IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ASSOCIATION FOR B350110
LOS ANGELES DEPUTY
SHERIFFS et al., (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCP05186)
Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate,
Stephen I. Goorvitch and Alison M. Mackenzie, Judges. Petition
denied.
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski
and Richard A. Levine for Petitioners.
 No appearance for Respondent.
Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall, Eleanor S. Ruth and
Lauren M. Brody for Real Parties in Interest.
____________________________
Petitioners David Jouzi, Benjamin Alvarado, and Dellanira
Aragon are former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (department) who were discharged for alleged
misconduct. They appealed their discharges to the Los Angeles
County Civil Service Commission (commission). While their
appeals were pending, the former deputies executed settlements
with department chiefs that purported to reinstate them to
employment. Real party in interest the County of Los Angeles
(county) refused to comply with these settlement agreements.
Jouzi, Alvarado, Aragon, and a recognized employee
organization (petitioner Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs or ALADS) 1 sued the county, seeking enforcement of the
settlements through mandamus, breach of contract, and
promissory estoppel claims, along with a declaration that the
county must comply with settlements executed by the
department during the pendency of commission appeals.
Initially, the trial court sustained the county’s demurrers to
petitioners’ pleading without leave to amend. On appeal, we
reversed and instructed the trial court to grant petitioners leave
to file an amended pleading identifying the legal basis (if any) for
the department’s alleged long-standing view that the Los Angeles
County Sheriff (sheriff) and his subordinates are authorized to

1 We refer to Jouzi, Alvarado, and Aragon collectively as
“deputy petitioners,” and we refer to the deputy petitioners and
ALADS collectively as “petitioners.”

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settle appeals before the commission without approval of other
county officials. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 771–772, 801,
812 (ALADS I).)
On remand, petitioners filed several amended pleadings,
and the trial court sustained the county’s demurrers to two of
them. The court sustained the county’s last demurrer without
leave to amend. In particular, the court found petitioners failed
to demonstrate that the chiefs executing the settlements were
“acting under authority of the board [of supervisors] or authority
conferred by law” for the purposes of Government Code
section 23005. Petitioners seek appellate review of the dismissal
of their claims.
As an initial matter, petitioners arguably failed to appeal
timely from the trial court’s order of dismissal by instead
appealing from a subsequent judgment entered by the court.
Assuming arguendo petitioners’ appeal is untimely, we exercise
our discretion to treat the appeal as a writ petition because the
trial court’s order sustaining the county’s demurrer to the
operative pleading directed the parties to meet and confer and
submit a proposed judgment of dismissal, thereby apparently
leading petitioners to believe the dismissal order filed
concurrently with the demurrer order was issued in error or was
otherwise not a final appealable judgment. The trial court’s later
issuance of the judgment of dismissal further indicated it may
not have intended for the dismissal order to be a final appealable
judgment. Accordingly, we conclude under the unique
circumstances of this case that the interests of justice would be
better served by treating this arguably untimely appeal as a writ
petition.

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 On the merits, petitioners have not demonstrated that the
sheriff and his subordinates were authorized to bind the county
to the settlements that are before us.
First, we reject petitioners’ assertion that encompassed
within the sheriff’s authority to appoint, suspend, and discharge
department personnel is the power to rescind or modify discipline
during the pendency of civil service appeals. Petitioners’
expansive interpretation of the sheriff’s power is not consistent
with the purpose and structure of the county’s civil service
system. That system is designed to ensure that (1) only
competent individuals are county employees and (2) favoritism
plays no role in the hiring process. Adopting petitioners’ theory
of implied authority would undermine those objectives by
upsetting the careful balance struck by the civil service system’s
delegation of authority to (1) the sheriff, who hires employees
from an eligible civil service list; (2) the director of personnel,
who maintains that list; and (3) the commission, which reviews
employees’ appeals of discipline.
Second, we reject petitioners’ argument that the county is
bound by a department manual provision they claim confers
authority on division chiefs and division directors to settle
commission appeals without the approval of the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors (the board of supervisors or board).
Petitioners’ assertion that department management
representatives and ALADS executed an agreement requiring the
adoption of that manual provision is unavailing because
petitioners have not demonstrated that the county authorized
those management representatives to execute that alleged
agreement.

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 Third, we reject petitioners’ contention the county is bound
by its alleged past practice of permitting chiefs and captains to
settle commission appeals because they have not demonstrated
that practice is subject to the collective bargaining requirements
imposed by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA; Gov. Code,
§ 3500, et seq.). 2
Fourth, we conclude that a prior unpublished appellate
decision upholding the validity of a settlement executed by
ALADS and a department official concerning the department’s
procedures for investigating officer-involved shootings does not
collaterally estop the county from contesting the instant
settlements.
We hold the trial court did not err in sustaining the
demurrer as to the contract and mandamus claims because they
are predicated on the validity of the settlements. Petitioners also
fail to show that despite this defect, they can recover on their
promissory estoppel and declaratory relief causes of action.
Lastly, petitioners do not argue the court erred in denying leave
to amend their pleading. In sum, we construe petitioners’ appeal
as a writ petition and deny it.

2 The MMBA “mutually obligates a public employer and an
employee organization to meet and confer in good faith about a
matter within the ‘scope of representation’ concerning, among
other things, ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment[.]’ [Citation.]” (See Claremont Police Officers Assn.
v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 628 (Claremont Police
Officers Assn.).)

5
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to this review
proceeding.

1. The initial trial court proceedings and ALADS I
On December 5, 2019, petitioners filed their initial verified
petition for writ of mandate and complaint, alleging three causes
of action for writ of mandate, three causes of action for breach of
contract, three causes of action for promissory estoppel, and one
declaratory relief cause of action. (ALADS I, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 772–773.) 4 Petitioners sought enforcement
of the settlements through their mandamus, breach of contract,
and promissory estoppel claims. (See ALADS I, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 771.) Petitioners also sought a declaration
that the county must comply with the department’s settlements
of commission appeals. (See id. at pp. 797–798.)

3 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from undisputed aspects of the trial court’s rulings,
admissions made by the parties in their filings, and the county’s
assertions that petitioners do not dispute in their reply brief.
(See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 772, fn. 2, 773–774
[employing this approach].)
Our Factual and Procedural Background is also based in
part on our prior opinion in ALADS I. (See People v. Czirban
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1058, fn. 4 [relying in part on the
Court of Appeal’s prior opinion in summarizing the factual and
procedural history of that case].) We, sua sponte, take judicial
notice of our prior opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
4 For the sake of clarity and consistency, we refer to
petitioners’ initial petition for writ of mandate and complaint and
the amendments thereto as petitions.

6
 The trial court sustained the county’s demurrer, without
leave to amend, as to the writ of mandate causes of action based
on the court’s ruling that mandamus is not an appropriate
remedy to enforce a contractual obligation against a public entity.
(See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 774.)
The trial court later sustained the county’s demurrer to the
remainder of the initial petition without leave to amend. (See
ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 774.) The court reasoned
that “the settlement agreements are void because county counsel
did not approve them, and section 21” of the Los Angeles County
Charter (county charter) “confers upon county counsel ‘exclusive
charge and control of all civil actions and proceedings in which
the County or any officer thereof, is concerned or is a party.’ ”
(See id. at pp. 771, 774–775.)
On appeal from the judgment of dismissal, we held
section 21 of the county charter “does not confer upon county
counsel exclusive authority to settle appeals of discipline
decisions pending before the commission,” but we also found
petitioners had not shown that “the sheriff and his chiefs were
authorized to execute on the county’s behalf the settlement
agreements at issue here.” (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 775, 777.) We concluded that there was “a reasonable
possibility that [the petitioners] could [have] amend[ed] their
initial petition[ ] to establish that the sheriff and his
subordinates have that authority,” and that the trial court erred
in denying leave to amend on petitioners’ mandamus causes of
action. (See id. at pp. 778, 806.) We reversed the judgment and
instructed the trial court to grant petitioners leave to amend as
to most of their claims. (See id. at p. 812.)

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2. The first amended petition, the second amended
petition, the trial court’s order sustaining the
county’s demurrer to the second amended petition
with leave to amend, the third amended petition, and
the court’s order striking the third amended petition
On February 1, 2024, petitioners filed their first amended
petition. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, petitioners filed a
second amended petition on March 26, 2024. On
November 25, 2024, the trial court sustained the county’s
demurrer to the second amended petition with leave to amend.
On January 10, 2025, petitioners filed their third amended
petition. The trial court later struck the third amended petition
because the pleading did not include the names of the deputy
petitioners.

3. The fourth amended petition
On March 24, 2025, petitioners filed their fourth amended
petition.5 The deputy petitioners are former deputies of the
department. ALADS is “a recognized employee organization as
defined in the [MMBA] . . . representing sworn non-management
peace officers employed by the Department and the County
District Attorney’s Office with regard to all matters concerning
wages, hours and working conditions. It brings this action on
behalf of all of its represented employees.”

5 The remainder of our Factual and Procedural
Background, part 3 summarizes certain material and properly
pleaded allegations from the fourth amended petition, which we
assume to be true for purposes of this review proceeding. (See
Standards of Review, post.) We detail additional averments in
our Discussion, post.

8
 Petitioners name as defendants and respondents the
county, the board of supervisors, the department, the sheriff, the
county counsel, the director of personnel, and the county’s
auditor-controller. Petitioners do not dispute — and thus tacitly
agree with — the county’s assertion we should treat this matter
as “an official-capacity suit and, therefore, as a suit against the
County alone.” (See also ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 795, fn. 29 [concluding petitioners impliedly made a similar
admission in ALADS I].)
Each of the three deputy petitioners alleges one cause of
action for writ of mandate (the first, fourth, and seventh causes of
action), one cause of action for breach of contract (the second,
fifth, and eighth causes of action), and one cause of action for
promissory estoppel (the third, sixth, and ninth causes of action).
The tenth cause of action for declaratory relief is brought on
behalf of all four petitioners.
It appears that in or about 2017, each deputy petitioner
was served with a letter of intent to be discharged from
employment. They participated in predeprivation hearings held
pursuant to Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194,
and were subsequently discharged from employment for alleged
misconduct. 6 Each deputy petitioner filed an appeal of his or her
discharge to the commission.

6 “ ‘Skelly [v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 15 Cal.3d 194]
requires that civil service employees be given notice of proposed
disciplinary action, the reasons for the action, a copy of the
charges and the written materials upon which they are based,
and an opportunity to respond either orally or in writing.
[Citation.] A “Skelly hearing” refers to the employee’s
opportunity to respond, and it has been described as an “informal

9
 In 2019, while their respective appeals were pending before
the commission, each deputy petitioner entered into a settlement
agreement with a chief of the department, the terms of which
purport to reduce the discipline already imposed and reinstate
the deputy petitioner’s employment. With regard to each of these
settlements, petitioners aver: “Based on information and belief,
the settlement agreement was entered into pursuant to the
authority granted in [department manual of policy and
procedures or MPP section 3-04/020.80]. All conditions precedent
set forth in MPP section [3-04/020.80] were met, including
consulting with the constitutional policing adviser and receiving
the approval of the Undersheriff.” 7
The county thereafter refused to comply with the terms of
the settlements. Although the fourth amended petition does not
detail the circumstances under which Jouzi became aware that
the county “refused . . . to reinstate [him] to his employment with
the County and to provide him with all emoluments of
employment,” the pleading alleges that shortly after their
settlements were executed, Alvarado and Aragon were “advised”
that “County Counsel and/or . . . [the] Director of Personnel
and/or . . . [the] Board of Supervisors vetoed” their settlements.
In its appellate brief, the county asserts that the settlement
“agreements were not approved by the Board of Supervisors . . . .”

probable-cause-type proceeding.” ’ ” (ALADS I, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 773, fn. 4.)
7 Although these paragraphs from the fourth amended
petition actually refer to “MPP section 3-04/020.080” rather than
MPP section 3-04/020.80, that appears to be a typographical
error. We describe MPP section 3-04/020.80 in further detail in
our Discussion, part B.2, post.

