500 matching results for "ravimor":
From CA Unpub Decisions
Steven A., the presumed father (Father) of the minor N.A. (Minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s order during a post-permanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3)[1]reducing the frequency of his visitation with Minor.[2] He contends the juvenile court abuseditsdiscretion. We shall affirm the order.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
Steven A., the presumed father (Father) of the minor N.A. (Minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s order during a post-permanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3)[1]reducing the frequency of his visitation with Minor.[2] He contends the juvenile court abuseditsdiscretion. We shall affirm the order.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
In accordance with Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), defendant Toriano Germaine Hudson, Sr., represented himself before the jury that in June 2015 convicted him of four vehicle-related offenses, two of which were felonies and involved the personal infliction of great bodily injury. Defendant was still representing himself when the trial court (Hon. Patricia Scanlon) found true allegations that defendant had four prior felony convictions, two of which qualified as “strikes” for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law. Defendant was still representing himself when Judge Scanlon sentenced him to state prison for a term of 35 years to life, with concurrent terms for the other three convictions.
On this timely appeal, defendant’s primary contention is that it was prejudicial error for the trial court (Hon. Terri Mockler) to determine that he was mentally competent, and therefore to permit him to dispense with appointed counsel and represent himself. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
The marriage of Elizabeth and Christopher Wright was dissolved by a judgment filed in June 2013.[1]Elizabethnow appeals from two postjudgment orders, one denying her request to modify spousal report andthe other designating a listing broker to sell the family residence. She argues that the superior court erred in issuing those orders after declining to require Christopher to comply in full with a subpoena seeking certain of his financial records. We will affirm.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
This is an appeal from judgment following the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs Lonnie and Janet Ratliff’s first amended complaint against defendants EMC Mortgage, LLC, Tiffany Skaife, vice-president of EMC Mortgage, LLC, and Homesales, Inc. (collectively, EMC). Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint asserts claims for unfair business practices and declaratory relief, and seeks injunctive relief and general damages.[1] The trial court sustained EMC’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend after finding, among other things, that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims, requiring dismissal. We affirm.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
A modification decision.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
A modification decision.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant John Christopher Connell appeals from an order denying a petition to recall his so-called “three strikes” sentence of 28 years to life, brought pursuant to the provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act), codified at Penal Code section 1170.126.[1] (See Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595.)
Defendant’s petition to recall his sentence and for resentencing was denied upon determination that “resentencing [defendant] would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (See § 1170.126, subd. (f).) Counsel was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Stuart Gorden Douglas appeals his convictions for attempted carjacking and making criminal threats after he pulled a gun on repossession agents attempting to repossess his recreational vehicle. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support his carjacking conviction. The People properly concede this claim. Defendant also claims the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on the legal definition of “permanent residency” as related to a recreational vehicle. This issue is moot in view of our reversal of the carjacking charge.
We reverse the attempted carjacking conviction and remand for resentencing. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
efendant Tony Lee Kitchen pleaded no contest to domestic violence. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).)[1] As part of defendant’s plea agreement, the trial court postponed imposition of judgment to allow defendant to complete a residential rehabilitation treatment program. The trial court later found defendant failed to complete six months in a residential rehabilitation program and sentenced him to three years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that imposition of sentence violated his plea agreement. We disagree and affirm the judgment. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury found defendant Juan Rodriguez guilty of bringing a controlled substance into a jail. On appeal, defendant contends his due process rights were violated because: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing admission of a clause in a stipulation regarding his prior uncharged conduct; (2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing evidence beyond the scope of a stipulation; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in prejudice. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Joshua Michael Lowe was convicted of multiple charges related to a series of vehicle burglaries. On appeal, defendant requests this court review the sealed documents related to his Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)) to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining there were no discoverable materials (Evid. Code, § 1043 et seq.). Because the trial court failed to swear in the custodian of records at the in camera hearing, we remand the case to the trial court with directions to hold a new hearing in which the oath is administered to the custodian of records before he testifies.
|
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Steven Werner Mueck, an inmate serving 25 years to life in prison following conviction of a felony that was not violent (as defined by Pen. Code, §667.5, subd. (c)) [1] or serious (as defined by § 1197.2, subd. (c)), filed a petition pursuant to Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, to have his sentence recalled and to be resentenced. (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) The Proposition 36 court denied the petition, finding resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the Proposition 36 court erred in denying his petition because it refused to apply the definition of “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c)) in Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (§ 1170.18, subd. (c)),[2] in considering his Proposition 36 petition.
We shall conclude that Proposition 47’s definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to publ |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant John Lawrence Halsema shot his friend and housemate Craig Davies in the back, killing him. Nine or ten days later, defendant called police to report the shooting, stating that it had been an accident.
A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the second degree (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189),[1] and found true an allegation that his personal use of a firearm resulted in Davies’s death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) However, finding that the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error, this court reversed the judgment and remanded for retrial.[2] At defendant’s second trial, a jury again found defendant guilty of second degree murder and found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm resulting in the death of Davies. |