CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053381
(San Benito County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. CR2400244)

v.

ANTHONY MARK OWEN
MADRUGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

This appeal requires us to construe the “right to kill all animals used
for food” (Pen. Code,1 § 599c) exception to the crime of animal cruelty set out
in section 597, subdivision (a) (section 597(a)). We decide that section 599c’s
exception does not extend to the killing of another person’s animal for food
without the animal owner’s consent.
A jury convicted defendant Anthony Mark Owen Madruga of 10 crimes
related to his nighttime entry into a barn at Hollister High School and his
subsequent killing of a goat and pig. The animals belonged to students at the
school and had been housed in the barn as part of the school’s Future
Farmers of America (FFA) program.
Madruga’s convictions include two counts of animal cruelty (§ 597(a))
for killing the goat and pig and two counts of misdemeanor child abuse

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(§ 273a, subd. (b) (section 273a(b)) for the emotional harm inflicted on the
students who owned the animals. The trial court sentenced Madruga, who
had a prior strike conviction, to an aggregate prison term of 11 years six
months.
On appeal, Madruga contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on the exception to animal cruelty for his “right to kill all animals
used for food” (§ 599c) and, in the alternative, defense counsel was
prejudicially ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. He also
claims insufficient evidence supports the two child abuse convictions and the
animal cruelty conviction concerning the pig.
For the reasons explained below, we reject these contentions and affirm
the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
The San Benito County District Attorney filed an information charging
Madruga with two counts each of animal cruelty (§ 597(a); counts 1 [goat] & 2
[pig]), vandalism in an amount of $400 or more (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1);
counts 3–4), and misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a(b); counts 7 [minor victim
D.B.] & 8 [minor victim D.G.]). The information also charged Madruga with
second degree burglary (§ 459; count 5), unlawful possession of ammunition
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 6), misdemeanor possession of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 9), and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Id., § 11364, subd. (a); count
10). In addition, the information alleged that Madruga had suffered a prior
strike conviction for first degree burglary (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) and
that he was armed with a weapon when he committed the animal cruelty,
vandalism, and burglary offenses (counts 1–5) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The

2
information also alleged four aggravating circumstances as to counts 1
through 5 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)–(3) & (8)).
Madruga admitted the prior strike allegation.2 The jury found
Madruga guilty as charged and found true the weapon allegation (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) and the aggravating circumstances for sentencing. The trial
court sentenced Madruga to 11 years six months.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
1. Prosecution Evidence
Around 11:30 p.m. on February 5, 2024,3 surveillance cameras at an
agricultural barn on the campus of Hollister High School recorded a person
around and inside the barn.4 The barn housed animals for the school’s FFA
program.
The next morning (February 6), school staff discovered that the barn
had been broken into. A deceased goat (named Stetson) was found in his
enclosure. The bones of Stetson’s “head had been splintered.” A pig (named
Oakley) and a wheelbarrow were missing.5

2 After Madruga’s admission, the district attorney orally amended

count 6 (possession of ammunition by a felon) to allege the admitted
conviction as the underlying prior conviction supporting that count. At trial,
the parties stipulated that Madruga had previously been convicted of a felony
for the purpose of count 6.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2024.
4 Hollister High School serves students from grades 7 through 12.

Approximately 99 percent of the students are under the age of 18.
5 Surveillance footage depicts the intruder carrying an axe and later

pushing a wheelbarrow containing the axe and an apparently dead pig
through and away from the barn. Additionally, a photograph depicting the
interior of the barn appears to show red stains on the floor and plywood
outside of the pigs’ enclosures. No surveillance footage of the actual killing of
the pig or goat was introduced into evidence at trial.
3
 Later that afternoon, near a homeless encampment located
approximately one mile from Hollister High School, sheriff’s deputies
discovered a pig carcass hanging from a tree. The pig was missing a
hindquarter. Deputies also found a wheelbarrow labeled “ ‘Hollister FFA’ ”
(with reddish brown staining in it) and rubber boots (with apparent fodder on
them) that were like other boots stored in the barn.
The deputies contacted Madruga at the encampment. The pig carcass
was approximately 75 yards away from the area in which Madruga
apparently was living; the wheelbarrow was approximately 50 yards away
from that area. Within Madruga’s living area, the deputies found pants,
boots, and a jacket that had reddish brown stains on the sleeves, shoulder
area, and back. The deputies also found glass pipes, a small plastic baggy
containing methamphetamine, and a round of ammunition.
A shoeprint located on concrete at the barn shared similarities with the
sole of the boots found in Madruga’s living area. In addition, the tread
pattern of the sneakers Madruga was wearing at the time of his arrest was
consistent with latent shoeprints found near the wheelbarrow.
The deputies did not find any pig parts in Madruga’s living area. The
deputies recovered the charred remains of an animal’s leg from a person
named Samantha. The deputies also found “some evidence” that someone
“could have consumed part of the pig or perhaps participated in its
butchering, but [the deputies] found no evidence that the other subjects were
involved in the dispatching of the pig or the thefts.” Additionally, none of the
fingerprints collected and analyzed by law enforcement had any evidentiary
value.
Hollister High School student D.G. testified that she owned Oakley the
pig and had raised him for about one month as part of the FFA program.

4
D.G. was immediately attracted to Oakley when she was selecting an animal
for the program. D.G. testified that she had purchased Oakley for $500
approximately one month before he was killed. For the first couple of weeks
after D.G. purchased Oakley, D.G. spent time “a lot of time” spoiling Oakley
with powdered doughnuts and teaching him how to walk. D.G. invested
approximately $1,000 into buying and raising Oakley. Before D.G. left the
barn late on February 5, D.G. and others “were just chilling out with music”
and “hanging out there with animals.” D.G. was “spoiling [Oakley] with
doughnuts” that night.
On the morning of February 6, D.G. learned that Oakley was missing
from the barn. D.G. had an emotional attachment to Oakley and “was
worrying about” him. D.G. testified, “I was very heartbroken and I couldn’t
sleep for a couple of months because I just had nightmares, and I was scared
for my next pig to be the next victim.” On cross-examination, D.G.
acknowledged that she knew and intended that Oakley would eventually be
sold and butchered for his meat.
Hollister High School student D.B. testified that she owned Stetson the
goat and had raised him for about two months as part of the FFA program.
D.B. had purchased Stetson for $650. D.B. “decided that goat was what [she]
best fit.” D.B. spent hours getting to know, feeding, washing, and training
Stetson to walk on a halter for showing. D.B. invested approximately $1,100
dollars into buying and raising Stetson. When D.B. left the barn on February
5, Stetson was lying in his enclosure going to sleep.
On February 6, D.B saw Stetson in lying dead in “a puddle of blood.”
D.B. was “really scared” by the experience and “really sad because [she] had
grown a connection with” Stetson. D.B. testified that she had an attachment

5
to Stetson even though he was being raised for auction. At the time of trial
(in April 2025), the loss of Stetson still had an emotional impact on D.B.
2. Defense Evidence
A private investigator confirmed that the wheelbarrow was found by
deputies approximately 50 yards from Madruga’s apparent living area. The
pig carcass was situated 124 yards from Madruga’s living area. The
investigator testified that the length of the likely route taken by a person
pushing a wheelbarrow from the barn to the homeless encampment was 1.1
miles. In addition, the investigator explained that the jacket recovered by
deputies in February 2024, did not fit Madruga when he tried it on in April
2025.
On cross-examination, the investigator acknowledged that the sleeves
of the jacket fit Madruga’s arms, and the jacket had some reddish-brown
stains on the sleeves and back. The investigator further acknowledged that
“[i]f the jacket was used as a smock or an apron, the size would actually
radically change in terms of its orientation on Mr. Madruga.”
II. DISCUSSION
Madruga raises three claims of error. We first address, concurrently,
Madruga’s claims that insufficient evidence supports the animal cruelty
conviction regarding Oakley the pig (count 2), the trial court erred by failing
to instruct sua sponte that killing an animal used for food is an exception to
animal cruelty (see § 599c), and, alternatively, Madruga’s defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by failing to request
instruction on that exception.6 We then turn to Madruga’s claim challenging

6 Although the conclusion sections of Madruga’s opening brief and reply

brief ask this court to reverse both count 1 (concerning the killing of the goat
named Stetson) and count 2 (concerning the killing of Oakley the pig), the
arguments stated in Madruga’s claims challenge only his conviction on count
6
the sufficiency of the trial evidence for his misdemeanor child abuse
convictions (counts 7 & 8).
A. Sufficiency of Evidence and Instruction on Animal Cruelty
Conviction Regarding Oakley the Pig (Count 2)
Madruga asserts there is insufficient evidence for his animal cruelty
conviction as to Oakley the pig (count 2). Madruga also claims the trial court
had a sua sponte duty to modify CALCRIM No. 2953 (CALCRIM 2953) to
include section 599c’s exception for killing an animal used for food and,
alternatively, defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to
request instruction on that exception.
1. Additional Background
Section 597(a) provides in relevant part: “Except as provided in
. . . [s]ection 599c, a person who maliciously and intentionally maims,
mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and
intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of a crime.” As relevant to this matter,
section 599c provides that section 597 must not be “construed . . . to interfere
with the right to kill all animals used for food.”
In count 2 of the information, the district attorney alleged that
Madruga committed the crime of animal cruelty, in violation of section
597(a), when he “did unlawfully, maliciously and intentionally kill an animal,
to wit a pig.”
In a trial brief, Madruga’s defense counsel recommended that the trial
court instruct the jurors on the animal cruelty charges using “CALCRIM

2. Thus, we do not consider count 1 when addressing Madruga’s claims
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instruction on animal
cruelty under section 597, and the effectiveness of defense counsel.
7
1670 [sic7] – Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a)).” (Boldface omitted.)
Counsel additionally stated that the instruction “[d]efines elements
(malicious killing), allowing argument that killing for food (if proven) negates
malice.” (Italics added.)
Despite this statement in Madruga’s trial brief, when the trial court
and counsel for the parties discussed the prosecutor’s proposed packet of jury
instructions, defense counsel did not object to or request any modification of
the proposed instruction on counts 1 and 2 under CALCRIM 2953, which did
not include the language related to killing an animal for food.
The trial court instructed the jurors on the animal cruelty charges
using CALCRIM 2953 as follows: “The defendant is charged in [c]ount[s] 1
and 2 with [a]nimal [c]ruelty in violation of Penal Code section 597. [¶] To
prove that the defendant is guilty of [animal cruelty], the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The defendant killed a living animal; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The
defendant acted maliciously. [¶] Someone acts maliciously when he or she
intentionally does a wrongful act or when he acts with the unlawful intent to
disturb, annoy or injure an animal.”8
In his closing argument regarding the animal cruelty counts, the
prosecutor stated, inter alia: “The crime is any person who kills an animal
maliciously. It is not malicious when you kill your own animal for food

7 CALCRIM does not contain an instruction numbered 1670. The
model instruction for animal cruelty is CALCRIM 2953.
8 The bench notes to CALCRIM 2953 state that “[t]he court will need to

modify this instruction if Penal Code section 599(c) [sic] applies.” (Judicial
Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2026), Bench Notes to CALCRIM
No. 2953, p. 1987; accord Use Note to CALJIC No. 14.96 (2026–1 ed.) p. 1032
[“If there is an issue raised concerning . . . section 599c, special instruction
will have to be devised. Unless an issue is raised concerning . . . section
[599c], delete the bracketed word ‘unlawful’ ” from the pattern instruction.].)
8
because that is your animal that is going to slaughter and that is clearly
what it is. [¶] Malicious just means intentionally does a wrongful act. It is
malicious, however, to kill intentionally someone else’s animal you do not
have a right to. So I don’t want you to get hung up on the idea it’s animal
cruelty because this was about being mean to the animal. Although, I think
it’s absolutely clear that the death of the goat, Stetson, was completely
unnecessary in this particular case and completely brutal for having its head
beat[en] in for no reason. [¶] But there isn’t an argument as it relates to the
pig that, oh, it was going to be raised for food anyways. The reality there is
that is not what’s relevant. The relevance is kills, which is clear, malicious
means wrongful, intentionally doing a wrongful act.” 9
The prosecutor added that if a person kills “an aggressive rabid dog”
that attacks the person, that killing is not malicious because the person has a
personal right to protect themself. In contrast, intentionally killing a dog
“because it barks too much and I don’t like my neighbor” is malicious.
Relatedly, when addressing the burglary charge (count 5), the
prosecutor argued that Madruga entered the barn “with either the intent to
steal an animal or the intent to commit animal cruelty, killing someone else’s
animal.” The prosecutor added that the surveillance footage showed that
Madruga was inside the barn for about 15 minutes, and Madruga placed the
pig and an axe in the wheelbarrow. The prosecutor asserted that “[t]he best
inference is that [Madruga] intended to steal the goat initially but then
decided to go to the pig as he heard other animals.”

9 Madruga’s defense counsel did not object to this portion of the

prosecutor’s argument, and Madruga makes no argument in this appeal that
his defense counsel’s failure to object to the argument amounts to prejudicial
IAC.
9
 Madruga’s defense counsel explained to the jurors in closing argument
that Madruga “is denying his involvement in this case.” Defense counsel
challenged the strength of the People’s proof and the adequacy of the police
investigation. Defense counsel stated Madruga “completely denies his
involvement. So we don’t know who did this. It’s a circumstantial case that
they are trying to piece together, a lot of random facts that they believe
conclude that they point to Mr. Madruga.” Counsel added that law
enforcement had not done any investigation of other people (such as the
women who possessed the charred leg) and “certainly Mr. Madruga didn’t
have” any pig parts. Defense counsel added: “Whoever did this, again, not
Mr. Madruga, but whoever did this, this was a random act to go in and take
an animal probably for food and maybe take it back down to the river for the
other homeless folks down there to enjoy. We don’t know. That’s a lot of
speculation.”
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘In construing a statute, our fundamental task is to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (People v.
Killian (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 191, 205 (Killian); see People v. Morgan (2026)
19 Cal.5th 132, 143 (Morgan).) “ ‘When reviewing the evidence for legal
sufficiency, our task is limited. We determine “whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime.” [Citation.] We
make this determination using the statutory language [citation], because “the
plain language of our statute must control as to the acts which constitute the
crime.” [Citations.] We apply de novo review to the meaning of statutory
language.’ ” (Killian, at p. 205; see Morgan, at p. 143.)

10
 Regarding jury instructions, “ ‘[t]he trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense.’ [Citation.]
‘ “In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must
instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” [Citation.]
That duty extends to instructions on the defendant’s theory of the case,
“including instructions ‘as to defenses “ ‘that the defendant is relying on . . .,
or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[O]nce a trial court undertakes to instruct on a legal
point, it must do so correctly.’ ” (People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
625, 660 (Howard).)
“Nevertheless, ‘[a] trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or
improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel
[citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct
instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal.’ ” (Howard,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 660.)
“We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they
completely and correctly state the law. [Citations.] ‘ “In considering a claim
of instructional error we must first ascertain what the relevant law provides,
and then determine what meaning the instruction given conveys.” ’ ”
(Killian, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)
3. History and Construction of Sections 597a and 599c
“In California, the Legislature has recognized since 1872 that animals
are special, sentient beings, because unlike other forms of property, animals
feel pain, suffer and die.” (Martinez v. Robledo (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 384,
392.) “As enacted in 1872, section 597 read: ‘Every person who maliciously

11
kills, maims, or wounds an animal, the property of another, or who
maliciously and cruelly beats, tortures, or injures any animal, whether
belonging to himself or another, is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ ” (People v.
Chung (2010) 195 Cal.App.4th 721, 728.)
In the first decade of the 1900s, the Legislature twice amended section
597. (Stats. 1905, ch. 519, § 1; Stats. 1909, ch. 661, § 1; see People v. Dunn
(1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 418, 420–421 (Dunn).)
As amended in 1905, section 597 read: “Every person who maliciously
kills, maims, or wounds an animal, the property of another, or who
overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments,
deprives of necessary sustenance, drink or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates, or
cruelly kills any animal, or causes or procures any animal to be so overdriven,
overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented,
deprived of necessary sustenance, drink or shelter, or to be cruelly beaten,
mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having the charge or custody of any
animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects any animal to needless
suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the same, or in any manner
abuses any animal, or fails to provide the same with proper food, drink,
shelter or protection from the weather, or who cruelly drives, rides or
otherwise uses the same when unfit for labor, is for every such offense, guilty
of a misdemeanor.”10 (Stats. 1905, ch. 519, § 1.)

10 The only change effected by the 1909 amendment to section 597 was

the deletion of the word “cruelly” from the prior statute’s final prohibitory
phrase (i.e., “or who cruelly drives, rides or otherwise uses the same when
unfit for labor”). (Stats. 1909, ch. 661, § 1.)
12
 Additionally, in 1905, the Legislature added section 599c to the Penal
Code, providing: “No part of this title[11] shall be construed as interfering
with any of the laws of this state known as the ‘game laws,’ or any laws for or
against the destruction of certain birds, nor must this title be construed as
interfering with the right to destroy any venomous reptile, or any animal
known as dangerous to life, limb, or property, or to interfere with the right to
kill all animals used for food, or with properly conducted scientific
experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of
a regularly incorporated medical college or university of this state.” (Stats.
1905, ch. 519, § 2, italics added.)
The Legislature has not altered section 599c since its enactment in
1905. In the 1950s, our Supreme Court observed that “the basic purpose of
section 599c is to limit the effect of the provisions prohibiting cruelty to
animals rather than to regulate the disposition of impounded animals.”12
(Simpson, supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 278.)
In 1972, the Legislature reorganized section 597 to include two
subdivisions, (a) and (b). (See Stats. 1972, ch. 779, § 1; People v. Farley
(1973) 33 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9–10; Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 420.)

11 Section 599c appears in title 14 of part 1 of the Penal Code (which

currently comprises §§ 594–625c). The statutes within title 14 that pertain to
animals are found at sections 596 through 600.8. Relatedly, section 595
provides: “The specification of the [a]cts enumerated in the following sections
of this [c]hapter is not intended to restrict or qualify the interpretation of the
preceding section.” Section 595 was enacted in 1872, when the section
preceding section 595 was section 594 (vandalism).
12 The Supreme Court made this observation in the context of deciding

whether a city ordinance of Los Angeles, which provided that the city would
surrender unclaimed impounded animals to certain institutions for medical
research, conflicted with certain state laws. (Simpson v. City of Los Angeles
(1953) 40 Cal.2d 271, 275–279 (Simpson).)
13
As enacted in 1972, section 597(a) provided in relevant part: “Every person
who maliciously maims, wounds, tortures, or mutilates a living animal which
is the property of another, or maliciously kills an animal which is the
property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1972, ch. 779, § 1.)
In 1984, the Legislature added three more subdivisions to section 597—
namely, subdivisions (c) through (e)—and amended subdivision (a) to, inter
alia, include an exception for new subdivision (c), which applies to the
malicious and intentional maiming, mutilation, or torture of endangered or
threatened species and other protected animals. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1215, § 8;
see People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 27 (Baniqued).) As
amended in 1984, section 597(a) provided in relevant part: “Except as
provided in subdivision (c), every person who maliciously maims, wounds,
tortures, or mutilates a living animal which is the property of another, or
maliciously kills an animal which is the property of another, is guilty of an
offense.” (Stats. 1984, ch. 1215, § 8.)
In 1986, the Legislature amended section 597(a) again, principally to
add the word “intentionally” to the subdivision.13 (Stats. 1986, ch. 846, § 1.)
In 1987, the Legislature amended section 597(a) to expand the
application of the statute beyond animals that are “the property of another,”
to further cover circumstances in which the harmed animal is owned by the
person who performs the prohibited act.14 (See Stats. 1987, ch. 814, § 1.)

13 As amended in 1986, section 597(a) read in relevant part: “Except as
provided in subdivision (c), every person who maliciously and intentionally
maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal which is the property
of another, or maliciously and intentionally[] kills an animal which is the
property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 846, § 1, italics
added.)
14 As amended in 1987, section 597(a) provided in relevant part:

“Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who maliciously and
14
 In 1988, the Legislature amended section 597(a) again. As relevant
here, the Legislature added section 599c into section 597(a)’s initial “[e]xcept
as” clause. The Legislature also deleted all language regarding ownership of
the animal. (See Stats. 1988, chs. 127, 1522, 1527, 1556, § 4 [eff. Jan. 1,
1989].) As amended in 1988, section 597(a) read in relevant part: “Except as
provided in subdivision (c) of this section or [s]ection 599c, every person who
maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living
animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of an
offense.” (Stats. 1988, chs. 127, 1522, 1527, 1556, § 4, italics added.)
In addition, the Legislature declared the following about its 1988
amendments to section 597: “It is the express intent of the Legislature that
the amendments to [s]ection 597 . . . made by this act shall not (a) interfere
with the existing rights to self-defense and use of force when it is reasonably
believed that an animal poses an immediate threat or danger to a person or
(b) interfere with any of the laws contained in the Fish and Game Code or the
Food and Agricultural Code.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 1522, § 6.)
The current version of section 597(a) is substantially similar to the
1988 version and provides in relevant part: “Except as provided in
subdivision (c) of this section or [s]ection 599c, a person who maliciously and
intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or
maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of a crime.”15 (Stats.
2023, ch. 546, § 2 [eff. Jan. 1, 2024].)

intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal which is
the property of the person or which is the property of another, or maliciously
and intentionally kills an animal which is the property of the person or which
is the property of another, is guilty of an offense.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 814, § 1,
italics added.)
15 As used in section 597(a), the “word ‘animal’ includes every dumb

creature” (§ 599b), and “in its broadest sense, the phrase ‘dumb creatures’
15
 Case law establishes that section 597(a) “is a general intent statute.”
(People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1190.) “General criminal
intent [] requires no further mental state beyond willing commission of the
act proscribed by law.” (People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1215
(Sargent); see People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 621 [explaining
that the defendant must intend the wrongful act but is not required to have
intended the result].) In the context of section 597, maliciously is defined as
“a wish to vex, annoy, or injure” an animal, or “an intent to do a wrongful
act.” (§ 7, subd. (b)(4); see Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 421 [observing
that the focus of the 1972 version of section 597 was on cruelty to animals
rather than “malice toward the animal’s owner”].)
4. Arguments on Appeal
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Madruga contends “if the pig
was killed for food, the conduct falls within the section 599c exception and
does not constitute a ‘wrongful act’ under the animal cruelty statute.” He
further contends that he “did not kill the pig with malice since killing an
animal for food is an exception to the animal cruelty statute.” He claims the
evidence shows he removed the pig from the barn, took it to the homeless
encampment, and killed it. He also claims that “the presence of a charred leg
supports the inference that the pig was killed for food.” He argues: “Because
section 599c exempts the killing of animals for food, even in the light most
favorable to the judgment, the evidence does not establish that [he]
committed a wrongful act and did not [sic] maliciously kill the pig within the
meaning of section 597, subdivision (a).”

describes all animals except human beings. The use of the adjective ‘every’ in
the definition indicates that a broad meaning was intended.” (Baniqued,
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 21.)
16
 Relatedly, Madruga contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to
modify the instruction on count 2 to include section 599c’s exception for
killing an animal for food because that “exception directly bears on an
element of animal cruelty: the intent of the person killing the animal.”
Madruga further asserts that the court’s failure to modify the animal cruelty
instruction to include the section 599c exception was prejudicial under the
Chapman harmless error standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24), as well as the less stringent Watson standard for state law error
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836). Alternatively, Madruga claims
the record establishes ineffective assistance of counsel based on his defense
counsel’s failure to request an instruction under the section 599c exception.
The Attorney General responds, inter alia, that section 599c is legally
inapplicable because Madruga “manifestly did not have [] a right [to kill for
food] an animal that was not his, taking [Madruga] outside the plain
language of the statute.”
In his reply brief, Madruga reiterates his argument that “[s]ection 597
requires that malice be directed at the animal itself, not at the animal’s
owner” (citing Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at pp. 420–421), and if the pig
were killed for food, section 599c precludes a finding of malice.
5. Analysis
When construing a statute, “ ‘we consider portions of a statute in the
context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part,
giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in
pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 617.) We begin our evaluation of Madruga’s claims with
a brief review of the evolution of the statutory scheme.

17
 When the Legislature enacted section 599c in 1905, the version of
section 597 concurrently enacted prohibited the malicious killing, maiming,
or wounding of an animal that is “the property of another.” (Stats. 1905, ch.
519, § 1.) The 1905 version of section 597 also prohibited other acts that
applied to “any animal” (i.e., “cruelly beat[ing], mutilat[ing], or cruelly
kill[ing] any animal”) (ibid.) and certain acts of cruelty, abuse, and
mistreatment perpetrated by a person “having the charge or custody of any
animal, either as owner or otherwise.” (Ibid.) Through these statutes, the
Legislature broadly protected animals from cruelty and maltreatment both
when the animal was not the property of the perpetrator and when the
animal was owned or rightfully possessed by the perpetrator.
Similarly, in 1988, when the Legislature added section 599c to the
exception language in section 597(a), it simultaneously removed all mention
of ownership (or lack thereof) over the harmed animal. (Compare Stats.
1987, ch. 814, § 1 with Stats. 1988, chs. 127, 1522, 1527, 1556, § 4.) In
addition, the Legislature expressly stated an intent not to “interfere with the
existing rights to self-defense and use of force” against an animal that poses
an immediate threat or danger to a person or “with any of the laws contained
in the Fish and Game Code or the Food and Agricultural Code.”16 (Stats.