10
Petitioners tacitly concede this point by failing to dispute it in
their reply. (See fn. 3, ante [noting that a party’s failure to
dispute in its reply an assertion raised in the opposing party’s
appellate brief may be deemed an admission thereto].) 8

4. The trial court’s order sustaining the county’s
demurrer to the fourth amended petition without
leave to amend and the dismissal of the action
On July 7, 2025, the trial court sustained the county’s
demurrer to the fourth amended petition without leave to amend.
The court remarked, “The dispositive issue in this case is
whether the chiefs executing the settlement agreements were
acting under the authority of the Board or authority conferred by
law for purposes of Government Code section 23005.” According
to the court, “Petitioners have still not alleged ‘the legal basis (if
any) for the department’s alleged long-standing apparent belief
that its personnel have authority to settle commission appeals on
their own.’ [Citation.]” (Quoting ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th
at p. 772.) The court denied leave to amend because “Petitioners
have . . . had three opportunities to identify this authority, and
they have failed to do so each time,” and “none of the discovery”
petitioners obtained from the county “would permit Petitioners to
amend the Fourth Amended Petition successfully.”

8 In ALADS I, we noted that petitioners had not
“contest[ed the county’s] representation that the deputy
[petitioners’] appeals were still pending before the commission
when they filed their [initial] petition[ in the trial court.]” (See
ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 774.) In their briefing for
the instant review proceeding, petitioners do not address whether
the commission appeals were still pending when they filed the
initial petition.

11
 On July 7, 2025, which is the date of filing of the order
sustaining the demurrer to the fourth amended petition, the
court also filed an order dismissing the action with prejudice.
(See Discussion, part A, post.) On August 11, 2025, the court
filed a judgment purporting to dismiss the action. (See ibid.) On
October 2, 2025, petitioners filed a notice of appeal seeking
review of the dismissal order and the judgment. (See ibid.
[explaining that petitioners’ appeal is arguably untimely, but
exercising this court’s discretion to treat the appeal as a writ
petition].)

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In ruling on a demurrer, a court determines whether a
party has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action.
(ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 776.) We review the trial
court’s ruling de novo and “ ‘ “ ‘treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] . . . .’
[Citation.] . . . . [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] We also consider
‘matters of which judicial notice can and has been taken.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
We review a trial court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse
of discretion. (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677, 685.)
Under this standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving there
exists a reasonable possibility that an amendment would cure the
defect. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, then the
trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Ibid.)
“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed correct.”
(Hernandez v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1190.)
To overcome the presumption of correctness, a party must

12
“ ‘ “ ‘ “affirmatively demonstrate error” ’ ” by “ ‘ “supply[ing] the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.” ’ [Citation.]”
[Citations.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (County of Los Angeles v. Niblett
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 462–463 (Niblett).)
Furthermore, an error of state law “ ‘generally does not
warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in
the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached.’ [Citation.]” (ALADS I, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.)

DISCUSSION

A. Assuming Arguendo Petitioners’ Appeal Is Untimely,
We Exercise Our Discretion To Treat the Appeal as a
Writ Petition
The county does not contest the timeliness of petitioner’s
appeal. “However, because the timeliness of an appeal poses a
jurisdictional issue, we must raise the point sua sponte and must
consider that question first.” (See Drum v. Superior Court (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 (Drum).) As we explain below,
although petitioners’ appeal is arguably untimely, we exercise
our discretion to reach the merits by treating the appeal as a writ
petition.
“[A] notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest
of: [¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the
party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment,
showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the
party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party
with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-

13
endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service;
or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).)
On July 7, 2025, the date on which the trial court had filed
its order sustaining the demurrer to the fourth amended petition
without leave to amend, the court also filed a signed order
dismissing the entire action with prejudice. The record contains
a certificate of mailing indicating that on July 7, 2025, the trial
court clerk served the file-stamped and signed dismissal order on
the parties’ counsel. Yet, in the order sustaining the demurrer,
the court directed “[t]he parties [to] meet-and-confer and lodge a
proposed judgment forthwith.” 9 On August 11, 2025, the trial
court filed a judgment purporting to dismiss the action in its
entirety and designating the county as the prevailing party
“entitled to recover [its] costs from [petitioners] in accordance
with law.” 10 On October 2, 2025, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal seeking review of a “Judgment entered [on]

9 It is unclear whether the trial court filed the dismissal
order before it filed the order sustaining the demurrer to the
fourth amended petition.
10 The judicial officer who signed the judgment was not the
trial judge who sustained the demurrer to the operative pleading
and signed the dismissal order. Additionally, we note that the
following documents are attached to the August 11, 2025
judgment: (1) a July 7, 2025 minute order that (inter alia)
sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend and
directed the parties to meet and confer and lodge a proposed
judgment, (2) the signed and file-stamped July 7, 2025 order
sustaining the demurrer, and (3) a certificate of mailing showing
that the trial court clerk served the July 7, 2025 minute order on
counsel for the parties on that date.

14
August 11, 2025 and [an] Order of Dismissal entered [on]
August 11, 2025.” 11
The order dismissing the action with prejudice that was
signed by the trial court and filed on July 7, 2025 appears to
constitute an appealable judgment. (See Roe v. Doe 1 (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 965, 972 [“An order of dismissal is an appealable
‘judgment’ if it is (i) in writing, (ii) signed by the court, and
(iii) filed in the action.”].) Because the trial court clerk served the
dismissal order on counsel for the parties on July 7, 2025, it
appears petitioners had to file their notice of appeal within
60 days of that date, that is, on or before September 5, 2025. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).) In addition, the trial
court’s filing of the judgment on August 11, 2025 does not seem to
have extended petitioners’ deadline to appeal from the dismissal
order. (See Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 842–843
[indicating that a new appeal period starts to run from service or
entry of a revised judgment only if it “ ‘substantial[ly]
modifi[es]’ . . . the [original] judgment”].)
We may treat an untimely appeal as a petition for writ of
mandate “in unusual circumstances” in which “do[ing] otherwise
would be unfair.” (See Drum, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 852–
853.) Such is the case here. By (1) filing the dismissal order on
the same date on which the trial court had filed an order
requiring the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed
judgment and (2) later filing a judgment on August 11, 2025, the
trial court appears to have led petitioners to believe the dismissal
order was issued in error or was otherwise not a final appealable

11 The case register does not indicate that an order of
dismissal was entered on August 11, 2025.

15
judgment. 12 It seems the county had the same belief given that
the trial court signed the proposed judgment submitted by the
county. Accordingly, assuming for argument’s sake petitioners’
appeal is untimely, we exercise our discretion to construe the
appeal as a writ petition. (Cf. Drum, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 847, 851–853 [exercising the reviewing court’s discretion to
excuse a party’s failure to file a timely appeal because that party
relied on an erroneous published decision to the effect that the
orders challenged on appeal were not immediately appealable].)

B. The Contract and Mandamus Claims Fail Because
Petitioners Do Not Demonstrate that the Sheriff and
His Subordinates Were Authorized To Execute the
Settlements
As we explained in our prior opinion, “Government Code
section 23004, subdivision (c) grants the county the power to
‘[m]ake contracts . . . .’ [Citation.] Government Code
section 23005 in turn provides: ‘A county may exercise its powers
only through the board of supervisors or through agents and
officers acting under authority of the board or authority conferred
by law.’ [Citation.] [¶] Thus, the validity of the deputy
[petitioners’] settlement agreements hinges on whether the chiefs
executing them were ‘acting under authority of the board or

12 (See In re The Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1224, 1233–1234 [“ ‘Generally speaking, only final judgments are
appealable . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . ‘If no issues in
the action remain for further consideration, the decree is final
and appealable. But if further judicial action is required for a
final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is
interlocutory.’ ”].)

16
authority conferred by law’ for the purposes of Government Code
section 23005.” (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 794.) We
also noted that petitioners’ contract and mandamus claims fail as
a matter of law unless they can show that “the chiefs were
authorized to enter into the settlements with the deputy
[petitioners] . . . .” (See id. at pp. 795–796.)
Petitioners raise four arguments in support of their
position the chiefs were authorized to execute the settlements:
(1) the sheriff’s power to “settle a disciplinary action that the
Sheriff himself previously imposed on an employee under his
command” is implicit in this county official’s “undisputed
authority . . . to appoint, suspend or discharge his employees,”
and the sheriff may delegate this power to his subordinates;
(2) MPP section 3-04/020.80 “constitutes the lawful delegation by
the Board of Supervisors of authority to the Sheriff [and his
subordinates] for executing binding settlement agreements” of
commission appeals or is a “law” that confers such authority on
department personnel for the purposes of Government Code
section 23005; (3) petitioners have alleged a “binding past
practice of the sheriff’s department of resolving disciplinary
appeals pending civil service commission proceedings” (boldface
& capitalization omitted); and (4) an unpublished Court of Appeal
decision collaterally estops the county from denying the chiefs’
authority to execute the settlements. We address these
contentions seriatim.

17
 1. Petitioners fail to demonstrate the
department’s authority over personnel
decisions includes the power to settle
commission appeals
“ ‘The same rules of statutory interpretation that apply to
statutory provisions also apply to local charter provisions[ ]’
[citation]” (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 779), Civil
Service Rules (see Head v. Civil Service Com. (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 240, 243–244), and ordinances (see Zubarau v.
City of Palmdale (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 289, 305). “ ‘When
construing a statute, “our goal is ‘ “to ascertain the intent of the
enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction
that best effectuates the purpose of the law.” ’ ” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] Put differently, our objective is to ‘ “ ‘arriv[e] at the
true [legislative] intent existing at the time the legislation was
enacted.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (ALADS I, supra,
at p. 779.) “We do not construe th[e] words [of legislation] in a
vacuum but rather consider them in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole.” (See Hirdman v. Charter
Communications, LLC (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 376, 384.)
Petitioners cite certain provisions of the Government Code,
county charter, county code, and Civil Service Rules for the
proposition that the “Sheriff and his subordinates [have
authority] to take fundamental personnel actions respecting
employees in the Sheriff’s Department,” to wit, the authority to
“appoint, suspend[,] or discharge [department] employees . . . .”
They assert that implicit within those powers to “render
fundamental personnel decisions” is “the right to rescind or
modify . . . previous disciplinary decision[s] based upon facts
discovered during the course of an administrative appeal . . . .”

