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<title>Terrell v. Super. Ct. CA1/1</title>
<description>Filed 11/20/26 Petitioner, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN A175811 (San Francisco City and County Respondent; Super. Ct. No. 2019001) Real Party in Interest. Clifton Terrell filed a petition in the superior court for appointment of counsel and discovery to aid him in seeking a writ of habeas corpus under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1 (the Racial Justice Act); Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)), 1 alleging a sp</description>
<link>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/terrell-v-super-ct-ca-87043.html</link>
<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/terrell-v-super-ct-ca-87043.html</guid>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Filed 11/20/26<br />
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DIVISION ONE</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">CLIFTON TERRELL,<br />
         Petitioner,<br />
 v.<br />
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE<br />
 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN                       A175811<br />
 FRANCISCO,<br />
                                              (San Francisco City and County<br />
         Respondent;<br />
                                              Super. Ct. No. 2019001)<br />
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br />
 CALIFORNIA,<br />
         Real Party in Interest.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Clifton Terrell filed a petition in the superior court for appointment of<br />
counsel and discovery to aid him in seeking a writ of habeas corpus under the<br />
California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1 (the Racial<br />
Justice Act); Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)), 1 alleging a special circumstance<br />
finding of murder during an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) was<br />
sought and imposed against him on the basis of race. (§ 1473, subd. (e).) The<br />
trial court denied Terrell’s petition in both respects. Terrell then filed a<br />
petition for writ of mandate in this court and we issued an order to show<br />
cause.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1<br />
      In denying Terrell’s petition, the trial court concentrated on perceived<br />
imprecisions in two disparity reports the petition relied on, focusing in<br />
particular on ambiguities that the petition’s allegations dispelled. In doing<br />
so, the court failed to heed the Legislature’s recent admonition that the<br />
Racial Justice Act’s “threshold to secure counsel is extremely low” and<br />
“should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.” (Stats. 2025,<br />
ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).)<br />
      We grant the petition before us and issue a writ of mandate directing<br />
the trial court to vacate its order denying Terrell’s habeas petition, appoint<br />
counsel for Terrell, and conduct a new hearing to consider such discovery as<br />
his new counsel elects to pursue.<br />
                              I. BACKGROUND<br />
      Early one morning in 2001, A.S. and Hunter McPherson were walking<br />
home from a friend’s house when Terrell pointed a gun at each of them and<br />
tried to rob them. (People v. Terrell (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375.) A.S.<br />
gave Terrell her purse, but McPherson refused to hand over his wallet.<br />
(Ibid.) Terrell shot McPherson, who died in the hospital a few hours later.<br />
(Ibid.)<br />
      In 2005, a jury found Terrell guilty of McPherson’s murder (§ 187) and<br />
found true a special circumstance allegation of murder during an attempted<br />
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), as well as an allegation that Terrell<br />
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,<br />
subd. (d)). (People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1373, 1379.) The<br />
jury also found Terrell guilty of robbery of A.S. (§ 212.5, subd. (c)) and<br />
attempted robbery of McPherson (§§ 664/212.5, subd. (c)) and found<br />
allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of both<br />
crimes to be true (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). (People v. Terrell, at pp. 1373, 1379.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2<br />
At trial, Terrell testified that “[h]is mother is ‘Mexican and Indian,’ and his<br />
father is Black.” (Id. at p. 1378.) While the record does not reflect<br />
McPherson’s race, we may infer from Terrell’s allegations that he was White,<br />
which the District Attorney confirms.<br />
      For McPherson’s murder, the trial court sentenced Terrell to life<br />
without the possibility of parole and imposed a consecutive term of 25 years<br />
to life for the allegation of personal use of a firearm resulting in death.<br />
(People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379.) The court imposed a<br />
concurrent term for the robbery of A.S. and stayed sentencing as to the<br />
attempted robbery of McPherson. (Ibid.) Terrell appealed and we upheld his<br />
conviction. (Id. at p. 1373.)<br />
      In 2025, Terrell filed a petition in the superior court to “challenge his<br />
felony-murder special circumstances allegation found true under [section]<br />
190.2(a)(17).” The petition claimed that “statistical evidence for charging and<br />
conviction rates in San Francisco County under . . . § 190.2(a) show<br />
significant racial disparities” establishing that his “conviction was sought and<br />
obtained on the basis of race under . . . § 745(a)(3) or § 745(a)(4)” of the Racial<br />
Justice Act. Specifically, Terrell alleged that Black people constitute 53<br />
percent of those sentenced to life without parole in San Francisco and receive<br />
that sentence at 16.8 times the rate of White people, as demonstrated by a<br />
report attached as an exhibit to his petition (the Skelton report). Citing a<br />
second exhibit (the Carney report), Terrell further alleged that “in felony-<br />
murder prosecutions in San Francisco from 2011-2021[,]” a Black defendant<br />
was “more than three times more likely to be charged with [a] special<br />
circumstances allegation” when the victim of his or her crime was White.<br />
Terrell alleged that both of the San Francisco-specific disparities he<br />
identified “are consistent with statewide racial disparities in the number of</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3<br />
Black people serving [life without parole] sentences and the disproportionate<br />
number of people serving [such] sentences when” their crime’s victim was<br />
White.<br />
      The District Attorney filed an informal response to Terrell’s petition,<br />
and Terrell submitted an informal reply. In an order filed in January 2026,2<br />
the trial court denied Terrell’s petition in its entirety, finding that Terrell<br />
failed to “ ‘plead[] a plausible allegation of a violation’ ” of the Racial Justice<br />
Act supporting the appointment of counsel because “he allege[d] a violation<br />
. . . in too conclusory and broad a manner.” The court reasoned that the<br />
statistics Terrell cited were “too broad because they relate to San Francisco<br />
County [life without parole] sentences in general [(the Skelton report)] and to<br />
special circumstances in general (with no county specified) [(the Carney<br />
report)], with no showing or allegation regarding Petitioner’s specific offense<br />
and conduct.” Based on similar reasoning, the court also found Terrell had<br />
failed to establish good cause for discovery by “ ‘advanc[ing] a plausible<br />
factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial<br />
Justice Act “could or might have occurred” in his case.’ ” The court continued<br />
to emphasize that the Carney report did not itself indicate that the data it<br />
addressed was specific to San Francisco or “isolate the particular special<br />
circumstance allegation charged in [Terrell]’s case.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2 On the same date that the trial court issued its ruling, Terrell filed an</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“[a]mendment” to his petition consisting of a declaration by an attorney who<br />
supervised the compilation of the data analyzed in the Carney report.<br />
(Boldface omitted.) The attorney confirmed that the data was from San<br />
Francisco. Several days later, Terrell filed a second “[a]mendment” setting<br />
forth argument about the opinion in People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025)<br />
114 Cal.App.5th 707. (Boldface omitted.) It is unclear whether the trial<br />
court ever reviewed these documents. Since they are immaterial to our<br />
disposition, we need not address them any further.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4<br />
                               II. DISCUSSION<br />
A.    Governing Legal Principles<br />
      1.    The Goals and Structure of the Racial Justice Act<br />
      The Legislature passed the Racial Justice Act with bold and<br />
unequivocal aims: “ ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice<br />
system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining<br />
convictions or in sentencing.’ (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)” (People v.<br />
Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 944–945 (Wilson); see also Stats. 2025, ch. 721,<br />
§ 1, subd. (f) [finding and declaring that the Racial Justice Act should be<br />
interpreted in light of the “bold, concerted, and ongoing efforts” required to<br />
correct racial bias in the criminal legal system].) To those ends, the statute<br />
prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or<br />
seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or<br />
national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) “[F]our numbered [paragraphs or]<br />
subparts within section 745, subdivision (a) . . . describe different means of<br />
proving that the state exercised its criminal sanctions power” in violation of<br />
this proscription. (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 163<br />
(Young).)<br />
      The statute enshrines a “broad scheme, which covers every stage of the<br />
prosecutorial process—from investigation through charging, trial, conviction,<br />
and sentencing . . . .” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) It responds<br />
to “direct evidence of discriminatory intent (i.e., an exhibition of ‘bias or<br />
animus’ or use of ‘racially discriminatory language’ (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(2))[)]”<br />
or “proof of racial bias against a group of which defendant is a member based<br />
on harsher treatment of his group vis-à-vis others of a different race (§ 745,<br />
subd. (a)(3)–(4)).” (Id. at pp. 163–164.) As relevant here, a violation may be<br />
established where “[t]he defendant was charged or convicted of a more</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5<br />
serious offense than defendants of other races” who “engaged in similar<br />
conduct and are similarly situated, and the . . . prosecution more frequently<br />
sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who<br />
share the defendant’s race” in the relevant county. (§ 745, subd. (a)(3).) A<br />
violation is also established where the defendant received a longer or more<br />
severe sentence than “similarly situated individuals convicted of the same<br />
offense” by nature of their race (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A)) or the race of their<br />
victim (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B)), again within the relevant county.<br />
      Among other changes, the Legislature “amended section 1473, which<br />
identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a<br />
subdivision governing the litigation of” claims under the Racial Justice Act.<br />
(Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 945.) The new subdivision authorizes a<br />
habeas petition “after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a<br />
criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation<br />
of subdivision (a) of Section 745 . . . .” (§ 1473, subd. (e).) It provides for the<br />
appointment of counsel to indigent petitioners where “either the petition<br />
pleads a plausible allegation” of such a violation “or the State Public<br />
Defender requests counsel be appointed.” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5).) “Newly<br />
appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment.”<br />
(Ibid.) A petitioner or petitioner’s counsel also may file a motion for discovery<br />
under section 745, subdivision (d), “in preparation to file a petition” or in<br />
connection with one that is pending. (§ 1473, subd. (e)(2).) If a habeas<br />
petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court<br />
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Id.,<br />
subd. (e)(7)(B).) If the court finds a violation, it must impose one or more of<br />
the statutory remedies. (Id., subd. (e)(8).)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6<br />
      As multiple courts have observed, the Racial Justice Act “contemplates<br />
escalating evidentiary burdens on a defendant seeking relief at the various<br />
stages of the process.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th<br />
Supp. 36, 61 (Gonzales); see also McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025)<br />
110 Cal.App.5th 33, 44 (McIntosh) [distinguishing “separate and distinct<br />
inquiries” associated with a request to obtain appointed counsel and a<br />
request for an order to show cause]; Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160–<br />
161.) The burden to obtain counsel is merely to plead a plausible allegation<br />
of a violation. (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5).) “The burden at the discovery stage is a<br />
good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the<br />
burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of [a] . . . violation by<br />
a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gonzales, at p. 61.) In analyzing the<br />
statute, it is important to bear in mind that the higher showings required at<br />
later stages “inform[] what is required”—and what is not required—“for the<br />
lesser showing[s]” that warrant discovery and the appointment of counsel.<br />
(Id. at p. 41)<br />
      2.     Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation<br />
      We review purely legal issues “ ‘such as the proper interpretation and<br />
application of a statute . . . de novo.’ ” (In re Lynex (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th<br />
756, 766 (Lynex).) The same standard applies to our review of the sufficiency<br />
of a pleading in a special criminal proceeding. (See People v. Perlas (2020)<br />
47 Cal.App.5th 826, 831–832 [petition to revoke parole]; see also Harmon v.<br />
Superior Court (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1236, 1249 [Racial Justice Act habeas<br />
petition is a special proceeding].)<br />
      In interpreting a statute, our central task “ ‘ “is to determine the<br />
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine<br />
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning,” ’ ”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">7<br />
which we generally must follow “ ‘ “unless a literal interpretation would<br />
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory<br />
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, [we] may<br />
consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and<br />
public policy.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608,<br />
616–617.) “ ‘ “[W]e consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire<br />
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to<br />
every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the<br />
legislative purpose.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 617.) In applying these principles to the<br />
Racial Justice Act, we give “considerable weight” to the Legislature’s detailed<br />
uncodified findings and statements of intent, given their specificity and<br />
because they were “voted upon by the entire legislative body, enrolled and<br />
signed by the Governor . . . .” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)<br />
B.    Analysis<br />
      The District Attorney contends that Terrell is not entitled to appointed<br />
counsel or discovery because his allegations do not address “individuals who<br />
have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated . . . .” She<br />
maintains that it does not suffice to allege a “disparity in charging rates<br />
based on the victim’s race[,]” as reflected in the Carney report, because the<br />
statute defines as violations charging disparities based on the defendant’s<br />
race and sentencing disparities based on the victim’s race, but not charging<br />
disparities based on the victim’s race. She also deems inadequate alleged<br />
racial disparities in the proportions of individuals serving life without parole<br />
sentences, as reflected in the Skelton report, absent details about the specific<br />
“crimes for which these individuals were convicted” and “statistical, case</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8<br />
specific, or” other facts that show the “county population [is] the proper<br />
baseline” for this analysis.<br />
      As we will explain, the District Attorney’s arguments are better<br />
addressed to later stages of this litigation. Taken together, Terrell’s<br />
allegations plead a plausible violation of the Racial Justice Act entitling him<br />
to appointed counsel. With counsel’s assistance and the benefit of discovery<br />
that counsel obtains, Terrell will face higher burdens as the matter proceeds. 3<br />
      1.    The Showing Required for Appointment of Counsel<br />
      As our discussion in section II(A)(1) reflects, for indigent defendants<br />
who seek appointed counsel, section 1473, subdivision (e) requires at least<br />
“two separate and distinct inquiries . . . during the informal pleading stage of<br />
habeas corpus proceedings[,]” (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44):<br />
first, whether the defendant is entitled to counsel, and last, after any<br />
requests for discovery and to amend the petition are resolved, whether the<br />
defendant is entitled to an order to show cause (ibid.). Although both<br />
“require an assessment of the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court’s review<br />
. . . before deciding whether to appoint counsel is not identical to its [prima<br />
facie] review before deciding whether to issue an [order to show cause].”<br />
(Ibid.) “With clear language,” the statute “limits the inquiry before the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3 We deny Terrell’s request for judicial notice of the Attorney General’s</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">response to the petition for writ of mandate filed in Mooring v. Superior<br />
Court (No. A175785), which the District Attorney opposes, and we likewise<br />
deny the District Attorney’s alternative request that we take judicial notice of<br />
all filings in that case. Our colleagues’ unpublished order in that case has no<br />
precedential value and should not be relied on (see Cal. Rules of Court,<br />
rule 8.1115(a)), and “the Attorney General’s position . . . in a different case is<br />
not relevant to our decision.” (Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co.<br />
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1, 23, fn. 12.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">9<br />
appointment of counsel to an assessment of the facial sufficiency” of the<br />
“allegations in the petition” to plausibly allege a violation. (Id. at pp. 44–45.) 4<br />
      The Legislature made this even clearer when it amended section 1473,<br />
subdivision (e) effective January 1, 2026, “emphasiz[ing] the ‘extremely low’<br />
showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel.” (Lynex, supra,<br />
118 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) The Legislature found and declared that despite<br />
this “extremely low” bar, “courts have denied counsel to litigants raising<br />
[Racial Justice Act] claims far more than they have appointed counsel.”<br />
(Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).) Accordingly, “[t]he Legislature<br />
reaffirm[ed] that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not<br />
require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by [McIntosh], and should be<br />
construed as a minimal pleading requirement.” (Ibid.) Alongside these<br />
findings and declarations, the Legislature amended the statute, which had<br />
previously required a petitioner to “allege[] facts that would establish a<br />
violation” of the Racial Justice Act in order to obtain appointed counsel<br />
(§ 1473, former subd. (e), added by Stats. 2024, ch. 495, § 8), to instead<br />
require a petitioner to “plead[] a plausible allegation of a violation” (§ 1473,<br />
subd. (e)(5)).</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4 McIntosh analyzed statutory language superseded by the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">amendments that govern our case, which required a petitioner to “ ‘allege[]<br />
facts that would establish a violation’ ” of the statute to obtain appointed<br />
counsel. (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) It contrasted this<br />
standard with the higher showing required to establish a prima facie<br />
showing, which the statute continues to define as the production of “facts<br />
that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of<br />
subdivision (a) occurred[,]” meaning “more than a mere possibility, but less<br />
than a standard of more likely than not.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(2), italics added;<br />
see McIntosh, at p. 44.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">10<br />
      Lynex deemed this new language ambiguous, and we agree. 5 (Lynex,<br />
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) Given the Legislature’s finding that courts<br />
were too frequently denying requests for counsel based on what was intended<br />
to be an “extremely low” and “minimal” standard, we conclude that the<br />
current standard for appointment of counsel is no more stringent than the old<br />
one—and is to some degree more lenient. (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).)<br />
      With that understanding, we hold that a petition is not required to<br />
allege facts that would suffice to prove or allege a prima facie violation under<br />
a particular paragraph of the Racial Justice Act, but need only set forth<br />
allegations establishing a “plausible” theory that the state sought, obtained,<br />
or imposed a conviction or sentence on the basis of race in “violation of<br />
subdivision (a) of Section 745 . . . .” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5); Lynex, supra,<br />
118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 774–776 [the Racial Justice Act standard for<br />