16 As relevant here, the Food and Agriculture Code provides that

certain livestock (including swine and goats) “shall be slaughtered by either
of the following prescribed methods: [¶] (1) The animal shall be rendered
insensible to pain by a captive bolt, gunshot, electrical or chemical means, or
any other means that is rapid and effective before being cut, shackled,
hoisted, thrown, or cast, with the exception of poultry which may be shackled.
[¶] (2) The animal shall be handled, prepared for slaughter, and slaughtered
in accordance with ritual requirements of the Jewish or any other religious
faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of
consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and
18
1988, ch. 1522, § 6.) With these changes, the Legislature broadly protected
animals for cruelty irrespective of ownership, while concurrently ensuring
that persons would not be held criminally liable for certain acts that the
Legislature otherwise deemed proper.
Turning to the portion of section 599c currently in effect and at issue in
this matter, the exception is explicitly tethered to “the right to kill.” (See
§ 599c [“No part of this title shall be construed . . . to interfere with the right
to kill all animals used for food.” (Italics added.)].) As defined by Black’s
Law Dictionary, a “right,” is, inter alia: “1. That which is proper under law,
morality, or ethics,” “2. Something that is due to a person by just claim, legal
guarantee, or moral principle,” and “3. A power, privilege, or immunity
secured to a person by law.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 1581,
cols. 1–2.) By using the phrase “the right to kill,” the Legislature has
described a claim to kill that is deemed just and proper.
From a property rights perspective, it is a “fundamental principle[] of
the common law” (Wright v. Solomon (1861) 19 Cal. 64, 69) that “no man’s
right to his property can be divested without his consent.” (Ibid.) Likewise,
“it is beyond dispute that an individual has the right to have his personal
property free from interference.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th
1342, 1375 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also id. at pp. 1350–1351.)
Thus, a person acts wrongfully if he or she damages the property of
another or interferes substantially with another person’s possession of their
property, including animals. (See Garcia v. Gunn (1897) 119 Cal. 315, 321
[explaining that the “right of control over and possession of all [wild goats on
leased land], with the right of selection, would be invaded if a stranger could

instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument.”
(Id., § 19501, subd. (b).)
19
come in and slay goats at will”]; Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541,
549–552 [discussing the torts of conversion and trespass to personal
property]; Kimes v. Grosser (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1558 [holding that a
pet owner can recover the costs of pet care attributable to injury caused by
another]; People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 896 [“[T]he fact that
section 594 [(prohibiting vandalism)] has its basis in a century-old statute
dealing with malicious injury to another’s property suggests that such
destruction of another’s property is fundamentally and presumptively wrong.”
(Italics added.)]; see also § 384h [prohibiting the willful or negligent killing,
maiming, or wounding of “an animal, the property of another,” “while
hunting upon the [e]nclosed lands of another”].)
As detailed ante, section 599c includes additional limitations. These
aspects of the statute likewise suggest that the Legislature intended section
599c’s restrictions on the laws against animal cruelty to apply only in
circumstances that are otherwise considered proper or just. For example,
section 599c prohibits interference with the policy judgments made with
respect to game animals (as stated in our state’s game laws), the destruction
of venomous reptiles and animals that are dangerous to persons or property,
and certain “properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations.” 17
(§ 599c.)
If the Legislature had intended, as Madruga implicitly argues, for
section 599c to apply broadly to all killings of animals used for food
irrespective of the ownership of the animal, it could easily have done so. A

17 At common law, a person had a right “to defend his domestic animals

against the attacks of dogs, or to kill such dogs when the circumstances
warrant the belief that his property is in peril.” (Sabin v. Smith (1915) 26
Cal.App. 676, 678; see also Food & Agr. Code, § 31102 [stating certain
conditions involving livestock or poultry that permit the killing of a dog].)
20
carveout intended to apply broadly to all killings of animals used for food
regardless of any legitimate interest or consent might, for example, have
provided that no part of the title shall be construed “to interfere with any
killing of animals used for food.” The tethering of the exception to the “right
to kill” strongly suggests a narrower ambit than that urged by Madruga.
Moreover, we do not perceive any inconsistency between section
597(a)’s requirement that malice be directed toward the animal killed (see
Dunn, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 420) and the limitation of section 599c’s
food exception to animal owners or those who act with the owner’s consent.
Section 597(a) and 599c balance differing and potentially competing interests
between the protection afforded animals and certain conduct toward animals
otherwise considered proper. By focusing the requisite malice on the animal
rather than the owner, section 597(a) broadly protects animals themselves.
An understanding of section 599c’s exception tied to ownership and consent
balances the protection of animals from malicious killing against an animal
owner’s appropriate use of the animal for food.
Considering the phrase “right to kill all animals used for food” in the
context of the statutory scheme and given the protection historically afforded
personal property, including animals, we agree with the Attorney General
that section 559c’s bar against “ ‘interfer[ing] with the right to kill all
animals used for food’ ” does not extend to any animal a person may choose to
eat. To decide the issues in this appeal, we need not decide the full scope of a
person’s “right to kill” animals for food. Whatever the outer bounds of that
right, we conclude it does not extend to animals owned by another, where the
owner has not consented to the killing of the animal.
We decide section 599c does not apply as a matter of law to Madruga’s
conduct, because it is undisputed he did not own the pig or have permission

21
to kill it. Given this conclusion, we reject Madruga’s appellate claim of
insufficient evidence on count 2. That claim lacks merit because it turns on
Madruga’s contention that he “did not kill the pig with malice since killing an
animal for food is an exception to the animal cruelty statute.” As we have
explained, there is no exception to section 597(a) for the killing of an animal
used for food when the defendant did not own the animal or have the owner’s
consent to kill it.
Moreover, to the extent that Madruga’s claim contends the evidence is
otherwise insufficient to support his conviction on count 2, we are not
persuaded. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that Madruga
killed Oakley in the barn using an axe and that the killing of Oakley occurred
in a manner akin to the brutal killing of Stetson. Thus, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude there is substantial
evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Madruga guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of animal cruelty as charged in count 2.
Additionally, because section 559c’s bar against interfering with the
right to kill all animals used for food is legally inapplicable under the instant
circumstances, we reject Madruga’s claims of instructional error and
ineffective assistance of counsel on count 2. Madruga’s claims are premised
on the applicability of section 599c’s bar to his conviction under section
597(a). Because the premise of Madruga’s claims is inapt, Madruga fails to
demonstrate any instructional error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Child Abuse Convictions (Counts 7 &
8)
Madruga also contends insufficient evidence supports his misdemeanor
child abuse convictions (counts 7 & 8). We turn now to that question.

22
 1. Standard of Review
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 944; see also Jackson v.
Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.)
“In applying this test, we . . . presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).) “ ‘We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient
evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s
verdict.” (Ibid.) “However, ‘[a] reasonable inference . . . “may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guess work. [¶] . . . A finding of fact must be an inference
drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities
without evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.)
“The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies
primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] We ‘must accept logical
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if
it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the
jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt

23
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.” (Zamudio, supra, 43
Cal.4th at pp. 357–358.) We decide questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. (Morgan, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 143.)
2. Analysis
Section 273a(b) “provides: ‘Any person who, under circumstances or
conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
[1] willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or [2] inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or [3] having the care or
custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that
child to be injured, or [4] willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in
a situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of
a misdemeanor.’ ” (People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 453–454
(Burton), quoting § 273a(b); see also Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)
“Section 273a encompasses a wide variety of situations and includes
both direct and indirect conduct.” (Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 454;
see also Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1215–1216; In re L.K. (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445, citing People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 783
(Valdez).) “When the harm to a child is directly inflicted, the requisite
mental state for the section 273a offense is general criminal intent.
[Citations.] When that harm is indirectly inflicted, the requisite mental state
is criminal negligence. [Citations.] Criminal negligence is aggravated,
culpable, gross or reckless conduct that is such a departure from that of the
ordinarily prudent or careful person under the same circumstances as to be
incompatible with a proper regard for human life. [Citation.] A defendant

24
may be deemed to be criminally negligent if a reasonable person in his
position would have been aware of the risk.” (Burton, at p. 454; see also
People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 874.)
“The term ‘willfully’ in the section 273a context of indirect conduct
implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the
omission referred to; an act or omission amounting to criminal negligence
can, in limited contexts, constitute a willful violation of the law.” (Burton,
supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 455, citing Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 787–
788, 790.)
The term “unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” means “pain
or suffering that is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the
circumstances.” (CALCRIM No. 823.) One court has observed that “the
meaning of section 273a . . . is not difficult to find. We do not think that the
word ‘unjustifiable,’ as used in the section, is synonymous with ‘unjust.’ It is
the antonym of ‘justifiable,’ rather than the antonym of ‘just.’ ” (People v.
Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal.App.Supp. 771, 778 (Curtiss).) The court explained,
“By the use of the word ‘unjustifiable,’ the Legislature intended to make use
of the antonym of ‘justifiable,’ and to designate as criminal the infliction of
physical pain or mental suffering upon a child, which could not be defended,
or vindicated, or which was not exculpable, excusable or authorizable, under
the circumstances. The standard thus set up is not abstract. It is concrete.
The concept by which it shall be determined whether the punishment is or is
not unjustifiable is a fluid one—like the concept by which the action of the
‘reasonable man’ serves as a criterion in determining the violations of duty
which amount to negligence.” (Id. at p. 779, italics omitted.)
The trial court instructed the jurors on counts 7 and 8 using CALCRIM
No. 823 as follows: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the

25
People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted a
child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering; [¶] AND [¶]
2. The defendant was criminally negligent when he caused or permitted the
child to suffer. [¶] Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it
willingly or on purpose. [¶] A child is any person under the age of 18 years.
[¶] Unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that is
not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances. [¶]
Criminal [n]egligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention,
or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when: [¶]
1. He acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the way an
ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation; [¶] 2. The person’s
acts amount to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of
his acts; [¶] AND [¶] 3. A reasonable person would have known that acting
in that way would naturally and probably result in harm to others.”
Madruga claims there is insufficient evidence for two of the requisite
elements for conviction under section 273a(b), namely, unjustifiable mental
suffering and criminal negligence. Regarding the unjustifiable mental
suffering element for D.B. (count 7) and D.G. (count 8), Madruga contends
the students’ emotional reactions and nightmares were “not excessive under
the circumstances.” He also notes that each student testified to an
understanding that her animal would ultimately be slaughtered.
We are not persuaded that the evidence is insufficient to prove the
unjustifiable mental suffering element. The term “mental suffering” means
“[a] highly unpleasant mental reaction (such as anguish, grief, fright,
humiliation, or fury) that results from another person’s conduct; emotional
pain and suffering.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) pp. 596, col. 2 & 1182,
col. 1 [defining mental suffering by reference to the definition of emotional

26
distress].) As detailed ante (see pt. I.B.1.), D.G testified that she was
emotionally attached to Oakley, worried when she learned that he was
missing from the barn, “very heartbroken,” unable to sleep soundly for “a
couple of months” because of nightmares, and “scared” that her next pig
might suffer the same fate. D.B, likewise, testified that she saw Stetson in a
pool of blood and was “really scared” and “really sad” because she had an
attachment to Stetson. D.B. also cried during her testimony.
Each student’s testimony provides substantial evidence of “mental
suffering.” The evidence shows the anguish, grief, and fright caused by the
premature and traumatic death of the animals the students had left secured
in a barn the night before the killings. Further, the students’ mental
suffering was “unjustifiable” because that suffering was not reasonably
necessary and was excessive under the circumstances. There is no justifiable
reason for an adult to place a minor student in the position of experiencing
worry, sadness, fear, or nightmares due to an attack on a farm animal the
student had kept safe and sound in a barn on a school campus. In other
words, the mental suffering that resulted from Madruga breaking into the
locked barn at Hollister High School and killing an animal under a student’s
care cannot “be defended[] or vindicated” and is “not exculpable, excusable or
authorizable.” (Curtiss, supra, 116 Cal.App.Supp. at p. 779.)
Contrary to Madruga’s suggestion, the students’ mental suffering need
not amount to “lasting psychological harm” or cause a “significant change in
the students’ mental health.” Under the terms of the statute, any amount of
mental suffering will suffice provided it is “unjustifiable.” As explained, the
unjustifiable nature of the students’ mental suffering was proved here by
Madruga’s intrusion into the locked barn and intentional attack on the
animals with an axe, which caused mental suffering that “could not, either as

27
to necessity or degree, be justified as reasonable, under the circumstances, to
a jury of reasonable persons.” (Curtiss, supra, 116 Cal.App.Supp. at p. 779;
see also Cline v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 943, 949.) For these
reasons, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to prove the unjustifiable
mental suffering element of section 273a(b).
Regarding the criminal negligence element, Madruga contends: “Even
assuming [Madruga] knew the barn was located on school grounds, a
reasonable person would not necessarily foresee that killing a farm animal or
stealing livestock, outside the presence of any minors, would cause a child to
suffer unjustifiable mental suffering.” We disagree.
We conclude the trial evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s finding of
criminal negligence. The locked barn was located on school grounds and
contained at least one item labeled “ ‘Hollister FFA’ ” (i.e., the stolen
wheelbarrow). A reasonable person entering a high school campus and
breaking into a locked barn would have recognized that minor students were
involved in caring for or, at least, connected to the animals inside. A
reasonable person also would have been aware of the risk that the minors
would suffer unjustifiable mental suffering when they later learned that their
animals were violently killed by an intruder who forcibly entered the barn
overnight.
Moreover, Madruga does not cite any precedent expressly requiring
that the minor be present at the time of the defendant’s actions to find the
defendant acted with criminal negligence in causing or permitting the minor
to suffer unjustifiable mental suffering. Although presence may be a relevant
factor in deciding whether a defendant was criminally negligent, we perceive
no basis to conclude that section 273a(b)—which applies “under

28
circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily
harm or death”—requires the child’s presence.
Madruga’s intrusion and attack on Oakley and Stetson involved
aggravated and reckless conduct that departed from that of an ordinarily
careful person and disregarded the unjustifiable mental suffering that a
reasonable person would know would naturally and probably result from the
intrusion, killing, and theft. The evidence satisfied the criminal negligence
standard. (See Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 783; see also Burton, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 453–456.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

29
 ______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Adams, J.

H053381
People v. Madruga
Trial Court: County of San Benito

Trial Judge: Hon. Brian R. Aronson

Counsel: Kevin Armonio, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under
the Sixth District Appellate Program, for Defendant
and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Amit Kurlekar,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

H053381
People v. Madruga


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B348276

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XWESA072463)
v.

DOUGLAS CORTEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.

Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 Defendant and appellant Douglas Cortez (defendant)
appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for recall
and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
I. Conviction and sentencing2
After jury trials in 2011 and 2012, defendant was convicted
of one count of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664; count 2), evading
an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 3), unlawfully
driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count
4), and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 5). As to
each count, the jury found true gang allegations pursuant to
section 186.22, subdivision (b), and as to counts 2, 3, and 4,
firearm allegations pursuant to sections 12022.7 and 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), and (e)(1) were also found true. (People v.
Cortez (Oct. 23, 2013, B244720) [nonpub. opn.] (Cortez).)
The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 46
years plus eight months to life in state prison. On direct appeal,
we modified the judgment as to counts 2 and 5 to reflect
defendant’s sentence is life with the possibility of parole with
minimum parole eligibility set at 15 years, with count 5 to run
concurrently with count 2. (Cortez, supra, B244720.) We
otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
II. Petition for recall and resentencing
On January 13, 2025, defendant filed a petition for recall
and resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).

1 All further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
2 Because the facts of the underlying offense are not relevant
to the current appeal, we do not include them.

2
Defendant alleged he was 17 years old at the time of the crime
and has been incarcerated for over 15 years. He provided a letter
of remorse and rehabilitation as required by section 1170,
subdivision (d)(2)(D). Relying on People v. Heard (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard), defendant argued entitlement to relief
because he was sentenced to de facto life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP). As such, defendant argued the trial court was
obligated to recall his sentence and certify the matter to juvenile
court for further proceedings consistent with Proposition 57 (as
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)). The People
opposed the petition. On June 6, 2025, defendant filed a
supplemental brief in support of his petition.
After entertaining the parties’ briefs and oral arguments,
on July 11, 2025, the trial court denied defendant’s petition.
During the hearing, the court and the parties discussed the then-
recently published decision in People v. Cabrera (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 650, along with People v. Olmos (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 580 and People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499,
review granted3 June 25, 2025, S290828 (Munoz).
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal.

3 In granting review, the Supreme Court ordered briefing on
the following issue: “Is a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to
50 years to life in prison entitled to recall and resentencing under
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) on the ground that
the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment
without parole?” (People v. Munoz (June 25, 2025, S290828).)

3
 DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law
A. Standard of review
We apply de novo review where, as here, the appeal turns
on questions of law and the application of law to undisputed
facts. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
485, 518.)
B. Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), section 3051,
and the split of authority
Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), “[w]hen a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to
the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” On
its face, section 1170, subdivision (d), limits relief to juvenile
offenders sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Olmos, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 583.)
In Heard, however, our colleagues in the Fourth District
held that denying the opportunity to petition for section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP violates the constitutional
guarantee to equal protection of the laws. (Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at pp. 612, 626–634; accord, People v. Cabrera,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 653; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1040 [reaffirming Heard]; People v. Sorto (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 435, 454 (Sorto) [following Heard and concluding
there was no rational basis to treat differently “explicit LWOP
offenders and functionally equivalent LWOP offenders”].)

4
 Heard and the line of cases that has developed since opine,
“[A] sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP if it includes a
‘term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the
juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy’” regardless of a
meaningful opportunity for release at an earlier date pursuant to
section 3051. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 443.) Finding
the plain language of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) cannot be
interpreted to include juvenile offenders not sentenced to LWOP,
these courts have found the equal protection clause compels the
conclusion that juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP be included in those entitled to relief under
the statute.
These courts have also found the plain language of the
statute compels the conclusion that, although People v. Franklin
(2016) 64 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and section 3051 have cured the
juvenile’s otherwise lengthy sentence so that it currently no
longer operates as the functional equivalent of LWOP, this “‘does
not change the fact that the sentence was a [functionally
equivalent] life without parole sentence at the time it was
imposed.’” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 447; see also
Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629 [appellate court reversed
the trial court on equal protection grounds, reasoning that
§ 1170, subd. (d)(1) “‘uses the phrase “was sentenced” and refers
to the past’” and “[a]t the time Heard was sentenced, section 3051
had not yet been enacted, and he was required to serve his
determinate term plus the full minimum period of confinement of
each of his life sentences before becoming parole eligible”].) In
undertaking an equal protection analysis, these courts were
“unable to identify a rational basis for making juveniles
sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole term, but

5
not juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of life
without parole, eligible to petition for resentencing under section
1170, subdivision (d)(1).” (Heard, supra, at p. 633.)
Recently, other Courts of Appeal have parted ways with
Heard and its rationale. These courts have found, in effect, there
are no longer de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders
because section 3051 provides a meaningful opportunity for
release during the 25th year of incarceration. (See People v. Lara
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review granted Dec. 30, 2025,
S294095; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review
granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev); People v. Baldwin
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978; People v. Thompson (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 1058, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540; People
v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, review granted Sept. 17,
2025, S292070 (Ortega); Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 499,
review granted.) In short, these courts have found “[f]irst, under
the plain language of [section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)], [the
defendants were] not sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. (See § 1170(d)(1)(A).) And second,
[defendants’] equal protection claim[s are] moot because under
clear and binding precedent [they were] not sentenced to a prison
term that currently violates the Constitution (i.e., a sentence that
is the functional equivalent of life in prison without the
possibility of parole).” (Ortega, supra, at p. 1265, underscoring
added.)
C. Equal protection challenges
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850–851
(Hardin), the California Supreme Court “clarified the governing
analytical framework” for claims under the equal protection
clause and found “when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing

6
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, … [t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether the
challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under
the applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party
challenging the law to show that it is not.”
Accordingly, here, the appropriate inquiry is whether there
is a rational basis justifying section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)’s
disparate treatment of individuals who, like defendant, were
sentenced to terms that might have been defined as the
functional equivalent of LWOP. (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 851.) “Rational basis review ‘sets a high bar’ for litigants
challenging legislative enactments. [Citation.] … ‘Coupled with
a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional,
[rational basis review] helps ensure that democratically enacted
laws are not invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory
conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.’
[Citation.] [¶] Under this deferential standard, we presume that
a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger
shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is
reasonably conceivable.’” (Id. at p. 852; see also People v.
Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 127 [reaffirming Hardin,
“[b]ecause these ‘legislative policy choices’ are not ‘irrational,’
they are not ‘impermissible as a matter of equal protection’”].)
“‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not
second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’” (Hardin, at
p. 852.)

7
II. Analysis
A. Defendant’s sentence of 46 years eight months to
life does not constitute the functional equivalent
of LWOP
In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268, our
Supreme Court defined sentences that constitute the functional
equivalent of LWOP as those with “a parole eligibility date that
falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy.”
Later decisions have refined this standard, but no published
decision has found a sentence as short as 46 years to life to
constitute functional LWOP, and we decline to expand the
doctrine to such terms. Moreover, given defendant is eligible for
section 3051, youthful offender parole, at age 41, even if his
sentence as pronounced were defined as de facto LWOP, it no
longer operates as the “functional equivalent of LWOP.”
While this disposes of the issue before us, given the
importance of the equal protection issue and the split in appellate
authority, we address the broader constitutional claim.
B. Section 1170, subdivision (d) does not apply to
functional LWOP sentences
As pointed out in Heard, the plain language of section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) only applies to individuals who committed their
offense under the age of 18 and were sentenced to LWOP.
(Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.) We agree. “In enacting
section 1170, subdivision (d), the Legislature drew a line at life
without the possibility of parole; it can draw other lines if it
wants to.” (Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 510, review
granted.)
As defendant was not sentenced to LWOP, section 1170,
subdivision (d) does not apply to him.

8
 C. Application of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
only to explicit LWOP sentences does not violate
equal protection of the laws
Because defendant relies on the precedent created in Heard
et al., he does not make his own equal protection claim and,
instead, invites us to follow their line of reasoning. We
respectfully disagree with the Heard line of cases. Instead, we
agree with Ortega and the line of cases that has developed since.
1. The flawed analysis of Heard et al.
The Heard line of cases rests on flawed equal protection
analysis. Rather than place the burden on the defendant to
“‘“negat[e] every conceivable basis”’” that might support the
statutory disparity between explicit LWOP and other lengthy
juvenile sentences (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60
Cal.4th 871, 881), it appears Heard and Sorto placed the burden
on the Attorney General and, seemingly, even themselves.
In Sorto, the panel discussed each of the potential “rational
bas[es]” for the Legislature’s actions in restricting section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) to explicit LWOP sentences, and while negating
each potential basis, the court repeated some version of, “[t]he
Attorney General suggests no reason—nor can we conceive of any
on our own.” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.) In Heard,
the panel concluded, “We can conceive of no legitimate reason for
making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without
parole terms eligible to seek resentencing but not juvenile
offenders sentenced to the equivalent of a life without parole
sentence,” and “[t]he People’s sole justification for the differential
treatment is that the Legislature ‘could have reasonably
concluded that the punishment of [life without parole] imposed
on those under age 18 could be excessive and this was an

9
appropriate means of reform by allowing for reconsideration of
such a sentence.’” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 632, italics
added.) The Heard and Sorto opinions do not discuss the reasons,
if any, offered by the defendants as to why the distinction
between the two categories was not rational. Thus, the burden
was not properly placed on the “party challenging the law.”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.)
Furthermore, the Heard line of cases adopts a
classification—functional equivalent of LWOP—originally
created to aid in Eighth Amendment analysis. In Hardin, the
court noted, in an effort to address Eighth Amendment concerns,
“[t]he Legislature enacted section 3051 to bring California
juvenile sentencing law into line with Graham [v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48], Miller [v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460], and
[People v.] Caballero[, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 268].” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 845.) The court observed, “section 3051
provided for youth offender parole hearings at which the Board of
Parole Hearings must provide ‘a meaningful opportunity’ for
release (§ 3051, subd. (e)) ….” (Ibid.; see also Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 268 [held § 3051 remedied any 8th Amend. defects
in sentencing of juvenile offenders].) Use of the “functional
equivalent” label to evaluate section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),
when the plain language is clear, is error; especially, where
defendants sentenced as juveniles are “now serving a life
sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release” and
are “not serving an LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent.”
(Franklin, supra, at pp. 279–280.)
2. Equal protection is not violated
The legislative history of Senate Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg.
Sess.), which led to enactment of section 1170, now-subdivision

10
(d)(1), demonstrates the Legislature intended to proceed
incrementally with respect to addressing the larger problem of
excessive punishment for juveniles. (People v. Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076.) Senate Bill No. 9 “was described as
a ‘“modest and narrowly focused piece of legislation.”’
(Thompson, at p. 1077.) Specifically, in response to the potential
for petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging “8th amendment
grounds of cruel and unusual punishment,” the Legislature hoped
to “simplif[y] the process for a small group of specified inmates,”
and “offer a less expensive alternative” to filing a habeas corpus
petition. (Sen. Appropriations Com. Fiscal Summary of Sen. Bill
No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced May 23, 2011, pp. 3,
2, italics added; see id. at p. 1 [“This bill authorizes the 293
[juvenile offenders] serving LWOP” sentences to petition under
the provision].)
Despite the sweeping and automatic changes created by
section 3051, “[t]he Legislature did not envision that the original
sentences of eligible youth offenders would be vacated and that
new sentences would be imposed to reflect parole eligibility …”;
instead, the “inmate remains bound by [their original] sentence.”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) However, Eighth
Amendment challenges are “moot” because both actual LWOP
and de facto LWOP defendants are now serving reformed
sentences under section 3051. (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1130, review granted.) Therefore, LWOP offenders are still
positioned differently from functional LWOP offenders because,
as discussed, “section 3051 d[oes] not alter the defendant’s
original sentence,” and they remain sentenced to LWOP. (Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.)