18
Before addressing this argument, we describe relevant aspects of
the county’s civil service system.

a. The county’s civil service system is designed to
ensure classified employees are competent and
not corrupt
Our high court recently explained, “[Los Angeles] County’s
charter establishes a civil service system and designates all
employment positions as ‘unclassified’ or ‘classified.’ [Citations.]
Elected officials, heads of County agencies, and other identified
executive positions are ‘unclassified,’ with all remaining positions
being ‘classified.’[ 13] [Citation.] By charter, the County ‘has a
formal civil service system . . . for filling classified positions and
fixing the salary and benefits of classified employees.’ [Citation.]
Civil service rules . . . . are . . . designed to prevent favoritism or
corruption by requiring that all employees are uniformly paid
based on their qualifications, job duties, and performance.”

13 Deputy petitioners do not claim to have had
“unclassified” county positions. Instead, petitioners assert in
their opening brief that the three deputy petitioners were
“permanent employees and members of the civil service system of
the County” (italics added), thereby suggesting they were
classified employees. That deputy petitioners appealed their
discharges to the commission further indicates they were
“classified” employees. (See Factual & Procedural Background,
part 3, ante [noting deputy petitioners appealed to the
commission]; see, e.g., L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules,
rule 18.02(B) [authorizing “a permanent employee” who “is
discharged” to “request a hearing before the commission”]; id.,
rule 2.24 [defining “[e]mployee” for the purposes of the Civil
Service Rules as “any person holding a position in the classified
service of the county”].)

19
(Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of
Los Angeles (2026) 20 Cal.5th 292, 314 (Los Angeles County
Employees Retirement Assn.).)
Indeed, the county charter states the “purpose of [the] civil
service system” is, inter alia, to “provide County government with
a productive, efficient, stable, and representative work force by:
[¶] . . . [r]ecruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the
basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills relevant to
the work to be performed[; and] [¶] . . . [r]etaining employees on
the basis of the adequacy of their performance, correcting
inadequate performance, and separating employees whose
inadequate performance cannot be corrected.” (See L.A. Cnty.
Charter, art. IX, § 30, capitalization omitted from first quotation.)
To that end, section 51 of the charter requires county
officers to appoint classified employees “from the eligible civil
service list . . . .” (See L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. XII, § 51.) The
Civil Service Rules confer upon the director of personnel the
responsibility to “[a]dminister the civil service system in
accordance with th[e] Civil Service Rules” (see L.A. Cnty. Civil
Service Rules, rule 3.01(A)), by, among other things,
promulgating and terminating eligible civil service lists (see id.,
rules 10.01 & 10.05). Civil Service Rules, rule 6.04 permits the
director of personnel to “withhold the name of a person from the
eligible list” on one of several grounds, including that the person
is responsible for “conduct not compatible with the requirements
of the position, whether or not it amounts to a crime.” (See L.A.

20
Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 6.04(D).) 14 The director of
personnel is also authorized to consider an appeal from “[a]n
employee who is suspended for up to five days . . . .” (See L.A.
Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(C).)
Additionally, as we noted in our prior opinion, section 34 of
the charter confers upon the commission authority to act as “ ‘an
appellate body . . . as provided in the Civil Service Rules . . . .’ ”
(See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 789, quoting L.A.
Cnty. Charter, art. IX, § 34.) The Civil Service Rules, inter alia,
authorize the commission to hear permanent employees’ appeals
of discharges and reductions in rank, grade, or compensation.
(See L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.02(A)–(C).) The rules
also indicate that the commission may hear an employee’s
challenge to a suspension in excess of five days. (See, e.g., id.,
rules 4.03(A) & 4.05(A)(1).)

b. Petitioners’ implied authority theory is
inconsistent with the purpose and structure of
the county’s civil service system
Petitioners argue that a provision of the County Civil
Service Enabling Law (Gov. Code, § 31100 et seq.) requires a
county that has adopted a civil service system to enact an
ordinance providing that “[a]ny officer or employee in the

14 The version of Civil Service Rules, rule 6.04(D) that was
in effect in 2019 (i.e., when each deputy petitioner’s settlement
was purportedly executed) likewise authorized the director of
personnel to withhold a person’s name from the eligible list if
that person was “guilty of conduct not compatible with county
employment, whether or not it amounts to a crime.” (See L.A.
Cnty. Ord. No. 88-0020 § 1 (part), 1988.)

21
classified civil service may be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in
rank or compensation by the appointing authority . . . by a
written order, stating specifically the reasons for the action.”
(Gov. Code, § 31108, subd. (a)(1).)
Petitioners contend that county charter sections 12 and 51;
Civil Service Rules, rule 2.03; and county code section 2.02.100 in
turn establish that the sheriff is an “appointing power” and
“appointing officer” with the power to appoint persons to
positions within the department. 15 Petitioners further maintain
that Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A) authorizes the “appointing
power” to suspend an employee, and rule 18.02 permits the
“appointing power” to discharge subordinates from county service
or reduce them in grade or compensation.16 They also assert the

15 Section 12 of the county charter identifies the sheriff as
an elective county officer (see L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. IV, § 12),
and section 51 provides that a county officer “shall appoint, from
the eligible civil service list, for either permanent or temporary
service, all . . . deputies . . . and other persons in the office or
department of such officer” (see L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. XII,
§ 51). Civil Service Rules, rule 2.03 defines “ ‘[a]ppointing
power’ ” as “the person, board, or commission having authority to
make appointments to a position” (see L.A. Cnty. Civil Service
Rules, rule 2.03), and county code section 2.02.100 similarly
defines “ ‘[a]ppointing officer’ ” as “the officer, board, commission
or body having power of appointment to any position in the
service of the county” (see L.A. Cnty. Code, § 2.02.100).
16 Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A) provides in relevant
part: “Subject to such appeal right as provided in this Rule, an
employee may be suspended by the appointing power for up to
and including 30 days, pending investigation, filing of charges
and hearing on discharge or reduction, or as a disciplinary

22
following ordinance empowers the sheriff to delegate to his
subordinates authority to settle disciplinary appeals pending
before the commission: “An appointing officer as defined in
Section 2.02.100 of this chapter may delegate to subordinates the
exercise of judgment or discretion to impose discipline or take
any other personnel action on behalf of the appointing officer.”
(L.A. Cnty. Code, § 2.04.070.)
Petitioners argue “the ability to settle a disciplinary action
that the Sheriff himself previously imposed on an employee
under his command . . . is . . . necessarily incidental to powers
expressly otherwise granted the Sheriff or his designees under
the above-referenced rules and regulations.” They also contend,
“[T]here is no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the
legislative body of the County has withheld authority from [the]
Sheriff to settle disciplinary cases pending Civil Service
Commission appeal” because absent that authority, the sheriff
could not “rescind or modify his previous disciplinary decision
based upon facts discovered during the course of an appeal from
such decision.”
We acknowledge the facial appeal of petitioners’ position.
At first blush, one would expect that a government official

measure.” (L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A).) As
pertinent here, Civil Service Rules, rule 18.02 states, “Before [a]
discharge or reduction [of a permanent employee] shall become
effective, the employee shall receive a written notice from the
appointing power of intent to invoke discharge or reduction, and
specific grounds and particular facts therefor. The employee
shall then be allowed a reasonable time, not to exceed 10 days, to
respond orally or in writing to the appointing power before the
discharge or reduction shall become effective.” (See L.A. Cnty.
Civil Service Rules, rule 18.02(A).)

23
authorized to appoint and discipline employees would likewise
have the discretion to reverse the imposition of discipline and
spare the county the expense and delay of litigating the
employee’s appeal before the commission. We conclude, however,
that petitioners’ assertion that the sheriff and his chiefs are
authorized to settle commission appeals notwithstanding the
absence of an express delegation of such authority is contrary to
the structure and purpose of the county’s civil service system.
As explained above, the county’s civil service system is
designed to ensure that (1) only competent individuals are
classified employees and (2) favoritism and corruption play no
role in the hiring and retention of said employees. (See
Discussion, part B.1.a, ante; see also Los Angeles County
Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 356
[observing that “[t]he overall aim of the civil service laws is ‘to
limit corruption and to promote efficiency and economy’ ”].) The
structure of the civil service system effectuates that purpose by
dividing authority over the system among various county
officials, including the appointing power/officer, the director of
personnel, and the commission, the latter being empowered to
hear appeals of discipline. (See Discussion, part B.1.a, ante.)
Petitioners’ expansive interpretation of the sheriff’s and his
subordinates’ authority would disturb the balance struck by the
laws governing the county’s civil service system. For instance, if
the sheriff and his chiefs could rescind a discharge during the
pendency of a commission appeal without the consent of the
board of supervisors, then sheriff’s personnel could bypass the
limitations barring the department from hiring classified
employees who have engaged in conduct not compatible with
county employment. (See Discussion, part B.1.a, ante [discussing

24
L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. XII, § 51 & L.A. Cnty. Civil Service
Rules, rules 6.04(D), 10.01, & 10.05].)
Additionally, petitioners acknowledged in their opening
brief in ALADS I that in 2020, a trial court granted the county’s
petition for writ of mandate contesting the then-sheriff’s attempt
to reinstate a former deputy.17 According to petitioners’ ALADS
I briefing, the county had averred that (1) “one of the Sheriff’s
first actions after his election was to attempt to rehire [the
former deputy],” and (2) the sheriff had attempted to reinstate
the former deputy via a settlement of a civil proceeding. Given
that the sheriff attempted to reinstate a former deputy who had
been discharged during a prior sheriff’s tenure, this episode
undermines petitioners’ intimation that adopting their position
would simply allow the sheriff to rescind or modify discipline he
“himself previously imposed” upon discovering new facts
showing the discipline was unwarranted or excessive. To the
contrary, embracing petitioners’ expansive interpretation of
department officials’ power would increase the risk of corruption
and favoritism the civil service system was designed to avert.
Additionally, if, during the appeals process, the sheriff or other
department personnel were to discover facts undermining a
previously imposed disciplinary decision, we see no reason why
the sheriff or other department personnel could not bring that
information to the attention of the commission (see, e.g., L.A.
Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 4.07 [indicating the appointing
power has the right to be heard at the hearing on the employee’s
civil service appeal]), or to the board of supervisors with a

17 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of petitioners’
opening brief from ALADS I. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

25
recommendation to settle the appeal (see Discussion, part B, ante
[noting that Gov. Code, §§ 23004 & 23005 confer upon the board
authority to make contracts on behalf of the county]).
Furthermore, a ruling that the sheriff and certain of his
subordinates may rescind or modify a discharge without approval
from the board could empower department officials to obligate
the county to pay monetary benefits to the discharged employee.
For instance, petitioners allege in the operative pleading,
“Pursuant to the Jouzi Settlement Agreement, Deputy Jouzi
would not be entitled to back pay until his reinstatement” (italics
added), thereby suggesting the settlement entitled Jouzi to
backpay. Yet, long before the board of supervisors adopted the
Civil Service Rules in 1988,18 the county enacted an ordinance
that restricts county counsel’s authority such that the official can
settle claims or suits without board approval only if “the amount
necessary to be expended” by the county “does not exceed the sum
of $20,000.00 . . . .” 19 Given that board approval is required
before county counsel may settle a claim for more than $20,000,
we cannot conclude that in the course of adopting Civil Service
Rules authorizing the sheriff and his subordinates to impose
discipline, the board intended tacitly to delegate authority to
department personnel to incur financial obligations that could
significantly exceed the $20,000 limitation.