appointment of counsel is lower than a prima facie showing]; cf. McDaniel,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5 The District Attorney’s position that the new standard is</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">unambiguous and does not require consideration of the uncodified findings<br />
and statements of intent is hard to reconcile with her characterization of the<br />
standard as “novel” and her failure to offer a concise explanation of what it<br />
means. She attempts to define the standard by interpreting case authority<br />
concerning Racial Justice Act discovery, but that authority supports a lenient<br />
reading of the standard and emphasizes the Legislature’s statements of<br />
intent. (See, e.g., McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228,<br />
247 (McDaniel) [“imperfect data should not automatically be deemed<br />
insufficient to trigger” discovery, “particularly in light of the Legislature’s<br />
broad intent to combat racial bias. (Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg.<br />
Sess.) § 2(i) [‘racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is<br />
intolerable’][)].”].) The District Attorney also relies on California and federal<br />
case authorities addressing statistical claims of discrimination under several<br />
other statutes. While the principles discussed in these opinions may be<br />
relevant to later stages of Racial Justice Act litigation, we do not find these<br />
authorities pertinent to an understanding of the minimal allegations needed<br />
to secure appointed counsel.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">11<br />
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [good cause for discovery under the Racial<br />
Justice Act is established with “ ‘a plausible factual foundation, based on<br />
specific facts, that a violation . . . could or might have occurred’ ”].) A direct<br />
fit between the allegations and evidence that would show a violation of a<br />
specific paragraph—or even a prima facie, substantial likelihood of a<br />
violation—is not required at this juncture. (See Young, supra,<br />
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [Racial Justice Act “defendants may pursue different<br />
theories supported by different kinds of proof[,]” and evidence supporting “a<br />
theory of violation under one [paragraph] may be corroborative of the<br />
evidence supporting another theory of violation under a different<br />
[paragraph]”].) As in the discovery context, determinations concerning<br />
eligibility for court-appointed counsel consider the numbered paragraphs not<br />
as isolated violations, but as pathways that “ ‘[might] work in tandem’ ” to<br />
collectively reveal “ ‘that the state exercised its criminal sanctions power “on<br />
the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” in violation of section 745,<br />
subdivision (a).’ ” (Gonzales, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. at pp. 60–61.)<br />
      Viewed this way, a facially plausible Racial Justice Act allegation need<br />
not “cognizably constitute a violation of at least one of the available<br />
[paragraphs of section 745, subdivision (a)] in its entirety[,]” as the District<br />
Attorney argues. To so hold would disturb the statute’s escalating<br />
evidentiary burdens by improperly elevating the standard to obtain counsel.<br />
It would also unreasonably demand that self-represented litigants produce<br />
the missing legal analyses that necessitate their requests for counsel in the<br />
first instance, a result similar to the “catch-22” recognized by Young, supra,<br />
79 Cal.App.5th at page 162, in the discovery context. “Preventing a<br />
defendant from obtaining information about charging decisions without first<br />
presenting that same evidence in a discovery motion is the type of a catch-22</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">12<br />
the [Racial Justice] Act was designed to eliminate.” (Ibid.) This reasoning<br />
applies equally, if not more so, to requests for counsel to assist in presenting<br />
the merits of a Racial Justice Act claim. 6<br />
      People v. Jimenez (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 1104 (Jimenez), a recent<br />
opinion by the Sixth Appellate District, drew the line between plausible<br />
allegations and prima facie evidence of a violation. Jimenez held that the<br />
defendant did not make a prima facie showing of a disparity in life without<br />
parole charging under section 745, subdivision (a)(3), by submitting two types<br />
of evidence. First, the defendant submitted evidence of a disparity in the<br />
populations of young adult Latinx versus White individuals serving such<br />
sentences relative to their shares of the general population in Santa Clara<br />
County, but the court of appeal held only the population “charged with or<br />
convicted of murder” was similarly situated for purposes of the prima facie<br />
analysis. (Id. at p. 1117; see also id. at pp. 1118–1122.) Next, the defendant<br />
identified “discrete occurrences of less serious outcomes for White murder<br />
defendants,” but the court of appeal held this did not show a systematic<br />
disparity absent a “complementary sample” of White murder defendants who<br />
received the more serious outcome and “corresponding samples for Latinx<br />
defendants.” (Id. at p. 1117; see also id. at pp. 1122, 1124–1125.) Despite<br />
these deficiencies in the defendant’s prima facie showing, the court of appeal<br />
concluded that he had “pleaded a ‘plausible allegation’ of [a Racial Justice<br />
Act] violation sufficient to entitle him to appointment of [habeas] counsel<br />
. . . .” (Id. at p. 1130.) The identification of individual comparator White</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6 This interpretation also honors section 1473, subdivision (e), which</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">authorizes newly appointed counsel to request relevant evidence and amend<br />
petitions that were filed before their appointment. These provisions entitle<br />
the initial Racial Justice Act pleadings of self-represented litigants to fine-<br />
tuning after legal representation is obtained. (§ 1473, subds. (e)(2), (5).)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">13<br />
murder defendants, coupled with the disparity in young adult Latinx<br />
individuals serving life without parole sentences relative to their share of the<br />
general county-level population, was enough to entitle the defendant to<br />
counsel.<br />
      We turn to the allegations at issue here.<br />
C.    Terrell Alleged That the Data Underlying the Carney Report<br />
      Was From San Francisco and Concerned Felony Murder<br />
      We first address the trial court’s repeated emphasis on asserted<br />
imprecisions in the Carney report that were clarified by allegations in<br />
Terrell’s petition. The court’s written order indicated that the Carney report<br />
gave “no indication as to what county” its statistics applied to, and that it<br />
wasn’t “county-specific.” It further characterized the report as addressed to<br />
“special circumstances in general.” Terrell’s petition, however, explained that<br />
the report’s statistics involved “disproportionate charging” in “felony-murder<br />
prosecutions in San Francisco[.]”<br />
      The trial court’s evaluation of the Carney report was improper given<br />
the “clear” limitation of the entitlement to counsel inquiry “to an assessment<br />
of the facial sufficiency of the . . . petition . . . .” (McIntosh, supra,<br />
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 44–45.) Because Terrell’s petition alleged that the<br />
Carney report data was from San Francisco, the court was bound to accept<br />
his allegation at this early juncture (at least insofar as nothing in the report<br />
contradicted it). 7 Likewise, the petition alleged that the Carney report<br />
concerned felony murder prosecutions—which is consistent with the report’s<br />
description of the data it analyzed as addressing “felony murder” and<br />
“robbery murder” charging. The court erred by finding Terrell had to do more</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">7 In her return, the District Attorney concedes that the data was from</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">San Francisco.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">14<br />
to support these allegations. At this point in the proceedings, the court must<br />
accept the petitioner’s allegations on their face.<br />
D.    Terrell Is Entitled to Counsel<br />
      Considering the Carney and Skelton reports in light of the allegations<br />
in Terrell’s petition as we must, we conclude that Terrell pleaded a plausible<br />
allegation of a violation of the Racial Justice Act entitling him to appointed<br />
counsel. 8 He does so on two theories, which may develop into alternative or<br />
consistent approaches to his case: one based on his victim’s race and one<br />
based on his own race.<br />
      Citing the Carney report, which professes to address “felony . . . and<br />
robbery murder eligible cases[,]” Terrell alleges that in San Francisco, Black<br />
defendants with White victims are over three times more likely to be charged<br />
with felony or robbery murder than Black defendants with non-White<br />
victims. When it comes to sentencing, the Racial Justice Act expressly<br />
defines such a disparity based on the victim’s race as a violation. (§ 745,<br />
subd. (a)(4)(B).) While it is true that the Carney report addresses charging<br />
rather than sentencing disparities among Black defendants with victims of<br />
different races, it is certainly plausible that such disparities would carry<br />
through to sentencing.9 This is what Terrell alleges by citing the Carney</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8 To the extent that People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2026)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">124 Cal.App.5th 10—which addresses a defendant’s entitlement to discovery<br />
under the Racial Justice Act—conflicts with our decision here, we respectfully<br />
disagree with its analysis.<br />
      9 The statute addresses circumstances where the defendant received a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">longer or more severe “sentence” than similarly situated individuals<br />
“convicted of the same offense.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B).) In our view, this<br />
language encompasses circumstances, like those alleged here, where a<br />
defendant receives a more severe “sentence” of life without parole for the<br />
substantive offense of murder. This is consistent with legislative history<br />
materials that describe “life without parole” as the type of “longer or more</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">15<br />
report as support for an “increased likelihood of being convicted and<br />
sentenced to a special circumstances allegation.” Such a disparity remains a<br />
violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(B) even though the Carney report<br />
also appears to show that “non-Black” defendants with White victims are<br />
charged with felony or robbery murder at an even higher rate than Black<br />
defendants, arguably undermining any allegation of a violation of subdivision<br />
(a)(4)(A) of section 745.<br />
      But, notably, the Carney report does not specify what percentage of<br />
“non-Black” defendants reflected in the data were White: the group may be<br />
dominated by other non-White defendants charged at rates similar to Black<br />
defendants, so that a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(A) remains<br />
plausible as well. In those circumstances, Terrell’s allegations based on the<br />
Carney report would be consistent with and perhaps supportive of his<br />
allegation, based on the Skelton report, that in San Francisco Black<br />
defendants are sentenced to life without parole at 16.8 times the rate of<br />
White defendants relative to their representation in the general population,<br />
and his allegation that the disparities reflected in both reports are consistent<br />
with statewide racial disparities. 10</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">severe sentence[]” the statute was intended to address. (See, e.g., Assem. Ash<br />
Kalra, Fact Sheet on Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).)<br />
       10 As the District Attorney points out in a footnote to her return, the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">data analyzed in the Carney report does not appear to cover the years during<br />
which Terrell was prosecuted and sentenced. And the Skelton report is<br />
arguably overinclusive, analyzing data for defendants sentenced from 1977 to<br />
2021. In our view, these circumstances should be addressed at a later stage<br />
of the litigation: at this stage, the reports in combination suffice to support a<br />
plausible allegation that the disparities they reflect existed at the time<br />
Terrell was prosecuted and sentenced. (See McDaniel, supra,<br />
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 244 [“challenges to the ‘methodologies used in the data<br />
and statistics’ or arguments regarding ‘overbreadth’ are” generally more<br />
“appropriately addressed at later stages ‘when the burden is higher’ ”].)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">16<br />
      We again emphasize the “extremely low” and “minimal” showing<br />
required at this juncture, and express no opinion as to whether Terrell’s<br />
allegations would satisfy a prima facie showing of a violation of section 745<br />
on any of the theories he alleges. The Racial Justice Act will impose<br />
“escalating evidentiary burdens” as his petition proceeds (Gonzales, supra,<br />
108 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 61)—but Terrell is entitled to the assistance of<br />
counsel in attempting to meet them.<br />
E.    Counsel May Amend Terrell’s Petition and Motion for Discovery<br />
      When the trial court appoints counsel for Terrell, counsel may amend<br />
Terrell’s petition and file a new or amended motion for discovery. (§ 1473,<br />
subds. (e)(2), (5).) Hence, as a changed approach to the case could impact the<br />
good cause analysis for discovery, and because trial courts are better<br />
positioned to weigh the relevant considerations than courts of appeal working<br />
with a limited record, we leave it to the trial court to address this issue in the<br />
first instance once counsel is appointed and ready to proceed. (Young, supra,<br />
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)<br />
                              III. DISPOSITION<br />
      Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to (1) vacate its<br />
January 16, 2026 order denying Terrell’s petition under the Racial Justice<br />
Act, (2) appoint counsel to assist Terrell with his claims, (3) conduct a new<br />
hearing on Terrell’s discovery motion or amended discovery motion, and<br />
(4) conduct any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">17<br />
                                           _________________________<br />
                                           SMILEY, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">WE CONCUR:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">_________________________<br />
HUMES, P. J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">_________________________<br />
BANKE, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Terrell v. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco /<br />
A175811</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">18<br />
Trial Court:     San Francisco County Superior Court</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Trial Judge:     Hon. Teresa M. Caffese</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Counsel:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Chloe<br />
Dominique Smith and Nisha Kashyap for Petitioner.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">No appearance for Respondent.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Brooke Jenkins, District Attorney, Maria Shih, Kathleen McBride and Peter<br />
Cownan, Assistant District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">19<br />
</span></span></p>
]]></content:encoded>
<comments>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/thread/87043/</comments>   
</item>

<item>
<title>Osoro v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA1/2</title>
<description>In 2019, appellant Fred Osoro received unemployment insurance benefits, and by July of that year had collected the full benefits available. Following a few months at another employer, in January 2020, Osoro filed a claim for additional benefits, called lag benefits, a claim ultimately rejected by the Employment Development Department in July 2020. Such denial is appealable to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) “within 30 days from servic</description>
<link>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/osoro-v-cal-unemployment-ins-appeals-bd-ca-86847.html</link>
<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/osoro-v-cal-unemployment-ins-appeals-bd-ca-86847.html</guid>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Filed 11/20/26 Osoro v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. CA1/2<br />
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS<br />
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for<br />
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or<br />
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DIVISION TWO</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">FRED OSORO,<br />
           Plaintiff and Appellant,<br />
                                                                        A175537<br />
 v.<br />
 CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT                                                (Alameda County<br />
 INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD,                                               Super. Ct. No. 25CV124094)<br />
           Defendant and Respondent.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In 2019, appellant Fred Osoro received unemployment insurance<br />
benefits, and by July of that year had collected the full benefits available.<br />
Following a few months at another employer, in January 2020, Osoro filed a<br />
claim for additional benefits, called lag benefits, a claim ultimately rejected<br />
by the Employment Development Department in July 2020. Such denial is<br />
appealable to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) “within 30 days from<br />
service of the notice” of the department’s determination, which a 30-day<br />
period may be extended for good cause. Osoro did appeal, but not until<br />
January 2025, over four years after the adverse determination. An ALJ<br />
dismissed the appeal. Finding no good cause, the Unemployment Insurance<br />
Appeals Board rejected his appeal from the ALJ decision. And following its<br />
independent review, the Superior Court denied his petition for administrative</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1<br />
mandamus, finding the Board’s decision was supported by substantial<br />
evidence. We affirm.<br />
                               BACKGROUND<br />
      The General Setting<br />
      Osoro worked for Cisco Systems, and was apparently laid off in<br />
December 2018. In January 2019, Osoro filed a claim for unemployment<br />
benefits, and collected such benefits from January 2019 and “zeroed out his<br />
claims” by July 2019—or as the ALJ put it, “collected [his] full benefit<br />
package” allowed.<br />
      Where a person receives unemployment benefits, Unemployment<br />
Insurance Code1 section 1277 prevents that person from establishing a valid<br />
claim for unemployment benefits in two successive benefit years—called lag<br />
benefits—unless the individual meets the eligibility criteria for having<br />
reestablished an attachment to the labor market subsequent to the effective<br />
date of the first claim. Osoro worked during October, November, and<br />
December of 2019, apparently as an independent contractor at “My<br />
Trucking,” “lost” that job, and in January 2020 filed a claim for lag benefits.2<br />
      The Employment Development Department (EDD) investigated Osoro’s<br />
January 2020 claim and initially determined that Osoro was ineligible for lag<br />
benefits because he failed to submit required proof of identity and failed to<br />
establish qualifying employment and earnings. As alluded to above, section<br />
1328 provides that such determination may be appealed to an ALJ “within 30<br />
days from service of notice of the determination or reconsidered</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the Unemployment<br />
Insurance Code.<br />
2     Though he did not list “My Trucking” in his claim, apparently claiming<br />
that his employment was at Cisco Systems.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2<br />
determination. The 30-day period may be extended for good cause, which<br />
shall include, but not be limited to, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or<br />
excusable neglect.”<br />
      Osoro did appeal, though apparently not within the 30-day period. The<br />
ALJ accepted Osoro’s proof of identity, reversed the denial of benefits on that<br />
ground, and remanded the matter to EDD for redetermination.<br />
      In July 2020, EDD issued a new determination, concluding that Osoro<br />
failed to establish eligibility for lag benefits based on the work and earning<br />
requirements. According to EDD’s records, its determination was mailed to<br />
Osoro at the address on record with EDD, the address Osoro had confirmed<br />
with EDD was correct—indeed, an address Osoro admitted he maintained<br />
from 2015 until 2022 or 2023.<br />
      As noted, the EDD determination is appealable. No such appeal was<br />
forthcoming.<br />
      Osoro’s position was, and is, that he did not receive notice of the July<br />
2020 rejection and, according to his testimony, for several weeks he tried<br />
calling EDD and checking its online portal to determine the status of his<br />
benefits, without success.<br />
      The EDD records in fact show that on October 29, 2021, Osoro spoke<br />
with an EDD representative regarding the status of his claim, and was<br />
informed that although his identity verification was corrected, his claim was<br />
denied on July 1, 2020, because he was ineligible for lag benefits based on<br />
work and earnings requirements. On that same day, October 29, EDD again<br />
mailed its July 1, 2020 determination to Osoro.3</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3      Osoro’s brief distills all of this in these few lines: “Appellant<br />
acknowledged a telephone conversation with EDD in 2021 in which he was<br />
told the claim had been denied, but he was never sent written notice</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3<br />
      In short, at least by October 2021, Osoro was aware of EDD’s adverse<br />
determination, but he did not appeal.4 And had no substantive contact with<br />
