California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PLAINTIFFS IN JCCP 5108, IN B349706
RE NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
CLERGY CASES, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No.
Petitioners, HG20053992 (JCCP
5108))
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION AND DENYING
ALAMEDA COUNTY, REHEARING

Respondent, [NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
ALL INSTITUTIONAL
DEFENDANTS IN JCCP 5108,

Real Parties in Interest.

It is ordered that the opinion filed on October 5, 2026, is
modified to delete “presumed and” in line 16 of footnote 5.
 The clerk of the court is directed to accept for filing
petitioners’ request for judicial notice received on October 20,
2026. The request for judicial notice and petitioners’ petition for
rehearing are denied. There is no change in judgment.

____________________________________________________________
BAKER, Acting P. J. MOOR, J. KIM (D.), J.

2
Filed 10/5/26 Plaintiffs in JCCP 5108 v. Superior Court CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PLAINTIFFS IN JCCP 5108, IN RE B349706
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA CLERGY
CASES, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No.
Petitioners, HG20053992 (JCCP
5108))
v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ALAMEDA COUNTY,

Respondent,

ALL INSTITUTIONAL
DEFENDANTS IN JCCP 5108,

Real Parties in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. S. Raj
Chatterjee, Judge. Petition denied.
Furtado, Jaspovice & Simons and Richard Simons; Manly,
Stewart & Finaldi, Vince W. Finaldi, and Morgan Stewart; Esner,
Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Stuart B. Esner, and Holly N. Boyer for
Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Horvitz & Levy, Peder K. Batalden, and Melissa B.
Whalen; Weintraub Tobin Chediak Coleman & Grodin, Paul E.
Gaspari, and Daniel C. Zamora for Real Parties in Interest.

2
 Proposition 51, a measure addressing multiple defendant
tort liability that was approved by voters in 1986, prospectively
eliminated joint and several liability for non-economic damages
(e.g., damages for pain and suffering, inconvenience, and
emotional distress). (See generally Evangelatos v. Superior Court
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1205-1206.) At our Supreme Court’s
direction, we issue this opinion to decide whether Proposition 51’s
elimination of joint and several liability applies to causes of
action for childhood sexual abuse that occurred long ago (before
Proposition 51’s enactment) but were statutorily revived by the
Legislature in 2019—notwithstanding the customary statute of
limitations that would otherwise bar such claims.

I. BACKGROUND
Petitioners are plaintiffs in Judicial Council Coordinated
Proceeding (JCCP) 5108, captioned In re Northern California
Clergy Cases. They are survivors of childhood sexual abuse who
sued various religious entities and institutions in Northern
California, and their claims have been joined in a coordinated
proceeding in Alameda County Superior Court.1
Petitioners contend they suffered sexual abuse and some of
that abuse occurred before Proposition 51 took effect on June 4,
1986. They did not sue within the then-existing statute of
limitations period, but their claims were revived when the
Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1

1
There are two similar coordinated proceedings: JCCP 5101
coordinates clergy cases filed in Los Angeles and Orange
Counties and JCCP 5105 coordinates clergy cases filed in San
Diego County. This appellate district is the designated review
court for all three JCCP coordinated proceedings.

3
decades after Proposition 51’s enactment.2 Pursuant to the
amended statute, sexual abuse claims that “would otherwise be
barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of
limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit”
were allowed to proceed if they were brought within three years
of January 1, 2020.3 (Former § 340.1, subd. (q), added by Stats.
2019, ch. 861, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.)
By way of a motion in limine filed in April 2025, petitioners
asked the JCCP 5108 trial court to find Proposition 51’s bar on
joint and several liability for non-economic damages does not
apply to any of their claims for sexual abuse that happened
before June 4, 1986—on the theory that those claims “accrued”
before Proposition 51’s enactment. The trial court held a hearing
on petitioners’ motion in limine and denied the motion in an
August 2025 order. The court found petitioners’ claims “accrued”
or “re-accrued” for Proposition 51 purposes when the claims were
statutorily revived in 2020, not when the alleged abuse occurred
some decades earlier.
Petitioners sought review of this ruling by filing a mandate
petition in this court. We summarily denied the petition for
review of an in limine ruling. Our Supreme Court, however,
granted a petition for review and transferred the cause back to us
with directions to issue an order to show cause why the relief

2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
3
Section 340.1 was amended in 2022 and again in 2023. Our
citations to section 340.1 refer to the version of the statute as
amended in 2019.

4
petitioners sought should not be granted. We issued the order,
held oral argument, and now again deny the petition.

II. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err in denying petitioners’ motion in
limine. Their claims accrued, for purposes of Proposition 51 as
explained in Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, when they were
revived as of January 1, 2020. There are no reliance interests
that counsel in favor of a contrary rule, the Legislature was
aware of prevailing law (Proposition 51) when it revived the
claims and said nothing to indicate then-prevailing law would not
apply, the statutory revival is a necessary element for any
prospect of liability on petitioners’ claims, and legislative history
materials if anything indicate an expectation that revived claims
would be subject to Proposition 51 just like claims for abuse
brought within the otherwise applicable statute of limitations.

A. Proposition 51
Before the voters approved Proposition 51 on June 3, 1986
(the measure took effect the following day), California followed
the traditional common law rule that joint tortfeasors were
jointly and severally liable for all damages suffered. Under that
joint and several liability rule, “if a defendant was found to be at
all negligent, regardless of how minimally, . . . he could be held
responsible for the full damages sustained by the plaintiff, even if
other concurrent tortfeasors had also been partially, or even
primarily, responsible for the injury.” (Evangelatos, supra, 44
Cal.3d at 1196.)
The voters approving Proposition 51 rejected this “deep
pocket rule,” which “resulted in a system of inequity and injustice

5
that . . . threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments,
other public agencies, private individuals and businesses
and . . . resulted in higher prices for goods and services to the
public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1431.1.) Instead, and to “remedy these inequities,” Proposition
51 declared “defendants in tort actions shall be held financially
liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them
differently is unfair and inequitable.” (Ibid.) In legal terms,
Proposition 51 modified the traditional joint and several liability
rule by retaining such liability only for economic damages while
limiting non-economic damages to several but not joint liability
(meaning that each defendant would be responsible only for the
share of non-economic damages attributable to that defendant’s
own fault). (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subds. (a), (b)(2); Evangelatos,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at 1192, 1198.)
In later litigation concerning the effect of Proposition 51,
our Supreme Court held the initiative applied only prospectively,
that is, to claims accruing after its effective date. (Evangelatos,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at 1193 [“we conclude that the Court of Appeal
erred in ruling that Proposition 51 applies to causes of action
which accrued before the measure’s effective date”].) In so
holding, Evangelatos followed settled law that legislation applies
prospectively in the absence of clear statutory language providing
for retroactive application. (Id. at 1193-1194.) The Evangelatos
court also explained that prospective application “[r]eflect[s] the
common-sense notion that it may be unfair to change ‘the rules of
the game’ in the middle of a contest” and upholds the reasonable
expectations of those who reasonably relied upon existing legal
doctrine “in conducting their legal affairs prior to the new
enactment.” (Id. at 1194.)

6
 B. Section 340.1
Section 340.1 was enacted in 1986 to extend the statute of
limitations for civil childhood sexual abuse claims from one year
to three years. (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42
Cal.4th 201, 207; former § 340.1, added by Stats. 1986, ch. 914,
§ 1, 3165-3166.) The statute has thereafter been amended
numerous times, often to further expand the limitations period or
to revive childhood sexual abuse claims that were otherwise time-
barred. (Shirk, supra, at 207-208.) As relevant for our purposes,
the Legislature in 2019 amended subdivision (q) of the statute to
create a three-year window in which victims of childhood sexual
abuse may bring time-barred claims: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, any claim for damages described in
paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has
not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred
as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of
limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit
had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced
within three years of January 1, 2020. A plaintiff shall have the
later of the three-year time period under this subdivision or the
time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that
added this subdivision.” (§ 340.1, subd. (q), as amended by
Assem. Bill No. 218 (AB 218), Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1, eff. Jan. 1,
2020.)
In addition to creating this three-year revival window, AB
218 more generally extended the statute of limitations for
childhood sexual assault to 22 years after a plaintiff reaches the
age of majority. AB 218 also made treble damages available
against any defendant found to have covered up the sexual
assault of a minor. (§ 340.1, subds. (a), (b).) A legislative

7
committee report prepared in connection with AB 218 explained
“[i]t often takes decades before victims recognize what was done
to them as abuse, realize how they have been harmed by the
abuse, or simply find the strength to come forward” (Assem. Com.
on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) and opined the statutory
amendment would “allow more victims of childhood sexual
assault to be compensated for their injuries and[ ] to help prevent
future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse” (id. at p. 3).