11
 This difference is a rational basis for treating these two
groups separately. Though it is not our burden to find rational
bases for the Legislature’s actions, we propose a few. First,
applying section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to only explicit LWOP
sentences creates a bright line that does not require judicial
determination of a petitioner’s eligibility. Requiring the statute
to include functional LWOP has already resulted in litigation
over basic eligibility that could not have been anticipated by the
Legislature. By limiting the statute to the estimated 293 inmates
sentenced to LWOP as juveniles, the Legislature was able to
predict and measure the fiscal impact of the legislation. Instead,
litigation over basic eligibility requires trial courts to hold
hearings, such as was done here, to determine whether each
petitioner’s sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Second, opening the statute to those sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP requires an unknown number of
full resentencing hearings. Upon receipt of a properly pled
petition—and a hearing over basic eligibility—section 1170,
subdivision (d)(5) requires the court to recall the sentence and
hold a hearing where the petitioner will be sentenced anew. As
evidenced by the amount of litigation since the Heard ruling,
reading section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to allow all juveniles
sentenced to lengthy sentences to proceed with a resentencing
petition creates an enormous strain on scarce and thinly spread
judicial resources. This too results in a vastly different impact
than originally contemplated.
Third, section 3051 comprehensively addressed the Eighth
Amendment concerns that arise when juveniles are sentenced to
terms that do not allow them a meaningful opportunity for
release in their lifetime, and it did so without any need for

12
inmates to petition or courts to conduct hearings. Section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) was enacted to address specific concerns
surrounding sentencing children to LWOP. Despite the
newfound eligibility for section 3051 parole hearings, section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) remains important for explicit LWOP
inmates because it allows them to escape the formal LWOP
designation—a classification the Legislature has determined is
inappropriate for juveniles.4 Because juveniles remain formally
sentenced to LWOP, they remain formally classified as having
received one of society’s most serious penalties, carrying unique
legal and social consequences not experienced by those originally
sentenced to the functional equivalent.
In short, it is not appropriate to read the statute to mean
something more than the plain language and legislative history
provide. Nor is it our place to conjure up rational bases for the
Legislature’s actions. Instead, it is for defendant to overcome the
“‘rebuttable presumption that [section 1170, subdivision (d)] is
constitutional.’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) Each of
the above, and perhaps many others, are rational bases for the
Legislature’s decision to continue to treat juveniles sentenced to
LWOP differently than those sentenced to lengthy indeterminate
terms. So long as “‘a plausible basis exists for the disparity,’” it is

4 Defendant’s contention that the Legislature’s failure to
repeal section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) is evidence of its approval
of Heard is unpersuasive. Because “legislative inaction is ‘“a
weak reed upon which to lean”’” (Troy Gold Industries, Ltd. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d
379, 391, fn. 6), and the very question is the subject of divide
among the Courts of Appeal and currently pending before our
Supreme Court, the Legislature’s silence is an unreliable gauge of
its intent.

13
not for us to “‘second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’”
(Ibid.) “‘“‘Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of
judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the
legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to
function.’”’” (Johnson v. Department of Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th
at p. 889.)

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) petition is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

I concur:

GOORVITCH, J.

14
People v. Cortez
B348276
RICHARDSON, J., Concurring.

I concur in the majority’s disposition affirming the trial
court’s denial of Douglas Cortez’s petition for recall and
resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). I
agree that Cortez’s sentence of 46 years eight months to life is not
the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP) for the reasons stated in the Discussion, parts II.A. and
II.B.: not only is the sentence too short to constitute an effective
life sentence under current law, but Cortez is also eligible for a
section 3051 youth offender parole hearing. (People v. Ortega
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1262 (Ortega), review granted
Sept. 17, 2025, S292070.)
Because Cortez is not among the group of defendants with
sentences functionally equivalent to LWOP, his equal protection
claim premised upon the disparate treatment of that group
necessarily fails. (See People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99,
121 [a defendant’s constitutional challenge fails “[i]f [he] cannot
demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional as applied to him”].)
I therefore would not reach the equal protection issue addressed
in the Discussion, part II.C. (See, e.g., People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [enactment of Pen. Code, § 3051 made
constitutional claim moot]; Ortega, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1265 [same], review granted; People v. Munoz (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 499, 507–508, 512 [declining to reach equal
protection claim because the defendant was not serving a
sentence functionally equivalent to LWOP], review granted
June 25, 2025, S290828.) Accordingly, I do not join that portion of
the majority opinion.

RICHARDSON, J.

2


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

BETTY TANSAVATDI, B343512

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC633651)
v.

CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
David K. Reinert, Judge. Affirmed.
Mardirossian Akaragian, Armen Akaragian and Adam Feit;
Singleton Schreiber and Benjamin I. Siminou for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wesierski & Zurek and David M. Ferrante; Pollak, Vida & Barer,
Karen M. Stepanyan and Daniel P. Barer for Defendant and Respondent.
 INTRODUCTION
Under Government Code section 830.6,1 public entities may be immune
from tort liability for dangerous conditions “caused by the plan or design” of
public property. This protection, afforded to public bodies for the
construction of public infrastructure, is generally called “design immunity.”
In a prior opinion in this case, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the
longstanding rule that design immunity does “‘not necessarily shield the
state from liability for a failure to warn of the same dangerous condition.’”
(Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2003) 14 Cal.5th 639, 657
(Tansavatdi I).)2 The Supreme Court explained that, if, for example, a design
for a roadway created a dangerous traffic condition, design immunity might
shield a public entity from liability for creating the dangerous traffic
condition. But design immunity does not necessarily immunize the public
entity from failing to warn the public of it. (Id. at pp. 658–659.)
The Supreme Court’s prior opinion expressly left open the following
question: “whether design immunity might apply if the public entity is able to
show that the presence or absence of warning signs was part of the approved
design.” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 661.) In other words, the
Supreme Court has not yet resolved whether and how design immunity
applies when warning signs about a danger are themselves part of an

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

2 Design immunity requires that a public entity establish three elements:
“‘(1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident;
(2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and
(3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design.’”
(Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 653.)

2
approved public design. Following further proceedings in the trial court, that
question is now squarely before us.
We hold as follows. When (a) the public entity has provided some
warning of the allegedly dangerous condition, and (b) that warning was
included as part of a reasonable plan or design that would be otherwise
entitled to design immunity under section 830.6, then (c) design immunity
may apply.
In our view, there is an important distinction between cases in which
the public entity has provided no warning at all of the dangerous condition,
and cases (like this one) in which the public entity has provided some
warning of the allegedly dangerous condition—but a plaintiff alleges the
warning was insufficient. Complaints about the adequacy of an existing
warning approved as part of a government’s design for public infrastructure
are, in essence, complaints about the government’s design of the warning.
Such complaints fall into the area where design immunity has long applied.
Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, we affirm the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment. We also affirm the trial court’s award of
expert fees to the respondent, the City of Rancho Palos Verdes.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a tragic death. In 2016, Jonathan Tansavatdi
was killed when his bicycle collided with a turning truck at an intersection in
the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi,3
sued the City alleging that the accident resulted from a dangerous condition
of public property under section 835. Tansavatdi contended that the City was

3 We refer to Jonathan by first name for clarity, as he shares a surname
with the plaintiff. No disrespect is intended.
3
liable for creating a dangerous condition in designing the roadway and in
failing to adequately warn of that danger.
While the factual record is extensive and the procedural history
lengthy, we resolve the bulk of the appeal based on an issue of immunity.
Our discussion is therefore focused on the record relevant to that issue.
A. The Accident
The facts surrounding the accident are largely undisputed. On the
afternoon of March 18, 2016, Jonathan was riding his bicycle on Hawthorne
Boulevard in the City. Although most of Hawthorne includes a bicycle lane,
the bicycle lane stops at Dupre Drive (to the north of the intersection at
issue) and then restarts after Vallon Drive (the intersection at issue). The
block between Dupre and Vallon pitches sharply downhill in the southbound
direction and curves to the right. (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 648.)
There is a right-turn-only lane on southbound Hawthorne at the intersection
with Vallon. (Ibid.)
At the time of the accident, Jonathan was traveling south (downhill)
along the right side of Hawthorne. (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
649.) As he approached the intersection with Vallon, he rode his bicycle into
the right turn lane. But rather than turn right onto Vallon, he continued
riding straight through the intersection. As Jonathan entered the
intersection, an 80-foot tractor trailer was making a right turn from
Hawthorne onto Vallon. Due to the length of the trailer, the truck started its
turn to the left of the right turn only lane, causing it to cut across the right
turn lane at a perpendicular angle. Jonathan collided with the truck and
died from his injuries. (Ibid.)
The truck driver testified that he was stopped at the red light at Vallon
with his right turn signal on, with his truck straddling the right lane and the

4
right turn only lane. He then slowly began his turn onto Vallon. He checked
his mirrors as he did so, but did not see anyone. A witness who turned onto
southbound Hawthorne after seeing Jonathan bike past testified that
Jonathan was traveling an estimated 35 to 40 miles an hour. She followed
behind Jonathan in the right lane, but she moved to the left lane when she
saw the truck in the right lane with his right turn signal on, waiting at the
red light at Vallon. She testified that as she came down the hill, the light at
Vallon turned green and the truck started its right turn. She noticed that
Jonathan, who was still in the right lane, had not slowed down, so she began
honking her horn to get his attention. The witness recalled that when
Jonathan was about 40 feet from the turning truck he looked up and
attempted to stop. He slowed to about 10 to 15 miles per hour before hitting
the side of the truck.
B. Tansavatdi’s Complaint
Tansavatdi filed a complaint against the City and others alleging a
single cause of action for dangerous condition of public property pursuant to
section 835.4 The complaint alleged that the intersection of Hawthorne and
Vallon constituted a dangerous condition the City had “created or allowed to
be created” under section 835. The complaint further alleged the City had
provided “inadequate warning of dangerous conditions not reasonably
apparent to motorists” driving through that intersection. As discussed below,
that the intersection itself constituted the allegedly dangerous condition is
significant to our resolution here.

4 Tansavatdi also sued other governmental entities, the driver of the
truck, and the trucking company. Only the City is pertinent to this appeal.
5
 C. First Motion for Summary Judgment
The City moved for summary judgment, focused on Tansavatdi’s theory
that the absence of a bicycle lane on Hawthorne north of Vallon constituted a
dangerous condition. The City asserted the affirmative defense of design
immunity under section 830.6. (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 423, 429, review granted Apr. 21, 2021, S267453
(Tansavatdi v. City).)
“In support of its claim for design immunity, the city submitted plans
for a 2009 street resurfacing project (2009 plans), which included the
resurfacing and restriping of Hawthorne Boulevard. Among other
specifications, those plans included directions to install specific striping
details, pavement markings, and signs.” (Tansavatdi v. City, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 429.)
The City also filed a declaration and deposition excerpts from Nicole
Jules, a former senior engineer and deputy director of public works for the
City. “Jules testified that in 2009, the city had carried out a resurfacing
project that included Hawthorne Boulevard. She explained that the project
relied on federal funding, and that the city was required to submit plans
signed by the city to secure that funding.” (Tansavatdi v. City, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) “Regarding the site of the accident and the portion of
Hawthorne Boulevard preceding it, Jules opined that it met or exceeded all
applicable government standards, and that the 2009 plans, including the
absence of a bicycle lane, were reasonably approved.” (Id. at p. 431.) The
conclusion that the 2009 plans were reasonable and in compliance with
applicable guidelines was echoed by Rock Miller, the City’s traffic
engineering expert. (Ibid.)

6
 The trial court granted summary judgment for the City based on design
immunity. The court found that the City had established the elements of
design immunity as a matter of law—a causal relationship between the
design and the accident, the relevant City employee's discretionary approval
of the 2009 plans, and substantial evidence that the plans were reasonable.
(Tansavatdi v. City, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) The trial court did not
address Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim. (Ibid.)
On appeal, Tansavatdi argued that design immunity did not protect the
absence of a bicycle lane and, alternatively, that her failure to warn theory
should survive the application of design immunity. (Tansavatdi v. City,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) This court affirmed the trial court’s finding
that the City established the elements of design immunity as to the absence
of a bicycle lane at the site of the accident. (Id. at pp. 435–441.) We also
considered Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim, specifically, that “the absence
of a bicycle lane at the area of the accident constituted a concealed trap for
which a warning was necessary.”5 (Id. at p. 441.) We concluded that “design
immunity does not, as a matter of law, preclude liability under a theory of
failure to warn of a dangerous condition.” (Ibid.) We remanded the case for

5 A failure to warn claim may also be subject to signage immunity under
section 830.8, which precludes liability “for an injury caused by the failure to
provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices.” As we discuss
further below, the “concealed trap” exception to signage immunity allows for
liability for injury “‘caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or
device ... was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered
the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to,
and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.’”
(§ 830.8; see also Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 654.) We do not reach
signage immunity or the concealed trap exception here, because we conclude
the relevant warnings were protected by the City’s design immunity.

7
the trial court to consider the failure to warn theory in the first instance. (Id.
at p. 442.)
The Supreme Court granted the City’s petition for review. In
Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 647, the court held that “design
immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims that involve
a discretionarily approved element of a roadway.” The Supreme Court
accordingly affirmed the decision in Tansavatdi v. City and remanded the
matter so that Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim could be considered by the
trial court. (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 670.) But the court noted
that the City had not proffered evidence of whether City officials considered
whether to include warnings about the alleged dangerous condition as part of
its design plan. Thus, the court cautioned, “we have no occasion to consider,
and express no view on, how design immunity might affect a failure to warn
claim when a public entity does produce evidence that it considered whether
to provide a warning.” (Id. at p. 661.)
D. Second Motion for Summary Judgment
1. City’s Motion
Upon remand, the City filed a new motion for summary judgment
focused on the issue left open by the Supreme Court in Tansavatdi I.
Specifically, the City argued that it had expressly considered the signs and
pavement markings that were present at the time of the accident, and it
included those warnings as part of the 2009 plans. Thus, the City contended
the warnings were subject to design immunity under section 830.6.
Alternatively, the City argued that even if design immunity was
inapplicable, there was no triable issue as to the elements of a failure to warn
claim. The City argued that there was no dangerous condition as a matter of
law (citing evidence of an absence of other accidents), the City had no notice

8
of any such condition, there was no evidence of a concealed trap, the City
provided warnings of the purportedly dangerous condition of the roadway,
and the absence of additional warnings was not a substantial factor in the
accident.
In support of its motion, the City presented evidence of the warning
signs and markings on Hawthorne to the north of the intersection with
Vallon. These warnings included broken striping for 200 feet in advance of
the preceding intersection (Dupre and Hawthorne) to signal the end of the
bicycle lane. In the center median, about 500 feet south of Dupre, there was
a yellow curve warning sign showing a curved arrow, and below that a 35
miles per hour advisory plate. Adjacent to these signs were “35” markings
stenciled in white on the pavement in each lane. Miller, the City’s
engineering expert, testified about the California Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices (MUTCD), the standard for design decisions regarding traffic
controls. Miller explained that the curve warning signs were advised by the
MUTCD where the comfortable speed around a curve (here, 35 miles per
hour) was lower than the speed limit (45 miles per hour). At the same
location, on the right shoulder, there was a yellow pictorial sign showing a
truck on a steep grade and below that a sign indicating an “8% GRADE.”
These signs were located approximately 225 feet from the start of the right-
hand curve, which begins about 700 feet south of Dupre. Along the curve in
the median were posted six yellow and black chevron signs, spaced equally.
Miller explained that these signs are recommended under the MUTCD
because the comfortable speed posted around the curve was ten miles per
hour lower than the speed limit. About 570 feet north of Vallon, there was a
warning sign depicting a traffic signal ahead, as well as “SIGNAL AHEAD”
messages stenciled on the pavement in each lane. According to Miller, these

9
warnings are recommended under the MUTCD because the traffic signal is
not visible to approaching traffic due to the curve. This area also included a
flashing yellow beacon in the median about 550 feet north of Vallon, near one
of the chevron signs. Finally, the right turn lane was marked with striping
beginning 220 feet north of Vallon, with painted arrows on the pavement.
There were also two “RIGHT LANE MUST TURN RIGHT” signs, one near
the start of the turn lane and one about 100 feet from the intersection. Miller
opined that all of these signs and markings were in conformance with the
MUTCD. Miller also opined that the intersection and approach were safe
when used with reasonable due care and were in compliance with all
applicable government standards.
The City presented evidence that the marking and signs identified were
part of the construction plans for the City’s 2009 street resurfacing project.
Former employee Jules provided a declaration stating that at the time of the
2009 project, “the city considered what signage, striping and stenciling to
include on Hawthorne Boulevard regarding the bike lane and any other
warnings, and those were included in the final plans and installed or kept in
accordance with the plans.” She stated that the warning signs described
above were already in place in 2009 and the “2009 plans expressly
acknowledged existed and consciously chose to keep them in place, making
their retention part of the 2009 approved plans.”
Miller noted that between 2022 and 2023 (several years after the
accident), the City decreased the advisory speed around the curve from 35 to
30 miles per hour, added three more chevron signs around the curve, and
added additional warning signs on the right shoulder near the start of the
curve.

10
 2. Tansavatdi’s Opposition
In her opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment,
Tansavatdi argued that the intersection and the southbound approach to the
intersection created a dangerous condition. She also contended there were
triable issues as to whether the condition was a concealed trap, whether the
City had notice of the danger, and whether the dangerous condition caused
the accident. In addition, she argued that the City was not entitled to design
immunity for the failure to adequately warn of the dangerous condition.
Tansavatdi’s expert, Edward Ruzak, opined that the signage
concerning the intersection and the approach to the intersection was
inadequate. While Ruzak acknowledged that the City had installed
numerous signs warning of the upcoming intersection, in Ruzak’s view this
signage was not enough. For example, he opined that the City should have
positioned a “radar speed feedback” sign on Hawthorne to raise “user
awareness of their speed.” He opined that the City should have installed a
“flashing warning beacon system to warn users of the upcoming intersection.”
And he asserted that “various” additional signs should have been installed in
advance of the intersection, including ones stating “BE PREPARED TO
STOP” “WATCH FOR STOPPED VEHICLES,” and “PROCEED AT OWN
RISK.” Finally, he opined that the City should have painted bicycle
stenciling with painted chevrons in the roadway (i.e., sharrows) to indicate
the presence of cyclists.
Ruzak further opined that the intersection and approach was a
dangerous condition and concealed trap at the time of the accident that was
or should have been known to the City. Tansavatdi presented evidence of
traffic collision reports and argued that the accident rate at the intersection
was higher than the City claimed.

11
 3. Trial Court’s Ruling
In a written ruling filed September 6, 2024, the court granted summary
judgment for the City.
The trial court accepted “as decided that the City is immunized under
section 830.6 for the design of the 2009 repaving project.” The court
considered the issue left open by the Supreme Court regarding the
application of design immunity to the warning signs. To do so, the trial court
first found it necessary to define the “dangerous condition” at issue in
Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim. It found that the relevant “dangerous
condition” was the intersection itself. It then found that the City had
presented evidence to show that it considered and included warnings about
the intersection as part of the approved design for the 2009 plan.
Thus, the trial court found that the City had met its burden to establish
that the warnings were part of the 2009 design plan and that the 2009 plan
was entitled to design immunity. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
City had established that it was immune from liability “for the design of the
warnings in place at the time of the collision as a matter of law.” On that
basis, the court granted summary judgment.6
This appeal followed.

6 The trial court made other rulings, less significant to our resolution on
appeal. The trial court found that there were triable issues of material of fact
as to whether the City had notice of the dangerous condition, as to whether
the dangerous condition was a concealed trap, and whether the failure to
warn was a substantial factor in causing the injury. In addition, the court
found that the City was entitled to signage immunity under section 830.8 “for
the decisions made as to what signs to post and where.”

12
 E. Motion to Tax Costs
On April 25, 2018, the City served a statutory offer to compromise on
Tansavatdi pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (998 offer). The
City offered a waiver of costs “[i]n full settlement of this action” in exchange
for dismissal of the action and a release of liability. In particular, the offer
required “execution and transmittal of a General Release by [Tansavatdi], in
favor of [the City]; and Each party is to bear their own costs and attorney fees
and the settlement will include all existing and future medical, legal and
other liens arising in any way from the subject accident.” Tansavatdi did not
accept the offer.
In October 2024, after the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment, the City served its memorandum of costs. The City sought over
$79,000, including $36,372 in expert witness fees. Tansavatdi filed a motion
to strike and/or tax the City’s costs. As relevant here, she argued that the
City was not entitled to expert witness fees because the 998 offer was
uncertain and was made in bad faith.
In a written ruling following a hearing on January 17, 2025, the court
granted the motion to tax costs in part and denied it in part. As to the 998
offer, the court found that it was “not so uncertain as to render it invalid.” In
particular, the court found that the inclusion of a “general release” in the
offer was “insufficient to invalidate a 998 offer if the offer is limited to claims
related to the instant lawsuit.” In total, the court awarded $75,979.22 in
costs to the City as the prevailing party.
Tansavatdi separately appealed from the order awarding costs to the
City. We consolidated the appeals for the purpose of briefing, argument, and
decision.

13
 DISCUSSION
I. Design Immunity
Tansavatdi contends the trial court erred in granting the City’s motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the
City was entitled to immunity under section 830.6. We therefore affirm the
grant of summary judgment.
A. Legal Standards
1. Summary Judgment
Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an
affirmative defense, the defendant must show that undisputed facts support
each element of the affirmative defense. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation
Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 289.) “‘We review the trial court’s decision
de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.’ [Citation.]
We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”
(Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277,
286.) “The appellant, however, still ‘has the burden of showing error, even if
he did not bear the burden in the trial court.’” (640 Octavia, LLC v. Pieper
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1189.)
2. Government Tort Claims and Immunities
“Under the Government Claims Act, ‘[a] public entity is not liable for
an injury’ ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.’” (Hampton v. County of
San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347 (Hampton).) Section 835 provides that
a public entity may be liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of
its property under two circumstances. First, a public entity may be held
liable for an act or omission by a government actor that created the

14
dangerous condition (§ 835, subd. (a)). Second, a public entity may be held
liable for a failure “to protect against” a dangerous condition of which the
entity had notice (id., subd. (b)). The phrase “protect against” includes
“warning of a dangerous condition.” (§ 830, subd. (b); see also Tansavatdi I,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 653.) A dangerous condition is one that “creates a
substantial … risk of injury” when the property is “used with due care in a
manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (§ 830,
subd. (a).)
The public entity may raise an affirmative defense of immunity, even if
a dangerous condition was established. At issue here is the immunity under
section 830.6, i.e., “design immunity,” discussed below. (See Tansavatdi I,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 653, 660.) Design immunity is often raised on a
motion for summary judgment, “enabling the trial court to find the defense
established as a matter of law.” (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 931, 939–940 (Grenier).)
B. Tansavatdi I
The touchstone of our analysis is the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Tansavatdi I. Tansavatdi I is not only a prior decision in this same case. It
is also the Supreme Court’s most thorough and recent consideration of the
doctrine of design immunity. We therefore discuss it at length.
At the outset of Tansavatdi I, the Supreme Court made clear that there
was one question before it—whether design immunity under section 830.6
“categorically precludes any claim that the public entity is liable for having
failed to warn of a dangerous traffic condition resulting from that approved
design.” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 652, italics added.) The high
court ultimately answered that question in the negative. It found that this
outcome was controlled by its prior opinion in Cameron v. State of California

15
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 318 (Cameron). (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 648.)
The Supreme Court declined the City’s request to overrule Cameron as
“illogical” or poorly reasoned. (Ibid.)
In explaining and reaffirming Cameron, Tansavatdi I extensively
analyzed another case, Flournoy v. State of California (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d
806 (Flournoy). (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 654–655.) It did so
because the “holding in Cameron is based largely on the analysis set forth” in
Flournoy. (Id. at p. 654.)
Flournoy was a wrongful death action resulting from a car accident on
an icy bridge. The plaintiffs alleged that the bridge design caused moisture
to condense on the roadway, creating a dangerous condition in freezing
weather. (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 808.) The plaintiffs also
alleged that despite notice of numerous accidents caused by ice on the bridge,
the state had not posted any signs warning motorists about the danger.
(Ibid.)
Flournoy found that design immunity “could affect only one of two
[alternative] theories of recovery.” (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p.
810.) Each theory “postulated a separate, although concurring, cause of the
accident. [Citation.] The first theory asserted causation in the state’s active
negligence in creating a danger, the second in the state’s passive negligence
in failing to warn of it.” (Id. at p. 811.)
Thus, as Tansavatdi I observed, under section 835, “‘[r]egardless of the
availability of the active negligence theory, plaintiffs were entitled to go
before a jury on the passive negligence theory, i.e., an accident caused by the
state’s failure to warn the public against icy danger known to it but not
apparent to a reasonably careful highway user.’” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 655, quoting Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 811.) As

16
such, “‘[b]y force of its very terms the design immunity of section 830.6 is
limited to a design-caused accident. [Citation.] It does not immunize from
liability caused by negligence independent of design.’” (Tansavatdi I, supra,
at p. 655, quoting Flournoy, supra, at p. 811.)
Turning from Flournoy to Cameron, the Tansavatdi I court discussed
the facts of that case. In Cameron, the plaintiff alleged that the state
negligently constructed an improperly banked curve and also failed to post
any warnings to drivers to reduce their speed. (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at
p. 322.) The Supreme Court reversed a grant of nonsuit based on design
immunity, finding that the state was not entitled to immunity because it
presented no evidence that the curve’s banking was part of the approved
design. (Id. at p. 326.) Additionally, the court found that even if the curve’s
banking was protected by design immunity, the state could be liable for a
failure to warn where there was evidence that the curve was a concealed trap
and the failure to warn “is an independent, separate, concurring cause of the
accident.” (Id. at p. 329.)
Tansavatdi I then addressed the issue before it in light of these
authorities. It rejected the City’s argument that failure to warn claims
against public entities are categorically limited to situations in which the
entity fails to warn of a dangerous condition not protected by design
immunity. Instead, the court concluded that a claim could sometimes lie for
a failure to warn of a dangerous condition created by the design of public
infrastructure, even if liability for the dangerous condition itself would be
barred by design immunity. (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 652.)
In so concluding, the Supreme Court made several points that are
important for our analysis here. First, quoting its previous decision in
Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 69 (Cornette),

17
the Court explained the purpose of design immunity. It noted that “‘[t]he
rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury from second-guessing the
decision of a public entity by reviewing the identical questions of risk that
had previously been considered by the government officers who adopted or
approved the plan or design.’” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 653–
654.) Thus, Tansavatdi I emphasized that the fundamental point of design
immunity is to preserve the ability of public officials to weigh questions of
risk without later interference by juries, a separation-of-powers concern.
Second, the reasons for not categorically extending design immunity to
failure to warn claims is rooted in a distinction between “active” and
“passive” negligence. (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 659–660.) That
a governmental entity might be immune from suit for its “active” negligence
in creating an approved infrastructure project does not necessarily immunize
it from suit for the “passive” failure to warn of the danger it created, so long
as the entity had notice of the danger. (Ibid.)
Third, the Supreme Court cautioned that for a failure to warn claim,
“the plaintiff must prove the absence of a warning was an ‘independent,
separate, concurring cause of the accident.’” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 661, quoting Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.) As such, “if a plaintiff
is not able to establish that the absence of a warning sign was a substantial
factor in causing the injury, the claim will fail.” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 661.)
Finally, as we previously noted, the Supreme Court expressly declined
to address “whether design immunity might apply if the public entity is able
to show that the presence or absence of warning signs was part of the
approved design.” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 661.) The Court