18 (See L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 1.01 [indicating
the board of supervisors adopted the Civil Service Rules in
1988].)
19(See L.A. Cnty. Code, § 2.14.020, subd. (B) [enacted in
1942 and amended in 1974 and 1982].)

26
 In sum, we reject petitioners’ assertion the sheriff and his
subordinates have the implied authority to rescind or modify
discipline during the pendency of commission appeals.

2. Petitioners do not show that MPP section 3-
04/020.80 authorized department personnel to
execute the settlements
In ALADS I, petitioners argued that MPP section 3-
04/020.80 “ ‘plainly provides authority to the Sheriff’s
subordinates to settle matters that are pending before the
Commission.’ ” (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 794.)
Section 3-04/020.80 provides in relevant part: “ ‘If discipline has
been imposed and the discipline is being appealed to the Civil
Service Commission and there are discussions about settling the
case, the division chief or division director shall consult with a
constitutional policing advisor and then obtain concurrence from
the Undersheriff prior to entering into a settlement agreement.’ ”
(Ibid., fn. omitted.)20 We rejected petitioners’ reliance on this
MPP provision because, inter alia, “the language [of the
provision] is ambiguous” and petitioners had not “establish[ed]
that (1) the manual is a proper delegation of authority from the
board of supervisors to department personnel to settle appeals of
discipline, or (2) the manual otherwise lawfully authorizes
department personnel to bind the county to those settlements.”
(See ALADS I, supra, at pp. 794–795, fn. omitted.)

20 In ALADS I, “[n]either side identifie[d the constitutional
policing advisor] or describe[d] his or her responsibilities.” (See
ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 794, fn. 26.) The same is
true in the instant review proceeding.

27
 In this proceeding, petitioners contend MPP section 3-
04/020.80 (1) “constitutes the lawful delegation by the Board of
Supervisors of authority to the Sheriff [and his subordinates] for
executing binding settlement agreements of disciplinary cases” or
(2) is a “law” that confers upon department personnel the power
to act on behalf of the county for the purposes of Government
Code section 23005.
Petitioners contend they alleged in the fourth amended
petition that five “ ‘duly authorized representatives of the Sheriff’ ”
negotiated MPP section 3-04/020.80 with representatives of
ALADS pursuant to the MMBA, and that, in July 2018, one or
more of those department representatives executed an agreement
with ALADS to adopt MPP section 3-04/020.80. From that
premise, petitioners argue, “[P]ursuant to [Los Angeles] County
Code section 5.04.030(O), th[at] agreement became binding upon
execution by [the aforementioned] management representatives
and representatives of ALADS,” meaning no board approval was
required for the county to be bound by MPP section 3-04/020.80,
which provision they claim authorizes division chiefs and division
directors to settle commission appeals.
We note petitioners do not argue the MMBA, as such,
granted the sheriff’s department officials executing the alleged
July 2018 agreement authority to bind the county to MPP
section 3-04/020.80. Rather, they rely upon a provision of the
MMBA that states: “ ‘The governing body of a public agency, or
such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other
representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such
governing body, shall meet and confer in good faith regarding
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with
representatives of such recognized employee organizations, as

28
defined in subdivision (b) of Section 3501, and shall consider fully
such presentations as are made by the employee organization on
behalf of its members prior to arriving at a determination of
policy or course of action.’ ” (Quoting Gov. Code, § 3505, italics
supplied by petitioners.) Thus, whether the representatives of
the sheriff’s department who signed the July 2018 agreement
could bind the county to MPP section 3-04/020.80 turns on
whether the board of supervisors or a law clothed these
department personnel with authority to bind the county to this
manual provision.
As we noted above, petitioners argue county code
section 5.04.030, subdivision O authorized the sheriff’s personnel
to sign the July 2018 agreement on the county’s behalf. That
ordinance provides in relevant part: “Agreements concerning any
matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the board of
supervisors or concerning any matters not otherwise delegated by
the board shall become binding when executed by the board of
supervisors and affected certified employee organizations.
Agreements concerning matters within the exclusive jurisdiction
of management representatives, or otherwise delegated to them
by the board, shall become binding when executed by said
affected management representatives and affected certified
employee organizations.” (L.A. Cnty. Code, § 5.04.030, subd. O.)
This ordinance did not delegate authority to sheriff’s
representatives to execute on behalf of the county the alleged
July 2018 agreement to adopt MPP section 3-04/020.80. County
code section 5.04.030, subdivision O simply provides that the
agreement would have become binding upon execution if the
matter were within those department representatives’ “exclusive
jurisdiction” or such contractual authority had been “delegated to

29
them by the board . . . .” (See L.A. Cnty. Code, § 5.04.030,
subd. O.) Petitioners do not direct us to (1) any law granting the
department representatives exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether division chiefs or division directors may settle
disciplinary appeals without board approval, 21 or (2) any
delegation of this authority from the board to these department
officials.
In sum, petitioners fail to demonstrate MPP section 3-
04/020.80 “is a proper delegation of authority from the board of
supervisors to department personnel to settle appeals of
discipline” (see ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 795,
quoting Gov. Code, § 23005), or constitutes the sort of “law” that
for the purposes of Government Code section 23005 could confer

21 Petitioners cite Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A) for the
proposition that “[t]he proposed adoption of MPP
section [3-04/020.80] was within the jurisdiction of management
representatives because it concerned matters affecting the
disciplinary process.” (See also L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules,
rule 18.01(A) [providing in relevant part that “an employee may
be suspended by the appointing power for up to and including
30 days . . . as a disciplinary measure”].) They do not claim — let
alone offer analysis and citation to authority demonstrating —
that the manual provision was within “the exclusive jurisdiction
of [the] management representatives” who allegedly executed the
July 2018 agreement requiring adoption of MPP
section 3-04/020.80. (See L.A. Cnty. Code, § 5.04.030, subd. O,
italics added; see also Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 466
[“ ‘ “[W]e may disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which [a party] reached the conclusions he wants us
to adopt.” ’ ”].)

30
upon the sheriff and his subordinates the power to act on behalf
of the county in executing such settlements. 22

3. Petitioners do not establish the county is bound
by an alleged past practice of allowing
department personnel to settle disciplinary
appeals
Petitioners maintain that in the fourth amended petition,
they alleged, “[S]ince at least 1980,” there has been “a lawful,
consistent practice of resolving . . . disciplinary disputes[ ] by the
means of executing a written settlement agreement between the
Captain or Chief making the disciplinary decision and the
individual ALADS member affected by the disciplinary decision.”
According to petitioners, they also averred, “[D]uring the same
period of time, it has never been necessary or required to obtain
the approval or agreement of the County Counsel, Director of
Personnel or Board of Supervisors in order for the Sheriff’s
Department and an ALADS member to negotiate and execute a
lawfully binding and enforceable settlement . . . [of] a dispute
concerning a disciplinary matter.”
Petitioners argue these allegations establish a binding
“past practice of the Sheriff’s Department entering into
settlement agreements with Deputy Sheriffs regarding
disciplinary appeals pending at the Civil Service Commission”
because this alleged “practice [was] (1) unequivocal; (2) clearly
enunciated and acted upon; and (3) readily ascertainable over a

22 Given this conclusion, we do not address whether
petitioners have allayed our concern from ALADS I that “the
language at issue [from MPP section 3-04/020.80] is ambiguous.”
(See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 794.)

31
reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice
accepted by both parties.” (Citing Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v.
County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1291 (Riverside
Sheriff’s Assn.).) As explained below, petitioners’ argument rests
on the implied and unsupported premise that the MMBA barred
the county from abolishing its supposed past practice of allowing
chiefs and captains to settle pending disciplinary appeals.
As a preliminary matter, the county asserts we held in
ALADS I that “the mere allegation of past practice, standing
alone, does not establish ‘that the chiefs executing [the
settlements] were “acting under authority of the board or
authority conferred by law” for the purposes of Government Code
section 23005.’ [Citation.]” (Citing ALADS I, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 794, 801.) The county misinterprets our
prior opinion.
In ALADS I, we rejected petitioners’ argument that MPP
section 3-04/020.80 conferred upon the chiefs authority to execute
the settlement agreements. (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 794–796.) Petitioners did not argue — and, consequently,
we did not address whether — a past practice could give rise to
authority to contract on behalf of the county under Government
Code section 23005. (See ALADS I, supra, at pp. 794–796.)
Instead, we simply remarked the trial court should have afforded
petitioners an opportunity to amend their initial pleading
because with further discovery, petitioners “may [have] be[en]
able to ascertain the basis (if any) for” the department’s alleged
“long-standing view that the sheriff and his subordinates are
authorized to settle appeals before the commission.” (See id. at
p. 801.)

32
 We note the sole authority on which petitioners rely for
their claim the county is bound by this alleged past practice is
Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1285. There, a
former sheriff’s deputy and an employee organization (Riverside
Sheriff’s Association or RSA) petitioned for declaratory relief and
a writ of mandate, alleging, inter alia, that Riverside County had
violated the MMBA by failing to meet and confer with RSA before
abrogating a past practice of granting annual step salary
increases for deputies who had been placed on leave due to
certain work-related disabilities under Labor Code section 4850.
(See Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., supra, at pp. 1287–1289, 1292.)
Riverside County placed the former deputy, who had been injured
in the course of duty, on leave for approximately eight months,
and, several months after she returned to work, the county
denied her annual step salary increase “because she had been
absent [during much of the year] and her performance could not
be evaluated . . . .” (See id. at pp. 1287–1288.)
On appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying the
petition for declaratory relief and for writ of mandate, the
reviewing court acknowledged that the MMBA “requires a public
agency’s governing body to ‘give reasonable written notice to each
recognized employee organization affected of any ordinance, rule,
resolution, or regulation directly relating to matters within the
scope of representation proposed to be adopted by the governing
body[,] . . . give such recognized employee organization the
opportunity to meet with the governing body[,]’ ” and “meet and
confer in good faith with the representatives of a recognized
employee organization before determining a policy or course of
action ‘regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.’ [Citation.]” (See Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., supra,

33
106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1289–1290, quoting Gov. Code, §§ 3504.5
& 3505, italics added.)
Further, the Court of Appeal adopted the Public Employee
Relations Board’s (PERB’s) three-part test for determining
whether an employer had a past practice, “the alteration of which
requires compliance with the MMBA.” (See Riverside Sheriff’s
Assn., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) Under that test, the
practice needs to have been “ ‘(1) unequivocal; (2) clearly
enunciated and acted upon; and (3) readily ascertainable over a
reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice
accepted by both parties. [Citation.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (See ibid.)
The Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. court found, “While [there
was] evidence . . . some deputies obtained step increases while on
[Labor Code section] 4850 leave without having worked a
sufficient time to be evaluated, [the evidence did] not establish
that such a practice was unequivocal, regular and consistent,
clearly enunciated or readily ascertainable over a reasonable
period of time.” (See Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.) The reviewing court thus affirmed
on the ground the former deputy and RSA “did not meet their
burden of establishing that a binding past practice to
automatically grant step increases to deputies on [Labor Code
section] 4850 leave existed.” (See id. at pp. 1292–1293.)
Critically, Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. explained, “A public
agency’s action must have a significant effect on wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment before it will be
subject to the provisions of the MMBA.” (See Riverside Sheriff’s
Assn., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) On its face, the alleged
past practice at issue in Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. would have had
a significant effect on wages for the purposes of the MMBA if the

34
former deputy and RSA had shown the practice satisfied PERB’s
three-part test.
For further guidance regarding the applicability of the
MMBA’s meet-and-confer requirement, we turn to our high
court’s decision in Claremont Police Officers Assn., supra,
39 Cal.4th 623. There, the City of Claremont decided to
implement a study that required its police personnel to fill out a
form with driver information when conducting vehicle stops in an
effort to determine whether officers were engaging in racial
profiling. (See id. at pp. 628–629.) The officers’ recognized
employee organization (Claremont Police Officers Association or
the Association) requested that the City meet and confer
regarding the study “because [the Association] asserted ‘the
implementation of policy and procedures in regard[ ] to this area
falls under California Government Code section 3504.’ ” (See
ibid.) 23 After the City denied that request, the Association filed a
petition to compel the City not to implement the study until it
met and conferred in good faith under the MMBA. (See
Claremont Police Officers Assn., supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 629.) The
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the petition,
concluding that the City’s implementation of the study was
subject to the MMBA because it “ ‘significantly affect[ed] officers’

23 Government Code section 3504 provides, “The scope of
representation shall include all matters relating to employment
conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not
limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, except, however, that the scope of representation
shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or
organization of any service or activity provided by law or
executive order.” (Gov. Code, § 3504.)