EDD between October 2021 and January 2025, when he contacted his local<br />
state senator who provided him an EDD appeal form, which he completed<br />
and filed in January 2025.<br />
      The Administrative Law Proceeding<br />
      Osoro’s appeal was heard on February 26, 2025, before an ALJ. Osoro<br />
testified essentially that he did not file the appeal because he did not receive<br />
written notice of EDD’s determination or an appeal form, and that without a<br />
physical copy of the appeal form, he was unable to appeal EDD’s<br />
determination.<br />
      Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision “dismissing<br />
untimely filed appeal,” in the course of which the ALJ made findings of fact<br />
that reflected Osoro’s testimony, which included the following:<br />
      “The Employment Development Department mailed the claimant an<br />
adverse notice of determination on July 1, 2020. This notice contained a<br />
statement that its decision was final unless appealed within 30 days from<br />
mailing of the notice. The appeal was filed on January 10, 2025. [¶] . . . [¶]<br />
      “At the hearing, the claimant noted that he worked for a different<br />
employer October, November and December of 2019 by the name of “My<br />
Trucking.” The claimant was not reported as an employee during this period<br />
of time and the claimant had not mentioned it at the time that he opened his</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">explaining his appeal rights or deadlines. (AR26.) After that call, he<br />
continued trying to reach EDD by email and telephone, but could not get<br />
through. (AR19.)”<br />
4     An appeal form is available from the EDD website:<br />
<a href="https://edd.ca.gov/en/unemployment/appeals" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://edd.ca.gov/en/unemployment/appeals</a>.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4<br />
claim in January 2020. The claim in January 2020 was not initially paid<br />
because he had both an ID verification disqualification and a Lag<br />
disqualification as the 429 Recall did not show work and earnings to validate<br />
a new claim. The claimant was advised that there were two issues pending<br />
and if the ID issue was removed, he would still have the Lag issue. The<br />
claimant was able to remove the ID issue in an appeal which was rendered in<br />
approximately June of 2020, and the department issued the 1277<br />
determination July 1, 2020, advising that he was ineligible as he did not have<br />
sufficient work and earnings to verify and validate a new claim effective<br />
January 5, 2020.<br />
      “The claimant had been living at the same address since 2015, but did<br />
not believe he received this notice. The claimant was sent also<br />
documentation asking for him to verify any interim wages which he did not<br />
return. The claim notes do not reflect any further contact with the claimant<br />
until October of 2021, October 29 when he was advised again that he had not<br />
met the Lag requirements, and they did not have any documentation from<br />
him, and he was reissued the determination in October of 2021. The<br />
claimant, at the hearing, noted that he did not receive this document either.<br />
Then there is no contact with the department between October of 2021 until<br />
January of 2025. The claimant acknowledges that he had returned to work<br />
between 2022 and 2024 and then opened a new claim at the end in 2024. The<br />
claimant, at the hearing, claimed that he made several attempts to get<br />
through to the department and was not successful and contacted his local<br />
legislator and then got through in January of 2025, after he had opened his<br />
new claim in the end of 2024. The claimant is being paid currently on his<br />
2024 claim. [¶] . . . [¶]</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5<br />
      “All these facts lead to the fact that the four and a half years that the<br />
claimant waited to actually file the appeal in 2025, was not with good cause,<br />
as he clearly was advised even by phone again in October of 2021, the need to<br />
file an[] appeal.”<br />
      And so, with Osoro failing to show good cause, the ALJ determined<br />
there was no jurisdiction to review EDD’s determination and dismissed the<br />
appeal.5<br />
      Osoro appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Unemployment Insurance<br />
Appeals Board (Board). The Board independently reviewed the matter, and<br />
on April 23, 2025, issued its final determination holding that the timeliness<br />
of an appeal is jurisdictional and requires good cause before the ALJ can<br />
decide a case on the merits. The Board found the ALJ’s findings were<br />
supported by the weight of the evidence and affirmed the ALJ’s decision to<br />
dismiss the appeal as untimely, adopting the ALJ decision as its own.<br />
      The Proceedings Below<br />
      On May 29, representing himself, Osoro filed in Superior Court a<br />
petition for writ of administrative mandamus against the Board. At an early<br />
case management conference, held before the Board’s answer was due, Osoro<br />
told the court he was awaiting completion of the administrative record, and<br />
would not file an opening brief. The court set the hearing on Osoro’s petition<br />
for October 16, and further ordered dates for the Board’s opposition brief and<br />
an optional reply brief by Osoro.<br />
      On September 15, the Board filed its opposition brief, and a week later<br />
its answer to the petition.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5    If an ALJ determines that a claimant’s appeal is untimely, the ALJ<br />
must dismiss the appeal “unless the appellant shows good cause for the<br />
untimeliness.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §§ 5051, 5066.1, subd. (g).)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6<br />
      On September 23, Osoro lodged the administrative record, and that<br />
same day filed his reply brief. In it, Osoro continued to assert his failure to<br />
receive the notices of determination and appeal form in July 2020 and<br />
October 2021, as well as his inability to reach EDD by phone and email due<br />
to the COVID pandemic as good cause for his late appeal. He asserted that<br />
EDD’s customer service did not suggest directly downloading the appeal form<br />
or any other way of accessing the appeal form as a basis for good cause. And,<br />
he claimed, laches should apply based on his non-receipt of EDD’s<br />
determination.<br />
      Following the Board’s answer, on September 29, Osoro filed an “ex<br />
parte” motion to strike the Board’s answer, with moving papers that did not<br />
specify a hearing date either as an ex parte application or a noticed motion,<br />
(though Osoro had reserved a December 2 hearing date for the motion). The<br />
motion to strike argued that the Board’s answer was a general “return” and<br />
opposition brief that should not be considered by the court.<br />
      Osoro’s petition for mandamus came on for hearing as scheduled on<br />
October 16, at the conclusion of which the court took the matter under<br />
submission.<br />
      On November 6, the trial court filed its amended order denying Osoro’s<br />
petition. After setting forth the “Background” of all that had occurred, and<br />
then the “Legal Standard” governing its review, the trial court’s order ended<br />
with its discussion, which included this:<br />
      “At the hearing, Petitioner testified that he had lived at the same<br />
address in Fremont from before he filed his claim through 2022 or 2023, but<br />
that he did not receive documentation from EDD regarding the denial and<br />
how to appeal until he obtained help through his state representative in<br />
2025. (AR24-26.) Petitioner acknowledged that he had a telephone</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">7<br />
conversation with EDD in 2021, when he was informed of the denial. (AR26.)<br />
He testified that he tried calling and emailing at different times but could not<br />
get through. (AR19.)<br />
      “The ALJ concluded that Petitioner had not established good cause to<br />
extend the 30-day deadline to appeal, based on the length of time during<br />
which Petitioner had no contact with the EDD. He was told that he had to<br />
appeal in October 2021 but did not offer an adequate explanation for the<br />
failure to file his appeal until January 2025.<br />
      “The Appeals Board carefully and independently reviewed the record<br />
and adopted the ALJ’s decision as its own. (See AR86.) This court has also<br />
carefully and independently reviewed the administrative record and finds<br />
that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.<br />
      “Petitioner argues that the COVID pandemic disrupted EDD<br />
operations and may have been the reason he did not receive the notices<br />
mailed by the EDD in 2020 and 2021. Any such circumstances, however,<br />
cannot account for the three years of silence after Petitioner was informed of<br />
the determination over the phone. Indeed, Petitioner testified that he had<br />
filed a new claim with EDD in 2024, and was receiving unemployment<br />
insurance benefits at the time of the hearing. (AR24.)”<br />
      In sum, the trial court concluded that upon its independent review of<br />
the administrative record, Osoro failed to establish good cause for his multi-<br />
year delay in appealing EDD’s denial of lag benefits. The court’s reasons<br />
included the fact that Osoro’s address had not changed and that by October,<br />
2021, he knew he had to appeal the adverse determination, yet failed to offer<br />
an adequate explanation for his delay in filing his appeal until January of<br />
2025. Further, while Osoro asserted the pandemic disrupted EDD</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8<br />
operations, this did not account for his three years of silence after he was told<br />
about the adverse decision and need to file an appeal.<br />
      By a later ruling the trial court vacated the December hearing date on<br />
Osoro’s “ex parte” motion to strike the Board’s answer as moot, also<br />
determining that Board’s answer was neither an improper second reply nor a<br />
writ return as asserted by Osoro.<br />
      On November 18, the court entered judgment in favor of the Board,<br />
from which Osoro filed a timely notice of appeal.<br />
                                 DISCUSSION<br />
      Introduction<br />
      Osoro represents himself here, which, of course, is his right. Doing so,<br />
however, he is held to the same standard as an attorney. (Rappleyea v.<br />
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Self-representation is not a ground<br />
for lenient treatment and, as in the case with attorneys, a person who<br />
represents herself “must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba<br />
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)<br />
      Osoro has filed a 13-page opening brief that is most conclusory. His<br />
“Statement Of The Case” is nothing but a list of dates and things that were<br />
filed or happened on those dates. And his “Statement Of Facts” is three short<br />
paragraphs, entitled, “Non-Receipt of Written Notice,” seven lines in length;<br />
“IRS Transcripts Submitted to EDD,” nine lines in length; and “Superior<br />
Court Proceedings,” five lines in length, all three paragraphs contained on a<br />
single page in his brief. It is not compliant with the Rules of Court or<br />
principles of appellate advocacy.<br />
      California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) provides that an<br />
appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant<br />
facts . . . .” And the leading California appellate practice guide instructs</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">9<br />
about this: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately<br />
and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and<br />
likewise as to the applicable law. [Citations.] [¶] Misstatements,<br />
misrepresentations, and/or material omissions of the relevant facts or law<br />
can instantly ‘undo’ and otherwise effective brief, waiving issues and<br />
arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on your credibility, may draw<br />
sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to lose the case.” (Eisenberg et<br />
al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025)<br />
(Eisenberg) ¶ 9:27, italics omitted.) Such summary is missing here.<br />
      But beyond that, to the extent that Osoro sets forth as a fact the “non-<br />
receipt of written notice,” he violates the most fundamental rule of appellate<br />
review that the evidence is read to be in favor of the ruling, not him. (See<br />
Foreman &amp; Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Nestle v. City of<br />
Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925.)<br />
      Turning to the arguments in the brief, Osoro argues that the “Superior<br />
Court Erred in Denying Good Cause for Late Filing,” an argument that has<br />
sub-parts asserting that: “Oral Notice is Legally Insufficient,” Osoro “acted<br />
promptly,” the “ALJ Failed to Consider Relevant Evidence,” and “the<br />
Superior Court Failed to Address” his contest of the tentative ruling.<br />
However Osoro purports to compartmentalize his argument, it is in one way<br />
or another an attack on the trial court’s determination—confirming that of<br />
the Board, and the ALJ—that Osoro “had not established good cause.” Thus<br />
what Osoro faces in his appeal is the need to demonstrate, under the<br />
applicable standard of review, that such holding is not supported by the<br />
record here. This, he has not done.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">10<br />
      Standard of Review<br />
      As Osoro acknowledges, we review a superior court’s decision on<br />
administrative mandamus for substantial evidence. (Fukuda v. City of<br />
Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824; Martinez v. Unemployment Insurance<br />
Appeals Board (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 500, 505.) We resolve all evidentiary<br />
conflicts and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the<br />
trial court’s decision. Where the evidence supports more than one reasonable<br />
inference, the appellate court may not substitute its deductions for those<br />
made by the trial court. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 457.)<br />
      Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘reasonable in nature,<br />
credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable mind might accept it as<br />
adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” (South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’<br />
Comp. Appeals Board (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 303; Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health<br />
Care (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 748, 762.) If “substantial evidence in favor of<br />
the respondent . . . is present, no matter how slight it may appear in<br />
comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld.”<br />
(Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.)<br />
      In fact, given the determination that Osoro failed to meet his burden to<br />
demonstrate good cause, his burden on appeal is daunting, as set forth, for<br />
example, in Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.<br />
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic): “ ‘Thus, where the issue on appeal<br />
turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes<br />
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter<br />
of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the<br />
appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of<br />
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination<br />
that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ (In re I.W. (2009)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">11<br />
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1528[, overruled in part on other grounds as<br />
stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010].)”<br />
         One relatively recent case described the burden imposed by Sonic this<br />
way: “ ‘ “[w]here, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the<br />
burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by<br />
arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless<br />
the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we<br />
presume the trial court found the [party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight<br />
and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power<br />
on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” ’<br />
[Citation.] The appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations<br />
for those of the trial court; it must view all factual matters most favorably to<br />
the prevailing party and in support of the judgment. [Citation.] ‘ “All<br />
conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent.’ [Citation.]”<br />
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019)<br />
42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067.)<br />
         Osoro has not demonstrated that the evidence compels a finding in his<br />
favor.<br />
         Substantial Evidence Supports that Osoro Failed to Show Good<br />
         Cause<br />
         To begin with, despite Osoro’s fundamental position that the delay was<br />
justified based on his claim he did not receive a physical copy of the<br />
decision—not in 2020 when it was rendered and not in October 2021 when<br />
the EDD again sent a copy to him—both copies of the decision were mailed to<br />
Osoro’s correct legal address, and thus were presumed to have been received.<br />
(Evid. Code, § 641.) And while the presumption can be rebutted by testimony<br />
denying receipt (Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Edwards (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">12<br />
1470, 1486), “the disappearance of the presumption does not mean there is<br />
insufficient evidence” (Craig v. Brown &amp; Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416,<br />
421), as the trier of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence supporting mailing.<br />
(Ibid.)<br />
      Moreover, EDD’s transcript of events demonstrated that Osoro was<br />
receiving EDD’s mailings, shown by the facts he appealed the first denial of<br />
his lag benefits claim, and that EDD’s records showed no returned mail.<br />
Thus, the trial court was entitled to discount Osoro’s bare assertion that he<br />
never received EDD’s twice mailed determination—and to conclude that he<br />
failed to meet his burden of showing good cause. (See Evid. Code, § 780.)<br />
      In any event, there is no question that in October 2021 Osoro was in<br />
contact with EDD and was told about the denial of his claim and his need to<br />
appeal, and did not in fact appeal for an additional three years and three<br />
months.<br />
      Finally, there is the fact—a fact the trial court found significant—that<br />
during the three-plus-year period between October 2021 and January 2025,<br />
Osoro was able to file a new claim for unemployment benefits after a period<br />
of employment. It is significant, as held in Fermin v. Department of<br />
Employment (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 586, 588, cert. den. (1963) 375 U.S. 888,<br />
where the petition was dismissed based on a three-month delay, and the<br />
court concluded there was no good cause for the late appeal where claimant<br />
filed a separate unemployment claim during the period of delay.<br />
      As alluded to above, Osoro has a brief additional argument that the<br />
ALJ erred in failing to address his IRS transcripts, this despite that Osoro’s<br />
tax filings were never introduced in the trial court nor during the<br />
administrative appeal. At best, Osoro testified during the ALJ hearing that<br />
he provided information of his IRS transcript to his legislative representative</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">13<br />
for transmission to EDD. Regardless, evidence related to his IRS transcripts<br />
could not matter because the administrative appeal was dismissed for lack of<br />
jurisdiction. The IRS transcripts could have nothing to do with that.<br />
      Lastly on Osoro’s discussion of evidence issues, Osoro asserts that the<br />
trial court erred in failing to address his position in response to the tentative<br />
ruling because the court made no changes to its tentative ruling in its final<br />
order. The argument is fatuous.<br />
      The trial court’s minute order describes the tentative ruling as<br />
contested, and that the court took the matter under submission; the final<br />
order likewise reflects that the matter was taken under submission following<br />
argument, all supporting the conclusion that the trial court considered the<br />
arguments raised during the hearing.<br />
      Moreover, Osoro’s opening brief concedes that the tentative was<br />
contested, that the court asked him questions during oral argument, and that<br />
the trial court took the matter under submission following argument. The<br />
fact that the court ultimately adopted its tentative ruling as the final ruling<br />
of the court does not mean the court failed to consider the arguments raised<br />
at the hearing. (See People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 651–652<br />
[court’s reading of a prewritten ruling after hearing argument did not mean<br />
the court prejudged its decision or failed to consider the parties’ arguments].)<br />
Rather, it is an indication that the court was ultimately unpersuaded by<br />
Osoro’s arguments.<br />
      Gibson v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1973) 9 Cal.3d 494,<br />
the case Osoro cites as supporting good cause, is easily distinguishable.<br />
There, the appeal was late by three days, which lateness was caused by a<br />
calendaring mistake by the claimant’s attorney. Considering the delay was<br />
only three days, that it was caused by the attorney not the claimant, and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">14<br />
there was admittedly no prejudice, the California Supreme Court determined<br />
good cause was established as a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 500–501.) The<br />
facts here are a far cry.<br />
      Finally, Osoro has a brief argument that asserts error in the failure of<br />
the trial court to rule on his ex-parte motion to strike the department’s<br />
return.<br />
      By way of brief recap, following the entry of the order denying the<br />
petition for mandamus, the trial court vacated the December 2 reserved<br />
hearing date as moot. In a brief nine-line argument, Osoro asserts that the<br />
trial court’s failure to rule on his motion before ruling on the merits was<br />
prejudicial error. The argument fails for several reasons.<br />
      First, as Osoro concedes, he raised the issue of his motion to strike<br />
during the hearing on his writ petition. Under Code of Civil Procedure<br />