18
noted that the plaintiffs in Cameron “specifically alleged that the state’s
failure to warn was not part of any approved plan.” (Ibid.)
C. The City is Entitled to Design Immunity Under Section 830.6
1. Design Immunity May Apply to Challenges to the Adequacy
of the Design of Signage

With Tansavatdi I in mind, we turn to the issues before us.
We start with what is not in dispute. Tansavatdi agrees, as she must,
that the City is entitled to design immunity for any dangerous conditions
resulting from the 2009 plans. (See Tansavatdi v. City, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 441.) Tansavatdi also agrees, as she must, that the
relevant “dangerous condition” is the intersection and the approach to the
intersection. And she agrees that there were multiple signs warning of the
intersection and the approach to the intersection that were part of the
approved 2009 plans. These included a curve warning sign with a reduced
speed limit advisory of 35 miles per hour, corresponding pavement markings,
six chevron signs, a flashing beacon around the curve, a sign noting the steep
grade of the hill, and a sign and pavement markings advising of the traffic
signal ahead. Thus, there is no dispute that the City provided some warning
of the relevant dangerous condition. And there is no dispute that these
warnings were installed as part of an approved design (the 2009 plans).
The parties disagree about the legal consequences of these facts. The
City argues that design immunity bars Tansavatdi’s failure to warn claim,
because the City “considered which warnings to provide” as part of an
approved design. According to the City, this means that the decision to not
provide additional warnings is automatically protected by design immunity.
Tansavatdi argues that design immunity does not apply because, according to
her, “failure to warn claims ... are not subject to design immunity” “at least

19
when they are based on a history of collisions after the roadway was
constructed.”
We adopt a more limited rule than urged by either of the parties. In
our view, when (a) there is some warning of the relevant dangerous condition
provided as part of (b) an approved design, but (c) the plaintiff claims that
additional or different warnings were necessary, such claims may be barred
by design immunity (assuming that all the other requirements of design
immunity are met). That more limited rule is sufficient to resolve this case.
We reach our conclusion for several reasons.
First, “the prime requisite of … design immunity” is a “design-caused
accident.” (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 812.) When, as here, there
are warnings included in the public entity’s design, a plaintiff complains that
the design should have included different or additional warnings, and alleges
that the failure to have different warnings caused an accident, it is difficult to
conclude that we have anything other than a “design-caused” accident. Thus,
design immunity should apply.
A comparison to Flournoy is instructive. As noted, in that case the
Court of Appeal found that design immunity applied to claims based on the
design of an ice-prone bridge, but did not apply to claims based on a failure to
warn that the bridge might become icy. (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at
pp. 810–811.) It further reasoned that this distinction “incorporated the
‘active’ and ‘passive’ theories of negligence recognized in the common law.”
(Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 659 [discussing Flournoy].) Flournoy’s
core holding was that the design immunity created by section 830.6 “‘does not
immunize from liability caused by negligence independent of design.’”
(Tansavatdi I, supra, at p. 655, quoting Flournoy, supra, at p. 811.) But here
we do not have negligence “independent of design.” Here, warnings were

20
provided, and they were considered as part of the roadway’s design. The only
question is whether the warnings were sufficient. In this case, liability is
intricately bound up with a question of design.
Second, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “to establish liability
for failing to warn of a dangerous traffic condition that is otherwise subject to
design immunity, the plaintiff must prove the absence of a warning was an
‘independent, separate, concurring cause of the accident.’” (Tansavatdi I,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 661, quoting Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.) For
purposes of design immunity, when a warning is provided as part of a design,
it is difficult to conclude that inadequacy of that warning is an “independent”
or “separate” failing different than the design itself, such that it can give rise
to a separate cause of action independent of design immunity.7
Third, allowing design immunity for claims like this one helps to fulfill
the core purpose of design immunity. As explained by the Supreme Court:
“[T]he law’s purpose is to avoid the dangers involved in permitting
reexamination and second-guessing of governmental design decisions in the
context of a trial: ‘While it is proper to hold public entities liable for injuries
caused by arbitrary abuses of discretionary authority in planning
improvements, to permit reexamination in tort litigation of particular
discretionary decisions where reasonable men may differ as to how the
discretion should be exercised would create too great a danger of impolitic
interference with the freedom of decision-making by those public officials in
whom the function of making such decisions has been vested.’” (Hampton v.

7 To be sure, the Supreme Court emphasized the “independent, separate,
concurring cause” language to make a different point (having to do with
substantial factor causation). (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 661.)
However, the court’s focus on independent causation supports the application
of design immunity here.
21
County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 349, quoting Recommendation
Relating to Sovereign Immunity (Jan. 1963) Proposed Legislation, com. foll.
§ 830.6, 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 823; see also Cornette,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 69 [discussing same]; Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 653–654 [discussing same].) This purpose is better served by imposing
design immunity in cases where the issue is the adequacy of an existing
warning.
True, as Flournoy, Tansavatdi I, and Cameron recognize, the
separation-of-powers values design immunity protects are not imperiled by
allowing juries to assess whether public entities should warn about
foreseeable dangers when the public entity has failed to provide or consider a
warning at all. (See Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 667–668
[explaining that the rule of Cameron and Flournoy “recognizes that a design
might be the best engineers can do under the circumstances but still leave
foreseeable dangers that can and should be addressed through appropriate
warnings”].)
But a case where the issue is whether a warning should have been
provided at all is different than a case where the issue is whether a
particular warning was adequate.
Take this case. Here, were the case to go to trial, the question before
the jury would not be whether the City should have provided some form of
warning about a dangerous intersection. There is no dispute that it did so.
Rather, the jury would be asked to determine the best form of a potential
warning, a fundamental question of traffic engineering. Should, as
Tansavatdi contends, the City have painted additional chevrons on the
roadway, have positioned a “PROCEED AT OWN RISK” sign, and have
installed a flashing warning beacon and a radar speed feedback sign? Or

22
were the City’s flashing yellow beacon, “SIGNAL AHEAD” sign, and other
City infrastructure enough?
While we do not think a jury is incapable of answering such questions,
asking a jury to do so implicates interference with significant infrastructure
planning decisions made by governments. Design immunity, when it applies,
reserves such decisions to public officials, not the courts. We also note that
extending design immunity to claims about the design of warnings may be
particularly appropriate in the context of traffic engineering. In the traffic
context, lines between a “warning” and the fundamental architecture of a
roadway are blurry. Are rumble strips (changes to road structure designed to
encourage drivers to slow down) a warning, or a part of an infrastructure
project? Is lane striping a “warning” or a design project? At what point does
a warning sign convey too much information, and at what point are so many
signs installed that any individual sign is ignored? At a minimum, the
answer to these questions is not obvious.
By contrast, Tansavatdi urges us to adopt a very different rule. She
contends that design immunity should never immunize a claim that a
particular warning of a dangerous condition was inadequate, as long as the
public entity had notice of the dangerous condition. Under Tansavatdi’s
proposed rule, public entities would never have design immunity for anything
that could be characterized as a “warning” of a known dangerous condition,
no matter how much consideration was put into the design of the warning.
Such a rule would substantially weaken design immunity. If we adopted
Tansavatdi’s proposed rule, even when a public entity thoroughly considers
how to warn of a known dangerous condition, a plaintiff could contend that
the warning needed to be designed differently. Of course, once an accident
has occurred, it is a somewhat trivial task to raise a triable issue of fact as to

23
whether a different warning would have been better at preventing accidents.
Thus, under Tansavatdi’s interpretation, in most cases where an accident
occurred and a dangerous condition is alleged, design immunity would not
protect against a trial or verdict. Such a rule is not persuasive—and no case
of which we are aware has adopted such a rule—because it appears
fundamentally inconsistent with the Legislature’s purpose in creating design
immunity in section 830.6.
We also note that our reading of Tansavatdi I is consistent with the
decision of our sister court in Stufkosky v. Department of Transportation
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 492 (Stufkosky). There, the plaintiffs’ father died in a
traffic accident resulting from another motorist striking a deer on the
highway. The plaintiffs alleged that the highway design and inadequate
number of deer crossing signs created a dangerous condition for motorists.
(Id. at p. 495.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of summary judgment
on the grounds of design immunity. (Id. at p. 496.) The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that design immunity did not bar their failure to warn
claim. It observed that “Caltrans produced evidence that its design plans
specified the quantity and placement of deer crossing signs. [Plaintiffs] did
not dispute Caltrans warned motorists of this danger, only that it did not do
so adequately.” (Id. at p. 496.)
On balance, therefore, lawsuits over the adequacy of warnings made on
a roadway as part of a public design—when a warning has been provided—
appear to us to be similar to the kind of infrastructure planning issues that
design immunity is intended to protect. We have little difficulty applying
design immunity on the facts here.

24
 Tansavatdi suggests a variety of deleterious or illogical consequences
would arise from a ruling allowing the City to invoke design immunity here.
We address the concerns she raises in turn.
Tansavatdi’s primary argument is that imposing design immunity
would “eviscerate liability for failure to warn in any case in which there were
design plans, which includes virtually every road.” She notes that there is
almost always some consideration of the provision of warnings when roads
are designed. Thus, she argues, if design immunity bars a failure-to-warn
claim based on a public entity’s mere consideration of a warning, that would
effectively bar failure-to-warn claims generally in cases involving roads or
highways, despite the Supreme Court’s recognition of such claims in
Tansavatdi I and Cameron.
But the rule we adopt is not as broad as Tansavatdi fears. And it does
not, we think, have the consequences of which Tansavatdi warns.
A comparison to Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks (1976) 65
Cal.App.3d 82, 89 (Anderson) marks the limits of our holding today. In
Anderson, the court considered a road with an allegedly dangerous curve,
which the plaintiff claimed could not safely be navigated at more than 45
miles per hour, although the posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour. (Id.
at p. 86.) The city, in that case, had not posted any roadway signs—
whatsoever—warning of the upcoming curve. (Id. at p. 87.) The Anderson
court found that, in general, the city’s decisions regarding placement of
warning signs and speed limits might be protected by design immunity. (Id.
at pp. 89–91.) However, it nonetheless found that the plaintiff might be able
to assert a claim for failure to warn, based on the city’s failure to warn of the
dangerous upcoming curve, citing Cameron. (Id. at pp. 91–92.)

25
 Nothing in our ruling today is inconsistent with Anderson. In cases
where no warning has been provided of a dangerous condition, it is difficult to
see how the purposes of design immunity are implicated. In such cases, as in
Flournoy, a jury is tasked only with determining whether or not a
governmental entity failed to warn of a known danger. But, for the reasons
we explain above, that is quite different than a case like this one, in which a
warning of the dangerous condition was designed by and approved by a
public entity as part of the design of public infrastructure, and the jury would
be tasked with assessing the adequacy of the design of that warning. Design
immunity should apply where design is at issue—but not to cases, like the
warnings in Anderson or Flournoy, where it is not.
Tansavatdi also argues that “granting public entities design immunity”
in cases like this one “would allow public entities to withhold badly needed
warnings with impunity in perpetuity, no matter how great the danger to life
and limb.” This is not so. For decades, since Baldwin v. State of California
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 434 (Baldwin), it has been California law that “when a
public entity has notice that changed physical conditions have caused an
approved design to become dangerous in operation, the entity ‘must act
reasonably to correct or alleviate the hazard,’” and that despite design
immunity a public entity “remains ‘“under a continuing duty to review its
plan in the light of its actual operation.”’” (Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 667 [discussing Baldwin].) The Legislature codified Baldwin (and slightly
softened its financial ramifications) in its current version of section 830.6.
(Id. at p. 663 [discussing legislative history].) The current version of section
830.6 provides that “Notwithstanding notice that constructed or improved
public property may no longer be in conformity with a plan or design or a
standard which reasonably could be approved by the legislative body or other

26
body or employee, the immunity provided by this section shall continue for a
reasonable period of time sufficient to permit the public entity to obtain funds
for and carry out remedial work necessary to allow such public property to be
in conformity with a plan or design approved by the legislative body of the
public entity or other body or employee, or with a plan or design in
conformity with a standard previously approved by such legislative body or
other body or employee. In the event that the public entity is unable to remedy
such public property because of practical impossibility or lack of sufficient
funds, the immunity provided by this section shall remain so long as such
public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the
existence of the condition not conforming to the approved plan or design or to
the approved standard.” (§ 830.6, italics added; see Tansavatdi I, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 663.) Thus, even when design immunity applies, a public entity
may have a duty to provide warnings when changed physical conditions or
other circumstances have caused the design to become dangerous—consistent
with the ordinary rules for design immunity. If changed physical conditions
have caused the design of a warning to no longer be reasonable, the existing
parameters of design immunity already restrict its application.8
We also do not agree with Tansavatdi’s argument that a finding of
design immunity in this case would render a separate immunity—so-called
“signage immunity” under section 830.8—“superfluous.” Section 830.8
provides that public entities are not liable for “an injury caused by the failure
to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices,” (§ 830.8)
except when “necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which would not be

8 In this case, however, Tansavatdi did not invoke these provisions. She
made no attempt to show that design immunity was lost due to a change in
physical conditions. So she cannot invoke that remedy here.

27
reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person
using the highway with due care.” (Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 327; see
Tansavatdi I, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 660.)
Tansavatdi argues that “if design immunity … applies to failure-to-
warn claims … it is hard to imagine how a public entity could ever be liable”
for failing to provide a sign “necessary to warn of a dangerous condition” and
not anticipated by a person using the highway with due care. But there is no
inconsistency between signage immunity under section 830.8 and design
immunity.
Section 830.8 signage immunity provides a general immunity for a
public entity’s failure to provide traffic signage, with an exception for signage
concerning what are called “concealed trap[s],” i.e., dangerous conditions that
a person using due care could not reasonably anticipate. (Chowdhury v. City
of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1196–1197 [discussing signage
immunity and “concealed trap” exception].) When signage immunity applies,
it protects a government entity’s decision to not post any warning signs at all,
even of a dangerous condition. (Ibid.) Where the dangerous condition is a
“concealed trap,” a government may be liable for failure to post any warnings,
or, as several cases have held, for providing warnings that were inadequate.
(E.g., Briggs v. State of California (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 489, 497 [discussing
cases].)
But the concern of signage immunity is something quite different than
design immunity. Signage immunity is not focused on the design of public
projects. Rather, it is intended to provide a general immunity for
governments against claims deriving from the failure to post signs—except
when the concealed trap exception applies, in which case there is no
immunity at all. Our holding here renders neither signage immunity nor its

28
concealed trap exception superfluous. In cases where design immunity does
not provide immunity for a government’s failure to place signs, signage
immunity might apply and provide a separate protection from liability for a
government. In cases, like Anderson, where there is a “concealed trap” and
neither design immunity (because no warning was provided, or because the
other requirements of design immunity are not met) nor signage immunity
applies, then a governmental entity might still be held liable for the failure to
post a warning sign. The two immunities, under our interpretation here, do
not work at cross-purposes.
Finally, Tansavatdi argues that applying design immunity to cases
such as hers will, at least in some cases, allow governments to escape liability
for providing inadequate warnings of dangerous conditions. While this
concern is understandable, it does not alter our conclusion. To some extent,
Tansavatdi’s concern is simply a complaint about the consequences of
providing an immunity at all. As we discuss above, the point of design
immunity is to limit governmental liability in some cases. While providing
limits to liability has consequences, as courts have long emphasized the point
of design immunity is that the weighing of the risks and benefits of
infrastructure design should generally be a task undertaken by authorized
government officials, not courts and juries. Under our holding here, that
means some entities may indeed escape liability for designing a warning a
plaintiff views as inadequate (just as Tansavatdi views the warnings
provided in this case).
But we also stress that design immunity does not immunize truly
unreasonable design, including the design of warnings. Design immunity, to
apply at all, requires evidence of “substantial evidence supporting the
reasonableness of the plan or design.” (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 69;

29
see § 830.6 [courts must determine whether “there is any substantial
evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have
adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable
legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or
design or the standards therefor”].) While this is a generous standard for
governmental entities, it is not a limitless one. It does require a showing of
reasonableness and does not apply in all cases. (E.g., Davis v. Cordova
Recreation & Park Dist. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 789, 798–799 [finding no
substantial evidence to support design immunity].) If, under our holding
here, a city designs a warning without substantial evidence of
reasonableness, the design of that warning will not be protected by design
immunity. And, of course, in addition to the substantial evidence
requirement, all the other requirements of design immunity are necessary for
it to apply, and design immunity can be lost over time. (Cornette, supra, 26
Cal.4th at pp. 69, 70–73.)
Put simply, for the reasons given above, we conclude that design
immunity may apply (assuming all other requirements of design immunity
are met) when, as here, a government provided a warning about a dangerous
condition, and the concern raised by the plaintiff is not whether a warning
should have been provided at all, but rather whether the design of the
warning of that dangerous condition was adequate.
2. The City Made a Sufficient Showing to Invoke Design
Immunity
As an alternative argument, Tansavatdi argues that even if design
immunity might in general protect against claims based on the adequacy of a
warning, it would not apply in this particular case. She argues there was no
evidence the City considered the “specific warnings at issue here.” According
to Tansavatdi, to obtain design immunity, the City was required to show that

30
it considered the specific warnings her expert identified and then
intentionally omitted them.
This argument finds no support in the design immunity caselaw.
Design immunity is not limited to features expressly considered by the public
entity. Our sister court in Stufkosky rejected the same argument.
(Stufkosky, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 498 [“Limiting design immunity to
those features expressly considered would be tantamount to requiring the
public entity to address all conceivable design features during the approval
process”]; Hampton, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 351 [discussing “practical
problems” of such proof].) Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Department of
Transportation (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 947, 956–959 (Rodriguez), the court
rejected a plaintiff’s argument that the public entity “cannot establish
discretionary approval because the purported decision maker never
considered the particular feature or design element at issue.” (Id. at p. 956.)
Nor do the cases that Tansavatdi cites support her argument. They
concern cases in which there was no evidence of a formal plan that adopted
the design feature at issue. (See Cameron, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 326
[reversing nonsuit on design immunity where “state has presented no
evidence that the superelevation which was actually constructed on the curve
in question … was the result of or conformed to a design approved by the
public entity”]; Martinez v. County of Ventura (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 364,
372 [no immunity “in the absence of evidence of the discretionary approval
required by section 830.6” as the county presented no evidence of a formal
plan].) Accordingly, we do not believe that Tansavatdi’s interpretation of the
requirements of design immunity is correct.
Tansavatdi also argues there was no evidence the City “took the
insufficient sight distance on southbound Hawthorne Boulevard into account”

31
as part of the 2009 plan. But we agree with the trial court’s finding to the
contrary. The City may not have expressly considered what Tansavatdi now
terms the “sight distance limitation,” but it did consider the facets of the
roadway that result in this purportedly dangerous condition. Specifically, as
we have discussed, the City included warnings of the curve, including a 10-
mile-per-hour reduction in speed, the steep grade, and the limited visibility of
the upcoming traffic signal. The warnings the City considered and ultimately
included were targeted at the very conditions Tansavatdi now cites.
Thus, we conclude that the City made a sufficient showing to obtain
summary judgment that it was immune from liability under section 830.6.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.9
II. Expert Fees
A. Timeliness of Appeal
Tansavatdi separately appealed the court’s order on her motion to tax
costs. The City moved to dismiss the costs appeal. It argues that the appeal
was untimely. We conclude the appeal was timely filed pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).10
Rule 8.104(a)(1) provides, subject to exceptions not relevant here, “a
notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶] (A) 60 days after
the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a
document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the

9 Because we affirm summary judgment for the City for this reason, we
need not reach the City’s alternate grounds for summary judgment—that it is
entitled to signage immunity under section 830.8, and that Tansavatdi lacked
the evidence to establish the elements of a failure to warn claim.

10 Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
32
party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a
document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry
of judgment.” The term “judgment” for purposes of this rule includes an
appealable order. (Rule 8.104(e).)
The record indicates that on January 17, 2025, the same day the court
issued its minute order ruling on the motion to tax costs, the court clerk
mailed a copy of the order to the parties. The 10-page minute order is not
filed-endorsed. At the conclusion of the order, the court directed the clerk “to
give notice of the ruling on the motion. Otherwise, the Plaintiff to give
notice.” The order further stated, “Certificate of Mailing is attached.” The
record also includes a filed-endorsed certificate of mailing, reflecting the
service of the minute order and the date.
On January 21, 2025, Tansavatdi served on the City a notice of entry of
judgment or order. She attached a copy of the January 17, 2025 minute order
on the motion to tax costs. Tansavatdi’s notice did not include the court
clerk’s certificate of mailing.
Tansavatdi filed her notice of appeal from the costs order on March 20,
2025, more than 60 days after the clerk’s service on January 17, but less than
60 days after her notice of entry. Thus, if the documents mailed by the court
clerk satisfied rule 8.104(a)(1)(A), then Tansavatdi’s notice of appeal was late.
But if those documents did not satisfy the rule, then rule 8.104(a)(1)(B)
governs and the notice of appeal was timely.
Tansavatdi contends that the documents served by the clerk—the
January 17, 2025 minute order and attached certificate of mailing—did not
comply with rule 8.104(a)(1)(A). She notes that neither document was a filed-
endorsed copy of the order or a notice of entry.

33
 The Supreme Court addressed the requirements of former rule
8.104(a)(1)11 in Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894
(Alan). There, the court clerk mailed two documents to the parties in a single
envelope. (Id. at p. 898.) The first document was a file-stamped statement of
decision denying the motion at issue. The second document was a minute
order, which was not file-stamped, reflecting issuance of the statement of
decision and the date of service of both documents on the parties. (Ibid.) The
Supreme Court found that the documents did not satisfy former rule
8.104(a)(1) because the file-stamped statement of decision was not appealable
and the appealable minute order was not file-stamped. (Id. at p. 902.) The
court reiterated the rule that “documents mailed by the clerk do not trigger
the 60–day period for filing a notice of appeal unless the documents strictly
comply” with rule 8.104(a)(1), thus a notice of entry “must bear precisely that
title,” and a file-stamped copy of the judgment “must truly be file stamped.”
(Id. at pp. 902–903.)
The Supreme Court also rejected the notion that the two documents
could be read together for purposes of rule 8.104(a)(1). The court held that
rule 8.104(a)(1) “require[s] a single document—either a ‘Notice of Entry’ so
entitled or a file-stamped copy of the judgment or appealable order—that is
sufficient in itself to satisfy all of the rule’s conditions, including the
requirement that the document itself show the date on which it was mailed.”
(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 905.) However, the court noted, “we see no

11 In 2016, the Judicial Council amended rule 8.104(a) to change “file-
stamped” to “filed-endorsed.” (See Huff v. Interior Specialists, Inc. (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Huff).) “Replacing ‘stamped’ with ‘endorsed’ was a
‘technical’ change made throughout the rules … to account for the fact that
electronic documents should not require a physical stamp.” (Ibid.) The other
amendments to rule 8.104 since Alan are not relevant here.
34
reason why the clerk could not satisfy the single-document requirement by
attaching a certificate of mailing to the file-stamped judgment or appealable
order, or to a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry.’ Obviously a document can
have multiple pages.” (Ibid.)
The City contends that under Alan, the clerk’s service of a minute order
that is not filed-endorsed but is attached to a filed-endorsed certificate of
mailing satisfied all of the requirements of rule 8.104(a)(1)(A). In other
words, we should look to the attached certificate of mailing to satisfy both the
requirement that the document be filed-endorsed and that it contain the date
of service.12 We are unaware of any courts that have held that the appealable
order itself need not be filed-endorsed, and the City cites none. The language
in Alan suggesting that it would satisfy the single-document requirement to
attach “a certificate of mailing to the file-stamped judgment or appealable
order” still expressly contemplates that the order itself will be filed-endorsed,
echoing the language of the rule. (Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 905; see also
rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) [requiring service of a “filed-endorsed copy of the
judgment”]; Huff, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 979 [deadline not triggered
because minute order was not filed-endorsed]; MSY Trading, Inc. v. Saleen
Automotive, Inc. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 395, 401 [later deadline applied where
appealable order served by clerk “was neither file stamped nor entitled
‘notice of entry’”].)