C. Proposition 51 and Accrual of Sexual Abuse Claims
The question we confront is this: for a statutorily revived
claim of childhood sexual abuse, does liability arise and a claim
“accrue” within the meaning of Proposition 51 and Evangelatos at
the time of the abuse or when the time-barred claim is revived?
That question has not been directly answered by the appellate
courts. Reviewing courts have instead only addressed questions
of accrual for revived childhood sexual abuse claims in the
separate context of government claims presentation deadlines.
(Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 905; Shirk, supra,
42 Cal.4th at 205.) Shirk and Rubenstein do not resolve the issue
we must decide because our high court has cautioned that “a
cause of action may be viewed in the eyes of the law as ‘accruing’
for different purposes on different dates, depending on the
purpose for which the accrual determination is being sought.”
(Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th
520, 530.) Buttram explains, for instance, that in personal injury
cases some courts invoke a relatively early accrual date when
determining whether insurance coverage is triggered even
though, for statute of limitations purposes, a personal injury

8
cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered he or she has a compensable
injury. (Ibid.)
The facts of Buttram, which also involved a dispute about
Proposition 51’s applicability, illustrate why the concept of
accrual depends on context. In that case, the plaintiff was
exposed to asbestos from 1964 to 1968. (Buttram, supra, 16
Cal.4th at 525.) Testimony established that cancer cells in the
plaintiff’s body probably started forming by 1984, but the plaintiff
was not diagnosed with asbestos-related cancer until 1991. (Id.
at 524-526.) To determine whether the plaintiff’s cause of action
accrued for purposes of Proposition 51 (i.e., whether it accrued
before the initiative’s effective date), Buttram looked to
Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188 and the reasons the
Evangelatos court gave for holding Proposition 51 applies only
prospectively. (Buttram, supra, at 531.)
Evangelatos grounded its holding in principles of
reasonable reliance and settled expectations that have figured in
numerous judicial decisions considering whether tort reform
legislation should apply prospectively or retroactively.
(Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 1194.) These decisions,
Evangelatos observes, “[r]eflect[ ] the common-sense notion that
it may be unfair to change ‘the rules of the game’ in the middle of
a contest” by “substantially modif[ying] a legal doctrine on which
many persons may have reasonably relied in conducting their
legal affairs prior to the new enactment.” (Ibid; see also id. at
1215 [“[P]laintiffs whose causes of action arose long before
Proposition 51 was enacted will often have reasonably relied on
the preexisting joint and several liability doctrine in deciding
which potential tortfeasors to sue and which not to sue”].) The

9
Evangelatos court additionally explained that applying
Proposition 51 retroactively also would “defeat the reasonable
expectations of parties who entered into settlement agreements
in reliance on the preexisting joint and several liability rule.” (Id.
at 1216.) Drawing on this reasoning, the Supreme Court in
Buttram concluded a claim for damages arising from a latent
disease accrues, for purposes of determining whether Proposition
51 applies, at the time of diagnosis or at the time a plaintiff
discovers the disease, whichever is earlier. (Buttram, supra, 16
Cal.4th at 540.)

D. Claims Revived by AB 218 Are Subject to the Non-
Economic Damages Limitations of Proposition 51
Petitioners believe we need not delve into the reasoning of
Evangelatos and Buttram in this case because the text of section
340.1 establishes Proposition 51’s elimination of joint and several
liability for non-economic damages does not apply to their claims.
As they put it (with some help from the italics typeface): “By its
express terms, the Legislature intended AB 218 to revive ‘any
claim[ ] for damages’ without limitation and therefore did not
intend to exclude joint and several noneconomic damages based
on application of Proposition 51.” If only it were so simple.
The problem with petitioners’ argument is twofold. First,
the “any” is in the wrong place for petitioners’ argument to work.
The Legislature’s focus in AB 218 was on reviving unknown,
possible claims for sexual abuse, which explains why it used the
term “any” in the indefinite or indeterminate sense (meaning any
claims that might be filed pursuant to the provisions of the
amended statute), not any and all forms of damages that might
be recovered for these revived claims—as would be the case if the

10
statute instead read “claim for any damages.” Second, and more
fundamentally, joint and several liability is not a type of
damages—notwithstanding the shoehorning attempted by
petitioners’ formulation. Joint and several liability is a method of
apportioning damages (of any proper kind) among multiple
defendants, and the text of section 340.1 alone cannot be said to
have expressed a preference for one method of apportionment or
another merely by referring to “any claim for damages.”4
Instead of looking to the plain text of section 340.1 for an
answer that will never come, we believe the principles articulated
in Evangelatos and applied in Buttram provide the appropriate
guidance. Under those principles, a claim for childhood sexual
assault brought pursuant to the 2019 amendment to section
340.1, subdivision (q) accrued for purposes of Proposition 51 and
Evangelatos when the claim was revived on January 1, 2020. By
then, petitioners had no reason to rely on pre-1986 law in
deciding who to sue or not to sue. And until petitioners’ claims
were then revived, defendants had no reason to calculate or plan
for any potential liability, to contemplate cross-claims or

4
Not only does the text of section 340.1 make no reference to
Proposition 51 or joint and several liability, it does expressly add
a treble damages remedy for victims who prove their sexual
assault “was as the result of a cover up.” (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(1).)
That specific reference indicates the Legislature could have, and
surely would have, spoken more directly to the question before us
if it had intended its amendment of the statute to answer the
question. (See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 907 [“Had
the Legislature intended to also revive in [section 340.1,]
subdivision (c) the claim presentation deadline under the
government claims statute, it could have easily said so. It did
not”].)