section 1091, the court was authorized to consider Osoro’s objection to the<br />
Board’s answer as having been made during the trial of the writ. Thus there<br />
was no need for the December hearing.<br />
      Second, the order denying Osoro’s petition rendered his ex parte motion<br />
moot because no further relief was available on his petition. Osoro’s<br />
substantive claims were fully resolved.<br />
      Third, there were procedural defects in Osoro’s “ex parte” motion:<br />
the moving papers failed to specify the hearing date and time thereby<br />
rendering them defective. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1110(b), 3.1204(a)(1).)<br />
      But more fundamentally, there was no prejudice. As noted, the<br />
ultimate determination against Osoro was that he failed to demonstrate good<br />
cause, a failure based on Osoro’s lack of evidence. So, even if the<br />
department’s return had been stricken, Osoro’s showing would still have<br />
failed. Thus the error could not be prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">15<br />
judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, . . . or for any<br />
error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire<br />
cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error<br />
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Code Civ. Proc.,<br />
§ 475.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DISPOSITION<br />
      The judgment is affirmed.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">16<br />
                                           RICHMAN, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">We concur.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">STEWART, P. J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">SWEET, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">(A175537N)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"><br />
       Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief<br />
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">17<br />
</span></span></p>]]></content:encoded>
<comments>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/thread/86847/</comments>   
</item>

<item>
<title>Conservatorship of W.W. CA2/4</title>
<description>W.W. appeals from a judgment reappointing the Public Guardian of Los Angeles (Public Guardian) as her conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (See Welf &amp; Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 She contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that she is gravely disabled. The only witness who testified at her trial, a stipulated expert, relied exclusively upon statements in W.W.’s residential chart to</description>
<link>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/conservatorship-of-ww-ca-86846.html</link>
<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/conservatorship-of-ww-ca-86846.html</guid>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Filed 11/20/26 Conservatorship of W.W. CA2/4<br />
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions<br />
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion<br />
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DIVISION FOUR</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Conservatorship of the Person of                                       B351160<br />
 W.W.<br />
                                                                        (Los Angeles County<br />
                                                                        Super. Ct. No.<br />
                                                                        ZE042265)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS<br />
 ANGELES COUNTY,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Petitioner and Respondent,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">v.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">W.W.,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Objector and Appellant.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los<br />
Angeles County, Robert S. Harrison, Judge. Reversed.<br />
     B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of<br />
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.<br />
     No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">______________________________________________</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">W.W. appeals from a judgment reappointing the Public<br />
Guardian of Los Angeles (Public Guardian) as her conservator<br />
under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (See Welf &amp;<br />
Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 She contends insufficient evidence<br />
supports the trial court’s finding that she is gravely disabled.<br />
The only witness who testified at her trial, a stipulated expert,<br />
relied exclusively upon statements in W.W.’s residential chart to<br />
form her opinions. Neither the chart, nor any statements made<br />
in the chart, were admitted into evidence. Because the expert’s<br />
opinion was based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary<br />
support, we reverse.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">BACKGROUND<br />
       The trial court established a conservatorship for<br />
54-year-old W.W. in October 2017 and reestablished it annually<br />
over the next seven years. In August 2025, the Public Guardian<br />
filed another reestablishment petition. At a hearing in<br />
September 2025, stand-in counsel for W.W. stated that her<br />
“[f]acility logged on and advised us that she refused. She also<br />
advised our paralegal she is not on conservatorship and she does<br />
not have a conservator.” Counsel asked to “set it for a refusal</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1      Unspecified references to statutes are to the Welfare and<br />
Institutions Code.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2<br />
court trial/jury trial setting.” The court set the matter for<br />
“[p]otential refusal court trial” and ordered a report on W.W.’s<br />
current mental status. (See § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); Evid. Code,<br />
§ 730.)<br />
       On November 12, 2025, before calling the matter for trial,<br />
an unidentified employee at W.W.’s residential facility told the<br />
court that W.W. was “refusing to attend.” The employee reported<br />
that she had informed W.W. that her refusal would likely result<br />
in continued conservatorship, to which W.W. “denied having [one]<br />
in the first place.” The employee clarified that she had no<br />
conversation with W.W. about conservatorship itself, only about<br />
appearing in court.<br />
       After these statements, the court “call[ed] the case” for<br />
W.W. and her appointed counsel stipulated to proceed in her<br />
absence. The parties stipulated that Marion Arom, a forensic<br />
psychologist at W.W.’s residential facility, could testify as an<br />
expert. Arom was the only testifying witness.<br />
       Arom testified that for the “third year in a row,” W.W.<br />
refused to speak with her. After reviewing W.W.’s residential<br />
chart, Arom determined that she suffered from schizoaffective<br />
disorder. When counsel for the Public Guardian asked Arom to<br />
provide factual support for this diagnosis, W.W.’s appointed<br />
counsel interposed a hearsay objection. The court sustained the<br />
objection.<br />
       Arom was then asked if she believed W.W. met the criteria<br />
for a grave disability. She replied: “I have only information from<br />
the chart. I never testify from the chart because it’s hearsay.<br />
But I don’t have anything else to testify from.” The court told<br />
Arom she could rely on collateral information and the chart so<br />
long as she did not reveal “what the chart says.” Arom testified</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3<br />
she did not “have anything” beyond the statements in W.W.’s<br />
chart. The court replied: “We don’t want anything from the<br />
charts [because] we don’t have them, but your opinion can be<br />
based on first-hand observations that you obtained in the charts.”<br />
The court overruled additional hearsay, foundation, and People v.<br />
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) objections.<br />
       “From the notes” made in W.W.’s chart, Arom believed she<br />
was gravely disabled. The court overruled additional hearsay<br />
objections and declined appointed counsel’s request to continue<br />
the matter to procure the declarants who made notations in the<br />
chart. The court credited Arom’s expert opinion and informed the<br />
parties, as before, that it did not “want to hear anything from the<br />
charts and that’s why I stopped and struck” testimony purporting<br />
to relay such information.2<br />
       The court granted the reestablishment petition, noting its<br />
own “benefit of Dr. Arom’s experience and knowledge of the<br />
procedures at [W.W.’s residential facility] and also of the medical<br />
records regarding [W.W.], specifically the direct observations of<br />
her treatment team.” The court had “little doubt on this.<br />
Actually, no doubt” that she remained gravely disabled. W.W.<br />
appealed.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2      The court struck Arom’s testimony concerning “specific<br />
information” appearing in W.W.’s chart, including: “[F]irst-hand<br />
information from a person who is a licensed mental health<br />
professional. First hand, [W.W.] doesn’t believe she has a mental<br />
illness, she refuses blood draws, she doesn’t believe she has a<br />
conservator, she doesn’t believe that she needs medication.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4<br />
                           DISCUSSION<br />
A.    Overview of the LPS Act<br />
      “The LPS Act has many purposes, including ‘end[ing] the<br />
inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of persons<br />
with mental health disorders’ (§ 5001, subd. (a)), ‘provid[ing]<br />
prompt evaluation and treatment’ (id., subd. (b)), and ‘provid[ing]<br />
individualized treatment, supervision, and placement services by<br />
a conservatorship program’ (id., subd. (e)).” (Conservatorship of<br />
K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 706 (K.P.).)<br />
      The LPS Act authorizes conservatorships for those who are<br />
gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. (§ 5350.)3 It defines<br />
“‘gravely disabled’” as a “condition in which a person, as a result<br />
of a mental health disorder, . . . is unable to provide for their<br />
basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or<br />
necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350,<br />
subd. (e).)<br />
      The LPS conservatorship process begins with a<br />
“professional recommendation to initiate conservatorship<br />
proceedings.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If this<br />
recommendation aligns with the opinion of the conservatorship<br />
investigation officer of the county of residence of the proposed<br />
conservatee, the officer must petition the superior court for<br />
conservatorship. (§ 5352.) The officer investigates “available<br />
alternatives to conservatorship, examining ‘all relevant aspects of<br />
the person’s medical, psychological, financial, family, vocational,<br />
and social condition, and information obtained from the person’s<br />
family members, close friends, social worker, or principal</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3     “Because this case involves only mental disorders,” we dispense<br />
mention of chronic alcoholism as a qualifying condition. (K.P., supra,<br />
11 Cal.5th at p. 703, fn. 2; see §§ 5001, subd. (a), 5350.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5<br />
therapist.’ (§ 5354, subd. (a).) After this investigation, the<br />
[officer] is empowered to ‘recommend conservatorship to the court<br />
only if no suitable alternatives are available.’ (Ibid.)” (K.P., at<br />
p. 709.)<br />
       Because LPS proceedings threaten “significant” liberty<br />
interests, the Legislature and courts have “built several layers of<br />
important safeguards into conservatorship procedure.”<br />
(Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 540.) Following<br />
a “carefully calibrated series of temporary detentions for<br />
evaluation and treatment” (id. at p. 541), court proceedings may<br />
be initiated to determine whether a proposed conservatee should<br />
be involuntarily confined for up to one year. (§§ 5350, subd. (d),<br />
5361, subds. (a)–(b).) Various safeguards attend these court<br />
proceedings, including the right to receive a copy of the<br />
conservatorship investigation report (§ 5354, subd. (a)); the right<br />
to a timely hearing on the conservatorship petition and jury or<br />
court trial, if demanded (§§ 5350, subd. (d)(1), 5365); the right to<br />
counsel (§ 5365); and a requirement that any determination of<br />
grave disability “must be unanimous and upon proof beyond a<br />
reasonable doubt.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 709.)<br />
       At the conservatorship hearing, the court may receive<br />
“evidence both oral and written” (§ 5118, subd. (a)) and may “read<br />
and consider the contents” of the conservatorship investigation<br />
report in rendering judgment (§ 5354, subd. (a)). The proposed<br />
conservatee may waive presence at this hearing. (§ 5365.1.) “If<br />
the proposed conservatee chooses to go forward with the hearing<br />
[they] may agree to be bound by the court’s decision at such<br />
hearing by not contesting the petition or thereafter demanding a<br />
trial.” (Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 651<br />
(Manton).) If, however, the proposed conservatee (or their</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6<br />
appointed counsel) demands one, the court must hold a trial at<br />
which it may not admit the conservatorship investigation report<br />
“to the extent it contain[s] inadmissible hearsay.” (Id. at pp. 652–<br />
653.)<br />
        If grave disability is found at the hearing and any contested<br />
trial, the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes<br />
restrictions on the conservatee as needed, for example, to prevent<br />
the conservatee from driving or refusing medical treatment<br />
(§ 5357), and determines the least restrictive appropriate<br />
placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)). A conservatorship<br />
automatically ends after one year and may be reestablished by a<br />
new petition, subject to the same jury trial rights and<br />
proceedings. (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 709–710; see §§ 5350,<br />
subd. (d), 5361, subds. (a)–(b); Conservatorship of Deidre B.<br />
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312.) The reestablishment<br />
petition “must include the opinion of two physicians, or other<br />
described professionals, ‘that the conservatee is still gravely<br />
disabled as a result of mental disorder . . . .’” (K.P., at p. 710,<br />
quoting § 5361, subd. (b).)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">B.     Insufficient Evidence of Grave Disability<br />
       W.W. contends the Public Guardian failed to present<br />
substantial evidence that she suffers from grave disability. We<br />
agree.<br />
       “‘In order to establish that a person is gravely disabled, the<br />
evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due<br />
to [a] mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to<br />
carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise<br />
provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.’<br />
[Citation.] ‘On review, we apply the substantial evidence test to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">7<br />
determine whether the record supports a finding of grave<br />
disability. [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness is<br />
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.’ [Citation.]”<br />
(Conservatorship of M.B. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 98, 106.)<br />
Substantial evidence also “includes circumstantial evidence and<br />
the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” (Conservatorship<br />
of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577.)<br />
       The sole witness in this case was a stipulated expert.<br />
Expert witnesses are given greater latitude when testifying than<br />
lay witnesses, who may only testify to matters within their<br />
personal knowledge. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) “In<br />
addition to matters within their own personal knowledge, experts<br />
may relate information acquired through their training and<br />
experience, even though that information may have been derived<br />
from conversations with others, lectures, study of learned<br />
treatises, etc. This latitude is a matter of practicality. A<br />
physician is not required to personally replicate all medical<br />
experiments dating back to the time of Galen in order to relate<br />
generally accepted medical knowledge that will assist the jury in<br />
deciding the case at hand.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at<br />
p. 675.) “When giving such testimony, the expert often relates<br />
relevant principles or generalized information rather than<br />
reciting specific statements made by others.” (Ibid.)<br />
       This latitude is, however, limited. If an expert testifies to<br />
“case-specific out-of-court statements to explain” the bases for<br />
their opinion, the statements, presented for their truth,<br />
constitute hearsay. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684.) “Like<br />
any other hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted<br />
through an applicable hearsay exception. Alternatively, the<br />
evidence can be admitted through an appropriate witness and the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8<br />
expert may assume its truth in a properly worded hypothetical<br />
question in the traditional manner.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “What<br />
an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific facts asserted<br />
in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by<br />
competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Id.<br />
at p. 686.)<br />
        In Sanchez, a gang expert testified both to his knowledge<br />
concerning the motivations and actions of gangs generally and to<br />
case-specific facts involving the defendant, including his past<br />
interactions with local law enforcement. (Sanchez, supra, 63<br />
Cal.4th at pp. 672–673.) The expert was not present for the past<br />
interactions and derived knowledge of them from police reports,<br />
which were not admitted into evidence and were not part of the<br />
appellate record. (Id. at pp. 673, 694.) Our Supreme Court found<br />
these police reports contained case-specific hearsay. (Id. at<br />
p. 694.) Absent independent proof or an applicable hearsay<br />
exception, the expert could not relay the past law enforcement<br />
interactions and treat the content of those statements as “true<br />
and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, . . .” (Id. at p. 686.)<br />
        LPS Act cases similarly prohibit expert witnesses from<br />
relaying “‘case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under<br />
a statutory exception.’” (Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13<br />
Cal.App.5th 1274, 1283, quoting Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at<br />
pp. 685–686.) One such exception permits hearsay “from medical<br />
records that qualif[y] for admission under the business records<br />
exception to the hearsay rule.” (Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25<br />
Cal.App.5th 438, 448; see Evid. Code, § 1561.) Another permits<br />
statements in medical records reflecting a proposed conservatee’s<br />
“symptoms or behavior stemming from a mental health disorder”<br />
if, after considering certain factors, the court makes a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">9<br />
preliminary determination that the statements are sufficiently<br />
reliable. (§ 5122, subd. (a), enacted by Stats. 2023, ch. 637, § 3.)4<br />
       The latter exception was enacted to “abrogate Sanchez in<br />
the LPS Act context by allowing expert witnesses [to testify] . . .<br />
about information contained in a medical record without a<br />
hearsay bar.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill<br />
No. 43 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 17, 2023, p. 21.)<br />
The Legislature sought to “prioritize the considerations of court<br />
efficiency and medical professionals’ time by allowing a medical<br />
expert to recount the observations and opinions of the proposed<br />
conservatee’s treating medical professionals wholesale, despite<br />
not being able to independently verify the medical conclusions<br />
being presented.” (Id. at p. 22.) The court’s required preliminary<br />
finding of reliability by the court was not, however, intended to<br />
be a rubber stamp. The Legislature recognized that the<br />
preliminary finding is significant because the proposed<br />
conservatee’s counsel has “no way to meaningfully question the<br />
medical opinions being presented to the court.” (Ibid.) “[I]f the<br />
file contained an error or faulty assumption, that material would<br />
be passed on as fact. Without any way to test the evidence<br />
supporting the state’s assertions of grave disability, there is a<br />
risk that LPS Act conservatorships could resemble the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4      This exception requires a preliminary fact determination that<br />
(1) the statements appear in “medical record[s]” and were made by<br />
“health practitioner[s],” as defined; (2) the statements were based on<br />
observations by the declarants; and (3) the time, content and<br />
circumstances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability.<br />
(§ 5122, subds. (a), (d); see id., subd. (e) [“Nothing in this section<br />
affects” application of the multiple hearsay rule].) The trial court did<br />
not consider this hearsay exception. As such, we decline to consider<br />
W.W.’s arguments questioning Arom’s testimony under it.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">10<br />
‘ceremonial rather than functional’ commitment hearings of the<br />
1950s and 1960s.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)<br />
      Beyond considering the admissibility of an expert’s opinion,<br />
we must equally bear in mind the weight to be accorded to it. In<br />
assessing the evidentiary value of an expert’s opinion, “we are<br />
mindful that [the expert] ‘does not possess a cart blanche to<br />
express any opinion within the area of expertise.’ [Citation.]<br />
When an expert’s opinion is ‘based on assumptions of fact without<br />
evidentiary support,’ or ‘on speculative or conjectural factors,’ it<br />
has ‘no evidentiary value.’ [Citation.]” (People v. G.A. (2023) 93<br />
Cal.App.5th 1126, 1138–1139 (G.A.); see Jennings v. Palomar<br />
Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108,<br />