12 Tansavatdi asserts that the certificate of mailing was “separately filed”
but provides no evidence or explanation to support this statement. She does
not directly dispute that the certificate of mailing was attached to the copy of
the minute order served by the court clerk. Indeed, Tansavatdi’s notice of
appeal attached both the minute order and the clerk’s certificate of mailing.
But, as we explain, even assuming the certificate of mailing was attached, we
conclude that the documents did not satisfy rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).
35
 We are mindful of the long-standing rule that “‘[t]he time of
appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear.’
[Citation.] ‘[B]right lines are essential in this area, to avoid both inadvertent
forfeiture of the right to appeal and excessive protective appeals by parties
afraid they might suffer such a forfeiture.’ [Citation.] ‘“Neither parties nor
appellate courts should be required to speculate about jurisdictional time
limits.”’” (Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 649–650.)
Based on these principles, courts have long required strict compliance with
rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) to trigger the 60–day period for filing a notice of appeal.
(See Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 902; Wing Inflatables, Inc. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1117 [“the clerk’s
certificate of service must be attached to, stamped on, or imbedded in the
notice of entry or file-endorsed copy of the judgment or appealable order
being served” to trigger time to appeal].)
Bearing these guidelines in mind, we find that the documents mailed
by the court clerk did not satisfy rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) because they did not
include “a filed-endorsed copy” of the appealable order being served.
Although Alan advises that we may consider an attached certificate of service
for the requisite date of service, we will not extend that holding to also mean
that a filed-endorsed certificate of service may satisfy the rule where the
appealable order itself was not filed-endorsed. We therefore deny the City’s
motion to dismiss and proceed to the merits of the appeal.
B. Validity of 998 Offer
Tansavatdi argues that the trial court erred in awarding expert fees as
part of the award of costs. She contends the City is not entitled to expert fees
because its 998 offer was invalid. Although she asserted multiple grounds for

36
invalidity below, on appeal she argues only that the offer was conditioned on
a release of claims beyond the current litigation.
“[W]here the issue is interpretation of a section 998 offer as to
undisputed facts, our review is de novo.” (Timed Out LLC v. 13359 Corp.
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 933, 942; see also Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 81, 86 (Ignacio) [“We independently review whether a section
998 settlement offer was valid”].) The burden is on the offering party to
demonstrate that the offer is valid under section 998 and we interpret any
ambiguity in the offer against its proponent. (Chen v. Interinsurance
Exchange of the Automobile Club (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 117, 122 (Chen);
Barella v. Exch. Bank (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 793, 799.)
It is well established that to be valid a section 998 offer “must not
dispose of any claims beyond the claims at issue in the pending lawsuit.”
(Chen, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 121; see also Ignacio, supra, 2
Cal.App.5th at pp. 86–87; Valentino v. Elliott Sav–On Gas, Inc. (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 692, 699–700 (Valentino).) “That limitation exists because of the
difficulty in calculating whether a jury award is more or less favorable than a
settlement offer when the jury’s award encompasses claims that are not one
and the same with those the offer covers.” (Chen, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at
p. 121.)
Tansavatdi contends that the inclusion of a “general release” in the
City’s 998 offer renders it invalid, relying on Ignacio, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at
page 89. There, the Court of Appeal found a 998 offer was invalid because it
included release of “any and all claims” against the releasors “whether now
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, that have existed or may have
existed or which do exist, or which hereinafter can, shall or may exist.”
(Ibid.) Other courts have invalidated 998 offers containing similarly broad

37
releases. (See Valentino, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 699 [offer invalid where
it expressly included release of claims outside the litigation]; Chen, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 122 [offer invalid where it includes release of “all
claims”].)
By contrast, in Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
899 (Goodstein), the case relied on by the trial court here, the court concluded
that a “general release” did not invalidate a 998 offer after construing it to
apply only to the litigation before it. (Id. at p. 907; see also Ignacio, supra, 2
Cal.App.5th at p. 89 [“The rule to be taken from Goodstein is not that a
‘general release’ does not invalidate a section 998 offer; the rule is that a
release of unknown claims arising only from the claim underlying the
litigation itself does not invalidate the offer”].) In Goodstein, the 998 offer
stated that it was made “in full settlement of this action” and included the
“execution and transmittal of a General Release” by the plaintiff in favor of
the defendant. (Id. at p. 905.) Applying the legal principles applicable to
contracts generally, the court relied on the language of the offer stating that
it was made “in full settlement of this action.” (Id. at p. 907.) Read together
with that phrase, the court concluded that the general release was limited to
the instant action. (Id. at pp. 907–908.) The court also noted that the release
did not expressly include claims outside of the litigation, as distinguished
from the invalid offer in Valentino. (Id. at p. 908.)
Similarly, in Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259, 272,
the court relied on Goodstein to conclude that a 998 offer requiring the
release of “all current claims” was valid when read together with the rest of
the offer. That case explained that the “point” of Goodstein is that “general
rules of contact construction apply to section 998 offers” and that “one of the

38
cardinal rules of contract construction is that, if possible, the contract [i.e.,
the 998 offer] should be construed to render it valid and enforceable.” (Ibid.)
We find the language of the 998 offer here is in line with Goodstein and
Linthicum. The “general release” did not expressly include claims outside of
the litigation, and it did state that the offer was made “in full settlement of
this action,” identical to the key language in Goodstein, supra, at page 907.
In addition, the offer expressly stated that “the settlement will include all
existing and future medical, legal and other liens arising in any way from the
subject accident.” Taken together, we conclude that, when read in context
and properly construed, the release contained in the section 998 offer
included only the claims and parties in the current litigation. As such, we
find no error in the trial court’s ruling that the proposed release did not
invalidate the City’s section 998 offer.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to recover its costs on
appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

DAUM, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.

39


ROB BONTA, as Attorney General, etc.,
Petitioner,
v.
CHAD BIANCO, as Sheriff, etc., et al.,
Respondents.

S295901

Fourth Appellate District, Division Two
E088096

September 24, 2026

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Burns* concurred.

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 BONTA v. BIANCO
S295901

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The state Constitution designates the Attorney General
“the chief law officer of the State,” subject to the powers and
duties of the Governor. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 (article V,
section 13).) It also assigns the Attorney General “the duty . . .
to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced,” and provides that the Attorney General “shall have
direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff . . . in
all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices.”
(Ibid.) A statute enacted in furtherance of article V, section 13
states that “[w]henever the Attorney General deems it
necessary in the public interest the Attorney General shall
direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation or
detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the sheriff.” (Gov.
Code, § 12560.)
The substance of article V, section 13 and Government
Code section 12560 has been in place for almost a century. Yet
this is the first time this court has addressed a dispute between
the Attorney General and a sheriff over the relationship created
by these provisions. The Attorney General asks us to interpret
state law as empowering him to issue binding directions to
respondents Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco and the
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (collectively,
respondents) regarding an investigation they have initiated.
The Attorney General also requests a writ of mandate that
would order respondents to comply with his prior instructions to

1
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

pause their investigation, preserve all items seized during this
investigation, and provide him with documents and other
materials relating to the investigation.
We conclude that the authority vested in the Attorney
General under the state Constitution and the Government Code
includes the power to give binding directions to sheriffs
regarding a particular investigation that are consistent with the
Attorney General’s duty “to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
We further conclude that the Attorney General’s clear, specific,
and lawful directions to respondents in this matter are all
within the scope of his authority and that the Attorney General
is entitled to a writ of mandate that orders respondents to
comply with these directions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At a special election held on November 4, 2025, California
voters adopted Proposition 50, known as the Election Rigging
Response Act. (Voter Information Guide, Special Elec. (Nov. 4,
2025) text of Prop. 50, p. 18.) Pursuant to Proposition 50, new
congressional district maps that were adopted by the
Legislature earlier in 2025 will be used in California’s
congressional elections through 2030. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 4,
subds. (b), (d).) Proposition 50 passed by a substantial margin
statewide, and the official results for Riverside County showed
that 56.3 percent of votes cast in that county were in favor of the
proposition.
A. Respondents’ Initial Investigation
After the special election, a community group, the
Riverside Election Integrity Team (REIT), alleged that it had
uncovered a discrepancy between different counts of the total

2
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

number of votes cast in that county. Specifically, REIT
calculated from records it had obtained from the Riverside
County Registrar of Voters that 611,426 valid ballots had been
cast countywide at the election, which was 45,896 fewer than
the 657,322 valid ballots counted by the registrar in his official
tally. On February 6, 2026, a representative of REIT contacted
the sheriff’s department to report the group’s findings.
Acting on this report, on February 9, the sheriff’s
department sought and obtained from the Riverside County
Superior Court a search warrant authorizing the seizure from
the registrar of “[a]ll ballots pertaining to the 2025 Special
Election.” The affidavit submitted in support of the February 9
warrant described the alleged discrepancy and stated that the
ballots were necessary “to prove or disprove any criminal
conduct.”
On February 10, the registrar gave a lengthy presentation
at a public meeting of the Riverside County Board of
Supervisors. The registrar defended the official election results
and told the Board of Supervisors that the handwritten records
REIT’s calculations relied upon were prone to human error and
did not account for certain kinds of ballots.
Continuing with its investigation, on February 23, the
sheriff’s department sought and obtained a second search
warrant from the superior court. This warrant authorized the
seizure of additional election materials from the registrar,
including paper records of voted ballots; voter identification
envelopes; spoiled, canceled, and unused ballots; tally sheets;
and challenge lists. The affidavit used to obtain this warrant
referred again to the alleged vote discrepancy but did not
mention the registrar’s February 10 presentation; on the

3
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

contrary, it stated that the registrar “has not given a reason for
the discrepancy.”
On February 24, before either of the search warrants had
been executed, the Attorney General learned for the first time of
their existence. A representative from the Attorney General’s
office asked Bianco for the search warrant affidavits, which
Bianco emailed to him. The representative then called Bianco
and asked that execution of the February 9 warrant be
postponed from February 27, the planned execution date, until
March 6 to give the Attorney General time to better understand
the basis for the investigation and the search warrants. Instead,
respondents advanced the execution of the February 9 warrant
to February 26 and seized 12 pallets (approximately
1,000 boxes) of ballots, which were transported to a secure
storage facility accessible only to sheriff’s department
employees.
B. The Attorney General’s Concerns and Initial
Directives
The Attorney General sent a letter to Bianco later on
February 26. The Attorney General expressed concern about
the seizure of ballots. He noted that the affidavits supporting
the February 9 and February 23 warrants “identify no specific
felony offenses you have probable cause to believe were
committed” and did not “identify particular persons whom you
have probable cause to believe committed any such offenses.”
The Attorney General’s letter also observed that the affidavit for
the February 23 warrant failed to inform the court of the
explanations the registrar had provided to the Board of
Supervisors for the discrepancy between the official number of
votes reported by the registrar and REIT’s calculations.

4
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The Attorney General’s letter continued, “I am concerned
about the potential for this investigation, which is
unprecedented in scope and scale, to undermine public
confidence in state elections. At the same time, I take seriously
any concerns about potential election irregularities, including
alleged discrepancies between votes cast and votes counted in
the November 2025 Special Election in Riverside County. For
these reasons, it is imperative that my office have adequate time
to understand the issues underlying the investigation before
your office takes further steps.” The Attorney General therefore
“direct[ed]” Bianco, “pursuant to [the Attorney General’s]
supervisory authority over California sheriffs set out in
article V, section 13 of the California Constitution and . . .
Government Code section 12560” to: “(1) preserve all ballots,
documents, or other materials that have been seized by [the
sheriff’s department] to date; and [¶] (2) pause further action in
this matter until my office has had the opportunity to review it.”
The Attorney General also requested that Bianco confirm his
compliance with this direction by noon the next day.
Bianco did not respond by this deadline or respond to the
Attorney General’s attempts to make contact over the following
several days. On March 4, the Attorney General sent another
letter to Bianco, stating he had “learned that [the sheriff]
intend[ed] to ignore” the Attorney General’s directives and count
the seized ballots “using Sheriff’s Department staff members
who are not trained and have no experience counting ballots.”
The Attorney General wrote that this was “unacceptable” and
requested confirmation from Bianco that he intended to comply
with the Attorney General’s directives and was “standing down
all further investigative action in this matter.”

5
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

C. Subsequent Activity
On March 5, sheriff’s department employees began
conducting a hand count of the ballots. In an email to the
Attorney General’s office that same day, Bianco confirmed
receipt of the Attorney General’s March 4 letter and replied that
the sheriff’s department was “complying with [the Attorney
General’s] directive” pending further communications. The
ballot count stopped, apparently at Bianco’s direction. The
sheriff’s department returned the ballots to their boxes, resealed
them, and left them in the storage facility, which was locked and
secured.
The Attorney General sent Bianco another letter on
March 6. This letter acknowledged receipt of Bianco’s March 5
email. It requested that, within five days, the sheriff’s
department provide the Attorney General with copies of the case
files relating to its investigation. After receiving no response,
another representative from the Attorney General’s office spoke
with Bianco on March 13. Bianco explained he had not yet seen
the March 6 letter but agreed to comply with the Attorney
General’s request for these materials. The Attorney General’s
representative asked that the records be provided by March 18.
On March 19, without notifying the Attorney General, the
sheriff’s department obtained a third search warrant. The
affidavit in support of this warrant informed the court that the
sheriff’s department had begun counting the seized ballots on
March 5, but further explained that the Attorney General had
sent letters to Bianco “that directed/requested a pause in this
investigation.” “In an effort to avoid any potential appearance
of impropriety,” the affidavit requested “a Special Master for the
service of this search warrant (specifically the counting of the

6
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

ballots).” The court issued the warrant but did not appoint a
special master.
On March 20, Bianco held a press conference in which he
announced his office had obtained a court order to continue its
counting of the ballots under the supervision of a special master.
On March 24, the sheriff’s department executed the
February 23 warrant and seized another 11 pallets of materials
relating to the November 2025 Special Election.
D. These Proceedings
The Attorney General initiated this litigation one day
before the March 24 seizure. The Attorney General originally
filed his petition for writ of mandate or other extraordinary
relief in the Court of Appeal. The petition asked that court to
issue a writ that would order respondents to comply with the
Attorney General’s prior directives in this case and all further
orders he might issue in connection with the investigation. The
Court of Appeal denied the petition, with its order stating that
the Attorney General had not shown he lacked an adequate
remedy in the Riverside County Superior Court.
The Attorney General then sought our review of the Court
of Appeal’s summary denial order, while also filing a writ
petition in the Riverside County Superior Court. After receiving
a preliminary opposition from respondents, we ordered that the
petition that had been filed in the Court of Appeal be refiled in
this court and that respondents show cause why the relief
sought by the Attorney General should not be granted. We also
ordered respondents to pause their investigation pending our
resolution of this case and to preserve all seized items. After we
ordered review, the Riverside County Superior Court stayed the
proceedings before it.

7
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

II. DISCUSSION
We must decide whether the Attorney General has the
authority to issue binding directions to respondents regarding
their investigation and if so, whether writ relief is appropriate
to enforce these directions. The Attorney General argues that
he may issue such directions pursuant to his constitutional
power to exercise “direct supervision over” sheriffs “in all
matters pertaining to” their duties (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13) and
his statutory authority to “direct the activities of any sheriff
relative to the investigation or detection of crime” (Gov. Code,
§ 12560). Disagreeing, respondents assert that under the state
Constitution the Attorney General cannot issue binding
directions to a sheriff regarding an ongoing investigation, and
that the Government Code cannot expand the Attorney
General’s authority beyond what article V, section 13 allows.
Respondents further argue that they have no ministerial duty
to comply with directions the Attorney General may give them
because their investigation of crimes inherently involves the
exercise of discretion.
A. The Attorney General’s Authority
1. Article V, section 13
a. Background
To provide context for the dispositive constitutional and
statutory provisions, we first briefly describe the powers and
duties of the Attorney General and sheriffs as they stood before
the Attorney General was vested with the responsibilities and
authority found in article V, section 13, and Government Code
section 12560.
As originally ratified in 1849 and subsequently amended
in 1879, the California Constitution provided for an Attorney

8
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

General but did not specify that officer’s responsibilities. (See
Cal. Const. of 1849, art. V, § 18; Cal. Const. of 1879, art. V, § 17.)
Laws enacted in the 1800s and early 1900s assigned various
responsibilities to the Attorney General. These included the
charge “[t]o exercise supervisory powers over district attorneys
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their offices” (former
Pol. Code, § 470), but no statute gave the Attorney General
comparable authority over sheriffs.
The 1849 and 1879 versions of the state Constitution also
recognized the office of county sheriff but similarly did not
assign any specific responsibilities to sheriffs. (See Cal. Const.
of 1849, art. VI, § 7; Cal. Const., former art. XI, § 5.) Instead,
both left it to the Legislature to define these duties. (Cal. Const.
of 1849, art. VI, § 7 [the Legislature “shall fix by law, [sheriffs’]
duties and compensation”]; Cal. Const., former art. XI, § 5 [the
Legislature “shall prescribe [sheriffs’] duties”]; see Beck v.
County of Santa Clara (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 789, 796 (Beck).)
Sheriffs’ statutory duties included the responsibilities to
“[p]reserve peace,” “[a]rrest and take before the nearest
magistrate for examination all persons who attempt to commit,
or who have committed, a public offense,” and “investigate
public offenses which have been committed.” (Former Pol. Code,
§ 4157.)
b. Constitutional text
Against this backdrop, voters at the November 1934
general election approved Proposition 4, the relevant language
of which now appears at article V, section 13 of the state
Constitution. The text of this provision provides our initial and
most important interpretive resource. (See Patterson v. Padilla
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 220, 233.) We construe this language in

9
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

context, giving words their ordinary meaning. (Greene v. Marin
County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2010)
49 Cal.4th 277, 289–290 (Greene); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 407.)
Article V, section 13 provides in full as follows: “Subject
to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General
shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of
the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall
have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff
and over such other law enforcement officers as may be
designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their
respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make
reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the
Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion
of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the
Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the
superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the
Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney.
When required by the public interest or directed by the
Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district
attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.”1

1
The substance of what is now article V, section 13 was
originally added to the state Constitution as article V,
section 21. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1934), text of
Prop. 4, appen. pp. 7–8 (Voter Pamphlet).) The phrasing of
article V, section 21 as adopted at the November 1934 General
Election was different in certain respects from the language that

10
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

This provision designates the Attorney General as the
state’s “chief law officer” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13), charges the
Attorney General with the duty “to see that the laws of the State
are uniformly and adequately enforced” (ibid.), and gives the
Attorney General “direct supervision over” sheriffs “in all
matters pertaining to” their official duties (ibid.). Reading this
language holistically, it is apparent that “direct supervision”
under article V, section 13 includes the power to issue specific
directions to sheriffs regarding a criminal investigation that are
consistent with the Attorney General’s duty “to see that the laws
of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Ibid.)
“[S]upervision over” someone in the performance of their
duties is commonly understood to include the power to issue
authoritative instructions regarding the discharge of those
responsibilities. (See, e.g., 10 Oxford English Dict. (1933)
p. 196, col. 2 [defining “supervision” as, among other things,
“[g]eneral management, direction, or control”].) The modifier
“direct” imparts that as used within article V, section 13,
“supervision” can involve the exercise of immediate directive
authority, rather than a more detached form of oversight. This
“direct supervision” extends to “all matters pertaining to the
duties of” a sheriff (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13), which further

appears in article V, section 13 today, but none of these
differences is material to our analysis. At all times the provision
has included language providing that the Attorney General is
“the chief law officer of the State,” subject to the powers and
duties of the Governor; that the Attorney General shall see that
state laws “are uniformly and adequately enforced”; and that the
Attorney General “shall have direct supervision over” sheriffs
and district attorneys “in all matters pertaining to the duties of
their respective offices.” (Cal Const., art. V, § 13; id., former
§ 21.)

11
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

communicates the power to direct whether and how the duties
subject to supervision are to be exercised in a particular
instance. And article V, section 13’s conferral of this power
together with a duty “to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced” conveys that “direct
supervision” should be construed as comprising effective
methods for realizing this objective.
Putting this all together, and when also combined with
sheriffs’ statutory duty to “investigate public offenses which
have been committed” (Gov. Code, § 26602; see former Pol. Code,
§ 4157), the language of article V, section 13 plainly confers
upon the Attorney General the authority to issue binding
directions to a sheriff regarding a criminal investigation.
Indeed, the authority to issue such directions is critical to the
Attorney General’s ability “to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
It would be unreasonable to conclude that the state Constitution
would assign the Attorney General such a responsibility without
also providing that officer with tools commensurate with the
task.
At oral argument in this matter, counsel for respondents
did not dispute that direct supervision over someone in the
performance of their duties is normally understood as including
the power to issue binding instructions to the supervisee.
Respondents nonetheless argue that other language in article V,
section 13 establishes that the Attorney General cannot issue
such directions regarding an ongoing sheriff’s investigation.
Respondents rely on the portion of article V, section 13
that provides, “Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General
any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any

12
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute
any violations of law of which the superior court shall have
jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have
all the powers of a district attorney.” According to respondents,
this language shows that the state Constitution is concerned
only with local underenforcement of the law. To address this
concern, their argument goes, article V, section 13 gives the
Attorney General the authority to assume a prosecutorial
function when that officer believes the law is not being
adequately enforced in a county, and it allows the Attorney
General to give directions to a sheriff to help investigate a
matter when there would otherwise be no investigation.
Respondents maintain that this “substitutional authority,” in
which the Attorney General can step into what would otherwise
be an enforcement vacuum, is exclusive of the authority to issue
binding directions regarding an ongoing investigation already
being undertaken by a sheriff.
We do not regard this as a plausible interpretation of
article V, section 13. The power to prosecute criminal cases is
properly understood as complementary to the Attorney
General’s broad supervisory authority over sheriffs. Under the
state Constitution the Attorney General may pursue the
uniform and adequate enforcement of state law by assuming a
direct prosecutorial role in circumstances where, in the Attorney
General’s opinion, the law is not being adequately enforced; or
the Attorney General may work toward this objective by issuing
binding directions as to an investigation or prosecution,
regardless of who initiates it. The existence of the former power
does not imply the absence of the latter.
Respondents’ argument to the contrary cannot be
reconciled with article V, section 13’s clear conferral to the

13
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Attorney General of the power to give lawful, binding directions
to a sheriff regarding a criminal investigation. The text within
article V, section 13 that respondents rely upon does not suggest
that this power is conditional on who initiated the investigation.
By necessity, the contrary is true. A rule denying the Attorney
General the ability to issue binding instructions regarding an
investigation already initiated by a sheriff would be unworkable
in practice and frustrate the Attorney General’s ability “to see
that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced.” (Ibid.) The fact that a sheriff’s investigation is
underway does not necessarily mean it is effectively
contributing to the uniform and adequate enforcement of the
laws. The Attorney General may conclude for any number of
reasons that it is not, and that it is appropriate to intervene and
issue binding directions.
Respondents also make the narrower argument that
whatever the Attorney General’s supervisory powers under
article V, section 13 may be, the Attorney General cannot direct
a sheriff to terminate an ongoing investigation. But the
language within article V, section 13 providing that the
Attorney General shall have “direct supervision over . . . all
matters pertaining to” a sheriff’s duties appears capacious
enough to accommodate such an order when issued to ensure
“that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced.” (Ibid.) In any event, the Attorney General has not
issued any such order here, having directed only a pause in the

14
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

investigation into the ballot count. We therefore need not
otherwise address this argument.2
Turning to an argument advanced by the California State
Sheriffs’ Association, appearing as amicus curiae in support of
respondents, the fact that the state Constitution elsewhere
provides for “an elected county sheriff” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1,
subd. (b)) does not imply, let alone establish, that the Attorney
General lacks the power to issue binding directions to sheriffs
regarding an investigation. No categorical rule prohibits one
constitutional executive officer from ever being subject to
directions from another. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v.
Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 157–158.) Furthermore, the
powers and duties of the office of county sheriff have always
been subject to definition by the Legislature. (See Beck, supra,
204 Cal.App.3d at pp. 796–797; cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1158 [“ ‘[t]he
county is merely a political subdivision of state government,
exercising only the powers of the state, granted by the state’ ”].)
It almost goes without saying that these powers and duties also
can be redefined through a constitutional amendment. The fact
that sheriffs are constitutional officers thus provides no reason
for construing the Attorney General’s powers under article V,

2
Nor do we address other hypothetical orders from the
Attorney General offered by respondents, including an
instruction to a sheriff to violate a court order, or a directive or
directives amounting to what respondents describe as “plenary
operational control” that would subject sheriffs to “complete
operational micromanagement” by the Attorney General. While
we agree in principle that neither the state Constitution nor the
Government Code confers limitless authority upon the Attorney
General, we have no reason here to evaluate hypothetical orders
so different from the directives that are before us.

15
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

section 13 as being more limited than the plain language of that
provision communicates.3
In short, article V, section 13 unambiguously confers upon
the Attorney General the authority to issue binding directions
to sheriffs regarding a criminal investigation, at least when
these directions are consistent with the Attorney General’s
responsibility “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly
and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) But even
if we were to assume for sake of argument that the
constitutional text is ambiguous as it pertains to the question
before us, making it necessary to consult extrinsic resources to
determine its meaning, these additional guideposts would lead
us to the same conclusion.
c. Prior construction
We first observe that this understanding of the Attorney
General’s supervisory authority under article V, section 13 is
supported by how we construed similar language that appeared

3
People v. Brophy (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 15 opined, in dicta,
that the state Constitution’s recognition of local governments
and officers meant that the Attorney General’s “supervision”
over sheriffs, as used in article V, section 13, “does not
contemplate absolute control and direction of” sheriffs and
district attorneys, or even just “control” over these officers.
(Brophy, at p. 28.) Brophy is inapposite in that it considered
whether the Attorney General has the power to order a
telephone company to discontinue service to a customer
suspected of criminal activity. (Id. at p. 29.) We nevertheless
disapprove of Brophy, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d 15 to the extent its
analysis is inconsistent with our conclusion that the Attorney
General may issue binding directions regarding a criminal
investigation that comport with the Attorney General’s
responsibility “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly
and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)

16
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

in the former Political Code prior to the adoption of
Proposition 4. As previously described, a statute in place at the
time of Proposition 4’s adoption gave the Attorney General the
power “[t]o exercise supervisory powers over district attorneys
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their offices.” (Former
Pol. Code, § 470.) We construed this language as giving the
Attorney General the power to countermand a decision made by
a local district attorney in a pending case. (County of
Sacramento v. C.P.R.R. Co. (1882) 61 Cal. 250, 254 (County of
Sacramento).) Reading it alongside another provision within
the same statute that empowered the Attorney General to
“assist” any district attorney “in the discharge of [their] duties”
(former Pol. Code, § 470), we explained that when the Attorney
General “assists the District Attorney, he may, by virtue of his
‘supervisory power over the District Attorneys in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their offices,’ assume a paramount
control and direction of the business he and the District
Attorney are jointly conducting” (County of Sacramento, at
p. 254; accord, State ex rel. Nolan v. District Court of the First
Judicial District (Mont. 1899) 55 P. 916, 916 [explaining that a
similarly phrased Montana statute vested “in the Attorney
General a right to oversee for direction, to inspect with an
authority all matters pertaining to the duties of the county
attorneys of the State, and to direct with superintending
oversight the official conduct and acts of such officials”]).
The electorate that approved Proposition 4 in 1934 was
presumably aware of our decision in County of Sacramento and
its interpretation of “supervisory powers . . . in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their offices.” (Former Pol. Code,
§ 470; see United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn
Rancheria v. Newsom (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538, 552 [“we presume

17
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

electors ‘to [have been] aware of existing laws and judicial
construction[s] thereof’ when they voted”].) The use of similar
language — “direct supervision . . . in all matters pertaining to
the duties of their respective offices” — within article V,
section 13 is therefore suggestive of an intent to give the
Attorney General power over a criminal investigation
comparable to the “paramount control and direction” that the
Attorney General could exercise in a case pursuant to former
Political Code section 470. (County of Sacramento, supra,
61 Cal. at p. 254; see Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson,
LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785 [“ ‘Where . . . legislation has
been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same
or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially similar
language, we may presume that the Legislature intended the
same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears’ ”].)
d. Election material
The official election pamphlet that was distributed by the
Secretary of State to voters at the November 1934 General
Election also provides insight into the intent behind article V,
section 13. (See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980)
27 Cal.3d 855, 866.)
That pamphlet included an argument in favor of
Proposition 4 that characterized state and local law enforcement
agencies as ineffective and in need of centralized coordination.
This argument told voters that the “system which gave to every
county, city and town the right to regulate its own police affairs
without supervision or interference from anyone could function
efficiently in the simple society that existed in [earlier] days, but
in our present complex society . . . that system has become

18
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

inadequate.” (Voter Pamphlet, supra, argument in favor of
Prop. 4, p. 9.)
The argument continued, “The law enforcement business
of California . . . is being run in a most unbusinesslike manner.
There are in this State 276 incorporated cities and 58 counties,
each of which is handling its law enforcement work in its own
way without supervision. . . . [¶] The amendment makes
possible the coordination of county law enforcement agencies
and provides the necessary supervision to insure that result.
Without curtailing the right of local self government and
without creating any new commission to accomplish this
purpose, it merely enlarges the duties of the Attorney General
so as to give him that supervision and make him responsible for
the uniform and adequate enforcement of law throughout the
State. In short, the Attorney General is made the supervisor
and coordinator for our county law enforcement agencies.”
(Voter Pamphlet, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 9.)
This argument further corroborates our interpretation of
article V, section 13 as giving the Attorney General the power to
issue binding directions to sheriffs regarding a criminal
investigation. The role of a “supervisor and coordinator,” as
used in the pamphlet’s description of the Attorney General’s
new responsibilities, is consistent with the ability to issue
binding directions. (Voter Pamphlet, supra, argument in favor
of Prop. 4, p. 9.) We have already discussed what supervision
entails; the ultimate task of a coordinator, meanwhile, is to
integrate subunits into an effective whole (see, e.g., 2 Oxford
English Dict. (1933) p. 965, col. 1 [defining “coordinate” as “[t]o
place or arrange (things) in proper position relatively to each
other and to the system of which they form parts; to bring into
proper combined order as parts of a whole”]), which may require

19
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

giving direct commands when necessary. The argument stated
that this supervision and coordination would avoid “curtailing
the right of local self government” (Voter Pamphlet, argument
in favor of Prop. 4, p. 9), as replacing sheriffs with a statewide
police force might (see Beasly, California Unifies Enforcement
Agencies to Fight Crime (1934) 20 A.B.A.J. 757, 758 [discussing
this option]). But it also apprised voters that the initiative
would reform a system in which each county had been allowed
to handle law enforcement “in its own way” (Voter Pamphlet,
argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 9) and that the Attorney
General’s exercise of the power conferred through the
proposition could “interfer[e]” (ibid.) with local authority, as
might occur if the Attorney General issued directives regarding
an investigation that a local sheriff disagreed with.
e. Government Code section 12560
Furthermore, when language in a constitutional provision
is ambiguous, we may consider how the Legislature has
interpreted that language. (Greene, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 290;
City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995)
10 Cal.4th 554, 563; Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986)
42 Cal.3d 481, 488.) “ ‘Although the ultimate constitutional
interpretation must rest, of course, with the judiciary [citation],
a focused legislative judgment on the question enjoys significant
weight and deference by the courts.’ ” (Greene, at p. 291.)
Implementing legislation enacted by the Legislature just
months after Proposition 4 passed indicates that the grant of
authority now found at article V, section 13 was perceived
around the time of its initial adoption as giving the Attorney
General the power to issue binding directions to sheriffs
regarding a criminal investigation.