11
equitable indemnity actions against co-tortfeasors, or to settle
claims that had long become stale.5
Also relevant is the context in which AB 218 was enacted.
At the time of AB 218’s enactment, Proposition 51 and
Evangelatos had been the law in California for over three
decades. “When a statute is enacted against a ‘legal backdrop,’
we assume the background legal rules continue to apply absent a
‘definitive indication’ that the Legislature intended to displace
them. [Citation.]” (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18
Cal.5th 310, 335.) Section 340.1, as we have seen, says nothing
about displacing Proposition 51’s elimination of joint and several

5
That petitioners did not reasonably rely on pre-1986 law is
further evidenced to some degree by the litigation history of
revived childhood sexual assault claims, both in this coordination
action and in past coordination actions. This coordination
proceeding was created in 2020, but it was not until 2025 that
petitioners suggested pre-1986 law regarding joint and several
liability might apply. And that was a novel position. Clergy
Cases III (JCCP 4359) (Clergy III) coordinated childhood sexual
assault cases filed against various Northern California dioceses
under the 2002 amendment to section 340.1, which revived
claims time-barred as of January 1, 2003. The approved set of
jury instructions included CACI 406, which incorporates
Proposition 51’s several-only liability on non-economic damages.
Petitioners’ liaison counsel in this case, who was also petitioners’
liaison counsel in Clergy III, acknowledges Proposition 51’s
applicability to the revived claims was presumed and not
litigated in Clergy III. The same is true for Clergy Cases I (JCCP
4286), which coordinated 2003 revival claims against the Los
Angeles Archdiocese and Orange diocese and Clergy Cases II
(JCCP 4297), which coordinated similar claims against the San
Diego and San Bernardino dioceses.

12
liability for non-economic damages, and the Legislature is
appropriately understood to have revived petitioners’ claims
subject to the settled Proposition 51 legal backdrop.
Petitioners believe that is incorrect only because they
attribute a retrospective, counterfactual purpose to AB 218. In
their words, they believe the Legislature enacting AB 218 had an
“intent to place victims of childhood sexual abuse in the same
position they would have been in if their claims had not been
time-barred to begin with.” That proves far too much and cannot
be right. The Legislature undoubtedly intended to give childhood
sexual abuse survivors a chance to pursue claims they may have
understandably been reluctant to pursue, or could not pursue,
when they were younger. But we see no persuasive evidence of a
legislative intent to require the revived claims to proceed as if the
law were trapped in 1986 amber. Petitioners cannot seriously
contend, for instance, that pattern jury instructions, rules of
evidence, and rules of court as they existed in 1986 govern
litigation of their revived claims. Yet there is no principled
reason why that should not be so were we to accept petitioners’
back-in-the-same-position argument about what AB 218 was
meant to achieve.
Insofar as they are necessary to consider, AB 218’s
legislative history materials confirm the Legislature did not
contemplate revived claims would be litigated outside the non-
economic damages constraints of Proposition 51. Committee
materials observe AB 218 “[f]irst and foremost . . . extend[ed] the
statute of limitations for bringing an action for recovery of
damages . . . by 14 years—from 26 years of age to 40 years of
age—and revive[d], for just three years, any action for childhood
sexual assault that may have expired due to the existing statute

13
of limitations.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16, 2019,
p. 2.) This reveals a primary aim of enabling victims of childhood
sexual abuse to bring claims for damages well into adulthood,
and the revival provision helps extend that same consideration to
victims who were assaulted as children years or decades ago even
though the statutes of limitation would otherwise bar such abuse
claims. There is no indication the Legislature contemplated
these two groups of abuse survivors—those who bring claims
under the extended statute of limitations and those who bring
revived claims—would litigate under different rules, or that one
group would be entitled to a greater prospect of recovery than the
other, yet that would be the case if we accepted petitioners’
position in this appeal.6
In addition, and in response to opposition from defendants
and insurers who were concerned about the costs of defending
and settling claims brought under AB 218, proponents of the bill
emphasized it did not change a plaintiff’s burden of proof,
eliminate or alter any defenses that might be available to
defendants, or affect the judge and jury’s ability to determine the
amount of damages. (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16,
2019, p. 11 [“[T]he elimination of the statute of limitations and
the revival of actions against perpetrators or third parties only
assures that claims can be heard on their merits. Any other

6
The only group of victims that might be entitled to greater
damages are those whose sexual assaults happened as the result
of a cover up. (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(1).) But, critically, that is
because the Legislature enacted language that clearly says just
that.