35
working conditions, particularly their job security and freedom
from disciplinary action, their prospects for promotion, and the
officers’ relations with the public.’ ” (See id. at pp. 629–630.)
On review, our high court articulated “a three-part inquiry”
for determining whether an employer’s action falls within the
“scope of representation” of the recognized employee organization
such that it is subject to the MMBA’s duty to meet and confer in
good faith. (See Claremont Police Officers Assn., supra,
39 Cal.4th at pp. 628, 630, 638.) “First, we ask whether the
management action has ‘a significant effect on the wages, hours,
or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees.’
[Citation.] If not, there is no duty to meet and confer.
[Citations.] Second, we ask whether the significant and adverse
effect arises from the implementation of a fundamental
managerial or policy decision. If not, then . . . the meet-and-
confer requirement applies. [Citation.] Third, if both factors are
present — if an action taken to implement a fundamental
managerial or policy decision has a significant and adverse effect
on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees —
we apply a balancing test. The action ‘is within the scope of
representation only if the employer’s need for unencumbered
decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the
benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the
action in question.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 638.) 24

24 We acknowledge PERB recently decided that Claremont
Police Officers Assn.’s balancing test (i.e., the third prong) applies
only to a certain subset of management actions, to wit,
“ ‘decisions that directly affect employment, such as eliminating
jobs, . . . [that] involve “a change in the scope and direction of the
enterprise, or . . . the employer’s “retained freedom to manage its

36
 Before applying this three-part test to the case before it,
the Supreme Court explained, “Both parties agree that the City’s
decision to take measures against racial profiling, specifically its
decision to implement the [s]tudy as a necessary first step, is a
fundamental managerial or policy decision” that “is outside the
scope of representation [citation], and is excepted from [the
MMBA’s] meet-and-confer requirement.” (See Claremont Police
Officers Assn., supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 628, 632, italics added.)
Conversely, the high court found that “the City’s implementation
of the [s]tudy, requiring officers to fill out the [f]orms in order to
collect data on possible racial profiling,” had to be analyzed to
determine whether the City was obligated to meet and confer
with the Association. (See id. at p. 635, italics added.)
The Supreme Court found the City’s implementation of the
study “did not have a significant and adverse effect on the
officers’ working conditions.” (Claremont Police Officers Assn.,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638.) The court explained the study
“ ‘require[d] slightly more information to be collected by the
officer than required in completing the citation or arrest report[,]’
” and “officers may complete [the f]orm in about two minutes and
may complete between four and six such [f]orms in a 12-hour

affairs unrelated to employment[.]” ’ . . . [Citation.]” (See
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los
Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 982, 997–998 & fn. 6, citing, inter
alia, Santa Clara County District Attorney Investigators’
Association v. County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Dec. No. 2799-
M.) We do not decide whether PERB’s decision is correct because
as explained later in this part, petitioners do not develop their
implicit contention that the MMBA constrained the county’s
decision to abandon its alleged practice of allowing department
personnel to settle commission appeals.

37
shift.” (See id. at pp. 638–639.) Because “the impact on the
officers’ working conditions was de minimis,” the high court
“conclude[d] the City was not required to meet and confer
[citation] with the Association before implementing the [s]tudy.”
(See ibid.) “Because there was no significant and adverse effect,
[the high court did not need to] balance the City’s need for
unencumbered decisionmaking . . . against the benefit to
employer-employee relations from bargaining about the subject.”
(Id. at p. 639.) In arriving at this conclusion, the Claremont
Police Officers Assn. court “emphasize[d] the narrowness of [its]
holding:” “In determining that the City was not required to meet
and confer with the Association before implementing the [s]tudy,
[the high court did] not decide whether such a duty would exist
should issues regarding officer discipline, privacy rights, and
other potential effects [citation], arise after the City implements
the [s]tudy.” (See ibid.)
Conspicuously absent from petitioners’ appellate briefing is
any analysis or citation to legal authority demonstrating that the
county’s purported abrogation of a past practice of permitting
chiefs and captains to settle disciplinary appeals without board
approval satisfies the threshold requirement of MMBA
applicability discussed in Claremont Police Officers Assn. and
Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. More specifically, petitioners do not
argue, let alone demonstrate, that the alleged abrogation of this
purported past practice “significantly and adversely affects a
bargaining unit’s wages, hours, or working conditions” and does
not have a “de minimis” impact on such matters. (See Claremont
Police Officers Assn., supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 637–638; see also
Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290

38
[acknowledging this requirement].) 25 Petitioners also do not
address whether the supposed rescission of that past practice
constitutes (1) a fundamental managerial or policy decision that
is excepted from the MMBA, (2) the implementation of such a

25 In a footnote in the section of their opening brief in
which they argue MPP section 3-04/020.80 is binding on the
county, petitioners cite two PERB decisions for the sweeping
proposition that “[i]ssues involving discipline are mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the MMBA.” (Citing San
Bernardino Teachers Assn. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch.
Dist. (1982) PERB Dec. No. 255, p. 11; American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees Local 3299 et al. v. Regents
of the Univ. of California (2021) PERB Dec. No. 2783-H, p. 30.)
Petitioners do not argue — let alone offer analysis demonstrating
— these decisions hold that recission of the county’s alleged past
practice of allowing chiefs and captains to settle disciplinary
appeals without board approval is subject to the MMBA’s meet-
and-confer requirement. Furthermore, in the absence of any
discussion of these PERB decisions in petitioners’ appellate
briefing, we fail to discern why petitioners believe they are
relevant to the instant case. (See San Bernardino Teachers
Assn., supra, PERB Dec. No. 255, p. 11 [indicating that PERB
addressed whether “rules of conduct which subject employees to
disciplinary action are subject to negotiation both as to criteria
for discipline and as to procedure to be followed”]; American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Local 3299,
supra, PERB Dec. No. 2783-H, pp. 30–31 [indicating that PERB
addressed whether an employer failed to “meet and confer in good
faith over negotiable effects of [its] decision to mandate influenza
vaccinations”]; see also United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies,
LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 165, fn. 6 (United Grand Corp.)
[“ ‘[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal
authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.’ ”].)

39
fundamental managerial or policy decision that is potentially
subject to the MMBA, or (3) neither.
In short, regardless of whether petitioners alleged facts
showing a past county practice that satisfies the three-part PERB
test discussed in Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., they fail to show that
abrogating an alleged past practice of allowing chiefs and
captains to settle commission appeals without board approval is
subject to the MMBA’s meet and confer obligation. Accordingly,
petitioners fail to demonstrate the MMBA prohibited the county
from abrogating unilaterally that alleged past practice. (See
Standards of Review, ante [noting petitioners must affirmatively
demonstrate error with cogent argument and legal analysis to
attain appellate relief].)
In light of our resolution of this issue, we do not address
petitioners’ argument that they sufficiently alleged a past
practice satisfying the three-pronged PERB test described in
Riverside Sheriff’s Assn., including their claim that a
February 2021 report from the Los Angeles County Office of
Inspector General shows that such a past practice existed.

4. The county is not collaterally estopped from
denying the chiefs’ authority to execute the
settlements
“ ‘An earlier ruling “will be given collateral estoppel effect
when (1) the issue is identical to that decided in a former
proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and (3) necessarily
decided; (4) the doctrine is asserted against a party to the former
action or one who was in privity with such a party; and (5) the
former decision is final and was made on the merits.” ’
[Citation.]” (Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 655, 664.)

40
 Petitioners seem to argue that the unpublished decision in
Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Baca (Nov. 13, 2013, B238141)
[nonpub. opn.] [2013 WL 6000970] (Baca) collaterally estops the
county from denying that the chiefs were authorized to execute
the settlements. It does not. As explained below, Baca does not
address the issue before us.
In Baca, ALADS entered into a settlement agreement with
the department in 1991 to resolve a civil action and an unfair
labor practice proceeding brought by ALADS. (See Baca, supra,
B238141 [2013 WL 6000970 at p. *1].) In the unfair labor
practice proceeding, ALADS had challenged the department’s
abrogation of its longstanding practice of postponing
administrative investigations of potential criminal conduct
perpetrated by sworn officers until the department’s criminal
investigation, and, if charges were filed, the trial and any
appeals, were completed. (See ibid.) The 1991 settlement, which
was executed by ALADS’s general counsel and the department’s
director of employee relations, “provided the Department would
not require a deputy subject to concurrent criminal and
administrative investigations arising out of the same incident to
submit to an administrative interrogation until it was
determined criminal charges would not be filed, . . . or the deputy
was arraigned on the criminal charge or the deputy requested a
continuance on the criminal charge . . . .” (See id. at pp. *2, *4.)
Between December 2006 and August 2009, the department
informed ALADS that it planned to interview deputies involved
in shootings prior to the district attorney’s determination
regarding whether criminal charges would be filed, and the
department attempted to renegotiate the 1991 settlement with
ALADS. (See Baca, supra, B238141 [2013 WL 6000970 at pp. *1,

41
*3].) ALADS later sued the department and the county, seeking
specific performance of the 1991 settlement agreement and a
declaration of the agreement’s continuing validity. (See id. at
p. *3.) The trial court entered judgment against ALADS after a
bench trial on the grounds the settlement was terminable at will
after a reasonable period of time, and a reasonable period had
elapsed by the time the department provided ALADS with
reasonable notice of termination. (See id. at pp. *1, *4–5.)
On appeal, our colleagues in Division Seven reversed the
judgment and remanded to the trial court with directions to
declare the continuing validity of the 1991 settlement agreement
and order other appropriate relief. (See Baca, supra, B238141
[2013 WL 6000970 at pp. *1, *9].) First, the reviewing court
rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the 1991 settlement was
terminable upon reasonable notice after a reasonable period of
time. (See id. at pp. *1, *5–6.)
The Baca court also rejected the county’s argument that
the 1991 settlement was void and unenforceable because there
was no evidence that the department’s director of employee
relations had attained board approval to execute the agreement
or that he was otherwise authorized to enter into it. (See Baca,
supra, B238141 [2013 WL 6000970 at pp. *7–9], citing, inter alia,
Gov. Code, § 23005.) Instead, the court ruled the director of
employee relations had “actual and ostensible authority to
negotiate and execute the 1991 settlement agreement.” (See
Baca, supra, at p. *8.) The reviewing court explained that the
county had conceded the director of employee relations was
authorized to execute the 1991 settlement so long as the
agreement was interpreted such that it was terminable with
reasonable notice after a reasonable period of time had elapsed.

