On appeal, defendant argues the court improperly dissuaded the jury from requesting a readback of testimony by certain witnesses and erred in failing to conduct a Marsden hearing in response to a post-trial letter from defendant.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
In September 2016, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) relative to an infant boy, D.L. (the minor). The Department alleged that the mother, R.K. (mother), and the father, D.L. (father), had a history of substance abuse. Mother had used methamphetamine, marijuana, and nonprescribed valium during her pregnancy, and the minor was born with controlled substances in his system. The toxicology report indicated that the minor had tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and diazepam (valium). The minor was cared for in the neonatal intensive care unit of the hospital for 15 days until his discharge. The Department reported that “[a]s a newborn, [the minor] required oxygen, medication, and a feeding tube in order to survive.”
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From CA Unpub Decisions
In this appeal, D.G. (Mother) asks us to reverse a juvenile court order issued by the court pursuant to section 361.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code denying her reunification services with respect to her daughter, I.C.. At the March 2018 dispositional hearing in this matter, the trial court bypassed Mother for reunification services in accordance with subdivision of section 361.5. Under those provisions, the court is not required to offer reunification services to a parent if the court has previously terminated reunification services or parental rights with respect to a sibling or half sibling of the child and the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . .” Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that she had not made reasonable efforts to treat her long-standing substance abuse issues.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Aurora L., born in early October 2017, tested positive for both methamphetamine and morphine. During the initial six-month reunification period, her father, Andrew L. missed 51 of 51 random drug tests and relapsed into heroin use. Then he became homeless. Even so, the juvenile dependency court did not terminate reunification services, but ordered the existing reunification plan continued for another six months, optimistically projecting Andrew’s reunification with Aurora by November 2018. In the process, the court made a formal finding that Andrew had been offered reasonable reunification services. Despite the absence of any immediate adverse consequences flowing from the finding at the six-month review that reasonable services had been offered, Andrew now appeals the order.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
M.B. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her nine-year-old daughter K.R., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She raises the following contentions: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); (2) the court violated Mother’s constitutional rights by failing to transfer the case to Nevada; (3) Mother did not receive reasonable reunification services; and (4) the court should have granted her section 388 modification petition. We conclude all of these contentions lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant was convicted of possession of a short-barreled shotgun (Pen. Code, § 33215; count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school (§ 626.9, subd. (b); count 3), possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 4), and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 5). As to counts 1 through 4, the jury found the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to four years eight months in prison, computed as follows: two years on count 3, with an additional two years for the gang enhancement; a consecutive eight months (one-third of the midterm) on count 4; and concurrent sentences of two years on each of counts 1, 2, and 5.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Generally, prosecutors cannot introduce character evidence as part of the proof that a defendant committed a crime. However, if a defendant introduces evidence of an alleged victim’s character for violence, the prosecution can then introduce evidence of the defendant’s character for violence. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).)
Here, defendant Richard Arnold Parker II hit his girlfriend Miesha D. over the head with a drinking glass, causing an injury; thereafter, Miesha stabbed Parker in the chest with a knife. At trial, Parker introduced evidence regarding Miesha’s character for violence. The prosecution introduced evidence regarding Parker’s character for violence. A jury found Parker guilty of an aggravated battery and related crimes. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted appellant Woodrow Raymond Sexton of possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and possessing heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found Sexton had suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b), (c)(1)).
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From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted defendant Abrand Gonzalez on two counts of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, and the court sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of seven years. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) during the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, he incorrectly described the meaning of the term “abiding conviction,” thereby misstating the reasonable doubt standard and improperly reducing the prosecution’s burden of proof; (2) the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s post-verdict Marsden motion; and (3) defendant was denied due process at sentencing. We reject all of defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Appellants Clifton Haralson III and Jahsee Elan Brewster were convicted of pimping, pandering, and trafficking Briana D, a minor. On appeal, they contend the trial court erred in admitting and instructing the jury on text messages between Haralson and Briana, admitting expert testimony on the meaning of those messages, and failing to instruct on the lesser offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. They also argue their convictions for trafficking must be reversed under the Williamson rule (see
In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651), and their sentences are unlawful. Finding appellants’ contentions unmeritorious, we affirm the judgments against them. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Appellant Albert Hernandez appeals following the dismissal of his civil complaint against respondents, Tulare County Sheriff Mike Boudreaux, Sheriff’s Deputy Diaz, Tulare County Jail, and Tulare County Human and Health Services. Appellant states he is appealing from “the initial Judgement of June 16, 2015” in this matter, but ultimately contends the trial court wrongly denied his motion to set aside that dismissal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Aaron Axel Deason (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of committing a lewd or lascivious act on more than one child under 14 years of age, oral copulation of a child 10 years of age or younger, and using a minor to perform sex acts. He was sentenced to a total unstayed term of five years eight months plus 50 years to life in prison and ordered to pay various fees, fines, and assessments. On appeal, he contends: (1) denial of his request to represent himself requires automatic reversal; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that would have impeached one of the complaining witnesses; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of child pornography found on defendant’s laptop computer; (4) the trial court erred by admitting statements made during a forensic interview; (5) CALCRIM No. 1190 improperly reduced the burden of proof; and (6) cumulative prejudice requires reversal. We find no reversible error and affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Appellant/defendant Raymond Tenorio was charged with first degree murder for beating Kirk Haag to death. Haag was a roommate in a residence with defendant and his family. The beating occurred after defendant confronted Haag about accusations that Haag had touched defendant’s young daughter, and Haag allegedly said that he had done so.
Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. He was sentenced to the second strike term of 17 years in prison. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
This is the third appeal brought by defendant Billy Wayne Ciggs, Jr., following his convictions for one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and four counts of assault with a firearm. In the first appeal, we affirmed the judgment in its entirely. (People v. Ciggs (July 12, 2005, E036083) [nonpub. opn.] (Ciggs I).)
A federal court subsequently granted defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and directed the trial court to resentence defendant on count 2. Defendant appealed from his new sentence and, in the second appeal, this court reversed the judgment in part because the sentences on counts 2 through 5 each incorrectly included an enhancement for the personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Pen. Code, former § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and an enhancement for the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent felony (Pen. Code, § 188.66, subd. (b)(1)(C)). (People v. Ciggs (Feb. 21, 2017, E064606) [nonpub. opn.] (Ciggs II).) |