20
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Shortly after the November 1934 General Election, the
Legislature added several new sections to the former Political
Code in furtherance of Proposition 4. (Stats. 1935, ch. 575,
pp. 1668–1670 [former Pol. Code, §§ 476–479].) Collectively,
these laws described the Attorney General’s powers in relation
to district attorneys, sheriffs, and grand juries, and authorized
the Attorney General to appoint up to 10 special agents or
investigators. (See ibid.)
One of these provisions, section 479 of the former Political
Code, is now codified at Government Code sections 12560 and
12561. Using language materially identical to text appearing in
former Political Code section 479 as originally enacted in 1935,
Government Code section 12560 provides, “The Attorney
General has direct supervision over the sheriffs of the several
counties of the state, and may require of them written reports
concerning the investigation, detection, and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. Whenever the Attorney
General deems it necessary in the public interest the Attorney
General shall direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the
investigation or detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the
sheriff, and may direct the service of subpoenas, warrants of
arrest, or other processes of court in connection therewith.”
(Italics added.) In the phrases “shall direct” and “may direct,”
the word “direct” is clearly being assigned the meaning of “[t]o
give authoritative instructions to; to ordain, order, or appoint (a
person) to do a thing.” (3 Oxford English Dict. (1933) p. 389,
col. 3.) This usage of “direct” thus reflects an understanding
that under article V, section 13 the Attorney General can issue
binding instructions to sheriffs regarding a criminal
investigation.

21
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Moreover, Government Code section 12560 carries
independent force in this context. As a duly enacted statute, it
defines the relationship between the Attorney General and
sheriffs unless it is unconstitutional, i.e., “ ‘ “unless it can be said
of the statute that it positively and certainly is opposed to the
constitution.” ’ ” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 486, 520; see also Methodist Hosp. of
Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 692; Lundberg v.
County of Alameda (1956) 46 Cal.2d 644, 652.) Government
Code section 12560 does not contravene the state Constitution;
as they pertain to the issue before us, the two are fully
consistent. Government Code section 12560 therefore imposes
upon sheriffs a statutory duty to comply with the Attorney
General’s directions, at least when such orders are consistent
with the Attorney General’s “duty . . . to see that the laws of the
State are uniformly and adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const.,
art. V, § 13.)
Our interpretation of both article V, section 13 and
Government Code section 12560 as allowing the Attorney
General to give binding directions to sheriffs also comports with
how we have previously understood these provisions. In
Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820
(Venegas), we determined that sheriffs are state, rather than
local, officials when acting in their law enforcement roles (id. at
pp. 826, 836), such that they are immune from damages liability
in a lawsuit brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code alleging a violation of federal rights arising out of
the exercise of these responsibilities. In reaching this result, we
highlighted the Attorney General’s constitutional and statutory
authority to directly supervise sheriffs. (Venegas, at pp. 833–
834.) Most notably, we specifically observed that Government

22
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Code section 12560 gives the Attorney General the ability “to
direct [sheriffs’] activities regarding . . . investigations”
(Venegas, at p. 834), without in any way suggesting that such
direction would exceed the Attorney General’s powers under the
state Constitution.
Respondents offer a different interpretation of the statutes
enacted to further what is now article V, section 13. They argue
that these laws support their position that the Attorney General
may step in to investigate or prosecute a crime when local
authorities have failed to act, but the Attorney General cannot
issue binding directions to a sheriff regarding an ongoing
sheriff’s investigation. We do not find respondents’ arguments
persuasive.
Respondents first note that under Government Code
section 12561, “Whenever the Attorney General deems it
necessary in the public interest, the Attorney General may
appoint some competent person to perform the duties of sheriff
with respect to the investigation or detection of a particular
crime and cause the arrest of persons in connection therewith.
Any person so appointed has all the powers of a sheriff with
respect to the particular matter.” Respondents assert that the
Attorney General’s power to appoint a sheriff to conduct an
investigation implies that the Attorney General may only act in
a “substitutional” manner and is prohibited from interfering
with an elected sheriff’s investigation.
We disagree. Like the language within article V,
section 13 that respondents rely upon, Government Code
section 12561 is properly understood as complementary to the
Attorney General’s power to issue binding directives to sheriffs.
Situations may arise in which the Attorney General would

23
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

prefer, because of a potential conflict of interest or for other
reasons, to have someone other than the local sheriff assist with
an investigation. In giving the Attorney General the flexibility
to appoint a sheriff pro tempore in such scenarios, Government
Code section 12561 does not imply that the Attorney General
lacks the authority to issue binding directions to local sheriffs in
other circumstances.
Respondents also assign significance to a difference in
phrasing between Government Code sections 12560 and 12550,
the latter of which addresses the Attorney General’s
relationship with district attorneys. In addition to providing
that “[t]he Attorney General has direct supervision over the
district attorneys of the several counties of the state,”
Government Code section 12550 states that “[w]hen the
Attorney General deems it advisable or necessary in the public
interest, or when directed to do so by the Governor, the Attorney
General shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of the
district attorney’s duties, and may, if deemed necessary, take full
charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of law of
which the superior court has jurisdiction. In this respect the
Attorney General has all the powers of a district attorney,
including the power to issue or cause to be issued subpoenas or
other process.” (Italics added.) Respondents assert that “take
full charge” (ibid.) communicates a greater degree of control
than “direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the
investigation or detection of crime” (§ 12560), and that the
absence of such language in Government Code section 12560
reflects an understanding that the Attorney General has no
authority to intervene in and direct an ongoing investigation
initiated by a sheriff’s department.

24
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We have described Government Code sections 12550 and
12560 as “substantially identical” (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 834), and we see no reason to alter that assessment here. The
Legislature is free to impart the same basic concept in different
ways (People v. Pacheco (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 100, 103 [“The
Legislature need not use any ‘magic words,’ as long as its intent
is clear”]), and we conclude that any modest difference between
the two statutes does not reflect an intent to limit the Attorney
General’s directive authority over sheriffs, as claimed by
respondents.
The Attorney General attributes the difference in
phrasing between Government Code sections 12550 and 12560
to how other statutes define the respective duties of district
attorneys and sheriffs. District attorneys “shall initiate and
conduct on behalf of the people all prosecutions for public
offenses” (Gov. Code, § 26500), whereas statutes describe
sheriffs’ relevant duties in more general terms (see, e.g., Gov.
Code, §§ 26600 [“The sheriff shall preserve peace”], 26602 [“The
sheriff shall prevent and suppress any affrays, breaches of the
peace, riots, and insurrections that come to his or her
knowledge, and investigate public offenses which have been
committed”]). Thus, the Attorney General posits, if any
meaningful difference exists between the language found in
sections 12550 and 12560, it most likely reflects an awareness
that a sheriff’s duties are frequently not specific to any
particular crime or investigation, and that language providing
that the Attorney General could “take full charge” (Gov. Code,
§ 12550) of a particular sheriff’s investigation would be too
limiting.
That is a possible interpretation of the statute. It is also
possible that the Legislature used “take full charge” in

25
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Government Code section 12550 because it expected that the
Attorney General would, or could, rely wholly on its own
personnel to investigate and prosecute a matter within the
jurisdiction of the superior court. “[T]ake full charge” (Gov.
Code, § 12550) is in line with such a complete assumption of
responsibility. In the broader array of circumstances captured
by Government Code section 12560, the Attorney General,
having limited investigatory staff, would more often rely on
sheriffs to implement specific directives. This difference makes
“direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation
or detection of crime” a more apt description of the Attorney
General’s typical exercise of supervisory power in relation to
sheriffs. (Gov. Code, § 12560.) In any case, this minor
discrepancy in phrasing does not suggest that Government Code
section 12560 means anything other than what its plain
language conveys — that the Attorney General can “direct the
activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation or detection
of crime.” (Ibid.)
To summarize, the text of article V, section 13 establishes
on its own that the Attorney General’s supervisory power over
sheriffs includes the authority to issue binding directions
regarding a criminal investigation, at least when the directions
are consistent with the Attorney General’s responsibility “to see
that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately
enforced” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13), and this understanding is
corroborated by all of the extrinsic interpretive resources we
have consulted.
2. Application
We now consider the validity of the specific instructions
the Attorney General gave to respondents. We conclude these

26
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

directions reflect a permissible exercise of the Attorney
General’s constitutional and statutory authority.
The Attorney General argues that uses of his supervisory
power should be reviewed under a highly deferential abuse of
discretion standard. We need not decide whether that is the
appropriate test because the directions that have been given
here pass muster under any standard of review that plausibly
could apply to them.
The directions to pause the investigation, preserve all
seized items, and provide certain materials to the Attorney
General all came after the Attorney General expressed concerns
regarding whether the affidavits supporting the February 9 and
February 23 search warrants provided adequate grounds for an
unprecedented seizure of ballots and election materials.
Regardless of whether the affidavits were or were not legally
sufficient, the Attorney General could have fairly concluded that
his intervention was necessary to ensure that any further
investigation was justified and if so, that the investigation
would be conducted in a law-abiding and appropriate manner —
in other words, to see that state law would be “uniformly and
adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) All of the
directions the Attorney General has issued to date are lawful
and accordant with this objective. Under any degree of scrutiny
that reasonably might be applied to these instructions, they are
within the scope of the Attorney General’s authority and binding
upon respondents.4

4
Although the Attorney General’s March 6 letter seeking
materials relating to respondents’ investigation was framed as
a request, under the circumstances it was tantamount to an
order, and we treat it as such.

27
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Respondents argue that the Attorney General should not
be permitted to issue directions regarding this investigation in
particular due to an alleged “conflict of interest.” Respondents
note that the Attorney General has expressed skepticism about
the investigation’s foundations, including calling them
“baseless.” They draw our attention to rule 3.8(a) of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a
prosecutor must “not institute or continue to prosecute a charge
that the prosecutor knows[] is not supported by probable cause.”
Respondents contend that under this rule, “if the Attorney
General were to take control of the investigation, he would be
required to dismiss or otherwise discontinue it. Accordingly,
there is an irremediable conflict of interest in allowing the
Attorney General to control the investigation.”
This argument conflates the Attorney General’s
obligations as a prosecutor with the Attorney General’s
supervisory role over an investigation. An investigation may
continue even if an officer believes probable cause has not yet
been established. The Attorney General has stated that
although the evidence that has been shared with him to this
point has not yet persuaded him that a crime may have been
committed, he will continue to review the matter in light of any
new evidence that is presented to him. We presume that
government officials act in good faith in exercising their
constitutional and statutory responsibilities (see Evid. Code,
§ 664), and we perceive no “conflict of interest” here.
Put succinctly, while there are undoubtedly limits to the
powers vested in the Attorney General under the state
Constitution and Government Code, the orders before us do not
test these boundaries, and no valid reason appears why the
Attorney General cannot exercise his authority here to issue

28
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

binding directions consistent with the uniform and adequate
enforcement of the law.
B. Availability of Writ Relief
We further conclude the Attorney General is entitled to
writ relief to enforce his directions.
1. General principles
In order to obtain a writ of mandate under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085, a petitioner generally must
demonstrate (1) a beneficial interest (2) in the performance of a
ministerial duty by the respondent and (3) that no plain, speedy,
and adequate alternative remedy at law exists. (People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 (Picklesimer).)
2. Beneficial interest
The beneficial interest requirement means that a party
seeking relief in mandate must have “ ‘some special interest to
be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected
over and above the interest held in common with the public at
large.’ ” (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan
Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 165.) “The beneficial interest must
be direct and substantial.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Generally, when a power or duty is imposed by law upon
a public board or officer, and in order to execute such power or
perform such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of
mandamus, it or he may apply for the same.’ ” (Bd. of Soc.
Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 101; see also
People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. El Dorado County (2005)
36 Cal.4th 971, 990–992 [the director of the Department of
Conservation had a substantial interest in writ relief addressing
local agency action that, if allowed to stand, would hamper or
frustrate the director’s efforts to attain statutory health and

29
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

environmental goals]; Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999)
21 Cal.4th 1142, 1156, fn. 9 [the state Senate and its president
pro tempore could seek writ relief challenging a measure that
“would have a significant and direct effect upon the role and
operation of the legislative branch”]; Brown v. Superior Court
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 509, 514.) Consistent with this principle, we
conclude that the Attorney General has a beneficial interest in
a writ that would order compliance with his directions and
thereby enable him to fulfill his responsibility under the state
Constitution “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and
adequately enforced.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)
3. Ministerial duty
“A ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific
act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of
facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the
propriety of the act.” (Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.)
“The critical question in determining if an act required by law is
ministerial in character is whether it involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion.” (Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 46 Cal.2d
220, 223–224.)
Respondents argue that writ relief directing compliance
with the Attorney General’s orders is improper because, in their
words, “investigative decisions are quintessentially
discretionary. Decisions regarding whether to pursue
investigative leads, seek search warrants, preserve evidence,
review seized materials, sequence investigative steps, or
allocate investigative resources necessarily involve judgment
and discretion.”
This argument fails to account for the effect of a clear and
specific order by the Attorney General. Article V, section 13

30
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

vests the Attorney General with the authority to exercise direct
supervision over sheriffs, and Government Code section 12560
expressly recognizes that this power includes the authority to
direct a sheriff’s activities concerning the investigation or
detection of crime. Once the Attorney General exercises this
authority by issuing a clear and specific directive to a sheriff
regarding a matter within the scope of the sheriff’s duties, the
sheriff has no discretion to decide whether to comply.
Compliance with the directive is therefore ministerial:
whatever discretion the sheriff may otherwise possess in
conducting a criminal investigation, that discretion does not
include the discretion to disregard a lawful directive issued by
an official with constitutional and statutory authority to direct
the sheriff’s activities. And that obligation is enforceable
through a writ of mandate so long as the directions given by the
Attorney General are lawful and sufficiently clear and specific
to provide the sheriff with proper notice and permit enforcement
by a court. (Cf. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d
644, 651 [“An injunction must be definite enough to provide a
standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed”].)
Here, the Attorney General’s orders to preserve all seized
items and to provide specifically described materials to him are
lawful, clear, and specific. The Attorney General’s order to
pause the investigation, although lawful, is somewhat less
specific. It is nonetheless comprehensible enough to provide a
basis for writ relief. (Cf. People ex rel. Gascon v. HomeAdvisor,
Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1083 [an “ ‘injunction need not
etch forbidden actions with microscopic precision’ ”].)

31
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

4. Other adequate remedy
Lastly, we address whether the Attorney General has an
adequate remedy at law. We conclude he does not. With the
November 2026 General Election nearing, the Attorney General
reasonably regards respondents’ investigation as requiring his
immediate attention and prompt intervention. Only this court
can provide a definitive explication of the Attorney General’s
powers and duties and appropriately tailored writ relief. In
light of the exigencies involved here, no other remedy would be
as effective as a writ issued by this court in securing the timely
and conclusive relief needed.5
III. CONCLUSION
The Attorney General has stressed throughout this
litigation that the circumstances before us are extraordinary,

5
In his writ petition, the Attorney General requested a writ
that would order respondents to follow his prior directions and
any future directions he might give in connection with the
investigation into the 2025 Special Election. His reply brief was
unclear about whether he continues to seek a writ that would
order respondents to comply with directions he has not yet given
them. We limit our writ to the directions that have been issued
to date, and expect that the guidance we have provided
regarding the extent of the Attorney General’s authority will
avert disagreements between the parties over directions that
may be given in the future. To address two specific potential
orders that have been discussed in this case and in the related
Cervantes v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026, S295866) (Cervantes)
matter, however, on this record we see no reason why the
Attorney General could not (1) direct respondents to return to
the superior court to request an order that would quash the
search warrants and provide for the return to the registrar of
voters of any seized materials that we have not already ordered
returned in Cervantes, and (2) direct the preparation of a chain-
of-custody report for seized items.

32
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that he does not lightly exercise the power conferred upon him
by article V, section 13 and Government Code section 12560,
and that normally his interactions with sheriffs are constructive
and collaborative. With the clarification provided by this
decision, we anticipate this norm of constructive and
collaborative interaction will continue to prevail in the future.
Here and now, however, with the Attorney General’s
orders to respondents falling within his constitutional and
statutory authority and the requirements for writ relief being
satisfied, he is entitled to a writ of mandate ordering compliance
with his directions. Respondents’ arguments all boil down to the
unsustainable view that the state’s chief law enforcement
officer, who is charged with “the duty . . . to see that the laws of
the State are uniformly and adequately enforced” (Cal. Const.,
art. V, § 13) and has the authority to exercise “direct supervision
over every district attorney and sheriff . . . in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their respective offices” (ibid.) and to
“direct the activities of any sheriff relative to the investigation
or detection of crime within the jurisdiction of the sheriff” (Gov.
Code, § 12560), nevertheless must remain a mere bystander to
an unprecedented sheriff’s investigation of undeniable
statewide significance. As we have explained, that is not the
case.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing
respondents Chad Bianco and the Riverside County Sheriff’s
Department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions
to (1) take no further action on the investigation of the
November 2025 Special Election in Riverside County pending
the Attorney General’s review of this matter; (2) retain, pending
further instruction, all records seized in the course of that
investigation, other than those that must be returned to the

33
 BONTA v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

registrar pursuant to our order in Cervantes;6 and (3) provide
the Attorney General with all materials requested in his
March 6 letter that are in respondents’ possession and have not
already been provided to the Attorney General. Each party shall
bear its own costs.7
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
BURNS, J.*

6
The Attorney General has appeared as an amicus curiae
in support of the petitioners in Cervantes, in which he has taken
the position that the ballots seized by respondents must be
returned to the registrar.
7
The stay previously issued by the court in this matter is
superseded in part by the disposition in Cervantes and is
otherwise dissolved upon finality of this opinion.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

34
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Bonta v. Bianco
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S295901
Date Filed: September 24, 2026
__________________________________________________________

Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt, State Solicitor
General, Helen H. Hong, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General,
Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Andra C. Lim,
Deputy State Solicitor General, Anya M. Binsacca, Malcolm A.
Brudigam, Lindsay M. Bailey, Lisa C. Ehrlich and Anne P. Bellows,
Deputy Attorneys General, and Zachary W. Sorenson, Deputy State
Solicitor General, for Petitioner.

Public Rights Project and Kyra Sikora for the County of Monterey, the
County of Santa Clara, Dean Logan, Juan Pablo Cervantes, Kristin
Connelly, Jesse Salinas and John Tuteur as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioner.

Tyler Law, Robert H. Tyler, Nic Cocis; Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
and Bradley W. Hertz for Respondents.
Jones Mayer, James R. Touchstone and Denise Lynch Rocawich for the
California State Sheriffs’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Respondents.

Constitutional Counsel Group and Alexander H. Haberbush for Jim
Niederecker as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondents.

Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Robert P. Brown, Assistant
District Attorney, for the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s
Office as Amicus Curiae.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Samuel T. Harbourt
State Solicitor General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3919

Bradley W. Hertz
Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
22815 Ventura Boulevard, #405
Los Angeles, CA 91364
(818) 593-2949


CLARISSA CERVANTES et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
CHAD BIANCO, as Sheriff, etc., et al.,
Respondents;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY CITIZENS et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

S295866

September 24, 2026

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Burns* concurred.

Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion.

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
S295866

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In order to protect the integrity of elections, our Elections
Code1 carefully limits who can handle and count voted ballots.
This case presents the question of whether the Riverside County
Sheriff complied with those limitations when, in response to
allegations of discrepancies in election counts by a community
group, his department seized approximately 650,000 ballots cast
in Riverside County at the November 4, 2025 Special Election
involving Proposition 50 (Voter Information Guide, Special Elec.
(Nov. 4, 2025) text of Prop. 50; the Election Rigging Response
Act).
The alleged discrepancy in the number of votes at issue in
this case is disputed. The community group contends there is a
discrepancy of about 45,896 between handwritten ballot intake
log estimates made by polling workers, and the final count
certified by the Registrar of Voters. The Registrar of Voters, by
contrast, responds that any discrepancy in the final count is
closer to 103 votes — 0.016 percent — which the registrar
describes as within the normal bounds for differences between
preliminary and certified totals. We are not called upon to
resolve these factual contentions, and everyone agrees that —

1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Elections Code.

1
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

even if true — the claimed discrepancy could not have affected
the outcome of the election.
Petitioners are four Riverside County residents who voted
in the November 2025 election. They allege that their ballots as
well as those of approximately 650,000 other Riverside County
voters were unlawfully seized. Petitioners request a writ of
mandate from this court directing respondent Chad Bianco, the
Riverside County Sheriff, to return these ballots and other
seized election materials to the custody of respondent Art
Tinoco, the Riverside County Registrar of Voters. Bianco
contends his actions were permissible because, in response to
the concerns raised by the community group, he was performing
a criminal investigation and had obtained search warrants.
We hold that the seizure of the ballots was unlawful.
California law long has recognized that voted ballots require
special care and handling to safeguard them from alteration or
tampering. Consistent with this principle, the Elections Code
narrowly limits the circumstances in which a court may order
the production of ballots for inspection, and even in those
narrow circumstances, requires that ballots remain in the
physical custody of the responsible elections official. Bianco’s
seizure of the ballots violated the plain language of
section 15551, subdivision (d), commanding that “[i]n no event”
shall voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections
official.”2 This provision manifests a legislative intent that
ballots remain in the elections official’s custody even in the
event of a criminal investigation. As we explain below, this clear

2
In footnote 6, post, we identify recent legislation modifying
section 15551 and conclude it does not alter the conclusions we
reach in this case.

2
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

custodial command safeguards the integrity of our elections by
protecting ballots from alteration, tampering, or other improper
interference.
To remedy this violation, we issue a peremptory writ of
mandate directing Bianco to return the seized ballots to the
registrar’s custody and to refrain from further handling of the
ballots except as necessary to comply with our order.
While allegations of election improprieties are a very
serious matter, our Elections Code contains numerous
established mechanisms for investigating and proving
misconduct that do not compromise the integrity of voted
ballots — contrary to the means employed here.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts relating to this petition are discussed at greater
length in Bonta v. Bianco.3
Both cases arise out of the sheriff’s department’s seizure
of approximately 650,000 ballots cast in Riverside County at the
November 4, 2025 Special Election involving Proposition 50.
(Voter Information Guide, Special Elec. (Nov. 4, 2025) text of
Prop. 50, p. 18.) In response to allegations of a discrepancy
between the registrar’s official count of votes recorded at that
election and the total number of votes calculated by a group of
concerned citizens, sheriff’s department personnel secured two
search warrants in February 2026. The warrants authorized
the seizure of ballots cast at the election, as well as other
election-related materials, from the registrar. In late February

3
On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of all
pleadings and exhibits filed in Bonta v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026,
S295901). (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

3
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

2026, the sheriff’s department seized the ballots and started to
count them. Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s expressed
concerns about the seizure of ballots, the sheriff’s department
obtained a third search warrant that contemplated the
appointment of a special master who would be responsible for
counting the ballots. No special master has yet been appointed.
Shortly after the third warrant was obtained, petitioners
filed a verified petition for a writ of mandate in this court. This
petition names Bianco and Tinoco as respondents, and Secretary
of State Shirley Weber (see § 13314, subd. (a)(4)) and “Riverside
County citizens who cast ballots on Proposition 50 in the
[November 2025 election]” as real parties in interest.4
Petitioners allege that the seizure of the ballots and other
election materials violated the statutory scheme governing the
care and custody of ballots and involved an unlawful recount by
unqualified individuals. Petitioners seek a writ of mandate or
another extraordinary writ that would direct Bianco “to return
in totality the seized election materials and ballots to [the
registrar]” and “to report to this court the chain of custody of
such election materials, the personnel involved and time/dated
timeline”; prohibit “any tallying, counting or handling of ballots
by personnel other than elections staff and under procedures not
provided for in the [Elections] Code”; and require that the
“movement of election materials . . . take place with redundant
election officials and in compliance with the procedures and
transparency provided for by law.”