14
applicable defense would not be affected, and plaintiffs would still
have to prove all the elements of their case”]; Assem. Com. on
Judiciary, Mandatory Information Worksheet on Assem. Bill No.
218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) p. 5 [the bill “does not change the
burden of proof or ability of the judge and jury to decide the
amount of damages awarded”].) Comparative fault is an
affirmative defense (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 319, 332) inconsistent with joint and several
liability, and by indicating “applicable defense[s]” would continue
to apply, the legislative history of AB 218 if anything evinces an
expectation that Proposition 51 would apply to revived claims
such that the defense and insurer cost protestations were
overblown. Moreover, the assurances in committee reports that
nothing other than the statute of limitations (and perhaps some
limited availability of treble damages) would be affected by AB
218 would have been hollow—misleading even—had the
Legislature intended to bring back joint and several liability for
non-economic damages on revived claims.
The bottom line is that if the Legislature had intended to
reinvigorate an erstwhile “unfair and inequitable” damages
regime that voters long ago jettisoned in order to provide for a
maximalist damages recovery scenario, we do not believe the
Legislature would have accomplished that intent so obliquely and
with so little fanfare. Instead, we believe the Legislature, aware
of law that had been settled for decades, revived childhood sexual
abuse claims for damages for a limited three-year window subject
to otherwise prevailing law, including Proposition 51’s limits on
non-economic damages (but not economic damages, which can
still be apportioned on a joint and several basis). We therefore
hold the trial court correctly concluded that liability for claims

15
revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q) is several but not
joint pursuant to the terms of Proposition 51.

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is denied. In the interests
of justice, all parties shall bear their own costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

16


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Lassen)

THE PEOPLE, C103807
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 2024-
v. CR0091057)

NORBERTO ANDRADE CARDENAS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Norberto Andrade Cardenas pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal
injury on a cohabitant. On appeal, he contends that his plea was not knowing and
voluntary because the trial court failed to ensure he understood the constitutional rights
he was waiving. We are not able to consider this contention because Cardenas failed to
obtain a certificate of probable cause.
BACKGROUND
Cardenas pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant after a
colloquy with the trial court addressing the charges and his constitutional rights. (Pen.
Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).)1 Consistent with the parties’ plea agreement, the court
sentenced him to three years in prison.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
 Cardenas filed a timely notice of appeal that included a checked box stating the
“appeal is based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not
affect the validity of the plea.” Cardenas did not request or obtain a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Cardenas seeks reversal on the ground that the trial court failed to properly advise
him of his constitutional rights and that his plea was therefore not knowing and
voluntary. The People argue that the appeal must be dismissed because Cardenas failed
to obtain a certificate of probable cause. We agree with the People.
“In general, a defendant may appeal from a final judgment of conviction, unless
otherwise limited by sections 1237.1 and 1237.5.” (People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th
296, 298-299, citing § 1237 & Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) Section 1237.5
provides: “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction
upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, … except where both of the following are met:
[¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under
oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other
grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and
filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” (See
generally People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 43 [discussing statute].) “ ‘[I]ssues
going to the validity of a plea require’ a certificate of probable cause.” (People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694.)
Here, section 1237.5 bars Cardenas’s appeal because his claim that he did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights is a challenge to the validity of
his plea. (See People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76.) Cardenas urges us to
overlook the absence of a certificate of probable cause because the People failed to object
on that basis below. We decline to do so. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084,
1097 [“defendant may not obtain review of certificate issues unless he has complied”

2
with the requirement to obtain a certificate of probable cause]; id. at p. 1098 [§ 1237.5 “is
a general ‘legislative command’ to defendants,” “lays down a ‘condition precedent’ to the
taking of an appeal within its scope,” and “should be applied in a strict manner”];
Panizzon, at p. 89, fn. 15 [“condemn[ing]” practice of “proceed[ing] to address the merits
of a defendant’s appeal following a guilty or nolo contendere plea despite the defendant’s
failure to strictly comply with section 1237.5”].) Because Cardenas’s sole claim on
appeal is not cognizable due to the failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause, we
will dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

3


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)

THE PEOPLE, C104570
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 25CF00833)
v.