42
(See id. at pp. *7–8 [discussing the “Department[’s]” concession];
see also id. at p. *3, & fn. 3 [noting that references to the
“Department” in Baca refer also to the county].) The court then
held the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred the county from
contesting the validity of the settlement because “both parties
acted for nearly two decades under the terms of the agreement”
and the court was “not dealing with a public works contract, . . .
no expenditure of public funds [was] involved[, and] . . . applying
estoppel [would not] directly contravene statutory limitations on
the county’s authority.” (See id. at pp. *8–9.)
Petitioners maintain the Baca court “addressed the same
statute involved in the instant matter, namely Government Code
section 23005, as well as the actual and ostensible authority
for a Sheriff’s Department official to negotiate a settlement
agreement . . . .” The Baca court held that the director of
employee relations was authorized to enter into a settlement on
behalf of the county as to ALADS’s unfair labor practice charge
and civil action concerning the department’s administrative
investigations of deputies who could be subject to criminal
investigation. (See Baca, supra, B238141 [2013 WL 6000970 at
pp. *1, *4, *7–9].) The court thus had no occasion to address
whether department chiefs may settle commission appeals
without board approval. Because the Baca court did not decide
the issue presented here, the decision does not collaterally estop
the county from litigating the validity of the settlements before
us.

C. Petitioners Do Not Demonstrate that They Pleaded
Viable Promissory Estoppel Causes of Action
We explained in ALADS I that “ ‘[p]romissory estoppel may
not be invoked against a governmental entity if “ ‘it would

43
operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 796–797.) We held,
“Promissory estoppel . . . is not available to defeat the public’s
interest in ensuring that only the board of supervisors, its agents
and officers, and other officials acting under authority conferred
by law have the power to incur liability on behalf of the county.”
(Id. at p. 797.) For that reason, we concluded the chiefs’ lack of
authority to execute the settlements was fatal to petitioners’
promissory estoppel causes of action. (See id. at pp. 796–797.)
In the instant review proceeding, petitioners complain that
“the lower court failed to address [their] causes of action for
promissory estoppel in its Order sustaining the Demurrer.” In
advancing this argument, petitioners overlook the general
principle that “[an] appellate court reviews the trial court’s
decision, not its rationale.” (See Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc.
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079.) Petitioners’ promissory
estoppel claims fail because the chiefs lacked authority to execute
the settlements. (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 796–797; see also Discussion, part B, ante [explaining that
petitioners have not shown the chiefs had this authority].)
Because petitioners’ causes of action for promissory estoppel are
defective, we need not determine whether the trial court should
have separately addressed those causes of action in its written
order.

D. Any Error on the Part of the Trial Court In
Sustaining the Demurrer to the Declaratory Relief
Cause of Action Was Harmless
In their tenth cause of action for declaratory relief,
petitioners allege: “An actual controversy has arisen and now

44
exists between ALADS, Jouzi, Alvarado, and Aragon on the one
hand, and [the county], on the other hand, concerning [the
county’s] obligation to comply with the terms of settlement
agreements [the county] enter[s] into, by and through the
Department, during the pendency of administrative discipline
cases such as the Jouzi Settlement Agreement, Alvarado
Settlement Agreement and Aragon Settlement Agreement.
[Petitioners] contend that [the county is] obligated to comply with
the terms of such settlement agreements. [The county]
contend[s] that [it is] not legally obligated to comply with the
terms of such settlement agreements.” 26
According to petitioners, “even if [they] are not entitled to a
judgment in their favor” on their declaratory relief cause of
action, the demurrer to this claim should have been overruled
because they alleged “an actual controversy . . . .” We explained
in ALADS I, however, that this “type of ‘technical’ error is
‘harmless if,’ as is the case here, ‘the substantive claim’
underlying the request for declaratory relief ‘is legally untenable.’
[Citation.]” (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.)
Thus, any error on the part of the trial court in sustaining the

26 Petitioners also seek injunctive relief in connection with
their tenth cause of action. By failing to address this claim for
injunctive relief in their appellate briefing, petitioners have
abandoned any claim the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to this aspect of their tenth cause of action. (See
ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 798, fn. 33 [ruling
petitioners had likewise abandoned their claim for injunctive
relief by failing to discuss it in their briefing].)

45
demurrer to the tenth cause of action does not warrant
reversal. 27

DISPOSITION
We exercise our discretion to construe this appeal as a
petition for writ of mandate. That writ petition is denied. Real
parties in interest are awarded their costs in this review
proceeding.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.

We thus do not address the county’s argument that
27
ALADS lacks associational standing to seek declaratory relief.
Additionally, petitioners do not claim in this review
proceeding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
leave to amend. They thus forfeit any such claim of error. (See
United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [holding
that if a party fails to support a claim of error with cogent
argument, the reviewing court may deem the claim forfeited].)

46


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re Izaiah W., a Minor.

Ruth D. et al., A174110
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Solano County
v. Super. Ct. No. AD2300020)

E.G.,
Objector and Appellant.

E.G., the mother of minor, Izaiah W. (Izaiah), appeals from the trial
court’s judgment granting a petition to declare Izaiah free from E.G.’s
parental custody and control filed by Izaiah’s guardians, E.G.’s mother,
Ruth D. (Ruth), and Ruth’s partner, Robin T. (Robin).1 On appeal, E.G.
contends that the trial court’s order was an abuse of discretion. She claims
she presented evidence rebutting the statutory presumption of an intent to
abandon, and that, without the presumption, Ruth and Robin failed to

1 The petition also asked the court to declare Izaiah free from the

parental custody and control of his father, but the trial court bifurcated the
father’s case.

1
demonstrate intent to abandon by clear and convincing evidence. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2011, E.G. gave birth to Izaiah when she was 19 years
old. Weeks after Izaiah was born, E.G. and Izaiah moved in with Ruth
(E.G.’s mother) and Robin (Ruth’s partner).
In October 2015, when Izaiah was three years old, Ruth and Robin
were appointed as his guardians with E.G.’s consent.2
In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, E.G. left Izaiah (who was
eight years old) with Ruth and Robin and moved in with her boyfriend,
DeMario G. (DeMario).
In April 2022, there was a disagreement between DeMario, Ruth,
and Robin. After the disagreement, E.G. was “upset” at Ruth and Robin,
and E.G. limited her contact with Ruth and Robin because of the
disagreement.3

2 According to E.G., she “was always told the guardianship was for

[her] to get on track, . . . but eventually there was going to be an end to the
guardianship.”
3 According to DeMario, Ruth and Robin were “trying to control the

parameters of [his] proposal to [E.G.]” and wanted to have the proposal at
their residence. They set a date for Ruth, Robin, DeMario, and his mother
to do a walk through of their property, but, on the day they were set to
meet, Ruth repeatedly asked to change the time. DeMario “became
frustrated because . . . Ruth and Robin were being disrespectful to not only
[his] time but [his] mother’s time,” and he “simply stopped responding.”
After not responding for several days, DeMario answered their call. Robin
and Ruth began to scream at him, repeatedly cut him off, and called him a
liar, and Robin banned him from their property.

2
 In December 2022, E.G. married DeMario.4 In January 2023, E.G.
gave birth to a daughter, A.G.
In April 2023, E.G. filed a petition requesting the termination of
Izaiah’s guardianship.
In May 2023, Ruth and Robin filed a petition to declare Izaiah free
from parental custody and control.
Over the course of multiple days in March 2024, September 2024,
and April 2025, Robin, Ruth, E.G., DeMario, and other witnesses testified
at trial.
E.G. testified that she did not pay Ruth and Robin any child support
from October 2015 (when Ruth and Robin were appointed guardians) to
May 2023 (when Ruth and Robin filed a petition to declare Izaiah free from
parental custody and control), even though she was working from 2020 to
2022.
E.G. testified about a document she described as a “timeline . . . of
when [she] was able to either visit or communicate with I[z]aiah via text,
FaceTime, [or] phone calls.”5 Asked to read from the timeline, she stated:
“ ‘September 13, 2022, reached out via text.[6] September 17, 2022, call
with Isaiah. . . . [¶] October 4, 2022, call with Isaiah. . . . November 25,

4 Izaiah did not attend E.G.’s wedding.

5 The timeline was part of an exhibit that Ruth and Robin moved to

admit, but the trial court sustained E.G.’s objection to the admission of the
exhibit.
6 On September 13, 2022, E.G. sent a text message to Ruth stating,

“hello hope all is well. wanted to see if you guys had some free time today. i
wanted to say hi to [Izaiah.]”

3
2022, call with Isaiah.[7] November 28, 2022, call with Isaiah.[8] . . .
December [XX], 2022, visit with Isaiah.’ ”9 E.G. testified that, during the
six-month period from September 2022 through February 2023 (the
statutory period), she had “[j]ust one visit” with Izaiah. During the
statutory period, she had four calls with Izaiah; one in September, one in
October, and two in November. E.G. never sent Izaiah any letters or cards.
E.G. testified that, while pregnant, she “had a team of doctors and
. . . was advised by all of them to limit the amount of stress,” and, to avoid
stress, she “limited . . . contact with the guardians” which, in turn, limited
her communication with Izaiah. E.G. testified that “having to choose
between . . . [her] new family and I[z]aiah . . . was very difficult.” E.G.
admitted that, during her pregnancy, she continued to work through her
third trimester, she planned a wedding, and she got married.
E.G. testified that A.G. was born in January 2023. E.G. never sent
any pictures or videos of A.G. to Izaiah. E.G.’s first visit with Izaiah in
2023 was in March.
On June 4, 2025, the trial court issued a final statement of decision.
The trial court “found the testimony of [Ruth and Robin] to be credible.”
The trial court “found the testimony of [E.G.], [DeMario], and [E.G.’s]
mother-in-law to be less credible” because “[t]heir testimony was
inconsistent with that of each other and that of [Ruth and Robin]” and

7 On November 25, 2022, E.G. sent a text message stating, “im at

work. ill be off in 30 mins,” and Ruth replied, “No Worries. I dialed you
accidentally. But you can call when you get off.”
8 On November 28, 2022, Ruth sent E.G. a text message asking what

time she was “off,” E.G. replied, “i just got off,” and Ruth replied, “We are
home if you have time to call.”
9 We have obscured this date because it is Izaiah’s birth date.