1117 [expert opinion is “‘worth no more than the reasons upon<br />
which it rests’”].)<br />
      Applying these principles, we cannot conclude Arom’s<br />
opinion furnished substantial evidence that W.W. presently<br />
suffers from grave disability. Though Arom opined that W.W.<br />
suffered from schizoaffective disorder and was “still gravely<br />
disabled,” virtually no facts were admitted to support either<br />
opinion. The Public Guardian did not produce W.W.’s residential<br />
chart at trial. Nor did it offer the chart into evidence as a<br />
business record (Evid. Code, § 1561) or sufficiently reliable<br />
medical record (§ 5122). The court denied appointed counsel’s<br />
request to continue the matter to procure the declarants who<br />
made the notations in the chart. Without knowing how the<br />
notations in W.W.’s residential chart were recorded, much less<br />
what they said, the expert opinion derived from them does not<br />
constitute substantial evidence. (See G.A., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th<br />
at pp. 1130–1131, 1138–1139; accord, People v. Wright (2016) 4<br />
Cal.App.5th 537, 541–542, 546.) A judgment “based solely on an</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">11<br />
expert opinion that relied on such assumptions and factors must<br />
be reversed for lack of substantial evidence.” (G.A., at p. 1139.)5<br />
       We must reverse the conservatorship judgment for<br />
insufficient evidence, but this reversal “does not mandate that<br />
any existing conservatorship be vacated. [W.W.’s] present status<br />
as conservatee, if applicable, would, of course, be pursuant to<br />
proceedings subsequent to those at issue here.” (Manton, supra,<br />
39 Cal.3d at p. 652, fn. 5.) The conservatorship judgment in this<br />
appeal commenced in November 2025 for one year and expired on<br />
October 30, 2026. (§ 5361.) If a new reestablishment petition<br />
was filed, considered, and granted, our reversal will have no<br />
effect on the more recent judgment. (Conservatorship of K.Y.<br />
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985, 988–989.) If the trial court has yet<br />
to consider or decide a subsequent reestablishment petition, our<br />
reversal does not bar a trial on that petition either. “[T]here is, of<br />
necessity, no bar to the public guardian filing a new petition” to<br />
reestablish a conservatorship whenever necessary.<br />
(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, 550,<br />
disapproved on another ground in K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at<br />
p. 717.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5      More than two months after its respondent’s brief was due and<br />
briefing was submitted, the Public Guardian applied for relief from<br />
default. We denied the untimely application for lack of good cause.<br />
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2), (d).) The proposed brief<br />
argued that W.W.’s grave disability finding was supported by unsworn<br />
statements from stand-in counsel at the September 2025 hearing and<br />
the unidentified employee prior to the November 2025 trial. The<br />
Public Guardian provided no authority in which to admit such<br />
unsworn statements. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 281; In re<br />
B.S. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 246, 253.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">12<br />
                           DISPOSITION<br />
      The conservatorship judgment is reversed. If W.W.’s status<br />
as conservatee has already been reestablished by proceedings<br />
subsequent to those at issue here, this appeal is moot and shall<br />
have no effect. If it has not, our reversal is without prejudice to<br />
the Public Guardian filing a new reestablishment petition.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">MORI, Acting P. J.<br />
      We concur:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">TAMZARIAN, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DAUM, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">13<br />
</span></span></p>
]]></content:encoded>
<comments>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/thread/86846/</comments>   
</item>

<item>
<title>P. v. Baldasaro CA4/2</title>
<description>Defendant and appellant Robert Baldasaro appeals from the trial court’s order denying his request for recall and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1. We asked for supplemental briefing on several issues. We conclude the appeal must be</description>
<link>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/p-v-baldasaro-ca-86845.html</link>
<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/p-v-baldasaro-ca-86845.html</guid>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Baldasaro CA4/2<br />
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions<br />
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion<br />
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DIVISION TWO</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">THE PEOPLE,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Plaintiff and Respondent,                               E086399</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">v.                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FRE03818)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">ROBERT BALDASARO,                                               OPINION</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Defendant and Appellant.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Dismissed.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Kristina L. Fox, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Appellant.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1<br />
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Arlene A. Sevidal, Collette C. Cavalier, and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">for Plaintiff and Respondent.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">INTRODUCTION</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Defendant and appellant Robert Baldasaro appeals from the trial court’s order</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">denying his request for recall and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1. We</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">asked for supplemental briefing on several issues. We conclude the appeal must be</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">dismissed.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 2). The court found true several firearm</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">enhancement allegations, one prior serious felony allegation, and one prior strike</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">allegation. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d) &amp; 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 12022, subd. (a)(1),</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of five</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">years, and a total indeterminate term of 100 years to life plus life with the possibility of</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">parole.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">On August 21, 2024, counsel for defendant filed with the court a copy of an</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Application for Commutation of Sentence that defendant had sent to the Governor, along</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">with a cover letter asking the court to exercise its discretion to review defendant’s case</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise<br />
indicated.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2<br />
under section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill No. 600. (Reg. Sess. 2023-2024; Stats. 2023,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">ch. 446.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">On October 4, 2024, the court held a hearing. Defendant and his attorney did not</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appear, but the prosecutor and a conflict panel attorney were present. The court ordered</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">counsel present to meet and confer with attorney Fox on whether she or the conflict panel</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">would be proceeding with the case. In the meantime, the court appointed the conflict</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">panel attorney to represent defendant.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The People filed an opposition brief.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Defendant had no contact with his counsel and was not sure if she had filed a reply</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">brief. Thus, he asked a friend of his, who was an attorney and parole expert, to write a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">letter to the court to point out some “inaccurate information/argument” in the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">prosecutor’s opposition brief, particularly with regard to defendant’s parole proceedings.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The court held a hearing on May 23, 2025. Defendant was present with his</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appointed conflict panel attorney. The court indicated that it reviewed all the documents</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">submitted, including additional briefing defense counsel submitted that day. The court</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">asked defense counsel if she wanted to be heard on the request for recall and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentencing. Defense counsel said she would submit to the court and added:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“[A]ctually we invite the Court to have a hearing, and we request the Court to conduct a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">hearing and grant our request to have [defendant’s] sentenced [sic] lowered accordingly</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">due to the interest of justice.” The court then asked the People if they wanted to be heard.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The People submitted on their opposition, requested that the court not even hold a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3<br />
section 1172.1 hearing, and noted that the court could simply decline to exercise its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">discretion and said, “that decision is not appealable.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The court agreed that it had discretion to accept defendant’s invitation and hold a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">hearing regarding his sentence but stated the following: “In the Court’s view, there has to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">be something alleged to justify the Court in exercising that discretion. Sometimes there’s</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">a change in the law. Sometimes there’s a change in the sentencing scheme or penalties.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Sometimes there’s a change, for example, gang enhancements that were alleged or found</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">true prior to 2012. [¶] Those statutes have been changed, so those would all be things</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">that would be significant changes in the law and sentencing that would cause the Court to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">have reason for the Court to exercise its discretion for resentencing. In this case, I tend to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">agree with the People that there is—there are no facts that would cause the Court to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">exercise its discretion to recall the sentence and have a hearing regarding resentencing.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In this case, [defendant] was the actual shooter who killed one victim and seriously</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">wounded a second victim. [¶] The penalties for those offenses, and the use of firearm</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">enhancements, are the same as they were. So given the nature of the offenses, no change</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">in the law or sentencing schemes, . . . and the defendant’s prior history, and the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">supplemental information that was provided regarding the defendant, . . . there’s nothing</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">there to—that in my mind would justify exercising my discretion to recall the sentence</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">and resentence the defendant.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The court concluded: “So the defendant’s request for the Court to exercise its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">discretion under 1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for resentencing is</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4<br />
denied for the reasons indicated.” The court also mentioned that defendant might be</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">eligible for parole. Defendant said he was granted parole twice and explained the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">circumstances. The court said, “I don’t have anything to do with that. That’s all between</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">you and the parole board.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DISCUSSION</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">I. The Trial Court’s Order Is Not Appealable</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his invitation for recall of</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">sentence and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill No. 600. He</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">contends the court erred in denying his request for relief, and the matter must be</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">remanded for a resentencing hearing. He also contends his appointed counsel rendered</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">ineffective assistance (IAC) by failing to communicate with him, file a reply brief, “grasp</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the factual posture of the case,” and advocate for him at the hearing. The People argue</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">that defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because the court’s order is nonappealable.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">They assert the court’s denial of defendant’s request did not affect his substantial rights</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">because section 1172.1 does not permit a defendant to file a petition for recall and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentencing under that section. Defendant replies that case law establishes the order is</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appealable since the court’s denial of the request after appointing counsel, allowing</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">briefing, considering input from the public, and holding a hearing, affected his substantial</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">rights. We conclude the order appealed from is not appealable; thus, the appeal must be</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">dismissed.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5<br />
       A. The Court’s Order Is Not Appealable</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) Section 1172.1 does not address the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appealability of a court’s order denying a defendant’s request for court-initiated recall</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">and resentencing. (People v. Olea (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 889, 897 (Olea).) Whether</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant’s appeal can go forward turns on section 1237, subdivision (b), which</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">authorizes an appeal from a postjudgment order if it affects a criminal defendant’s</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“‘substantial rights.’” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 992 (Hodge);</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">§ 1237, subd. (b).)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">A trial court may rule on postjudgment matters only if the Legislature has</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">provided it with jurisdiction to do so. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">337.) Section 1172.1 (former § 1170.03) provides an exception to the general rule that a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">trial court loses jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun by authorizing a recall</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">and resentencing procedure that may be invoked when, for example, the Secretary of the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommends resentencing. (§ 1172.1,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">subd. (a)(1).) Assembly Bill No. 600 amended section 1172.1 to allow a court to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentence a defendant “on its own motion” when “applicable sentencing laws at the time</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2; Hodge, supra, 107</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) Accordingly, effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6<br />
subdivision (a)(1), now provides that “the court may, on its own motion, . . . at any time if</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">changed by new statutory authority or case law, . . . recall the sentence and commitment</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1),</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">italics added; Hodge, at p. 992.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Notably, section 1172.1, subdivision (c), expressly states that “[a] defendant is not</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section” and if a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant requests relief, “the court is not required to respond.” (Italics added.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Accordingly, a defendant who files “an unauthorized request for resentencing has</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">no right to a ruling.” (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) Consistent with barring</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">a defendant’s petition, section 1172.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of his</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">or her appeal rights only “[a]fter ruling on a referral authorized by this section . . . .”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">(§ 1172.1, subd. (d), italics added.) Presumably, if the Legislature had contemplated an</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appealable order from a ruling on a defendant’s petition, it would not have limited the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">advisement of appellate rights to rulings resulting from a referral made by a qualifying</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">agency or official.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In Hodge, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from the summary denial of a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant’s request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1 and held that a “trial</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall [a defendant’s] sentence [does] not</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">7<br />
affect [a defendant’s] substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">trial court had no statutory obligation to act at all on [the defendant’s] request.” (Hodge,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) Since “a defendant has no right to demand that the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">trial court actually make such a decision,” the “trial court’s choice not to make one does</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">not deprive the defendant of any right, much less a substantial one.” (Id. at p. 996.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Hodge further explained that a contrary conclusion would result in an arbitrary</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">rule where, if a trial court does not respond to a defendant’s request for recall and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentencing, there would be no order to appeal, but if the court informs a defendant that</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">it will take no action on the request (as was the case here), the defendant would be able to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appeal that decision. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) The court in Hodge</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">found “such an irrational and arbitrary result” seemed unlikely to have been intended by</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the Legislature. (Ibid.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">We agree with the reasoning of Hodge and join other Courts of Appeal that have</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">followed it and concluded that a trial court’s decision declining to exercise its discretion</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">to recall a sentence under section 1172.1 on its own motion, pursuant to a defendant’s</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentencing request, is not appealable. (People v. Brammer (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">675, 696 (Brammer); People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1044-1047</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">(Brinson); People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 997-999 (Roy); People v.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 694-697 (Faustinos).) Given the plain language</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">of section 1172.1, subdivision (c), an order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">for relief under the statute cannot be said to affect his substantial rights. (Faustinos, at</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8<br />