ADRIAN KEVIN HILLS, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

After defendant Adrian Kevin Hills, Jr., was charged with multiple felonies in
connection with an altercation with his then-girlfriend (the victim), he called and wrote to
a mutual acquaintance about the victim’s potential upcoming testimony. Based on those
communications, a jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade her from testifying.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation for
three years. On appeal, Hills argues his conviction for attempted dissuasion is not
supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Hills and the victim dated for six to eight months. Over the course of their
relationship, they fought “sometimes.” On at least one occasion, he was violent with the
victim and “threw [her] around.” During one fight, she called the police. She considered
getting a restraining order against him but decided not to after he said he would “ruin”

1
her if she did. Previously, he had also threatened to get the victim “kicked out” of her
apartment and have her child “taken away.”
Late one night in November 2024, Hills entered the victim’s apartment through
her bedroom window and “tossed [her] around a little bit” “all over the house.” The
victim called 911 and a neighbor called the police. Hills was arrested that same night.
Four days later, Hills called the victim from jail half an hour before his
arraignment. He told her he was taking his case all the way to trial and that she was
going, too. She responded, “I don’t want to do any … I don’t want any of this. No, I’m
cool. I just want you to stay away from me.” He replied, “Well, then you got to let them
know.” After this call, at his arraignment, Hills was served with a domestic violence
restraining order prohibiting him from contacting the victim. He called her once more
before ceasing direct contact.
Three months later, on the eve of Hills’ preliminary hearing, Hills called a mutual
friend of his and the victim’s. Hills talked about the victim’s description of the incident.
The friend asked, “She can’t retract nothing? She can’t do nothing?” Hills responded,
“I’m going to tread lightly on that, but of course.” The friend said, “from what [the
victim] said, she’s not going to court or nothing.” Hills responded that he had not “talked
to her, because you know they listening,” then said, “it’s like … I win,” “She’s their only
evidence,” and “If that’s the case, then, all right, then. It’s a matter of time, then this shit
go away.” Hills also said he would write to the friend.
In that letter, Hills wrote: “* means important.” “Well here[’]s the thing. If she
doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good. If she happens to come to court
hopefully she recants and is on my side.* … If anything* she told me to come through
the window … . That[’]s what she wanted me to do*. That would help drop that charge.
[¶] We need to work on getting these charges dropped … . [¶] Do what you can but
tread lightly cause they are sensitive. Maybe tell them I[’]m facing 20 years and
something should be done on my favor. Or them just stay away from the situation. …

2
[¶] They can also plead the 5th if they happen to show up to court. That shouldn[’]t hurt
me. This needs to go away*.” The friend understood “they are sensitive” as referring to
the victim.
The following day, the date of Hills’ preliminary hearing, Hills called the friend
again, twice. In the first conversation, Hills told the friend, “we got to be easy on the
phone, you know what I’m saying,” “Come on, bro. Just do what you can, bro,” and
“Like that word that you mentioned yesterday, the R word,” “[i]f they can R word, you
know what I’m saying?” The friend understood Hills’ “Come on, bro. Just do what you
can, bro” as asking him to speak with the victim. At trial, the friend said he could not
recall what Hills was referring to with “the R word,” but did not think it meant
“retracting.”
In the second conversation that day, Hills said, “Come on, bro. You know what
I’m saying? I sent you one of the birdies, but just do what you got to do. Know what I’m
saying?” The friend replied that the victim “was not elaborating, not doing nothing,” and
“They just pretty much fishing at this point.” Hills said, “They said the window was
closed when they checked it. I’m like, man. At the end of the day, this shit got to get …
You know what I’m saying,” and “Shit got to get fixed, bro.” Then, later in the
conversation, Hills said, “they’re trying to make it bad, bro,” and “I low key- Shit got to
be done, bro. You know what I’m saying,” “[l]ike, from your end?” The friend,
understanding Hills as asking him to reach out to the victim, responded, “Yeah. Like I
said, I’ll definitely reach out, you feel me,” and “I’m not going to push it like that to
where, oh, shit, no.” Not wanting to be “involved in the situation,” the friend did not
reach out to the victim on behalf of Hills after the conversation.

3
 A jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (Pen.
Code,1 § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) and misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 243, subd. (a)(1))
and not guilty of several felonies. The trial court placed Hills on formal probation for
three years, suspended imposition of sentence for the attempted dissuasion, and sentenced
Hills to 90 days with credit for time served for the misdemeanor.
Hills timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Hills’ sole challenge on appeal is that insufficient evidence supports his conviction
for attempting to dissuade the victim from testifying. The People disagree and so do we.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless
it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (Ibid.)
Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits a person from “[k]nowingly and
maliciously attempt[ing] to prevent or dissuade a witness or victim from attending or
giving testimony at a trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law,” regardless of
whether that attempt is successful. (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); see id., subd. (d).) Because
“[t]he very nature of this crime is solicitation,” a defendant may violate section 136.1,
subdivision (a)(2) by soliciting a third party to convey his wishes to the victim instead of