4
“was uncorroborated and inconsistent with the exhibits admitted into
evidence.”
The trial court found that E.G.’s failure to “provide child support
during the statutory period . . . creat[ed] a rebuttable presumption of the
intent to abandon.”
The trial court “conclude[d] that the 5 times [E.G.] contacted [Izaiah]
during the 6-month period [were] not meaningful efforts, but only token
efforts to communicate with him.” The trial court stated that “testimony
by [E.G.] and text messages admitted into evidence support a finding that
. . . it was . . . Ruth . . . who initiated some of the contact between [E.G.]
and [Izaiah] during the relevant period.”
The trial court rejected E.G.’s argument that “she had limited
contact with [Ruth and Robin] and [Izaiah] because of her high-risk
pregnancy and concern for her stress, thus rebutting the presumption of
abandonment.” The trial court stated that E.G.’s “pregnancy and stress
concerns may have possibly limited her in-person contact with [Izaiah], but
does not excuse her [from her] duty to communicate with him by other
means which did not require her to have contact with [Ruth and Robin].”
The trial court stated that E.G. “could have communicated with him by
sending him cards and/or letters during her pregnancy, photos or videos of
his new baby sister.” The trial court stated that “[t]he evidence presented
was contrary to this assertion[;] she planned her wedding, got married, and
continued to work through her third trimester.”
The trial court “[found] based on clear and convincing evidence, that
[Izaiah] was left with no contact and no financial support for over a six (6)
month period.” The trial court “[found] that based on the lack of contact
and financial support, there is an inference of an intent to abandon [Izaiah]

5
pursuant to Family Code section 7822.” The trial court found E.G. did not
rebut the presumption of abandonment. The trial court granted the
petition as to E.G. and “declare[d] [Izaiah] freed from [E.G.’s] custody and
control.”
E.G. appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
“Section 7822 provides a . . . mechanism for terminating parental
rights based on a parent’s voluntary abandonment of a child.” (In re
Aubrey T. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 316, 325.) “An interested person may file
a petition . . . for an order or judgment declaring a child free from the
custody and control of either or both parents” under certain circumstances
(Fam. Code, § 7841, subd. (a)), including if a “child has been left by both
parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a
period of six months without any provision for the child’s support, or
without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the
part of the parent or parents to abandon the child.” (Fam. Code, § 7822,
subd. (a)(2).) “The parent need not intend to abandon the child
permanently; it is sufficient the parent had the intent to abandon the child
during the statutory period.” (In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 839.)
In determining whether a parent intended to abandon a child, “the court
‘must objectively measure the parent’s conduct, “consider[ing] not only the
number and frequency of his or her efforts to communicate with the child,
but the genuineness of” the parent’s efforts.’ ” (In re Aubrey T., at p. 327.)
“If the parent or parents have made only token efforts to support or
communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by

6
the parent or parents.”10 (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (b).) “[T]oken efforts
will not overcome this statutory presumption.” (Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 912, 923.) A trial court’s finding of abandonment must “be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (See Fam. Code, § 7821 [“A
finding pursuant to this chapter shall be supported by clear and convincing
evidence, except as otherwise provided”].)11
“[F]ailure to provide support, or failure to communicate is
presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon.” (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd.
(b).) “[W]hen a party challenging the existence of section 7822’s
presumption of an intent to abandon presents evidence of its nonexistence,
the presumption disappears and the court must find the requisite intent
‘without regard to the presumption’ and ‘with no change in the allocation
in the burden of proof.’ ” (In re Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.)
“ ‘ “The questions of abandonment and of intent . . . , including the issue of
whether the statutory presumption has been overcome satisfactorily, are
questions of fact for the resolution of the trial court.” ’” (Adoption of A.B.,
supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 922.)
On appeal, when a parent challenges a trial court’s factual finding
that the presumption has not been overcome, “[t]he question is whether
there was substantial evidence to support the . . . court’s finding that [the
parent] failed to overcome that presumption.” (See In re Aubrey T., supra,

10 “In the event that a guardian has been appointed for the child, the

court may still declare the child abandoned if the parent or parents have
failed to communicate with or support the child within the meaning of this
section.” (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (b).)
11 “The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence . . .

‘requires a finding of high probability.’ [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998 (O.B.).)

7
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 328.) “[A]n appellate court must account for the clear
and convincing standard of proof when addressing a claim that the
evidence does not support a finding made under this standard.” (O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) “[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at pp. 995–996.) “[A]n appellate
court reviewing a finding made pursuant to the clear and convincing
standard does not reweigh the evidence itself.” (Id. at p. 1008.)
“Consistent with well-established principles governing review for
sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court
must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.)
B. Analysis
As an initial matter, we note that E.G. does not, and could not,
contend on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that her failure to
“provide child support during the statutory period . . . creat[ed] a
rebuttable presumption of the intent to abandon.” Under the statute,
“failure to provide support, or failure to communicate is presumptive
evidence of the intent to abandon.” (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (b).) It is
undisputed that E.G. did not give Ruth and Robin any money for Izaiah’s
support during the statutory period even though she was working in 2022,
and, on appeal, E.G. does not offer any excuse for not doing so.
Rather, E.G. contends that she rebutted the presumption by
presenting evidence that her five contacts with Izaiah (one visit and four

8
calls) during the six-month statutory period were not token efforts because
her “limited contact with Izaiah . . . was the result of the ongoing family
conflict, petitioners’ refusal to permit unsupervised contact, and
pregnancy-related stress—not parental indifference.” We are not
persuaded. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the record
as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found by clear and convincing evidence that E.G. failed to
overcome the presumption that she intended to abandon Izaiah. (See O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995–996.)
To begin with, a reasonable fact finder could have found that medical
advice to limit stress was not truly a cause of E.G.’s limited contact with
Izaiah during the statutory period. During trial, E.G. claimed that she
“had a team of doctors and . . . was advised by all of them to limit the
amount of stress,” and, to avoid stress, she “limited . . . contact with the
guardians” which, in turn, limited her communication with Izaiah. But the
trial court found that there was “evidence . . . contrary to” her assertion of
“pregnancy and stress concerns.” Specifically, E.G. admitted that, during
her pregnancy, she continued to work through her third trimester, she
planned a wedding, and she got married. A reasonable fact finder could
also have found that, because, while pregnant, E.G. was capable of
tolerating the stress of working and chose to tolerate the stress of wedding
planning and getting married, she was capable of tolerating the stress of
communicating with, or being in the presence of, Ruth and Robin so that
she could have contact with Izaiah, but she chose not to do so.
Furthermore, based on the text messages that were admitted during
trial, a reasonable fact finder could have found that communicating with
Ruth and Robin to arrange calls with Izaiah was not so stressful that doing

9
so would have been contrary to medical advice. For example, on
September 13, 2022, any stress did not deter E.G. from sending a text
message to Ruth stating, “hello hope all is well. wanted to see if you guys
had some free time today. i wanted to say hi to [Izaiah.]” Nor did stress
deter E.G. from exchanging text messages on November 25, 2022, when
E.G. sent a text message stating, “im at work. ill be off in 30 mins,” and
Ruth replied, “No Worries. I dialed you accidentally. But you can call when
you get off.” Nor did stress deter her from exchanging text messages three
days later, when Ruth asked her what time she was “off,” E.G. replied, “i
just got off,” and Ruth replied, “We are home if you have time to call.”
Based on these text messages in the record, a reasonable fact finder could
have found that any stress caused by communicating with Ruth and Robin
to arrange calls with Izaiah was not intolerable.
Even assuming that family conflict made contact with Ruth and
Robin stressful and Ruth and Robin’s refusal to permit unsupervised
contact made visits stressful, the record contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could have found that such stress was not
truly a cause of E.G.’s limited contact with Izaiah during the statutory
period. As the trial court observed, while her “pregnancy and stress
concerns may have possibly limited her in-person contact” with Izaiah,
they did not excuse her from “her duty to communicate with him by other
means which did not require her to have contact with the Petitioners.”
Specifically, E.G. “could have communicated with him by sending him
cards and/or letters.” Because E.G. chose not to send cards or letters, a

10
reasonable fact finder could have found that E.G.’s limited contact with
Izaiah was a choice.12
Based on E.G.’s five contacts with Izaiah during the six-month
statutory period and the other substantial evidence discussed above, we
conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have found under the clear and
convincing evidence standard that E.G. failed to overcome the presumption
that she intended to abandon Izaiah. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 995–996.)

12 E.G. argues that she limited contact with Izaiah because of

restrictions Ruth and Robin placed on her access to Izaiah and notes that,
in In re H.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 42, the court stated that “it would be
unfair to treat [the father’s] decision to prevent contact as evidence that
[the] mother did not care to talk to her daughters.” (Id. at p. 53.) In re
H.D. is distinguishable because, there, the “mother tried to maintain
contact” but the father prevented contact because he “didn’t want the girls
interacting with her.” (Id. at p. 52.)
Similarly, E.G. argues that she managed to maintain some
communication with Izaiah despite Ruth and Robin’s visitation constraints
and notes that, in In re Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 316, the father
“rebutted [the] presumption with his testimony and documentary evidence
showing that he visited Aubrey when permitted by [the mother].” (Id. at
p. 330.) In re Aubrey T. is distinguishable because, “there were times when
[the mother] refused [the father’s] requests for a visit.” (Id. at p. 329.)
Along the same lines, E.G. argues that her contact with Izaiah
remained subject to Ruth and Robin’s supervision and notes that, in In re
E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 828, the mother established multiple
conditions limiting father’s contact with children. In re E.M. is
distinguishable because, there, the mother would not allow the father to
see their children until he was sober for 30 days. (Id. at p. 833.)
Here, while Ruth and Robin may have placed conditions on visits,
including by not allowing E.G. to see Izaiah alone, E.G. does not contend
that Ruth and Robin prevented her when she tried to make contact.

11
 Finally, E.G. contends that the petition to terminate Ruth and
Robin’s guardianship that she filed was “entirely inconsistent” with an
intent to abandon. But the petition was filed in April 2023, after the six-
month statutory period. As E.G. acknowledged in her opening brief, “[t]he
parent need not intend to abandon the child permanently; it is sufficient
the parent had the intent to abandon the child during the statutory
period.” (In re E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.) Here, a reasonable
fact finder could have found that, while evidence that E.G. sought to
terminate Izaiah’s guardianship might show that she did not intend to
abandon Izaiah permanently, it does not dissipate the clear and convincing
evidence that she intended to abandon Izaiah during the statutory period.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GORDON, J.*

* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

12


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Lassen)

THE PEOPLE, C103807
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 2024-
v. CR0091057)

NORBERTO ANDRADE CARDENAS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Norberto Andrade Cardenas pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal
injury on a cohabitant. On appeal, he contends that his plea was not knowing and
voluntary because the trial court failed to ensure he understood the constitutional rights
he was waiving. We are not able to consider this contention because Cardenas failed to
obtain a certificate of probable cause.
BACKGROUND
Cardenas pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant after a
colloquy with the trial court addressing the charges and his constitutional rights. (Pen.
Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).)1 Consistent with the parties’ plea agreement, the court
sentenced him to three years in prison.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
 Cardenas filed a timely notice of appeal that included a checked box stating the
“appeal is based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not
affect the validity of the plea.” Cardenas did not request or obtain a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Cardenas seeks reversal on the ground that the trial court failed to properly advise
him of his constitutional rights and that his plea was therefore not knowing and
voluntary. The People argue that the appeal must be dismissed because Cardenas failed
to obtain a certificate of probable cause. We agree with the People.
“In general, a defendant may appeal from a final judgment of conviction, unless
otherwise limited by sections 1237.1 and 1237.5.” (People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th
296, 298-299, citing § 1237 & Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) Section 1237.5
provides: “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction
upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, … except where both of the following are met:
[¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under
oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other
grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and
filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” (See
generally People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 43 [discussing statute].) “ ‘[I]ssues
going to the validity of a plea require’ a certificate of probable cause.” (People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694.)
Here, section 1237.5 bars Cardenas’s appeal because his claim that he did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights is a challenge to the validity of
his plea. (See People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76.) Cardenas urges us to
overlook the absence of a certificate of probable cause because the People failed to object
on that basis below. We decline to do so. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084,
1097 [“defendant may not obtain review of certificate issues unless he has complied”

2
with the requirement to obtain a certificate of probable cause]; id. at p. 1098 [§ 1237.5 “is
a general ‘legislative command’ to defendants,” “lays down a ‘condition precedent’ to the
taking of an appeal within its scope,” and “should be applied in a strict manner”];
Panizzon, at p. 89, fn. 15 [“condemn[ing]” practice of “proceed[ing] to address the merits
of a defendant’s appeal following a guilty or nolo contendere plea despite the defendant’s
failure to strictly comply with section 1237.5”].) Because Cardenas’s sole claim on
appeal is not cognizable due to the failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause, we
will dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

3


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)

THE PEOPLE, C104570
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 25CF00833)
v.

