Filed 2/27/18 P. v. Hudson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARCOS N. HUDSON,

Defendant and Appellant.
D072076



(Super. Ct. No. SCN361994)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Harry M. Elias, Judge. Affirmed.

Marcos Hudson, in pro. per.; and Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Marcos Hudson guilty of possession of unlawful pornographic material depicting minors. (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Hudson to state prison for a determinate term of three years.
Hudson appeals. His appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and has not raised any specific issues. Hudson's counsel asks this court to review the record independently for error as required by Wende. We granted Hudson the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf and he has done so. We have independently reviewed the record under Wende and have found no reasonably arguable issues for reversal on appeal. We therefore affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of this section, we state the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690; People v. Dawkins (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 991, 994.)
In April 2016, Hudson was arrested for, and subsequently charged with, assaulting and robbing another man. A jury ultimately acquitted Hudson of the assault and robbery charges. However, in a search incident to that original arrest, the police recovered a cell phone that Hudson admitted belonged to him. After obtaining a search warrant, the police examined the contents of the phone and discovered thousands of pornographic images on a memory card inserted into the phone. Some of the images depicted minors engaged in various sexual acts. Hudson refused to provide the passcode for the phone to the police, which prevented a more detailed examination that could reveal the sources of the images and/or the dates on which they were downloaded to the phone's internal storage from the Internet.
The People filed a separate complaint charging Hudson with possession of unlawful pornographic material depicting minors. At trial, Hudson testified and admitted that the phone belonged to him, but claimed that he did not know that the images were on the memory card. He stated that he purchased the phone from a stranger and that he did not place the child pornography on the memory card. Hudson explained that he would not provide the passcode to the police because he did not want the police to see his text messages regarding drug deals.
Following a short deliberation, the jury found Hudson guilty. At a bifurcated bench trial following Hudson's waiver of his right to a jury trial regarding the truth of his prior convictions, the court found true the allegation that Hudson had suffered a prior strike conviction. The court denied Hudson's motion for a new trial, but granted his motion to strike the prior allegation pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The court declined to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor and sentenced Hudson to the upper term of three years in prison. The court awarded Hudson a total of 521 days of custody credits, comprised of 261 days in actual custody credits pursuant to section 2900.5 and 260 days in conduct credits pursuant to section 4019.
III.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Hudson's appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Wende and Anders and has not raised any specific issues on appeal. Instead, she identified seven possible, but not arguable, issues pursuant to Anders: (1) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense motion for dismissal based on the lack of a timely probable cause finding"; (2) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense motion alleging denial of his speedy trial rights"; (3) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense discovery motion to compel access to the contents of the cell phone"; (4) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense objection to the introduction of the images depicting obscene material, based on their inflammatory and prejudicial effect"; (5) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense request for a jury instruction regarding third-party culpability"; (6) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense motion to set aside the verdict for lack of sufficient evidence"; and (7) "[w]hether the trial court properly denied the defense motion to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)."
After this court received counsel's brief, we provided Hudson with the opportunity to file a supplemental brief. Hudson filed a brief. In his supplemental brief, Hudson claims that the trial court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits. He asserts that he should be awarded credits from the date of his original arrest rather than from the date of the filing of the complaint charging him with his current offense.
We have independently reviewed the record under Wende and have considered the possible issues identified by Hudson's counsel. We have found no reasonably arguable issues for reversal. Competent counsel has represented Hudson in this appeal.
The issue that Hudson raises concerning presentence custody credits does not establish a basis for reversal. Pursuant to section 2900.5, subdivision (b), presentence custody credits "shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted." Hudson's time in custody arising from his arrest for the assault and robbery offenses before he was formally charged with the offense giving rise to his current conviction is not "attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct" for which Hudson was convicted. The trial court properly deemed only the time between the date of the filing of the criminal complaint and Hudson's sentencing as the period of custody attributable to this proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:




BENKE, Acting P. J.




GUERRERO, J.