4
As discussed below, we conclude petitioners properly
sought writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085;
we therefore do not address whether Elections Code section
13314 also applies.

4
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We ordered respondents to show cause, returnable before
this court, why petitioners are not entitled to the relief they
seek.5 In his return, Bianco contends he lawfully seized the
ballots and other election materials pursuant to the search
warrants. He further maintains that the special master
procedure contemplated by the third search warrant, possibly
coupled with other safeguards, adequately addresses any
concerns that might otherwise arise from the removal of the
ballots from the registrar’s custody. Tinoco, on the other hand,
agrees with petitioners “that voted ballots and related election
materials should be maintained, preserved, transported,
inspected, retained, and administered in accordance with the
Elections Code” and “therefore does not oppose the relief
requested in the Petition.” The Secretary of State and the
Attorney General (appearing as amicus curiae in support of
petitioners) likewise both take the position that the ballots were
seized unlawfully and must be returned to the registrar.
II. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that maintaining the integrity of voted
ballots is critical to the sanctity of our elections. At the same
time, law enforcement has the important responsibility of
investigating possible criminal conduct, including crimes that
relate to elections. The central question presented in this case
is whether law enforcement may circumvent the Elections
Code’s comprehensive scheme governing the custody of ballots
during and after elections by seizing ballots pursuant to a search
warrant and thereby removing them from a local registrar’s

5
We had previously issued an order in Bonta v. Bianco
directing Bianco to pause his investigation and preserve all
seized items.

5
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

custody. We hold that such a seizure is unlawful under the plain
language of section 15551, subdivision (d), which expressly
states that “[i]n no event” shall voted ballots “be taken from the
custody of the elections official.”6 If election misconduct is

6
After oral argument in this case, the Legislature passed
Senate Bill No. 1418 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1418),
which modified section 15551, subdivision (d)’s previous
language stating that “[i]n no event shall” packages containing
voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections official.”
As amended, section 15551, subdivision (d) now more broadly
provides that “[i]n no event” — subject only to two expressly
identified exceptions, neither of which is applicable here —
“shall any document that is or will be subject to the preservation
requirements in Section 17300 to Section 17306, inclusive, or
any certified voting technology or electronic data or portion
thereof, including source code, or any other election-related
material or equipment necessary for the conduct of an election,
be taken from the custody of the elections official.” (Stats. 2026,
ch. 341, § 2.) Senate Bill 1418 also amended section 15551,
subdivision (a). (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The Governor signed
Senate Bill 1418 on September 19, 2026, and its provisions came
into effect immediately. (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 10.) Briefing
and argument in this case were premised on the prior language
of section 15551, and the parties have not briefed the impact
Senate Bill 1418 may have on the issues presented.
We conclude that the voted ballots must be returned to the
registrar pursuant to section 15551, subdivision (d) as it stood
prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1418, and it is evident that
the current version of section 15551 is at least as protective of
ballots as preexisting law was. (See § 17302, subd. (b)(1)–(10).)
Meanwhile, petitioners have emphasized throughout this
litigation the importance of having the seized ballots returned
promptly to the registrar. Under the circumstances, although
we conclude that petitioners have not shown a ministerial duty
to return to the registrar anything other than the packages
containing voted ballots, we decline to delay the resolution of
this dispute by requesting further briefing regarding whether

6
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

suspected, the Elections Code provides several mechanisms for
law enforcement to review and examine ballots without
compromising their integrity. But those procedures were not
followed and the type of seizure that occurred here directly
conflicts with the Elections Code’s carefully considered and
controlling provisions. We therefore issue a writ of mandate
directing Bianco to return the ballots to the registrar forthwith.
A. General Principles
“A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is
unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “The writ
must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be
issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially
interested.” (Id., § 1086.)
To secure a writ of mandate, petitioners must show that
they have standing to pursue such relief, that they lack an

Senate Bill 1418 applies here and creates a ministerial duty to
return seized records other than the ballots. Those issues may
be addressed, if necessary, in a future proceeding.
Consistent with the parties’ presentation of the issues, our
analysis considers the language of section 15551 as it read at
the time of oral argument in this matter, which (aside from the
introduction of subdivisions pursuant to Senate Bill No. 73
(2025–2026 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2026, ch. 10) was the same as the
language in effect at the time of the seizures.

7
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

adequate remedy at law, and that they seek to enforce a
ministerial duty capable of being enforced through a judicial
writ. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340
(Picklesimer).) We conclude each of these requirements is met
here.
B. Standing
Bianco no longer contests petitioners’ standing,7 so we
discuss it only briefly. In general, “To have standing to seek a
writ of mandate, a party must be ‘beneficially interested’
[citation], i.e., have ‘some special interest to be served or some
particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the
interest held in common with the public at large.’ ” (Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com.
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361–362.) “Nevertheless, ‘ “where the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the [petitioner]
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in

7
In his preliminary briefing, Bianco challenged petitioners’
standing based on misquoted passages from, and an incorrect
recitation of our holding in, Common Cause v. Board of
Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432 (Common Cause). The law
firm responsible for the error apologized and withdrew Bianco’s
standing argument. We disapprove of the improper use of
artificial intelligence tools, which apparently contributed to the
significant error that occurred here and remind counsel of
attorneys’ professional duties of competence and candor to the
court. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 1.1, 3.3.) We also refer
the matter to the State Bar of California to determine whether
discipline is warranted. (See canon 3D(2) of the California Code
of Judicial Ethics.)

8
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” ’ ”
(Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 166 (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition).)
We agree with petitioners that they have standing because
they seek to “ ‘ “procure the enforcement of a public duty,” ’ ”
namely, the duty to lawfully handle and preserve all ballots cast
at an election. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition, supra, 52 Cal.4th
at p. 166.) In this respect, petitioners allege that Bianco’s
seizure and retention of the ballots violate various provisions of
the Elections Code designed to ensure that ballots are safely
maintained and handled only by designated personnel in the
manner specified by statute. Enforcement of this duty
vindicates the public right to the proper handling of voted
ballots. (See Common Cause, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 439
[recognizing citizens’ public interest standing in a suit against a
county to enforce provisions of a statutory voter outreach
program].)
C. No Adequate Remedy at Law
“ ‘The writ of mandate lies generally to compel
performance of a legal duty when no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law is available.’ ” (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v.
Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 785.)
This requirement has also been satisfied by petitioners.
This case presents a question of statewide importance as to
which this court’s immediate intervention is warranted. (See,
e.g., Legislature of the State of California v. Weber (2024)
16 Cal.5th 237, 246–247; Legislature of the State of California v.
Padilla (2020) 9 Cal.5th 867, 871; Patterson v. Padilla (2019)
8 Cal.5th 220, 223.) Even assuming that petitioners could have
sought declaratory or injunctive relief in the superior court,

9
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

under the circumstances presented here, a writ proceeding
before this court is appropriate to secure the prompt and final
resolution of significant legal questions. (See Glendale City
Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328,
343, fn. 20; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp
(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 265; California Teachers Assn. v.
Nielsen (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 25, 28–29.)
D. Substantive Law
To obtain writ relief, petitioners must demonstrate “ ‘ “a
clear, present . . . ministerial duty on the part of the
respondent[s]” ’ ” that is capable of being enforced. (Picklesimer,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Based on our review of the
applicable statutes, we conclude Bianco violated his ministerial
duty to carry out his law enforcement responsibilities in
compliance with the robust protections for the handling of
ballots set forth in the Elections Code. One particular provision
is dispositive — section 15551, subdivision (d). Until its recent
amendment by Senate Bill 1418, this subdivision stated that
“[i]n no event shall [voted ballots] be taken from the custody of
the elections official.” Following the amendment, it continues to
provide that “[i]n no event . . . shall [election materials including
voted ballots] . . . be taken from the custody of the elections
official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The plain text of this
statute, when read in light of the overall statutory scheme,
requires that elections officials maintain custody of voted
ballots, even in the event of a criminal investigation. Bianco
therefore had no authority to seize the ballots from the
registrar’s custody, and writ relief is appropriate to direct their
return.

10
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

1. Overview of relevant Elections Code provisions
To provide context for our analysis, we outline the most
relevant Elections Code provisions. The Elections Code sets
forth a comprehensive statutory framework for the care and
handling of ballots, including detailed procedures governing the
transportation and counting of ballots during an election; the
retention and disposal of ballots after an election; and the review
of ballots in the event of an election contest8 or criminal
prosecution. These procedures reflect a legislative intent to
ensure the integrity of the ballots through strict chain-of-
custody protocols, robust oversight, and public transparency.
The Elections Code requires that precinct workers
undergo specialized training in elections procedures and ballot
handling protocols (§ 12309.5, subd. (a)(1)–(8)) and declare
under oath that they will faithfully discharge their duties
(§ 12321, subd. (b)). As voting occurs, a voter hands their ballot,
or the envelope containing their ballot, to one of these workers,
who must put the ballot in a ballot container. (§ 14277.) After
the polls close on election day, “the precinct board shall, in the
presence of the public,” “(1) [s]eal the container used to
transport voted ballots and insure that the precinct number, or
in an election conducted using a voter center, the vote center
number, is designated on the ballot container”; “(2) [c]ertify,
sign, and seal the several packages or envelopes [of related

8
An election contest is a civil action challenging an election
on various grounds, in which a recount may occur at trial in the
presence of all parties, if necessary to determine the contest.
(See §§ 16100, 16101, 16601.) This case does not involve an
election contest.

11
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

materials] as directed by the elections official”;9 and “(3) [b]y not
less than two of their number, deliver the ballot container and
packages to the elections official at the central counting place in
the manner prescribed by the elections official. The ballot
container and packages shall remain in their exclusive
possession until delivered to the elections official.” (§ 15201,
subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also § 15202.) Vote by mail ballots are
subject to similarly strict custody and handling requirements.
(See §§ 3017, 3019, 3025, subd. (b), 3026.)
Only designated elections personnel may count ballots
(§§ 15205, 15207; see also § 18575 [making it a felony for a
person other than an elections officer to “perform[] or discharge[]
any of the duties of an election officer in regard to the handling,
counting, or canvassing of any ballots”]), and “[a]ll proceedings
at the central counting place . . . shall be open to the view of the
public” (§ 15204). During the counting process, “no person,
except one employed and designated for the purpose by the
elections official or his or her authorized deputy, shall touch any
ballot container.” (Ibid.) “[A]s soon as” the ballots are all
counted, they “shall not thereafter be examined by any person”
but instead must “be carefully sealed in a strong envelope” with
“[t]he signatures of each member of the precinct board . . .
written across the seal.” (§ 15279.) “After ballots are counted

9
See sections 14431 (requiring the precinct board to
“enclose and seal in one or more packages” the following: “all
voted, spoiled, canceled, or unused ballots”) and 14432,
subdivisions (a)–(e) (requiring the precinct board to “enclose and
seal in one or two packages” the following: “[t]wo tally sheets, if
ballots are to be tabulated manually at the precinct”; the
“roster”; the “copy of the voter list”; the “challenge list”; and the
“assisted voter’s list”).

12
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

and sealed, the elections official may not open any ballots nor
permit any ballots to be opened except” under specified
circumstances not relevant here (see §§ 15303, 15304) or in the
event of a recount. (§ 15370.)10
After an election, ballots remain in the custody of the
responsible elections official, who then must destroy them at
specific junctures identified in the Elections Code. For elections
such as the November 2025 Special Election with no federal
races on the ballot, the following “shall be kept by the elections
official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date
of the election” (§ 17302, subd. (b)): “[t]he packages containing”
“[v]oted polling place ballots,” “[p]aper cast vote records,”
“[v]oted vote by mail voter ballots,” “[v]ote by mail voter
identification envelopes,” “[v]oted provisional voter ballots,”
“[v]oted conditional voter registration ballots,” “[p]rovisional
ballot voter identification envelopes,” “[s]poiled ballots,”
“[c]anceled ballots,” and “[u]nused vote by mail ballots
surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)–(10).) “If a contest is not commenced within the six-
month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent

10
Under the Elections Code, a recount can be initiated
through different channels, depending on the circumstances.
(See §§ 15610 [recount initiated by the elections official], 15620
[recount initiated by “any voter” at the voter’s expense], 15640
[recount initiated by the district attorney], and 15645 [recount
initiated by the Governor].) Statutory recounts include detailed
procedures to ensure ballot integrity and public transparency,
such as strict rules regarding the examination and touching of
ballots and requirements that recounts take place in public
view. (See, e.g., §§ 15625, subd. (a), 15629, subd. (c), 15630,
subds. (a), (b).) No such recount was initiated in this case.

13
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail
voters’ signatures is not commenced within the six-month
period . . . the elections official shall have [these] items . . .
destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain
unopened until the items are destroyed or recycled.” (§ 17302,
subd. (c).)11
Most critical here, section 15551 addresses what occurs
when an election contest or criminal prosecution is commenced
within that six-month timeframe. Prior to its recent
amendment through Senate Bill 1418, it provided in full: “(a) If
a contest or any such criminal prosecution[12] has been
commenced before the date fixed for its destruction, the package
containing the voted ballots shall be subject to the order of the

11
In non-federal elections, elections officials are also
required to keep packages containing the following materials
“for a period of six months”: two tally sheets; the copy of the
roster used as the voting record; challenge lists; and assisted
voter lists. (§ 17304, subd. (b).) If a contest or criminal
prosecution is not commenced within six months, the elections
official “may have the packages destroyed or recycled.” (Id.,
subd. (d).) In addition, “The elections official shall preserve all
rosters or combined rosters and voter lists . . . until five years
after the date of the election, after which they may be destroyed
by that official.” (§ 17300, subd. (a)(1).)
12
The phrase “such criminal prosecution” no longer appears
in section 15551 due to changes made by Senate Bill 1418. (See
Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The statute now refers to “any contest
or criminal prosecution.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The
background to the earlier “such criminal prosecution” (§ 15551,
former subd. (a)) language suggests that it included
prosecutions described in section 17302, subdivision (c), i.e., “a
criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or
falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters’
signatures.” (See former § 7201, as amended by Stats. 1955,
ch. 517, § 1.5, p. 993.)

14
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

court in which the contest or criminal prosecution is pending
and shall not be destroyed until after final determination of the
contest or criminal prosecution. [¶] (b) In the case of a
congressional election contest, the elections official shall hold
the ballots of that congressional district in custody subject to the
inspection of any committee of the House of Representatives
having in charge the investigation of the contest, until the final
determination of the contest by the House of Representatives.
[¶] (c) In the case of a contest in the State Legislature, the
elections official shall hold the ballots of the Senate or Assembly
district in custody subject to the inspection of any committee of
the Senate or Assembly having in charge the investigation of the
contest until the final determination of the contest or the final
adjournment of the session of the Legislature in which the
contest is filed, whichever is the later. [¶] (d) In no event shall
the package or its contents be taken from the custody of the
elections official.” (Former § 15551, italics added.) As
previously observed, the current version of section 15551,
subdivision (d), as amended by Senate Bill 1418, continues to
include language providing that “[i]n no event . . . shall
[specified election records] . . . be taken from the custody of the
elections official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.)
In sum, the Elections Code contemplates that voted ballots
remain in the continuous custody and control of elections
officials from the moment the voter deposits them until the
moment they are destroyed.
2. Analysis
In petitioners’ view, section 15551’s mandate that “[i]n no
event” shall voted ballots be “taken from the custody of the
elections official” (§ 15551, subd. (d)) — when read in context of

15
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

the overall statutory scheme governing the handling of
ballots — means voted ballots may not be removed from the
registrar’s custody for any reason, even by law enforcement
pursuant to a criminal investigation. Thus, petitioners assert,
the sheriff’s department acted unlawfully in removing the
ballots from the registrar’s custody, notwithstanding the fact it
had obtained a search warrant to seize them.
Bianco acknowledges that section 15551 reflects “the
Legislature’s concern for ballot security and election-official
custody,” but argues that section 15551 should not be
interpreted to foreclose law enforcement from seizing ballots,
and removing them from the custody of elections officials,
pursuant to a search warrant. He emphasizes that a search
warrant is itself a kind of court order authorized by statute,
albeit one situated outside the Elections Code. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1523 et seq. [statutory scheme applicable to search warrants].)
He argues that we should harmonize a court’s authority to issue
search warrants under the Penal Code with the ballot-
protection provisions of the Elections Code in a way that
authorizes the unprecedented action he took here.
As the parties’ respective positions demonstrate, the
meaning of section 15551 is at the crux of this dispute. To
determine section 15551’s meaning, we apply general principles
of statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute,
“[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If
the statutory language permits more than one reasonable

16
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”
[Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative
purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California
Coastal Com. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 334, 366.)
a. Section 15551’s text
Starting with section 15551’s text, the statute specifies
only two situations in which voted ballots are “subject to the
order of the court.” (§ 15551, subd. (a).) Those situations are
(1) an election “contest,” and (2) a “criminal prosecution.” (Ibid.)
Neither circumstance is present here. No election contest has
been filed, and the issuance of a search warrant, by itself, does
not trigger a “criminal prosecution.” (§ 15551, subd. (a).) A
criminal prosecution commences only upon the occurrence of
certain events — none of which has occurred in this case — and
may only be initiated by a public prosecutor. (Pen. Code, § 804
[for statute of limitation purposes, except as otherwise provided,
the “prosecution for an offense is commenced” upon the
occurrence of an indictment, information, complaint,
arraignment, or an arrest or bench warrant specifically
identifying a defendant]; Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d
442, 451 [“[t]he prosecution of criminal offenses on behalf of the
People is the sole responsibility of the public prosecutor”]; People
v. Case (1980) 105 CalApp.3d 826, 832 [“It is a matter of common
knowledge that most search warrants are issued prior to and
independent of any pending prosecution”].)

17
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

But even if a criminal prosecution had commenced,
allowing for a court-ordered production, section 15551’s plain
text prohibits the removal of the ballots from the registrar’s
physical custody. Section 15551, subdivision (a) identifies
limited circumstances in which a court might order the
production of ballots for inspection, i.e., election contests or
criminal prosecutions. And even in those limited circumstances,
section 15551, subdivision (d) expressly provides that “[i]n no
event” shall voted ballots be “taken from the custody of the
elections official.” This provision reflects a legislative intent
that, even in those situations in which it is necessary to view or
recount ballots as evidence, they remain in the physical custody
of the responsible elections official. This is consistent with the
overall statutory scheme in which section 15551 resides, which
is designed to ensure the integrity of ballots through continuous
custody by election professionals, bolstered by public oversight.
This interpretation of section 15551, subdivision (d)’s
plain text does not, as Bianco contends, “expressly repeal Penal
Code warrant authority” or otherwise ignore the possibility of
criminal proceedings. Instead, as the registrar explains, “rather
than overlooking the possibility of criminal proceedings, the
Legislature expressly addressed them and nevertheless
required continued custodial control by the elections official.”
Nor are we persuaded by Bianco’s strained alternative
interpretation of section 15551, subdivision (d) as only
governing the custody of ballots in those situations addressed in
section 15551, subdivisions (a) through (c). Such an
interpretation is undermined by a statutory framework that, at
all times throughout the election process, entrusts the handling
of voted ballots only to trained and sworn elections officials. It
is also difficult to fathom why the Legislature would allow law

18
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

enforcement to seize ballots pursuant to a search warrant before
any criminal prosecution commenced, while expressly
prohibiting ballots from being “taken” from the custody of the
responsible elections official (§ 15551, subd. (d)) when they
become the subject of a criminal prosecution (§ 15551, subd. (a)).
Nothing in the statute supports this incongruous reading. To
the contrary, allowing ballots to be seized and removed from the
custody of the responsible elections official pursuant to a
warrant or other court order not expressly mentioned in section
15551 would create a substantial gap in the otherwise
comprehensive statutory scheme for the retention and handling
of voted ballots.
Thus, based on its plain text, we conclude that section
15551 unambiguously prohibits the removal of ballots from an
elections official’s custody, notwithstanding the existence of a
search warrant authorizing their seizure.
b. Legislative history and relevant case law
Because we consider the plain text of section 15551 to be
unambiguous, it is unnecessary to take the further step of
consulting extrinsic resources to guide our interpretation.
(Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 713.) However, a
brief review of section 15551’s legislative history, and the case
law interpreting its predecessor statutes, only serves to bolster
our interpretation of the plain text.
As originally adopted, the Political Code of 1872 (since
repealed and, as relevant here, replaced by the Elections Code)
set forth detailed procedures for the collection, handling,
counting, sealing, and transport of ballots that are in many
respects analogous to the procedures in place today. (See former
Pol. Code, §§ 1185, 1186, 1198, 1225, 1226, 1228, 1252, 1253,

19
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

1257, 1258, 1259, 1265, 1266.) Within that code, sections 1265
and 1266 governed the retention and destruction of ballots.
Section 1265 provided that, “Upon the receipt of the [precinct]
packages the [county] Clerk must file the one containing ballots,
and must keep it unopened and unaltered for twelve months,
after which time, if there is not a contest commenced in some
tribunal having jurisdiction about such election, he must burn
the package, without opening or examining its contents.”
(Former Pol. Code, § 1265.) Section 1266 further provided that,
“If within twelve months there is such a contest commenced,
[the clerk] must keep the package unopened and unaltered until
it is finally determined, when he must, as provided in the
preceding section, destroy it, unless such package is, by virtue
of an order of the tribunal in which the contest is pending,
brought and opened before it, to the end that evidence may be
had of its contents, in which event the package and its contents
are in the custody of such tribunal.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1266.)
In Ex parte Brown (1892) 97 Cal. 83, we construed these
statutes as prohibiting a court from ordering the production of
ballots except in the limited circumstance of an election contest.
In Brown, a precinct inspector was charged with a felony offense
involving an election. (Id. at pp. 84–85.) The county registrar
was found guilty of contempt after he refused to comply with a
superior court order to produce and open in court the sealed
package of ballots that had been returned at the inspector’s
precinct. (Id. at p. 85.) The registrar then petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, arguing that the order directing him to
produce and open the ballot package was unlawful pursuant to
former Political Code sections 1265 and 1266. (Brown, at p. 85.)
We granted the writ, explaining that former Political Code
section 1266 contemplated the production of ballots in court only

20
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

in the event of an election contest, a limitation on access the
Legislature saw as essential to maintaining the ballots’
evidentiary value in such a proceeding. (Id. at pp. 88–90.)
Without this limitation, we explained, the “security and
integrity” of the ballots would be undermined because they
would be “opened, handled, and exposed to the danger of all
sorts of changes and mutilations as often as any judicial officer
may conclude that they contain evidence material to an
issue . . . before him.” (Id. at p. 89.) We further noted that it
“must be left to the legislature itself” to amend the statutory
scheme “[i]f it is thought necessary to make the ballots available
as evidence in criminal proceedings” with appropriate
“limitations and restrictions as may be deemed essential to their
integrity.” (Id. at p. 90.)
The year after our decision in Brown, the Legislature
amended former Political Code section 1265 to allow courts to
order the production of ballots in other kinds of cases, not just
those involving an election contest, but in doing so it added the
limitation that, “In no event shall the [precinct] packages, or any
of them, or the ballots contained therein, be taken from the
custody of the County Clerk.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1265, as
amended by Stats. 1893, ch. 220, § 10, p. 309.)
Over the following decades, former Political Code sections
1265 and 1266 were merged, reformulated, eventually moved to
the newly created Elections Code, and further amended.
However, the requirement that “[i]n no event” shall ballots be
“taken from the custody” of the responsible elections official has
remained constant and universally applicable. (§ 15551,
subd. (d).)

21
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Nothing in this sequence of events suggests the
Legislature has disputed or overturned the central premise of
Brown, i.e., that in order to ensure the integrity of voted ballots,
physical custody over them must be carefully controlled, and
they may be ordered produced only in limited circumstances
specifically defined by statute. Moreover, even in those limited
circumstances where a court may order the production of ballots
for inspection, they shall not be “taken from the custody of the
elections official.” (§ 15551, subd. (d).)13
3. Bianco’s remaining counterarguments
Resisting this conclusion, Bianco argues that the Elections
Code cannot be read to displace Penal Code provisions governing
criminal investigations and that the two statutory schemes
must be harmonized. The problem with this view is that there
is a direct conflict between the Elections Code’s mandate that
ballots remain in the custody of the elections official, even in the
event of a criminal prosecution, and provisions in the Penal
Code authorizing the issuance of search warrants to seize
property that might be evidence of a crime. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1524.) Recognizing such a conflict, it is clear that the unique
scheme for the safeguarding of ballots must prevail. In the
event of a true conflict between statutes, “ ‘later enactments
supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific provisions

13
Bianco argues that Brown is not instructive here because
it pertained to a subpoena duces tecum and was decided before
the enactment of modern search warrant statutes. We fail to
see how this is relevant to Brown’s holding, which focused on the
limited statutory grounds upon which ballots might be ordered
produced, not the type of court order used to compel their
production.