p. 697 [“A defendant never has a right to a trial court initiation of a section 1172.1</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentencing. We lack any ‘discernable criteria’ to review such a decision. [Citation.] A</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">trial court’s discretionary decision not to initiate a proceeding on its own motion cannot</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">be legal error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”]; Hodge, supra, 107</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Cal.App.5th at p. 997 [“section 1172.1 places no constraints on the trial court’s decision</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">declining to initiate reconsideration of a sentence on its own motion”].) In other words,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">because a defendant has no right to the court’s initiation of recall and resentencing</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">proceedings on its own motion under section 1172.1, the order denying such relief cannot</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">be said to affect a defendant’s substantial rights. (See Brinson, at p. 1049.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">We note defendant’s contention in his supplemental brief that “[t]he jurisdictional</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">conditions required by Assembly Bill [No.] 600 exist here.” Specifically, he claims that</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), “conferred jurisdiction because applicable sentencing</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">laws had, in fact, changed.” However, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), provides “the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">court may, on its own motion, . . . at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">law, . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant.” (Italics added.) While a change in a sentencing law or sentencing laws is a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">reason a court may choose to recall a defendant’s sentence, such a change does not</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">abrogate the prerequisite in section 1172.1 that the trial court initiate the recall on its own</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">motion. The statute makes it clear that, if the sentencing laws have changed, then the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">court may “on its own motion” recall a defendant’s sentence. (See Faustinos, supra, 109</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">9<br />
Cal.App.5th at p. 695.) It is undisputed that the court here did not initiate a recall “on its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">own motion.” As the record establishes, and defendant himself asserts, he “invit[ed] the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Court to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1.” Thus, contrary to defendant’s</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">claim, section 1172.1, subdivision (a), did not confer jurisdiction for the court to act here,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">since the court did not initiate a recall.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In sum, defendant did not have a right to file a section 1172.1 petition, the trial</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">court had no obligation to even issue an order in the first place or to advise him of any</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appellate rights connected to its order, and the court’s decision on his request is not</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">appealable. (§ 1172.1, subds. (c) &amp; (d); Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 697;</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Brammer, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 696 [a court that receives an unauthorized</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">section 1172.1 petition may exercise its discretion to recall the sentence on its own</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">motion but “an order declining to exercise such discretion is not appealable and we lack</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the authority to rule on the merits”].)2</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">B. Olea and Craig</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Defendant relies upon two published cases that have held that when a court</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">engages with a defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence, takes certain procedural</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">steps, and the record reflects the court considered the section 1172.1 invitation on its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">merits in denying it, the resulting order is appealable. In Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">p. 901, the court held the denial of the defendant’s request for resentencing under</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2 In light of our conclusion that the court’s order is not appealable, we decline to<br />
address defendant’s other arguments that the court abused its discretion in denying his<br />
invitation and that his counsel rendered IAC and “cost [him] a chance to be re-<br />
sentenced.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">10<br />
section 1172.1 was appealable because the circumstances “differ[ed] from Hodge, Roy,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">and Faustinos such that the order issued affected Olea’s substantial rights.” (Olea, at</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">p. 901.) The court found it “noteworthy that the trial court took a number of procedural</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">steps that did not take place in the aforementioned cases, including appointment of</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">counsel at Olea’s request, ordering the release of subpoenaed records from the CDCR to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the defense, ordering the defense to provide copies of these records to the People, and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">setting a contested hearing on Olea’s request, at which Olea appeared remotely.” (Id. at</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">p. 901.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The trial court in Olea held a hearing at which it heard arguments from both</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">parties, “and made statements in its final ruling that reflected it had reviewed the original</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">sentence in full, along with the briefs and attached exhibits. Though the court indicated</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">that it was declining Olea’s invitation to recall and resentence him, it also stated that it</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">found the original sentence to be ‘just’” and explained its reasoning for that conclusion</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">on the record. (Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) “[T]he trial court chose not only</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">to respond, but it did so in a manner which effectively mirrored those rights afforded to a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">petitioner after a resentencing request has been initiated by one [of] the enumerated</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">agencies in section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(1) . . . .” (Id. at p. 902.) Accordingly, “the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">trial court effectively evaluated and denied Olea’s petition on the merits, thus affecting</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Olea’s substantial rights.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1173 (Craig) [finding order appealable where trial court “took most of the same</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">procedural steps the superior court in Olea did”].)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">11<br />
       In his reply brief and supplemental brief, defendant argues that the court here took</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">several procedural steps, as in Olea and Craig; thus, under the holdings of those cases, he</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">has a right to appeal the court’s denial of his request to recall his sentence. However,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Olea and Craig are distinguishable. At the hearing in Olea, defense counsel argued the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">merits of why the defendant deserved a reduced sentence, including numerous mitigating</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">factors, such as his childhood trauma, efforts at rehabilitation he had made in prison, and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">changes to his thought processes. (Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.) The Olea</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">court ultimately denied the defendant’s request to recall and resentence him, noting that it</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">found the original sentence to be just, considering his “‘extremely abhorrent and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">shocking actions.’” (Ibid.) Similarly, in Craig, the defendant argued the merits of why</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">he deserved resentencing, including that he was young at the time of the offense, and he</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">had done a lot of rehabilitative work since that time. The prosecutor referred to the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant’s prison file and pointed out his rule violations, recounted the details of the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">crime, and expressed doubt in his plan for employment. The Craig court discussed the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">facts of the case and declined to resentence the defendant because it was not impressed</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">that he had a job waiting for him, did not find it persuasive that he was young at the time</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">of the offense and had since rehabilitated himself, and believed he should be held to his</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">plea agreement. (Craig, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1169-1170.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In contrast, the parties’ arguments in the instant case focused on whether the court</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">should accept defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence and hold a resentencing</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">hearing in the first place. Defense counsel stated, “[W]e invite the Court to have a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">12<br />
hearing, and we request the Court to conduct a hearing and grant our request to have</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">[defendant’s] sentence[] lowered accordingly due to the interest of justice.” The People</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“request[ed] the Court not to even hold a hearing under 1172.1” and stated, “The Court is</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">not required to hold any hearing at all. The Court can simply decline to exercise its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">discretion and that decision is not appealable.” The court agreed that it had discretion to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">accept defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence and have a resentencing hearing.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">However, it denied “the defendant’s request for the Court to exercise its discretion under</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for resentencing” and briefly referenced</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“the nature of the offenses, no change in the law or sentencing schemes . . . the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant’s prior history, and the supplemental information that was provided regarding</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">the defendant.”3</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The trial court’s actions and statements do not indicate it was exercising its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">discretion to recall and resentence defendant “on its own motion.” (§ 1172.1,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">subd. (a)(1).) Instead, the court expressly stated that “defendant’s request for the Court to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">exercise its discretion under 1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">resentencing is denied.” Moreover, we cannot say the court’s comments in declining</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3 We note defendant’s claim in his supplemental brief that the court “identified<br />
changed sentencing laws as a qualifying basis, evaluated whether such changes and other<br />
facts existed, weighed the offense and [defendant’s] role, his prior history, the<br />
postconviction information, and ultimately found ‘nothing’ justified recall.” However,<br />
we do not read the court’s brief comments as such. To the extent defendant is claiming<br />
the “changed sentencing laws” the court identified “as a qualifying basis” were the gang<br />
enhancement laws the court mentioned, the court merely referenced those as an example<br />
of a change in the law that could justify a court in exercising its discretion to recall a<br />
sentence. (“Sometimes there’s a change in the sentencing scheme or penalties . . . for<br />
example, gang enhancements that were alleged or found true prior to 2012.”)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">13<br />
defendant’s invitation amounted to a decision on the merits which included the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">postconviction factors set forth in section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), which a court is</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">required to apply where it has decided to recall and resentence a defendant on its own</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">motion.4</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">We conclude this is not a case where the trial court effectively evaluated and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">denied defendant’s invitation after conducting the equivalent of a hearing on the merits.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Thus, Olea and Craig are inapposite.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Moreover, we agree with the People, that by making a court’s thorough and</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">careful exercise of its discretion in determining whether to accept a defendant’s invitation</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">for the court to resentence him on its own motion subject to review, but its decision to</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">ignore the invitation or otherwise not respond to it not appealable, a court is</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“disincentiviz[ed]” from taking a critical look at such invitations and exercising its</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">discretion in a transparent way. We respectfully decline to do so.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Here, after looking at the matter carefully, the court plainly did not recall the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">defendant’s sentence on its own motion. Since defendant had no right to bring such a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">request, its denial could not have affected his substantial rights.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), provides: “In recalling and resentencing<br />
pursuant to this provision, the court shall consider postconviction factors, including, but<br />
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while<br />
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical<br />
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that<br />
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued<br />
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">14<br />
                                DISPOSITION</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">The appeal is dismissed.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">FIELDS<br />
                                                        J.<br />
We concur:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">McKINSTER<br />
             Acting P. J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">CODRINGTON<br />
                       J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">15<br />
</span></span></p>
]]></content:encoded>
<comments>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/thread/86845/</comments>   
</item>

<item>
<title>Marriage of Gonsalves CA5</title>
<description>-ooOoo- Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves (Wife) and appellant Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves (Husband) married on May 20, 2006, and separated on July 8, 2020. Wife filed a petition for dissolution on July 9, 2020. Following a two-day bench trial, the superior court issued rulings pertaining to three real properties, designated in this opinion as Backus Lane, Delta Court, and Lambert Way. The court initially concluded Backus Lane and Delta Court wer</description>
<link>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/marriage-of-gonsalves-ca-86844.html</link>
<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid>https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/marriage-of-gonsalves-ca-86844.html</guid>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Filed 11/20/26 Marriage of Gonsalves CA5</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions<br />
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion<br />
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">In re the Marriage of KATERYNA and LLOYD<br />
DANIEL GONSALVES.<br />
                                                                                F088139<br />
KATERYNA GONSALVES,<br />
                                                                   (Super. Ct. No. FL-20-001602)<br />
        Appellant,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">v.<br />
                                                                              OPINION<br />
LLOYD DANIEL GONSALVES,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">Appellant.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Marcus L.<br />
Mumford, Judge.<br />
        Moran Law Firm, Amanda K. Moran, S. Eric Bishop II, and Janay D. Kinder for<br />
Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves.<br />
        Law Offices of Goss, Goss &amp; Leavy and Andrea M. Leavy for Appellant Lloyd<br />
Daniel Gonsalves.<br />
                                                -ooOoo-<br />
        Appellant Kateryna Gonsalves (Wife) and appellant Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves<br />
(Husband) married on May 20, 2006, and separated on July 8, 2020. Wife filed a petition<br />
for dissolution on July 9, 2020. Following a two-day bench trial, the superior court<br />
issued rulings pertaining to three real properties, designated in this opinion as Backus<br />
Lane, Delta Court, and Lambert Way. The court initially concluded Backus Lane and<br />
Delta Court were Husband’s separate properties whereas Lambert Way—which was sold<br />
while the dissolution action was pending—was community property. Citing Family<br />
Code1 section 2550, the court reserved jurisdiction over unadjudicated claims requesting<br />
reimbursement or asserting pro tanto interests pursuant to the Moore/Marsden2 rule. The<br />
judgment of dissolution was entered on April 26, 2024.<br />
        On appeal, Wife makes several contentions. First, Backus Lane “should be<br />
deemed 100% community property” (capitalization omitted) or, in the alternative, Wife is<br />
entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest therein because she “contributed<br />
physically and financially to improving the Backus Lane property.” Second, Wife is<br />
entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Delta Court because she “contributed<br />
physically and financially to improvements on the Delta Court property” and<br />
“community funds were used to pay down the loan against the property.” Third, Wife is<br />
entitled to Watts3 charges for Husband’s “continued use of the Backus Lane and Delta<br />
Court properties between the time of separation and the time of trial.” Finally, Husband<br />
breached his fiduciary duties under sections 721 and 1100. We conclude: (1) substantial<br />
evidence supported the superior court’s initial characterization of Backus Lane as<br />
Husband’s separate property; (2) the Moore/Marsden and Watts issues should be</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Family<br />
Code.<br />
        2 In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366; In re Marriage of Marsden<br />
(1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426.<br />
        3 In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">2.<br />
adjudicated by the superior court, which expressly reserved jurisdiction over them; and<br />
(3) Wife’s failure to raise a claim of breach of fiduciary duty below forfeited such a claim<br />
on appeal.<br />
       On cross-appeal, Husband contends Lambert Way could not be deemed<br />
community property because the execution of a grant deed adding Wife to the property’s<br />
title was the product of undue influence. We conclude substantial evidence rebutted the<br />
presumption of undue influence.<br />
                                    BACKGROUND4<br />
I.     Backus Lane<br />
       a. Documentary evidence<br />
       In a grant deed dated January 27, 2011, and recorded February 2, 2011, M.P.<br />
granted to Husband—“a married man”—Backus Lane “as his sole and separate property”<br />
“for a valuable consideration” (capitalization omitted). M.P. marked a checkbox<br />
declaring “[t]his transfer is exempt from the documentary transfer tax pursuant to<br />
Revenue and Taxation Code [section] 11930.”<br />
       b. Wife’s trial testimony<br />
       Wife testified Husband’s mother M.P. originally owned Backus Lane. At some<br />
point, M.P. could no longer live independently and moved in with Husband and Wife.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4 The appellate record consists of clerk’s transcripts and a settled statement<br />
certified by the superior court as “an accurate summary of the testimony and other<br />
evidence that is relevant to the … reasons for the appeal.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,<br />
rule 8.137.)<br />
        Husband filed a May 5, 2026 motion asking this court to augment the appellate<br />
record to include a “missing” “Grant Deed evidencing Husband’s original acquisition of<br />
the Lambert Way property from the sellers.” He indicated this grant deed was supposed<br />
to be included as part of Exhibit H (see at p. 7, post) but was “incorrectly handled.” We<br />