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

4
directly conveying those wishes to her himself. (People v. Foster (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 331, 336.) In determining whether an unlawful attempt at dissuasion
has occurred, we consider both the dissuading action or statement itself and the
circumstances under which the defendant made it. (People v. Wahidi (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 802, 806.) “If the defendant’s actions or statements are ambiguous, but
reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future consequence of
dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.” (Ibid.)
Here, the record shows Hills repeatedly stressed his need for the victim to either
avoid testifying or change her story, and also repeatedly attempted to solicit that friend to
convince her on his behalf. He wrote or told the friend things such as, “If she doesn[’]t
cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good,” “Maybe tell them … just stay away from
the situation,” “Do what you can but tread lightly cause they are sensitive,” “Come on,
bro. Just do what you can, bro,” and “Shit got to be done, bro. You know what I’m
saying,” “[l]ike, from your end?”
The context surrounding these statements supports the jury’s finding that Hills
made the statements in a “knowing[] and malicious[]” attempt to dissuade her from
testifying. Shortly before making these statements, Hills emphasized the importance of
the victim’s testimony to the mutual friend, saying that if the victim was not going to
court, “it’s like … I win,” “She’s their only evidence,” and “If that’s the case, then, all
right, then. It’s a matter of time, then this shit go away.” Prior to those conversations,
Hills also encouraged the victim “to let them know” she did not want to be involved in
his trial. Viewed in the context of these conversations, as well as Hills’ repeated violence
towards the victim and prior threats to “ruin” her, have her evicted, and cause her child to
be “taken away,” there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that
Hills knowingly and maliciously attempted to dissuade the victim from testifying. (See
§ 136; People v. Wahidi, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.)

5
 Although Hills suggests his statements are, if anything, reasonably construed as
attempting to convince the victim to retract her previous statements—and were therefore
punishable under a different statute—the record indicates that Hills wanted and intended
for their mutual friend to convince the victim not to testify. Hills’ statements in his letter
that, “If she doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good,” “Maybe tell them
… just stay away from the situation,” and “They can also plead the 5th if they happen to
show up to court” all support the jury’s finding that Hills specifically intended to
dissuade the victim from testifying. Moreover, because a defendant may harbor dual
intents that bring him or her within the meaning of more than one statutory provision
(People v. Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 933), the evidence showing Hills’ intent
to also persuade the victim to change her testimony does not weaken the evidence
supporting the jury’s finding.
Consequently, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Hills violated
section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

6


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Amador)

THE PEOPLE, C104618
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CR31862)
v.

DARONTA TYRONE LEWIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appointed counsel for defendant Daronta Tyrone Lewis asked this court to review
the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We have done so and find
no arguable error. There is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment
and the clerk’s minutes and abstract of judgment, however. We order the trial court to
correct the minutes and abstract to conform to the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In July 2021, while Lewis was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, a
correctional officer observed him covering the window of his cell with pieces of paper.
The officer asked him to stop, but Lewis ignored the request. When the officer entered
the cell to remove the paper, Lewis approached him and spat in his face.
The People charged Lewis with one count of gassing an officer (Pen. Code,
§ 4501.1, subd. (a)) and alleged a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,

1
subds. (a)-(d)).1 The People also alleged two circumstances in aggravation under
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.
Lewis pleaded guilty, pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, to gassing
an officer. The parties’ plea agreement provided that he would be sentenced to three
years in prison, with execution of the sentence suspended, and three years’ formal
probation, with Lewis waiving his right to the two-year probation term limit under
Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).
In October 2023, the trial court sentenced Lewis according to the terms of the plea
agreement and placed him on three years of formal probation. The court imposed a
$300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $40 court operations fee (§ 1465.8), a $30 criminal
conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)), and a $300 probation revocation fine,
stayed pending successful completion of probation (§ 1202.44).
On January 5, 2024, a probation officer filed a petition to revoke Lewis’s
probation based on his failure to obey all laws. The petition alleged that Lewis had
committed several offenses in Solano County, including robbery (§ 211); false
imprisonment (§ 236); destroying, erasing, or concealing evidence (§ 135); evading a
police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). He
was later convicted of two of those offenses (robbery and evading a peace officer) and
sentenced to an aggregate term of seven years four months.
At the probation violation hearing, Lewis waived his right to a hearing and
admitted violating the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked his probation and
imposed one-third the middle term of his three-year suspended sentence. The court
ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to his sentence for robbery and evading
a peace officer for a total sentence of eight years four months.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
 Lewis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Lewis’s appointed counsel asks this court to conduct an independent review of the
record under People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel advised Lewis of his right
to file a supplemental brief; Lewis did not file such a brief. We have reviewed the entire
record and find no arguable error on appeal.
We have, however, identified two discrepancies between the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of judgment and the clerk’s minutes and abstract of judgment. Both the
minutes and the abstract of judgment state that, when sentencing Lewis on the probation
violation, the trial court imposed and suspended a $300 parole revocation fine under
section 1202.45 and lifted the stay on the $300 probation revocation fine under
section 1202.44. The court, however, did not orally impose either fine.2 When there is a
discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment or
the clerk’s minutes, the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
Accordingly, we order the trial court to correct the minutes and abstract of judgment to
conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment.