22
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

take precedence over’ the more general.” (People v. Adelmann
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1071, 1079.) “[W]hen these two rules are in
conflict, the rule that specific provisions take precedence over
more general ones trumps the rule that later-enacted statutes
have precedence.” (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior
Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 960 (Department of Public Health).)
Ultimately, “ ‘[O]ur goal is to discern the probable intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the laws in
question.’ ” (Id. at p. 961.)
We conclude that section 15551 is the more specific
statute, and its provisions governing the custody of ballots must
control. As we have observed, “the requirement that courts
harmonize potentially inconsistent statutes when possible is not
a license to redraft the statutes to strike a compromise that the
Legislature did not reach.” (Department of Public Health, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 956.) It is apparent “that the Legislature [has]
thought carefully and specifically” (id. at p. 961) about when
ballot production may occur and has limited such production to
certain defined circumstances and subject to the condition that
ballots remain in the custody of the responsible elections official.
In contrast, Penal Code section 1524 addresses the seizure of
evidence pursuant to a search warrant “at a high level of
generality.” (Department of Public Health, at p. 961.) There is
no indication that the Legislature intended for the general
warrant statutes to displace the detailed scheme for the
safekeeping of ballots, which by their unique nature require
great care and expertise in handling to protect against
alteration or tampering.
Next, Bianco argues that construing section 15551 as
limiting a court’s ability to issue search warrants would violate
separation of powers principles by allowing a legislative

23
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

imperative to invade the province of the judiciary. This
argument is also unpersuasive. As we have explained, “ ‘ “Of
necessity, the judicial department as well as the executive must
in most matters yield to the power of statutory enactments.
[Citations.] The power of the legislature to regulate criminal
and civil proceedings and appeals is undisputed.” ’ [Citation.]
But this power has limitations. ‘ “The sum total of this matter
is that the legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon
constitutional functions of the courts provided they do not defeat
or materially impair the exercise of those functions.” ’ ” (Le
Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1102, italics omitted.)
We assume, for sake of argument, that the Legislature has
less than plenary authority to dictate when and for what a
search warrant may issue. Even if that were the case, the
prohibition on seizing ballots in a manner that would remove
them from the custody of the responsible elections official
neither substantially impairs nor practically defeats courts’
authority to issue search warrants generally. We have
repeatedly upheld statutes that made minor changes in how
courts may exercise their powers, and we see no persuasive
reason to reach a different outcome here. (See In re McKinney
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 11 [the Legislature may place “reasonable
limitations” on the courts’ inherent power to punish contempt of
court]; Fleming v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 344, 351
[statute prohibiting the introduction of evidence based on the
use of speed traps did not violate separation of powers
principles].)14

14
The Legislature has imposed other limits on the courts’
authority to issue search warrants, including making some

24
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Finally, Bianco contends that precluding the seizure of
ballots pursuant to a search warrant premised on possible
misconduct by a registrar or another elections official would
result in the “absurd consequence of leaving potentially relevant
evidence exclusively in the control of an office” that is itself
being investigated. Bianco’s contention fails for two reasons.
First, Bianco presumably could have used traditional
investigatory tools, within the bounds of the law, to obtain other
evidence of election-related crime as may have existed besides
ballots. Second, to the extent it was necessary to examine the
ballots to investigate the alleged vote count discrepancy, the
Elections Code contains numerous established mechanisms that
allow for the carefully controlled inspection of ballots without
compromising their integrity.
The Elections Code contemplates the possibility of
election-related crimes and provides robust avenues to
investigate and prove these crimes in a manner that protects the
sanctity of ballots as evidence. For instance, elections officials
themselves can initiate a recount, if they have “reasonable cause

material off-limits to seizure. (Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (g) [no
“warrant shall issue for an item or items described in Section
1070 of the Evidence Code” involving disclosure of journalists’
sources]; id., subd. (h) [no “warrant shall issue for an item or
items that pertain to an investigation into a prohibited violation
as defined in [Penal Code] Section 629.51,” involving
reproductive health care services, gender-affirming health care
services, and gender-affirming mental health care services
protected under California law]; id., subd. (c) [requiring special
procedures when a warrant involves documentary evidence in
the possession of an attorney, doctor, psychotherapist, or
clergyperson who is not suspected of criminal activity]; id.,
subds. (i) & (j) [requiring special procedures when a warrant
involves attorney work product or privileged information].)

25
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to believe the ballots in the precinct have been miscounted” and,
after an examination under oath, precinct or counting board
members “are unable to explain the returns of their respective
precincts.” (§ 15610, subds. (a), (b).) Perhaps more relevant
here, the district attorney may, “[w]hen requested by the board
of supervisors or the grand jury” (§ 15640, subd. (a)), petition the
court to order a recount based on probable cause that
misconduct or tabulation errors have occurred. (Id., subds. (a)–
(b).) If law enforcement officers have sufficient reason to suspect
election irregularities, they can approach the district attorney
to consider seeking a recount through this established channel
or request that the district attorney consider pursuing a
criminal prosecution, during which a court might order the
registrar to make ballots available for inspection pursuant to
section 15551, subdivision (a).
Bianco’s argument also overlooks that allowing law
enforcement unfettered access to ballots, or the ability to handle
and count them in secret based on unregulated protocols, itself
creates a substantial risk to election integrity. There is no need
to introduce this risk because the Elections Code already
contains its own comprehensive procedures for recounting and
examining ballots, including for law enforcement purposes,
without exposing them to alteration or tampering — unlike the
unlawful seizure that occurred here.
In short, Bianco’s arguments fail to persuade us that we
should interpret section 15551 in a manner inconsistent with its
plain text, which mandates that voted ballots remain in the
custody of elections officials.

26
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

E. Ministerial Duty
The analysis above leads to the conclusion that Bianco
violated his “ ‘ “clear, present, . . . ministerial duty” ’ ” not to
remove the voted ballots from the custody of the registrar.
(Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Government officials,
such as Bianco, have a ministerial duty to carry out their official
responsibilities in accordance with applicable law. “A
ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific act in a
manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of facts exists,
without regard to any personal judgment as to the propriety of
the act.” (Ibid.) Such a duty exists “where the law imposes upon
[an] officer specific duties which he refuses to perform because
of an erroneous conclusion as to his legal duties [citation], or
where petitioner is entitled by law to a certain action.”
(Consolidated Printing & Pub. Co. v. Allen (1941) 18 Cal.2d 63,
66.) Bianco breached this duty when his department seized the
ballots in violation of section 15551, subdivision (d). The
appropriate remedy is for Bianco to return the ballots to the
registrar’s custody forthwith, without further review or
counting of them. (See Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1113 [“As a general matter,
the nature of the relief warranted in a mandate action is
dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case”].)
F. Petitioners’ Other Requests for Writ Relief
Petitioners also seek writ relief that would order Bianco to
(1) return all other election materials, including non-ballot
materials, that were seized pursuant to the search warrants and
(2) prepare a chain-of-custody report detailing the transport,
handling, and location of the seized materials. We conclude
that, at least under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of
Senate Bill 1418, petitioners have not met their burden of

27
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

showing that such additional relief is warranted. (See Reilly v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 653 [the petitioner for a
writ of mandate bears the burden of pleading and proving the
facts on which the petitioner bases a claim for relief].)
The Elections Code sets forth specific procedures for the
custody and handling of ballots, which is a special category of
election material. As described above, before Senate Bill 1418
was enacted, section 15551, subdivision (a) provided, “If a
contest or any such criminal prosecution has been commenced
before the date fixed for its destruction, the package containing
the voted ballots shall be subject to the order of the court in
which the contest or criminal prosecution is pending and shall
not be destroyed until after final determination of the contest or
criminal prosecution.” (Italics added.) Section 15551, former
subdivision (d) further provided that, “In no event shall the
package or its contents be taken from the custody of the elections
official.” (Italics added.)
While packages containing voted ballots are subject to this
specific custodial protection, prior to Senate Bill 1418 no
comparable restrictions existed in the Elections Code with
respect to other election-related materials. Nor have petitioners
identified any statute or other authority that imposes a
ministerial duty to provide a chain-of-custody report for seized
materials in this scenario. It may be the case that the recent
amendments to section 15551, subdivision (d) that were
implemented through Senate Bill 1418 will alter this analysis,
but as we previously explained (see fn. 6, ante), that is
something we need not address. Furthermore, while we decline
to grant the additional writ relief requested in this case, our
holding does not preclude any orders the Attorney General
might issue on these subjects pursuant to his supervisory

28
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

authority under article V, section 13, of our state Constitution
and Government Code section 12560, the scope of which is
addressed in Bonta v. Bianco.
III. CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted in part and
denied in part, as follows: Let a peremptory writ of mandate
issue directing Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco to return
all packages containing the voted ballots to the custody of the
Riverside County Registrar of Voters forthwith and to refrain
from further handling of the ballots except as necessary to
comply with this order. The petition for writ relief is otherwise
denied without prejudice to petitioners’ ability to pursue
additional relief in a future proceeding. To the extent they
conflict, this order supersedes the search warrants issued by the
superior court in this matter. Each party shall bear its own
costs.
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
BURNS, J.*

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

29
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
S295866

Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu

Free and fair elections are the lifeblood of democracy. And
election officials are the backbone of our electoral system. The
role of these public servants is to administer our elections
competently, impartially, and safely, in accordance with the law.
In recent years, these officials have faced increased harassment,
threats, and political pressure. (See Minkin et al., Issue One,
Turning the Tide on Turnover (Feb. 2026) pp. 1–2, 5–6; Gronke
et al., Elections & Voting Information Center, Today’s Election
Administration Landscape: Findings from the 2024 EVIC Local
Election Official Survey (Feb. 2025) pp. 6–8.) They are having
to do their jobs “in an environment marked by increasingly toxic
polarization, misinformation, and public distrust.” (Election
Reformers Network, Ethical Frontlines: Impartiality
Challenges Facing Local Election Officials (Apr. 29, 2026) p. 3.)
This case involves one such official: the Riverside County
Registrar of Voters, Art Tinoco. Petitioners named Tinoco a
respondent because of his role in turning over ballots from the
November 2025 special election to Riverside County Sheriff
Chad Bianco pursuant to a search warrant secured by Bianco.
But the Registrar has made clear that his position on the
Sheriff’s actions is the same as petitioners’, and it is the same as
the court’s holding today: “the seizure of the ballots was
unlawful.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.) I write to highlight the
important role played by the Registrar and to address the

1
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

difficult predicament he faced as a result of the Sheriff’s
unlawful conduct.
I.
As an initial matter, it is notable that the Registrar is
represented here by private counsel and by the Riverside
County Counsel. The County Counsel represents the Riverside
County Board of Supervisors and county agencies, departments,
commissions, and officers, and of necessity has a broad
perspective on legal issues facing the county. As the Registrar’s
briefing indicates, the County Counsel has determined that the
Sheriff’s legal position in this case is “erroneous, as it cannot be
reconciled with the text and structure of [Elections Code] section
15551.” (All undesignated statutory references are to the
Elections Code.)
The Sheriff is not represented by the County Counsel in
this matter or in Bonta v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026, S295901)
(Bianco). Attorneys in the County Counsel’s office were copied
on a letter from the Attorney General to the Sheriff on February
26 and on emails between the Attorney General’s office and the
Sheriff on March 4 and 5. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 3, fn. 3
[taking judicial notice of all pleadings and exhibits in Bianco].)
An email on March 13 from the Sheriff to Senior Assistant
Attorney General Anthony Brady then says “we are unable to
obtain legal representation from our County Coun[se]l.” When
asked at oral argument whether the County Counsel offered a
legal opinion before the ballots were seized, Bianco’s attorney
said, “I’m not aware of that other than [the County Counsel]
wouldn’t represent the Sheriff.” When asked whether the
Sheriff sought guidance from the County Counsel, Bianco’s
attorney said, “I believe he did not.”

2
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

The court today holds that the Sheriff’s seizure of the
ballots was “unlawful under the plain language of section 15551,
subdivision (d).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6, italics added.) And the
court in Bianco holds that “the language of article V, section 13
[of the California Constitution] plainly confers upon the
Attorney General the authority to issue binding directions to a
sheriff regarding a criminal investigation,” as does the “plain
language” of Government Code section 12560. (Bianco, supra,
filed opn. at pp. 16, 26, italics added.) Further, “[a]ll of the
directions the Attorney General has issued to date are lawful”
“[u]nder any degree of scrutiny that reasonably might be applied
to these instructions.” (Id. at p. 27, italics added.) As these
holdings indicate, the legal issues presented by this controversy
are neither difficult nor close.
“ ‘Every citizen is presumed to know the law.’ ” (Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (2020) 590 U.S. 255, 265.) This
applies equally to our public officials and especially to law
enforcement officers. No one expects the Sheriff’s Department
to know the ins and outs of the Elections Code; elections are not
the department’s expertise, after all. But it is precisely because
elections are not the department’s expertise that the Sheriff’s
consultation with counsel would have been prudent if not
imperative before wading into a sensitive and closely regulated
area. Had the Sheriff sought and followed guidance from the
County Counsel, the past seven months of controversy and
“substantial risk to election integrity” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 26)
could have been avoided. There are lawful avenues for
investigating claims of election misconduct (id. at pp. 25–26),
but the approach taken here is not one.

3
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

II.
To understand how the Registrar was caught in the
middle, I add some details to the court’s recounting of what
happened. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3–5; Bianco, supra, filed
opn. at pp. 2–8.)
Tinoco was appointed Registrar of Voters by the Riverside
County Board of Supervisors in December 2023 after working in
the Registrar’s office since 2002 and serving eight years as
Assistant Registrar of Voters. Tinoco administered the
November 4, 2025 special election in Riverside County, and the
Secretary of State certified the ballots cast by county residents
on December 12, 2025. No election contest was filed (§§ 16100
et seq.); no recount was requested (§§ 15610 et seq.).
Some time later, a community group called the Riverside
Election Integrity Team (REIT) contacted the Registrar to
request ballot materials. In response, the Registrar provided
materials that could be lawfully disclosed. The REIT group said
their audit of the materials showed 45,896 fewer ballots cast
than the Registrar’s official count of 657,322.
On February 6, 2026, a REIT member, Greg Langworthy,
emailed the Sheriff’s Department about the alleged discrepancy.
He also contacted the Board of Supervisors, which scheduled a
public meeting on February 10 to examine the issue. One day
before the meeting, on February 9, the Sheriff obtained a
warrant, under seal, from the Riverside County Superior Court
authorizing seizure of all ballots cast in the county in the special
election.
At the Board of Supervisors meeting on February 10, a
video of which is available online, the Registrar appeared and
discussed the special election for more than an hour. In a

4
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

detailed presentation followed by questions from the Board, he
described the election procedures his office followed, and he
addressed the discrepancy alleged by REIT. He explained that
his office uses two systems to count ballots: the Election
Information Management System (EIMS), which tracks
signature-verified ballots that are legally eligible to be counted
(what the Registrar called “good” ballots), and the Liberty Vote
System, which scans and tabulates the “good” ballots and
generates election results. He then reported that for the
November 2025 special election, the EIMS system showed
657,219 ballots cast in Riverside County, and the Liberty system
showed 657,322 ballots counted — a variance of 103, or 0.016%.
He explained that the Secretary of State uses such comparisons
across all 58 counties statewide to spot anomalies between
ballots cast and counted, and that the variance was 0.069%
among large turnout counties (500,000+ voters) and 0.107% for
all counties in the special election. In addition, as part of the
Registrar’s presentation, Deputy County Counsel Stephanie
Nelson discussed the California Voting System Standards
issued by the Secretary of State and how voting systems are
tested for accuracy and security.
As to the discrepancy alleged by REIT, the Registrar said
that REIT’s tally of ballots cast did not include confidential
voters, conditional registration voters, and provisional ballots,
which together account for approximately 6,000 ballots.
Further, he explained, the REIT tally was based on handwritten
ballot statements and collection or intake forms that were filled
out before ballots were officially processed. These materials,
which are used as internal “reference guides” and are not
required by law, are “imprecise” because they reflect
preliminary hand counts and are “completed in the field by

5
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

election officers during long work days” and “may include
estimates or unintentional mistakes.” The Registrar said
county elections involve 921 precincts, 150 vote centers, 107 vote
dropoff sites, and over 2,500 volunteers working almost around
the clock, and “there will be some unintentional mistakes.” He
made clear that REIT’s reliance on handwritten “raw data” to
derive a count of ballots cast is “not a methodology that is
anywhere codified or law.” (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11–15
[discussing Elections Code provisions that prescribe training,
oath, custody, and transparency requirements for handling and
counting ballots].)
After the Registrar spoke, the Board heard comments for
almost an hour from Langworthy and 10 additional REIT
members or supporters. Several focused on the difference
between REIT’s count and the Registrar’s official tally, and said
the handwritten materials provided by the Registrar’s office are
accurate and reliable. One of the speakers, Shasta County
Registrar of Voters Clint Curtis, said that his office uses public
hand counts to reconcile ballots cast and ballots counted, and
that hand counts promote transparency and public confidence
whereas electronic voting systems lack transparency and can be
manipulated. As to the feasibility of hand counting in large
jurisdictions, Curtis said “we do 65,000” ballots in Shasta
County but “I could do 65 million just as easily because it’s a
matter of putting another staff member on it to make it count.
Scaling is not a problem.”
The Board received the information presented on
February 10, and several supervisors said they would study the
issue. Since then, it does not appear that the Board has found
cause to further examine the special election. On April 14, the
Board voted not to authorize the hiring or payment of outside
6
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

counsel to defend the Sheriff in the two cases before us and two
others arising from his election investigation.
Petitioners assert and the Registrar confirms that
Sheriff’s Department personnel attended the Registrar’s
presentation at the February 10 meeting. On February 23, the
Sheriff’s Department obtained a second search warrant,
authorizing seizure of additional election materials from the
Registrar. “The affidavit used to obtain this warrant referred
again to the alleged vote discrepancy but did not mention the
registrar’s February 10 presentation; on the contrary, it stated
that the registrar ‘has not given a reason for the discrepancy.’ ”
(Bianco, supra, filed opn. at pp. 3–4.) Highlighting this
omission, the Attorney General stated in a February 26 letter to
the Sheriff that “[t]here . . . appear to be material omissions in
the affidavit that may have substantially interfered with the
magistrate’s inference-drawing process.”
When the Registrar learned that the Sheriff intended to
seize the ballots, he informed the Secretary of State, who in turn
contacted the Attorney General on February 24. The Attorney
General promptly directed Bianco to pause his investigation and
postpone execution of the first warrant from February 27, the
planned date, until March 6. The Sheriff instead executed the
warrant on February 26 and seized 12 pallets (around
1,000 boxes) of ballots with the Registrar’s compliance. On
March 24, the Sheriff executed the second warrant and seized
another 11 pallets of materials, again with the Registrar’s
compliance.
III.
Petitioners sued the Registrar alongside the Sheriff on the
ground that the Registrar failed to uphold his duty under section

7
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

15551 to maintain custody of the ballots. According to
petitioners, the Registrar “violated” that duty “when he
acquiesced to the seizure and counting of ballots by Bianco
without even a minimal effort to assert his duty in court.”
As the circumstances suggest, the Registrar was caught
between a rock and a hard place. In his briefing, he agrees with
petitioners that while election misconduct is “not beyond the
reach of a lawful criminal proceeding,” the Sheriff’s seizure of
the ballots ran afoul of the statutory framework for any such
process. He notes: “There is no evidence of suspected criminal
wrongdoing by personnel within the Riverside County Registrar
of Voters’ office. Likewise, there is no evidence that the
integrity, preservation, or security of the ballots would be
jeopardized by their continued custody by the Registrar . . . .”
Further, he says his office conducted the November 2025 special
election accurately and in accordance with the law.
At the same time, the Registrar contends he acted lawfully
in complying with the search warrants: “As Riverside County’s
chief elections official, Respondent is charged both with carrying
out duties imposed by the Elections Code and with complying
with orders and warrants issued by courts of competent
jurisdiction. When presented with judicial process purporting
to authorize the seizure of voted ballots, Respondent was not
free simply to disregard that process based on his own
assessment of the governing law.”
I agree that in the scenario here, the Registrar cannot be
faulted for complying with a facially valid search warrant.
“Importantly,” his briefing notes, “at the time the warrants were
executed, the warrant applications and supporting materials
were sealed. Accordingly, Respondent did not have access to the

8
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

evidence or affidavits presented to the issuing court and could
not assess the factual or legal basis for the warrants.” Further,
the execution of the warrants by armed officers with enough
trucks to remove several pallets of materials did not leave the
Registrar with much choice. And the Registrar may have
believed that the Attorney General’s involvement would
facilitate the return of the seized materials. Under these
circumstances, the Registrar was not required to subject himself
to arrest and contempt of court in order to uphold his official
duties. (Cf. Ex parte Brown (1892) 97 Cal. 83, 84–85.)
But predictably the Registrar’s acquiescence led to him
being sued. One could say the Registrar does not seem to mind
since he does not oppose the relief requested by petitioners. Yet
the time and expense of defending a suit brought by concerned
voters, as well as the prospect of being held in violation of the
law, pose an unfavorable situation for any public official.
An alternative path was available to the Registrar, and it
is available to election officials who face similar dilemmas: The
Registrar could have gone to court himself to vindicate his duties
and authority under the law. Here, this could have taken the
form of a motion to quash the search warrants in the superior
court, especially since it was unclear whether the court had
considered the Elections Code before authorizing seizure of
ballots. Nor had the court been informed of the Registrar’s
presentation to the Board of Supervisors on February 10, which
was plainly material to whether there was probable cause of
criminal activity. Further, the Registrar could have filed a
petition for a writ of mandate similar to the one now before us.
The Registrar was undoubtedly a proper party to bring such
actions; his role in the statutory scheme was at stake, and no
one was in a better position to elucidate the requirements of the
9
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

Elections Code or to describe the ballot handling and counting
procedures as they relate to the underlying dispute.
Going forward, election officials have additional recourse.
In response to these events, the Legislature amended the
Elections Code to prohibit peace officers from interfering with
elections and to authorize enforcement actions by the Attorney
General, Secretary of State, and county elections officials
(§ 15007), to provide for civil and criminal liability for such
interference (§§ 18564.5, 18568), and to require the Attorney
General to advise election officials on how to respond to requests
from law enforcement (§ 15006). (Stats. 2026, ch. 10, §§ 1–14
(Senate Bill No. 73); see Assem. Com. on Appropriations,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 73 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended
May 11, 2026, p. 3 [describing bill as a response to the events in
Riverside County as well as “others around the country where
elections officials were presented with court orders to turn over
election materials,” and recognizing “the difficult position of
elections officials in these situations”].)
A raft of additional legislation, signed into law just days
ago, further strengthens protections against unlawful election
interference. (Stats. 2026, ch. 330, §§ 1–5 (Assembly Bill
No. 282); Stats. 2026, ch. 336, §§ 1–4 (Assembly Bill No. 1664);
Stats. 2026, ch. 340, §§ 1–4 (Senate Bill No. 884); Stats. 2026,
ch. 341, §§ 1–10 (Senate Bill No. 1418).) The Elections Code
now requires county election officials to notify the Secretary of
State “immediately, but no later than one calendar day,” after
becoming aware of a warrant or subpoena pertaining to the
search, seizure, or retention of election materials in their
custody. (§ 23, subd. (b).) It also imposes criminal liability on
“any person who seizes or causes or assists in the seizure of
ballots, election records, or certified voting technology . . . before
10
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

election results are certified” and on “[a]ny person with
authority who directs one or more other persons subject to their
supervision or authority” to undertake such a seizure. (§ 18579,
subds. (a), (b).)
Notably, the new amendments to the Election Code
contain civil and criminal enforcement provisions that
specifically target violations of the custody requirement in
section 15551, subdivision (d). (See §§ 18564.5, subd. (a)(7),
18568, subd. (i).) The Registrar says he “intends to rely on those
statutory protections in the future to help ensure continued
compliance with the Election Code’s custodial requirements
governing election materials.”
IV.
It is a lot to ask of our election officials that they not only
do their jobs competently but also stand ready to sue anyone
who unlawfully interferes with their duties. Yet here we are.
For our democracy to flourish, our elections must be conducted
in accordance with the law.
I would underscore the seriousness of the violation here.
This is not a case involving a few documents. It involves the
unlawful removal and handling by armed deputies of over 1,000
boxes of documents — and not just any documents, but the most
precious documents of the citizenry in a democracy: their votes.
We ordered an immediate stay of this conduct shortly after
receiving the Bianco petition. Then, in light of “the November
2026 General Election nearing” (Bianco, supra, filed opn. at
p. 32), we heard argument in this case and Bianco in a special
session less than two months after briefing was completed.
Today’s unanimous opinions come 31 days after argument. This

11
 CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring

court is prepared to act with dispatch and clarity to ensure that
our elections are conducted in accordance with the law.
But it should not have come to this. Although it is the job
of courts to decide cases that come before them, we should keep
in mind that the events here are “extraordinary.” (Bianco,
supra, filed opn. at p. 32.) Court orders aside, every public
official has an independent duty to follow the law. The judiciary
serves as an essential backstop, but the rule of law depends in
the first instance on the conscientious discharge of that duty by
all officials.
LIU, J.

12
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Cervantes v. Bianco
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S295866
Date Filed: September 24, 2026
__________________________________________________________

Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

UCLA Voting Rights Project, Chad W. Dunn, Sonni Waknin,
Bernadette Reyes; and Xavier Becerra for Petitioners.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt, State Solicitor
General, Helen H. Hong, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General,
Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Anya M. Binsacca,
Lindsay M. Bailey, Malcolm A. Brudigam, Lisa C. Ehrlich and Anne P.
Bellows, Deputy Attorneys General, and Zachary W. Sorenson,
Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, for the California Attorney
General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Tyler Law, Robert H. Tyler, Nic Cocis; Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
and Bradley W. Hertz for Respondent Chad Bianco.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel; Strumwasser & Woocher, Fredric D.
Woocher, Dale K. Larson and Salvador E. Pérez for Respondent Art
Tinoco.
Illovsky Gates & Calia, Kevin Calia and Christopher Hales for Real
Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Chad W. Dunn
UCLA Voting Rights Project
1900 Pearl Street
Austin, TX 78705
(512) 717-9822

Bradley W. Hertz
Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
22815 Ventura Boulevard, #405
Los Angeles, CA 91364
(818) 593-2949

Dale K. Larson
Strumwasser & Woocher LLP
1250 6th Street, Suite 205
Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 576-1233

Kevin Calia
Illovsky Gates & Calia LLP
1611 Telegraph Avenue, Suite 806
Oakland, CA 94612
(415) 500-6640

Samuel T. Harbourt
State Solicitor General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3919