deferred our ruling pending consideration of the appeal on its merits. Having done so, we<br />
now deny Husband’s motion because the information therein “is not germane to the<br />
dispositive issue[s] we address.” (Acosta v. Brown (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 234, 246,<br />
fn. 6.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">3.<br />
Wife acknowledged “there was a ‘Grant Deed’ that transferred title of the property from<br />
[M.P.] into Husband’s name” but “did not know the transfer was a gift to be Husband’s<br />
separate property.” After M.P. vacated Backus Lane, Husband and Wife “elected to<br />
maintain Backus Lane as a rental property during the marriage.” Wife “assisted<br />
physically and financially with the maintenance of the Backus Lane property, including<br />
making improvements to the property.” The rental income was “reported on their taxes”<br />
and “placed into a bank account.” Husband did not allow Wife to access this account, but<br />
Wife “believed [it] belonged to the community” since Husband “used the account to pay<br />
for daily living expenses for the both of them, such as groceries, movie tickets, utility<br />
bills, etc.”<br />
          c. Husband’s trial testimony<br />
          Husband testified Backus Lane “was gifted to him by his mother [M.P.] via a<br />
Grant Deed to be his separate property.” Wife “assisted him with multiple renovations<br />
and updates to the Backus Lane property for rental purposes.” For instance, “when there<br />
was a change of tenants, the property required remodeling, new paint, new flooring, and<br />
yard cleaning, which Wife assisted with.” Rental income was deposited into a<br />
community property bank account and “used to improve the property and to pay annual<br />
taxes.”<br />
II.       Delta Court<br />
          a. Documentary evidence<br />
          A grant deed dated February 27, 1978, and recorded April 7, 1978, showed Delta<br />
Court was granted to Husband and his former spouse C.G. as joint tenants. The<br />
instrument provided the following description of the property: “Lot 4 in Block 3451 of<br />
University Estates, as per Map filed May 23, 1973 in Vol. 24 of Maps, page 48,<br />
Stanislaus County Records.” (Some capitalization omitted.)<br />
          Husband and C.G. signed a “Marital Settlement Agreement” (some capitalization<br />
omitted) on April 15, 2005, and May 2, 2005, respectively. Per the agreement, Delta</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">4.<br />
Court “shall be the sole and separate property, asset and debt of [Husband],” Husband<br />
“shall take a loan on the home and buy out [C.G.’s] ½ of its value,” and C.G. “will sign<br />
off of the deed to the home.” According to the agreement, Delta Court’s value was<br />
approximately $270,000.<br />
       Husband borrowed $165,000 on April 19, 2005, and executed a deed of trust on<br />
Delta Court as security therefor on April 21, 2005. After he married Wife, he borrowed<br />
$164,000 on September 16, 2008, and executed a deed of trust on Delta Court as security<br />
therefor on September 17, 2008. Both deeds of trust listed Delta Court’s Assessor Parcel<br />
Number (APN) as “071-019-037-000.” A “Substitution of Trustee and Deed of Full<br />
Reconveyance” (boldface &amp; some capitalization omitted) executed on September 30,<br />
2008, identified “[Husband] a married man, as his sole &amp; separate property as Trustor”<br />
(boldface omitted). A “Full Reconveyance” (boldface, underscoring &amp; some<br />
capitalization omitted) executed on April 20, 2011, likewise identified “[Husband], a<br />
married man as his sole and separate property as Trustor(s)” (boldface &amp; some<br />
capitalization omitted).<br />
       On January 5, 2012, Husband and Wife executed a deed of trust on Delta Court to<br />
secure a home equity line of credit. The instrument identified: (1) “[Husband], a married<br />
man as his sole and separate property, and [Wife], his wife” (boldface &amp; capitalization<br />
omitted) as “Trustor”; (2) Husband and “all co-signers and co-makers signing the<br />
[January 5, 2012] Credit Agreement [in the principal amount of $100,000]” as<br />
“Borrower”; and (3) “Tax ID No[.]: 071-019-037” (boldface &amp; some capitalization<br />
omitted) for Delta Court. A “Substitution of Trustee and Full Reconveyance” (boldface<br />
&amp; some capitalization omitted) executed on May 2, 2016, identified “[Husband], a<br />
married man, as his sole and separate property, and [Wife], his wife” (boldface &amp;<br />
capitalization omitted) as “the Original Trustor.”<br />
       On April 8, 2016, Husband executed a deed of trust on Delta Court to secure a<br />
reverse mortgage loan. The instrument identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5.<br />
and separate property” (boldface &amp; capitalization omitted) as “trustor.” A “Substitution<br />
of Trustee and Deed of Reconveyance” (boldface &amp; some capitalization omitted)<br />
executed on December 15, 2020, identified “[Husband], a married man, as his sole and<br />
separate property” (capitalization omitted) as “Trustor.”<br />
       In a grant deed dated September 29, 2020, and recorded October 1, 2020, Husband<br />
and D.G.5 “as joint tenants” (capitalization omitted) granted Delta Court to “The Lloyd<br />
Daniel Gonsalves Trust, Lloyd Daniel Gonsalves as Trustee” (some capitalization<br />
omitted). The instrument listed Delta Court’s APN as “071-019-037-000” and contained<br />
the following description of the property: “Lot 4 in Book [sic] 3451 of University<br />
Estates, as per Map filed May 23, 1973, in Vol. 24 of Maps page 48, Stanislaus County<br />
Records.” (Some capitalization omitted.)<br />
       b. Wife’s trial testimony<br />
       Wife testified Delta Court “was purchased by Husband prior to their marriage”<br />
and served “as their primary residence during the marriage.” During the marriage, the<br />
property “had an outstanding loan against it in the amount of $165,000.00,” which was<br />
taken out to buy out Husband’s former spouse. Using community income and assets, the<br />
loan was paid off in full on April 28, 2011. Wife’s name was added to a deed of trust for<br />
Delta Court on January 18, 2012. She “contributed to improvements being made on the<br />
property, including new windows, floors, and building a large shop (to be used by<br />
Husband).” Wife “had no knowledge of Husband having any joint bank accounts with<br />
his mother, [M.P.].”<br />
       c. Husband’s trial testimony<br />
       Husband testified “he acquired the Delta Court property prior to marriage with<br />
Wife.” He “acknowledged that there was a mortgage balance for the property during the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">5 In an attachment to a family law settlement conference statement, Husband<br />
identified D.G. as his son and stated he “executed a grant deed to the subject property in<br />
favor of himself and [D.G.]” in May 2019.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6.<br />
marriage, but testified that it was not paid for with community property funds.” Instead,<br />
M.P. “left him between $165,000.00 and $175,000.00 before her passing” and he “used<br />
funds from a joint bank account with his mother” to pay the mortgage in full.<br />
III.   Lambert Way<br />
       a. Documentary evidence<br />
       Lambert Way was purchased on April 17, 2012, using the aforementioned home<br />
equity line of credit. The final closing statement was addressed to Husband.<br />
       On March 13, 2012, Wife signed an “Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed” in which<br />
she granted Husband—“a married man”—Lambert Way “as his sole and separate<br />
property.” (Boldface &amp; some capitalization omitted.) The instrument listed Lambert<br />
Way’s APN as 061-040-013 and contained the following description of the property:<br />
“Lot 13, in Block 364, of Westmont Subdivision, as per Map filed April 12, 1978 in<br />
Volume 27 of Maps, at Page 63, Stanislaus County Records.” A copy of the interspousal<br />
transfer grant deed was admitted and marked as “Respondent’s Exhibit H” (hereafter<br />
Exhibit H) at trial.<br />
       Lambert Way was sold in late October 2020 and the proceeds were divided<br />
equally between Husband and Wife.<br />
       b. Wife’s trial testimony<br />
       Wife testified Lambert Way “was purchased during the marriage with community<br />
funds and assets.” The property “was rented out” and the rental income “was used for<br />
community bills” and “listed on the parties’ joint tax returns.”<br />
       During one tax season, Wife was approached by Husband, who “asked her to sign<br />
a document which he stated was for their taxes.” The document “was in English.” Wife,<br />
who “speaks little English and cannot read it,” “trusted Husband and signed the<br />
document.” She “did not know that the document she had signed was an interspousal<br />
transfer deed for the Lambert [Way] property, transferring the property into Husband’s<br />
name alone (without consideration).” Wife “did not learn of what she had actually signed</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">7.<br />
until years later” and subsequently “filed a police report believing that she had been<br />
defrauded.”<br />
       c. Husband’s trial testimony<br />
       Husband testified he purchased Lambert Way in March 2012 “in his name” using<br />
“separate property funds” “obtained by a deed of trust against the Delta Court property.”<br />
Title thereto “was taken in his name alone” and Wife “signed off her interest in the<br />
property.” Husband testified “the community did not make mortgage payments toward<br />
this property, as it was purchased with cash.”<br />
       In 2020, “after divorce papers were served upon him” but “prior to any court<br />
orders being issued,” Husband “was in the process of selling [Lambert Way]” when<br />
Wife’s daughter T.C. “confronted him about the property.” T.C. stated “she contacted<br />
law enforcement” and “Husband would be in criminal trouble if he did not add Wife to<br />
the title and give her half of the sale proceeds.” Husband “was scared and added Wife to<br />
the title only as a result of [T.C.]’s threat of criminal prosecution.”<br />
       According to the settled statement, “[t]he trial court commented that it did not<br />
believe Husband’s testimony that he was in fear.”<br />
       d. Testimony of T.C.<br />
       T.C. testified she witnessed Wife “perform physical labor to<br />
improve/renovate/repair” both Backus Lane and Lambert Way. For months, Husband<br />
and Wife “spent equal time fixing and repairing the Lambert [Way] property to make it<br />
suitable for renting.”<br />
       After Husband was served the divorce papers, he “immediately took action to sell<br />
the property.” The proceeds were divided “50/50” between Husband and Wife. Because<br />
Wife “did not speak or communicate with Husband since [she] filed for divorce in 2020,”<br />
T.C. “acted as the initial messenger between them until they acquired attorneys.” T.C.<br />
denied threatening Husband and maintained “she always treated Husband with love and<br />
respect as if he were her own father” and “they had a great relationship.”</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8.<br />
       According to the settled statement, “[t]he trial court commented that it found<br />
[T.C.]’s testimony credible and did not believe that she ever threatened Husband.”<br />
IV.    Rulings<br />
       The superior court issued rulings regarding Backus Lane, Delta Court, and<br />
Lambert Way in a tentative statement of decision dated March 7, 2024.<br />
       First, the court concluded Backus Lane “is Husband’s separate property and shall<br />
be confirmed to Husband as such.” While recognizing “undisputed” evidence<br />
demonstrated Backus Lane was “acquired during marriage and before separation, which<br />
would ordinarily result in the presumption that the residence is community property,”<br />
“undisputed” evidence also demonstrated Backus Lane “was initially acquired by gift<br />
from Husband’s mother, i.e., a donative transfer without consideration.” In particular,<br />
“the form of title on the deed was to Husband, ‘a married man, as his sole and separate<br />
property,’ ” which evinced “the donative intent of Husband’s mother and Husband’s<br />
acceptance thereof.” The court further remarked: (1) “Wife admitted that she understood<br />
this residence to have been gifted by Husband’s mother to him alone and the deed clearly<br />
reflected Husband’s title to be separate property notwithstanding Husband’s marital<br />
status at the time”; (2) “the parties never made [Backus Lane] their principal residence”;<br />
and (3) “there is no testimony or evidence found to be credible and persuasive by the<br />
Court of a ‘joint gift’ under the circumstances in the case at bar.”<br />
       Citing section 2550, the court emphasized its Backus Lane ruling was “limited to<br />
characterization of the subject property and its concordant exclusion from the equal<br />
division rule applicable to the remainder of the marital estate community property” and<br />
reserved jurisdiction over Wife’s claims “to any reimbursement rights as to the subject<br />
property and the use of community efforts to maintain and improve it.” Although<br />
“undisputed” evidence demonstrated “rent from the subject property was collected,<br />
identified as income on the parties’ joint tax return and that various repairs and<br />
improvements were made to the property over the years,” the court specified Wife</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">9.<br />
“simply has not adduced any evidence that the Court finds credible, persuasive and<br />
sufficient to establish the right of the community to a pro tanto ownership interest in the<br />
subject property” (italics omitted) and “introduced no documentary or testimonial<br />
evidence sufficient for the Court to make the necessary findings.”<br />
       Second, the court concluded Delta Court “shall be confirmed to Husband as his<br />
separate property.” The “undisputed” evidence demonstrated: (1) Delta Court “was the<br />
marital residence of Husband and his former wife”; (2) Husband “was awarded the<br />
residence pursuant to a Judgment/Marital Settlement Agreement at a value of<br />
approximately $270,000.00, with each spouse entitled to half, or $135,000.00”; and<br />
(3) Husband “borrowed against the property to buy out his former wife’s interest on or<br />
about April of 2005.” The court also stated, “Wife’s name was originally on title and<br />
Wife signed the loan paperwork associated with a Home Equity Line of Credit,” but she<br />
“later signed an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed removing herself from title and all<br />
encumbrances .…”<br />
       Citing section 2550 and employing “the same analysis applicable to the Backus<br />
Lane property,” the court emphasized its Delta Court ruling was limited “to the<br />
characterization of the subject property” and “reserve[d] jurisdiction over any<br />
reimbursement claim that Wife may or may not have .…” Although Wife “offers a<br />
Moore-Marsden calculation,” “there was no evidence introduced before the Court as to<br />
the principal paid on any of the encumbrances from community sources, as opposed to …<br />
interest, insurance and taxes for which the community acquires no pro tanto interest in an<br />
owner spouse’s separate property.” Husband also testified “payments made with<br />
presumptively community income or resources were interest-only” and “there were no<br />
payments of principal made during the marriage and before separation.”<br />
       Lastly, as to Lambert Way, the court pronounced:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">“[T]his property was sold by the parties and the proceeds divided equally.<br />
       Accordingly, the Court finds and holds that the property was deemed</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">10.<br />
       community and any argument to the contrary waived. In the overall<br />
       equalization and division of the marital estate, each party shall be credited<br />
       with their respective half of the proceeds.”<br />
       In a minute order dated April 26, 2024, the court adopted the tentative statement of<br />
decision as the final statement of decision.<br />
V.     Objections<br />
       In a “Petitioner’s Objection to Final Statement of Decision” (boldface &amp; some<br />
capitalization omitted) filed March 14, 2024, Wife “contends that there was no evidence<br />
demonstrating an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed executed related to … Delta<br />
Court .…”<br />
       In a “Respondent’s Objection to Statement of Decision and Proposed Division of<br />
Assets and Debts” (boldface &amp; some capitalization omitted) filed March 19, 2024,<br />
Husband challenged the statement of decision “to the extent … [it] does not award [him]<br />
a … [s]ection 2[6]40 reimbursement for his separate property contribution to the<br />
acquisition of” Lambert Way.<br />
       In a minute order dated April 26, 2024, the court overruled Wife’s objection on the<br />
grounds “Exhibit H is an [interspousal transfer grant deed] for the Delta Court property<br />
that was signed by [Wife].” The court also overruled Husband’s objection “[b]ecause<br />
Lambert Way was characterized, valued and divided pursuant to the parties’ mutual<br />
agreement before trial” and “the Court is bound by that disposition, as are the parties.”<br />
The court noted it “reserved jurisdiction over reimbursement requests” “with respect to<br />
the Lambert Way property.”<br />
                                      DISCUSSION<br />
I.     Standard of review<br />
       “The California Rules of Court provide an appellant with a choice of several types<br />
of records upon which to take an appeal. The choices include a reporter’s transcript, a<br />
clerk’s transcript, an agreed statement and a settled statement. [Citations.]” (Nielsen v.<br />
Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “A settled statement is a summary of the</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">11.<br />
superior court proceedings approved by the superior court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule<br />
8.137(a).) Where a case is on a settled statement, “[e]vidence to support the findings of<br />
fact and conclusions of law and the judgment must appear in the settled statement<br />
[citation]; we are bound to assume that enough appears in the settled statement to enable<br />
us to decide whether reversible error was committed; and we must make our ruling upon<br />
what is affirmatively shown by the record [citations].” (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Works<br />
v. Bond (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 435, 436; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(d).)<br />
       “As a general rule, factual findings that underpin the characterization<br />
determination are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009)<br />
172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal<br />
significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v.<br />
Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651; cf. ibid. [“Speculation or conjecture alone<br />
is not substantial evidence.”].) “ ‘[W]here the findings are attacked for insufficiency of<br />
the evidence, [a reviewing court’s] power begins and ends with a determination as to<br />
whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; … [the reviewing court] ha[s]<br />
no power to judge … the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to<br />
consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the<br />
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ [Citations.]” (Leff v. Gunter (1983)<br />
33 Cal.3d 508, 518; see In re Marriage of Slivka (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 159, 162 [“[A]ll<br />
factual matters are to be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of<br />
the judgment; all issues of credibility are for the trier of fact.”]; In re Marriage of Kahan<br />
(1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 63, 68 (Kahan) [“[W]e must defer to the trial judge’s assessment<br />
of the witnesses and resolve any factual conflict in support of the court’s finding.”].)<br />
“The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in<br />
question in light of the whole record.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, supra, at p. 652;<br />
see Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874 [“If such substantial evidence<br />
be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">12.<br />
other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (italics<br />
omitted)]; see also In re Marriage of Higinbotham (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 322, 328–329<br />
[“[A] daunting burden [is] placed on one who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence<br />
to support a trial court finding.”].)<br />
II.    Analysis<br />
       a. Wife’s appeal<br />
               i. Backus Lane<br />
       Wife contends Backus Lane “should be deemed 100% community property.”<br />
(Capitalization omitted.)<br />
       “In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court’s characterization of the parties’<br />
property—as community property or separate property—determines the division of the<br />
property between the spouses.” (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399<br />
(Valli); see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291 [“Characterization<br />
must take place in order to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect<br />
to a particular asset or obligation and is an integral part of the division of property on<br />
marital dissolution.”].) “Section 760 states the presumption that, except as otherwise<br />
provided by statute, all property acquired during marriage is community property.” (In re<br />
Marriage of Ettefagh (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1585; accord, In re Brace (2020) 9<br />
Cal.5th 903, 914 (Brace).) Nevertheless, this presumption may be rebutted upon a<br />
showing the property acquired during marriage was “acquired by gift or bequest .…”<br />
(Valli, supra, at p. 1400, citing § 770, subd. (a)(2); accord, Brace, supra, at p. 914.) “The<br />
elements of a gift are: ‘(1) competency of the donor to contract; (2) a voluntary intent on<br />
the part of the donor to make a gift; (3) delivery, either actual or symbolical;<br />
(4) acceptance, actual or imputed; (5) complete divestment of all control by the donor;<br />
and (6) lack of consideration for the gift.’ [Citation.]” (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 141<br />
Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036, fn. 5.)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">13.<br />
      We conclude substantial evidence supported the superior court’s initial<br />
characterization of Backus Lane as Husband’s separate property acquired after marriage<br />
by gift. The record—viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling—demonstrates<br />