ADRIAN KEVIN HILLS, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

After defendant Adrian Kevin Hills, Jr., was charged with multiple felonies in
connection with an altercation with his then-girlfriend (the victim), he called and wrote to
a mutual acquaintance about the victim’s potential upcoming testimony. Based on those
communications, a jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade her from testifying.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation for
three years. On appeal, Hills argues his conviction for attempted dissuasion is not
supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Hills and the victim dated for six to eight months. Over the course of their
relationship, they fought “sometimes.” On at least one occasion, he was violent with the
victim and “threw [her] around.” During one fight, she called the police. She considered
getting a restraining order against him but decided not to after he said he would “ruin”

1
her if she did. Previously, he had also threatened to get the victim “kicked out” of her
apartment and have her child “taken away.”
Late one night in November 2024, Hills entered the victim’s apartment through
her bedroom window and “tossed [her] around a little bit” “all over the house.” The
victim called 911 and a neighbor called the police. Hills was arrested that same night.
Four days later, Hills called the victim from jail half an hour before his
arraignment. He told her he was taking his case all the way to trial and that she was
going, too. She responded, “I don’t want to do any … I don’t want any of this. No, I’m
cool. I just want you to stay away from me.” He replied, “Well, then you got to let them
know.” After this call, at his arraignment, Hills was served with a domestic violence
restraining order prohibiting him from contacting the victim. He called her once more
before ceasing direct contact.
Three months later, on the eve of Hills’ preliminary hearing, Hills called a mutual
friend of his and the victim’s. Hills talked about the victim’s description of the incident.
The friend asked, “She can’t retract nothing? She can’t do nothing?” Hills responded,
“I’m going to tread lightly on that, but of course.” The friend said, “from what [the
victim] said, she’s not going to court or nothing.” Hills responded that he had not “talked
to her, because you know they listening,” then said, “it’s like … I win,” “She’s their only
evidence,” and “If that’s the case, then, all right, then. It’s a matter of time, then this shit
go away.” Hills also said he would write to the friend.
In that letter, Hills wrote: “* means important.” “Well here[’]s the thing. If she
doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good. If she happens to come to court
hopefully she recants and is on my side.* … If anything* she told me to come through
the window … . That[’]s what she wanted me to do*. That would help drop that charge.
[¶] We need to work on getting these charges dropped … . [¶] Do what you can but
tread lightly cause they are sensitive. Maybe tell them I[’]m facing 20 years and
something should be done on my favor. Or them just stay away from the situation. …

2
[¶] They can also plead the 5th if they happen to show up to court. That shouldn[’]t hurt
me. This needs to go away*.” The friend understood “they are sensitive” as referring to
the victim.
The following day, the date of Hills’ preliminary hearing, Hills called the friend
again, twice. In the first conversation, Hills told the friend, “we got to be easy on the
phone, you know what I’m saying,” “Come on, bro. Just do what you can, bro,” and
“Like that word that you mentioned yesterday, the R word,” “[i]f they can R word, you
know what I’m saying?” The friend understood Hills’ “Come on, bro. Just do what you
can, bro” as asking him to speak with the victim. At trial, the friend said he could not
recall what Hills was referring to with “the R word,” but did not think it meant
“retracting.”
In the second conversation that day, Hills said, “Come on, bro. You know what
I’m saying? I sent you one of the birdies, but just do what you got to do. Know what I’m
saying?” The friend replied that the victim “was not elaborating, not doing nothing,” and
“They just pretty much fishing at this point.” Hills said, “They said the window was
closed when they checked it. I’m like, man. At the end of the day, this shit got to get …
You know what I’m saying,” and “Shit got to get fixed, bro.” Then, later in the
conversation, Hills said, “they’re trying to make it bad, bro,” and “I low key- Shit got to
be done, bro. You know what I’m saying,” “[l]ike, from your end?” The friend,
understanding Hills as asking him to reach out to the victim, responded, “Yeah. Like I
said, I’ll definitely reach out, you feel me,” and “I’m not going to push it like that to
where, oh, shit, no.” Not wanting to be “involved in the situation,” the friend did not
reach out to the victim on behalf of Hills after the conversation.

3
 A jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (Pen.
Code,1 § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) and misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 243, subd. (a)(1))
and not guilty of several felonies. The trial court placed Hills on formal probation for
three years, suspended imposition of sentence for the attempted dissuasion, and sentenced
Hills to 90 days with credit for time served for the misdemeanor.
Hills timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Hills’ sole challenge on appeal is that insufficient evidence supports his conviction
for attempting to dissuade the victim from testifying. The People disagree and so do we.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless
it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (Ibid.)
Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits a person from “[k]nowingly and
maliciously attempt[ing] to prevent or dissuade a witness or victim from attending or
giving testimony at a trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law,” regardless of
whether that attempt is successful. (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); see id., subd. (d).) Because
“[t]he very nature of this crime is solicitation,” a defendant may violate section 136.1,
subdivision (a)(2) by soliciting a third party to convey his wishes to the victim instead of

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

4
directly conveying those wishes to her himself. (People v. Foster (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 331, 336.) In determining whether an unlawful attempt at dissuasion
has occurred, we consider both the dissuading action or statement itself and the
circumstances under which the defendant made it. (People v. Wahidi (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 802, 806.) “If the defendant’s actions or statements are ambiguous, but
reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future consequence of
dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.” (Ibid.)
Here, the record shows Hills repeatedly stressed his need for the victim to either
avoid testifying or change her story, and also repeatedly attempted to solicit that friend to
convince her on his behalf. He wrote or told the friend things such as, “If she doesn[’]t
cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good,” “Maybe tell them … just stay away from
the situation,” “Do what you can but tread lightly cause they are sensitive,” “Come on,
bro. Just do what you can, bro,” and “Shit got to be done, bro. You know what I’m
saying,” “[l]ike, from your end?”
The context surrounding these statements supports the jury’s finding that Hills
made the statements in a “knowing[] and malicious[]” attempt to dissuade her from
testifying. Shortly before making these statements, Hills emphasized the importance of
the victim’s testimony to the mutual friend, saying that if the victim was not going to
court, “it’s like … I win,” “She’s their only evidence,” and “If that’s the case, then, all
right, then. It’s a matter of time, then this shit go away.” Prior to those conversations,
Hills also encouraged the victim “to let them know” she did not want to be involved in
his trial. Viewed in the context of these conversations, as well as Hills’ repeated violence
towards the victim and prior threats to “ruin” her, have her evicted, and cause her child to
be “taken away,” there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that
Hills knowingly and maliciously attempted to dissuade the victim from testifying. (See
§ 136; People v. Wahidi, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.)

5
 Although Hills suggests his statements are, if anything, reasonably construed as
attempting to convince the victim to retract her previous statements—and were therefore
punishable under a different statute—the record indicates that Hills wanted and intended
for their mutual friend to convince the victim not to testify. Hills’ statements in his letter
that, “If she doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good,” “Maybe tell them
… just stay away from the situation,” and “They can also plead the 5th if they happen to
show up to court” all support the jury’s finding that Hills specifically intended to
dissuade the victim from testifying. Moreover, because a defendant may harbor dual
intents that bring him or her within the meaning of more than one statutory provision
(People v. Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 933), the evidence showing Hills’ intent
to also persuade the victim to change her testimony does not weaken the evidence
supporting the jury’s finding.
Consequently, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Hills violated
section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

6


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Amador)

THE PEOPLE, C104618
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CR31862)
v.

DARONTA TYRONE LEWIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appointed counsel for defendant Daronta Tyrone Lewis asked this court to review
the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We have done so and find
no arguable error. There is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment
and the clerk’s minutes and abstract of judgment, however. We order the trial court to
correct the minutes and abstract to conform to the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In July 2021, while Lewis was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, a
correctional officer observed him covering the window of his cell with pieces of paper.
The officer asked him to stop, but Lewis ignored the request. When the officer entered
the cell to remove the paper, Lewis approached him and spat in his face.
The People charged Lewis with one count of gassing an officer (Pen. Code,
§ 4501.1, subd. (a)) and alleged a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,

1
subds. (a)-(d)).1 The People also alleged two circumstances in aggravation under
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.
Lewis pleaded guilty, pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, to gassing
an officer. The parties’ plea agreement provided that he would be sentenced to three
years in prison, with execution of the sentence suspended, and three years’ formal
probation, with Lewis waiving his right to the two-year probation term limit under
Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
In October 2023, the trial court sentenced Lewis according to the terms of the plea
agreement and placed him on three years of formal probation. The court imposed a
$300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $40 court operations fee (§ 1465.8), a $30 criminal
conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)), and a $300 probation revocation fine,
stayed pending successful completion of probation (§ 1202.44).
On January 5, 2024, a probation officer filed a petition to revoke Lewis’s
probation based on his failure to obey all laws. The petition alleged that Lewis had
committed several offenses in Solano County, including robbery (§ 211); false
imprisonment (§ 236); destroying, erasing, or concealing evidence (§ 135); evading a
police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). He
was later convicted of two of those offenses (robbery and evading a peace officer) and
sentenced to an aggregate term of seven years four months.
At the probation violation hearing, Lewis waived his right to a hearing and
admitted violating the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked his probation and
imposed one-third the middle term of his three-year suspended sentence. The court
ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to his sentence for robbery and evading
a peace officer for a total sentence of eight years four months.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
 Lewis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Lewis’s appointed counsel asks this court to conduct an independent review of the
record under People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel advised Lewis of his right
to file a supplemental brief; Lewis did not file such a brief. We have reviewed the entire
record and find no arguable error on appeal.
We have, however, identified two discrepancies between the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of judgment and the clerk’s minutes and abstract of judgment. Both the
minutes and the abstract of judgment state that, when sentencing Lewis on the probation
violation, the trial court imposed and suspended a $300 parole revocation fine under
section 1202.45 and lifted the stay on the $300 probation revocation fine under
section 1202.44. The court, however, did not orally impose either fine.2 When there is a
discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment or
the clerk’s minutes, the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
Accordingly, we order the trial court to correct the minutes and abstract of judgment to
conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment.

2 To the extent that the fine under section 1202.45 is mandatory, the People have not
asked us in this appeal under People v. Wende to correct as unauthorized the trial court’s
failure to impose the fine.

3
 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the clerk’s minutes
and prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

4