2 To the extent that the fine under section 1202.45 is mandatory, the People have not
asked us in this appeal under People v. Wende to correct as unauthorized the trial court’s
failure to impose the fine.

3
 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the clerk’s minutes
and prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

4


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088954
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF193475A)
v.

BENITO JUAREZ YBARRA, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David Wolf,
Judge.
J. Edward Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., DeSantos, J. and Harrell, J.
 Defendant Benito Juarez Ybarra, Jr., pleaded no contest to assault with force likely
to cause great bodily injury and, after violating his terms of probation, was sentenced to a
four-year term in prison. Defendant’s appellate counsel makes no claim of error and
requests our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436. (See also In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97.) Counsel filed an
opening brief that sets forth the relevant facts of the case. Defendant was advised of the
right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief.
More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. Finding
no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we
affirm the judgment.
The following is a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case.
(See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On February 13, 2023, defendant approached Joe T. at an intersection, told Joe that
he intended to kill him, and struck Joe’s hand with a shovel. Joe feared for his life.
The District Attorney of Kern County filed an information on March 8, 2023,
charging defendant with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 1) and threatening to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily
injury (§ 422; count 2). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered two
prior strike convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) and had been convicted of two prior serious felony convictions
(§ 667, subd. (a)). Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied all allegations.
On July 13, 2023, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to amend the
information to charge defendant with assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3). Defendant executed a “Felony Advisement of Rights,
Waiver and Plea Form” (plea form) in which he agreed to plead no contest to count 3 and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
admit his two prior serious felony convictions for purposes of the Three Strikes law, in
exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to recommend a two-year term of probation and
to strike the prior convictions for purposes of punishment. The plea form further
acknowledged that defendant had not been threatened, his plea was freely and voluntarily
made, and he understood a plea of no contest was the same as a guilty plea for all
purposes. The plea form also included an acknowledgement of the constitutional rights
he would be giving up by pleading no contest to the offense, as well as his statutory right
to a preliminary hearing and the consequences of his plea, including receipt of the
maximum penalty, fines, and restitution. The plea form also provided that defendant
admitted he acted as described on the record and as stated in the police reports and
waived each of his constitutional rights.
In response to questioning by the trial court, defendant acknowledged he had read
and understood the plea form and was willing to give up those rights. Counsel stipulated
to a factual basis for the plea based on the preliminary hearing transcript. Defendant then
pleaded no contest to count 3 and admitted suffering two prior strike convictions. The
court accepted the no contest plea and found that defendant was guilty, he had knowingly
and voluntarily waived his rights and entered his plea, and the plea was supported by a
factual basis.
On August 10, 2023, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, struck
defendant’s two prior strike convictions, placed defendant on a two-year term of
probation conditioned upon serving 357 days in county jail, and ordered payment of
victim restitution and all fines, fees, and assessments as set forth in the probation report.
On September 11, 2023, the probation department filed a declaration attesting that
defendant had been arrested for a violation of section 243 on August 15, 2023, and
defendant failed to report the arrest. A second declaration was filed on April 19, 2024,
attesting that defendant had violated his probation by failing to report to the probation
department after his revocation hearing as directed by the court. Defendant denied the

3.
allegations. Defendant requested a Marsden2 hearing on August 8, 2024, which the trial
court granted but thereafter denied his request for new counsel.
During the revocation hearing on September 16, 2024, Probation Officer Alvaro
Leon testified that defendant was assigned to his caseload on August 10, 2023, when he
was sentenced to two-year term of formal probation and ordered to report to probation
within five days of his release from custody. Defendant failed to report to the probation
office as directed. The court found defendant had violated his probation and sentenced
him to the upper term of four years in prison.3 The court also ordered defendant to pay
victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) in an amount to be determined by probation, a
$300 restitution fine (§ 1204.4, subd. (b)), a $300 probation revocation restitution fine
(§ 1202.44), a stayed $300 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $40 court operations
assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov.
Code, § 70373).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 18, 2024.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel or any other arguable error that would result in a
disposition more favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
3 At the same time, defendant was also found in violation of his probation terms in
two other separate cases and sentenced to concurrent three-year and 180-day terms.

4.