M.P. transferred title thereto to Husband via a 2011 grant deed. The instrument specified<br />
Husband was “a married man” but Backus Lane would be “his sole and separate<br />
property.”6 Wife herself acknowledged “there was a ‘Grant Deed’ that transferred title of<br />
the property from [M.P.] into Husband’s name .…”7 (Cf. Louknitsky v. Louknitsky<br />
(1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 406, 410 [“ample support for the trial court’s finding that the<br />
home property belongs to the community” where—among other things—the husband did<br />
not know the wife “took the property in her name only” at the time of purchase].) After</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">6 Citing Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th 903, Wife claims “the fact that only [Husband’s]<br />
name was on the title holds no weight in characterizing the Backus Lane property.”<br />
Brace does not stand for such a blanket proposition. In that case, the “central point of<br />
disagreement … concern[ed] the applicability of two statutes: … section 760 and<br />
Evidence Code section 662.” (Id. at p. 914.) As noted, section 760 sets forth the<br />
community property presumption. (In re Marriage of Ettefagh, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at<br />
p. 1585.) Evidence Code section 662 reads: “The owner of the legal title to property is<br />
presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted<br />
only by clear and convincing proof.” The Supreme Court held “Evidence Code section<br />
662 does not apply to property acquired during marriage when it conflicts with … section<br />
760.” (Brace, supra, at p. 938.) Nothing in the opinion circumscribes a gift analysis<br />
under section 770, subdivision (a)(2), which the high court recognized as a “[s]tatutory<br />
exception[] to the community property presumption explicitly provid[ing] for separate<br />
property treatment.” (Brace, supra, at p. 914; cf. id. at p. 915 [“Evidence Code section<br />
662 is not a separate property exception to … section 760 .…”].)<br />
      7 According to the settled statement, Wife testified she “did not know the transfer<br />
was a gift to be Husband’s separate property.” By contrast, in the statement of decision,<br />
the superior court recalled, “Wife admitted that she understood this residence to have<br />
been gifted by Husband’s mother to him alone .…” Wife, whose primary language is<br />
Ukrainian, insists this discrepancy “was due to an inaccurate translation” by a “non-<br />
certified,” “non-registered” Ukrainian interpreter and “prejudiced [her].” Even assuming,<br />
arguendo, the court misstated this portion of Wife’s testimony, it is not “reasonably<br />
probable a result more favorable to [Wife] would have been reached in the absence of the<br />
error” (In re Marriage of Jackson (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 980, 997) because substantial<br />
evidence still supported a gift finding.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">14.<br />
M.P. vacated the premises, Backus Lane was maintained as a rental property during<br />
Husband and Wife’s marriage. While Wife testified M.P. could no longer live<br />
independently and thus moved in with her and Husband, she did not intimate M.P. was<br />
incompetent or did not transfer Backus Lane of her own volition.<br />
       Wife stresses the 2011 grant deed contains the phrase “for a valuable<br />
consideration” (capitalization omitted) and argues “a plain reading of the deed document<br />
… leads to no other conclusion than this transfer was not a gift, and that payment of some<br />
kind was provided in exchange for title of the property.” Not so. It is generally true<br />
“[t]he facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as<br />
between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest” (Evid. Code, § 622), but “this<br />
rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration” (ibid.). In fact, “parol evidence is<br />
admissible to show lack or failure of consideration.” (Coast Bank v. Holmes (1971) 19<br />
Cal.App.3d 581, 590; see Bertelsen v. Bertelson (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 479, 483 [“[T]he<br />
plaintiffs were not bound by the consideration recited in the defendant’s deed but were<br />
entitled to show all of the facts.… On the contrary, they were entitled to show that the<br />
deed was in truth and in fact a gift deed.”]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (f)<br />
[“Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute, this section does not exclude<br />
evidence relevant to that issue.”].) Notwithstanding the phrase “for a valuable<br />
consideration,” M.P. marked the checkbox in the instrument declaring “[t]his transfer is<br />
exempt from the documentary transfer tax pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code<br />
[section] 11930.” This provision explicitly deals with inter vivos gifts. (See Rev. &amp; Tax.<br />
Code, § 11930 [“Any tax imposed pursuant to this part shall not apply to any deed,<br />
instrument, or other writing which purports to grant, assign, transfer, convey, divide,<br />
allocate, or vest lands, tenements, or realty, or any interest therein, if by reason of such<br />
inter vivos gift or by reason of the death of any person, such lands, tenements, realty, or<br />
interests therein are transferred outright to, or in trust for the benefit of, any person or<br />
entity.”].) Husband also testified Backus Lane “was gifted to him by his mother [M.P.]</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">15.<br />
via a Grant Deed to be his separate property.” (See Kahan, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at<br />
p. 68 [“Substantial evidence to sustain a finding may consist of testimony of a party or<br />
other single witness.”].) Finally, although “[t]here is no general presumption in favor of<br />
a gift, … this rule should be viewed in the light of the principle that valuable services<br />
rendered between persons having kinship by blood … will be presumed to be gratuitous.”<br />
(35 Cal.Jur.3d (2026) Gifts, § 43, fns. omitted; see Newbert v. McCarthy (1923) 190 Cal.<br />
723, 726 [“[T]he relationship existing between the parties, as parent and child, stepparent<br />
and stepchild, brother and sister, and the like, is itself strong … proof that no<br />
remuneration was intended.”].)<br />
       Alternatively, Wife contends she is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest<br />
in Backus Lane because she “contributed physically and financially to improving the<br />
Backus Lane property.”<br />
       Under the Moore/Marsden rule, “[w]hen community property is used to reduce the<br />
principal balance of a mortgage on one spouse’s separate property, the community<br />
acquires a pro tanto interest in the property.” (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th<br />
1409, 1421–1422; accord, In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1552.)<br />
“The Moore/Marsden rule is based upon the principle that where community funds<br />
contribute to the owner’s equity in separate property, the community obtains a pro tanto<br />
quasi-ownership stake in the property” (In re Marriage of Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th<br />
497, 502). “Because contributions to capital improvements also increase [a] property’s<br />
equity value, [the Moore/Marsden rule] applies as well to capital improvements made to<br />
separate property.” (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Sherman (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 795,<br />
800 [“Courts have applied this so-called Moore/Marsden rule not only where the parties<br />
use community funds to pay down a mortgage, but also where they use community funds<br />
to make improvements to a residence purchased by one of the parties before marriage and<br />
those improvements increase the property’s equity value.”]; Bono v. Clark, supra, at<br />
p. 1423 [Moore/Marsden rule “applies with equal force to capital improvements” “as a</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">16.<br />
matter of both logic and fairness”].) Conversely, “community payments made for taxes,<br />
interest, and maintenance are not subject to the rule.” (In re Marriage of Allen, supra, at<br />
p. 502.)<br />
       At trial, Wife testified she “assisted physically and financially with the<br />
maintenance of the Backus Lane property, including making improvements to the<br />
property.” Husband testified Wife “assisted him with multiple renovations and updates<br />
to the Backus Lane property for rental purposes,” such as “remodeling, new paint, new<br />
flooring, and yard cleaning.” However, there was a paucity of evidence establishing the<br />
extent to which these “improvements” constituted capital improvements that enhanced<br />
the property’s equity value. Wife’s assertion the failure to “provide[] documentation of<br />
the exact increase in value of the property” “resulted in an outright dismissal of her right<br />
to a pro tanto interest” is belied by the statement of decision, in which the superior<br />
court—which could not “make the necessary findings” at the time—expressly reserved<br />
jurisdiction over her claims “to any reimbursement rights as to the subject property and<br />
the use of community efforts to maintain and improve it.” (See § 2550 [court in<br />
dissolution proceeding shall “divide the community estate of the parties equally” “either<br />
in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of legal separation of the<br />
parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property<br />
division”]; McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 903, 919 (McMillin) [family<br />
court reserved jurisdiction to adjudicate community property reimbursement claims].)<br />
       Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle<br />
“factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H.<br />
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 120, 125), adjudication of the Moore/Marsden claim is “properly<br />
within the province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920).<br />
(See People v. Asghedom (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 718, 728 (Asghedom) [“As an appellate<br />
court, it is not our role to resolve factual issues and exercise discretion in the first<br />
instance.”]; Hicks v. Barnes (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 (Hicks) [“[T]he function of</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">17.<br />
the trial court as the normal and primary finder of the facts has been uniformly<br />
recognized and it was never intended that the appellate court should perform those<br />
functions in the first instance.”].)<br />
               ii. Delta Court<br />
       Wife points out “[t]he trial court erroneously determined that [she] signed away<br />
any interest in the Delta Court property.” (Boldface &amp; italics omitted.) We agree. In the<br />
statement of decision, the superior court—in making the Delta Court ruling—stated<br />
“Wife’s name was originally on title” but she “later signed an Interspousal Transfer Grant<br />
Deed removing herself from title and all encumbrances .…” In the April 26, 2024 minute<br />
order, the court reiterated “Exhibit H is an [interspousal transfer grant deed] for the Delta<br />
Court property that was signed by [Wife].” By its terms, however, the interspousal<br />
transfer grant deed referred to Lambert Way, not Delta Court. Husband agrees. This<br />
error notwithstanding, Wife does not challenge the superior court’s initial<br />
characterization of Delta Court as Husband’s separate property.8 Rather, she contends<br />
she is entitled to a Moore/Marsden pro tanto interest in Delta Court because she<br />
“contributed physically and financially to improvements on the Delta Court property”<br />
and “community funds were used to pay down the loan against the property.”<br />
       At trial, Wife testified Delta Court “had an outstanding loan against it in the<br />
amount of $165,000.00” during the marriage and “was paid off in full” using<br />
“community income and assets.” However, as observed by the superior court, “there was<br />
no evidence … as to [the] principal paid on any of the encumbrances from community<br />
sources, as opposed to … interest, insurance and taxes for which the community acquires<br />
no pro tanto interest in an owner spouse’s separate property.” Wife also testified she<br />
“contributed to improvements being made on the property, including new windows,</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">8 For our part, we will not raise such a challenge on Wife’s behalf. (See Paterno<br />
v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court is not required<br />
to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.”].)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">18.<br />
floors, and building a large shop (to be used by Husband),” but there was a lack of<br />
evidence establishing the extent to which these “improvements” constituted capital<br />
improvements that enhanced the property’s equity value. Wife’s assertion the court<br />
“rul[ed] that [she] was not entitled to a pro tanto interest in the property” is fallacious.<br />
Employing “the same analysis applicable to the Backus Lane property,” the court<br />
expressly reserved jurisdiction over her Moore/Marsden claim, which was not<br />
adjudicated prior to entry of the dissolution judgment. (See § 2550; McMillin, supra, 70<br />
Cal.App.5th at pp. 903, 919.)<br />
       Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle<br />
“factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H.,<br />
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 125), adjudication of the Moore/Marsden claim is “properly<br />
within the province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920).<br />
(See Asghedom, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 728; Hicks, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d at<br />
p. 863.)<br />
              iii. Watts charges<br />
       “ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive use of a community asset during the period<br />
between separation and trial, that spouse may be required to compensate the community<br />
for the reasonable value of that use.’ [Citation.] The right to such compensation is<br />
commonly known as a ‘Watts charge.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone &amp; Fyke<br />
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 978.) “Watts charges typically have been applied where the<br />
community owns the entire property, for example, because it was purchased with<br />
community funds during the marriage” (In re Marriage of Mohler (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th<br />
788, 797) but also “may be applied where … the community does not own the property<br />
outright but instead maintains a beneficial partial interest in the property due to a<br />
Moore/Marsden calculation” (ibid.).</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">19.<br />
       On appeal, Wife contends she is entitled to Watts charges for Husband’s<br />
“continued use of the Backus Lane and Delta Court properties between the time of<br />
separation and the time of trial.” As discussed, the superior court initially characterized<br />
Backus Lane and Delta Court as Husband’s separate properties. (Cf. In re Marriage of<br />
Bell (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 300, 311 [Watts charge for “exclusive use of a community<br />
asset by one of the parties following separation” (italics added)].) While Watts charges<br />
may apply where “the community does not own the property outright but instead<br />
maintains a beneficial partial interest in the property due to a Moore/Marsden<br />
calculation” (In re Marriage of Mohler, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 797), the superior<br />
court did not adjudicate Wife’s Moore/Marsden claims prior to entry of the dissolution<br />
judgment and expressly reserved jurisdiction over them as well as claims “to any<br />
reimbursement rights.” (See § 2550; McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 903, 919.)<br />
       Given the superior court’s reservation of jurisdiction and in light of the principle<br />
“factual matters are assessed in the first instance by the trial court” (In re Clarissa H.,<br />
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 125), adjudication of the Watts claim is “properly within the<br />
province of the family law court” (McMillin, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 920). (See<br />
Asghedom, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 728; Hicks, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d at p. 863.)<br />
              iv. Breach of fiduciary duties<br />
       Finally, Wife contends Husband breached his fiduciary duties under sections 721<br />
and 1100. Among other things, she asks for an award of “100% of the Backus Lane and<br />
Delta Court properties” (boldface &amp; some capitalization omitted) pursuant to section<br />
1101, subdivision (h) or, in the alternative, “50% of each property” (boldface &amp; some<br />
capitalization omitted) pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (g). A claim of breach of<br />
fiduciary duties, however, was never raised below. “[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing<br />
court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could<br />
have been but were not presented to the trial court.” (Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry &amp;<br />
Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 26.) “ ‘[T]heories not raised in the trial court cannot be</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">20.<br />
asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the theory (or<br />
theories) on which their cases were tried. This rule is based on fairness—it would be<br />
unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on<br />
appeal .…’ [Citation.]” (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4<br />
Cal.App.5th 982, 997; accord, Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44<br />
Cal.4th 1334, 1350–1351, fn. 12.) Therefore, Wife forfeited the claim on appeal.<br />
       b. Husband’s cross-appeal<br />
       On cross-appeal, Husband contends the superior court “erred by characterizing the<br />
Lambert Way property as community property based on the parties’ post-separation<br />
conduct and an implied waiver” and should have adjudicated his claim the execution of<br />
the grant deed adding Wife to Lambert Way’s title was the product of undue influence.<br />
Even assuming, arguendo, the court erred in the manner described above, “[n]o rule of<br />
decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder<br />
basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not<br />
be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any<br />
theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the<br />
considerations which may have moved the [decisionmaker] to its conclusion.” (Davey v.<br />
Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329; see Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78<br />
Cal.App.4th 597, 610 [“[T]here can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or<br />
reasoning if the decision itself is correct.”].)<br />
       “Married persons may, through a transfer or an agreement, transmute—that is,<br />
change—the character of property from community to separate or from separate to<br />
community.” (Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1400, citing § 850.) “A rebuttable<br />
presumption of undue influence arises when one spouse obtains an advantage over<br />
another in an interspousal property transaction.” (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133<br />
Cal.App.4th 624, 630; see id. at p. 629 [“Generally, a spouse obtains an advantage if that<br />
spouse’s position is improved, he or she obtains a favorable opportunity, or otherwise</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">21.<br />
gains, benefits, or profits.”].) “When a presumption of undue influence applies to a<br />
transaction, the spouse who was advantaged by the transaction must establish that the<br />
disadvantaged spouse’s action ‘was freely and voluntarily made, with full knowledge of<br />
all the facts, and with a complete understanding of the effect of’ the transaction.<br />
[Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 738–739.) A<br />
rebuttal finding will not be reversed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.<br />
(In re Marriage of Burkle, supra, at p. 737; In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, at p. 632.)<br />
       We conclude substantial evidence supported a rebuttal finding. The record—<br />
viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling—demonstrates Husband, who has been a<br />
party to numerous instruments in the past, is well versed in real property-related<br />
transactions. There is no dispute Husband added Wife to Lambert Way’s title via grant<br />
deed before the property was sold in late 2020 and the proceeds therefrom were divided<br />
equally between Husband and Wife. At trial, Husband testified he only added Wife to<br />
Lambert Way’s title because Wife and her daughter T.C. confronted him, T.C. threatened<br />
him with criminal prosecution, and he was “scared.” (See In re Marriage of Balcof<br />
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1520 [threats “constitute[] undue influence, inasmuch as<br />
[the disadvantaged spouse’s action] was not ‘freely and voluntarily made’ ”].) On the<br />
other hand, T.C. testified Wife “did not speak or communicate with Husband since [she]<br />
filed for divorce” on July 9, 2020. T.C. also testified she “acted as the initial messenger<br />
between [Husband and Wife] until they acquired attorneys” and “always treated Husband<br />
with love and respect as if he were her own father.” According to the certified settled<br />
statement (see ante, fn. 4), the superior court (1) “commented that it did not believe<br />
Husband’s testimony that he was in fear”; and (2) “commented that it found [T.C.]’s<br />
testimony credible and did not believe that she ever threatened Husband.” (See In re<br />
Marriage of Balcof, supra, at p. 1521 [trial court finding one spouse’s testimony more<br />
credible]; Kahan, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 68 [“Substantial evidence to sustain a<br />
finding may consist of testimony of a party or other single witness.”].)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">22.<br />
                                     DISPOSITION<br />
       The judgment is affirmed. Parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (See Cal.<br />
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">DETJEN, Acting P. J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">WE CONCUR:</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">MEEHAN, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">SNAUFFER, J.</span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13pt"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman",serif">23.<br />
</span></span></p>
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