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In re D.C. CA2/1

In re D.C. CA2/1
By
11:19:2026

Filed 11/19/26 In re D.C. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.C. et al., Persons B354574
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP06596)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Michael C. et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore. D.H.’s appeal
from the order terminating parental rights over I.R. is affirmed.
D.H.’s and Michael C.’s appeals from the order terminating
parental rights over D.C. are dismissed.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Michael C.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant D.H.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________

This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders
terminating parental rights over D.C. (born in 2015) and I.R.
(born in 2017). D.C. was two years old and I.R. was 11 months
old when they were removed from mother’s custody. D.C. did not
have any relationship with his biological father, Michael C., who
has appealed from the order terminating parental rights. I.R.
did not have any relationship with his alleged father, Chris R.,
who did not appeal from the order terminating parental rights.
On appeal, D.C.’s father Michael argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because when counsel filed in
2025 a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 petition
seeking reunification services, counsel did not contend the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Instructions Code.

2
(DCFS) failed to serve Michael properly with notice of the 2019
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Michael does not
demonstrate that this court has jurisdiction to consider his
section 388 petition in this appeal from the order terminating
parental rights. We therefore dismiss his appeal. On the merits,
Michael does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mother D.H. argues that in 2019, DCFS failed to serve
I.R.’s father, Chris R., with notice of the jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing, and therefore, all the proceedings are void
and must start anew. Assuming arguendo mother can assert a
challenge on his behalf, Chris R., as an alleged father, does not
have standing to challenge the order terminating his parental
rights. We affirm the orders terminating parental rights as to
I.R., the only order mother challenges on appeal. We dismiss
mother’s appeal from the order terminating parental rights over
D.C. because mother fails to challenge that order on appeal.

BACKGROUND
This case commenced seven years ago. We summarize only
those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal.2

1. The court assumes jurisdiction over mother’s
children; mother does not reunify with D.C. or I.R.,
and the court terminates mother’s parental rights
over D.C. and I.R.
On October 12, 2018, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging J.H. (then 12 years old), M.H. (then nine years old), J.R.

2 The allegations of the petition, which concerned mother’s
inability to care for the children because of her marijuana use,
are not relevant to any issue on appeal.

3
(then seven years old), D.C. (then two years old) and I.R (then
11 months old) came within juvenile court jurisdiction pursuant
to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). This appeal concerns only D.C.
and I.R. The section 300 petition indicated D.C.’s father’s
identity was unknown. It also indicated I.R.’s father’s identity
was unknown. As their identities were unknown at the time,
DCFS did not serve either D.C.’s father Michael or I.R.’s father
Chris with the petition. In January 2019, the court assumed
jurisdiction over D.C. and I.R.
In January 2021, DCFS recommended the court terminate
mother’s reunification services. In March 2021, the court
terminated mother’s reunification services with D.C. and I.R.
On April 14, 2026, the court terminated mother’s parental
rights over D.C. and I.R. Mother appealed from the orders
terminating her parental rights over D.C. and I.R. On appeal,
she challenges only the order terminating her parental rights
over I.R.

2. D.C.’s father, Michael
On October 15, 2018, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to
present evidence of due diligence as to locating D.C.’s father. On
November 2, 2018, mother completed a parentage questionnaire
identifying Michael as D.C.’s father. Mother indicated that
Michael was not present at D.C.’s birth, has not held himself out
as a parent, and never paid child support. The court found
Michael to be an alleged parent.
In January 2019, DCFS reported that it found Michael,
who was incarcerated with a pending release date in
November 2025. In January 2019, when it served other parties,
DCFS did not serve Michael with notice of hearing on the
petition. Michael was not present at the February 2019

4
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing when the court ordered
no reunification services for him.
On August 28, 2019, DCFS served Michael at his place of
incarceration with a notice of the six-month review hearing. On
March 19, 2020, DCFS served Michael with notice of the
12-month review hearing. On March 12, 2024 (five years later),
the juvenile court ordered an attorney to contact Michael at his
place of incarceration.
On December 11, 2024, Michael called the social worker.
He told the social worker that he was D.C.’s father and his name
was not on the birth certificate because he was incarcerated when
D.C. was born. The social worker called Michael’s mother, who
“was not aware” Michael “had a child.” Michael’s brother also
was not aware that Michael had a child.
On March 17, 2025, after Michael took a paternity test, the
juvenile court found Michael was D.C.’s biological father. On
June 3, 2025, Michael filed a section 388 petition requesting the
court change the order of no reunification services issued on
February 25, 2019. Michael also requested reunification services.
Michael stated on his parentage form that he told all his friends
and family about D.C. He acknowledged that he gave D.C. no
money or things and that D.C. spent no time with his family.
On June 5, 2025, the juvenile court denied Michael’s
section 388 petition without a hearing. The court found no
changed circumstances other than the fact that Michael was no
longer incarcerated. The court further stated that D.C. “is
already nine and to find out suddenly that he has a father who is
coming forward might be really difficult for him and increase
some trauma.” The court found it was not in D.C.’s best interest

5
to provide Michael reunification services. Michael did not appeal
from the order denying his section 388 petition.
In August 2025, Michael returned to prison because of a
probation violation. In February, March, and April 2026, DCFS
reported that Michael remained incarcerated.
On April 14, 2026, the juvenile court terminated mother’s
and Michael’s parental rights over D.C. Michael was present at
the hearing and was represented by counsel. Michael appealed
from the order terminating his parental rights.

3. I.R.’s father, Chris
On October 15, 2018, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to
present evidence of due diligence regarding locating I.R.’s father.
Mother identified Chris as I.R.’s father and stated that he was
incarcerated. Mother also stated that Chris was not involved in
I.R.’s life. Chris was not on I.R.’s birth certificate. According to
mother, Chris did not hold himself out as a parent and did not
support I.R. financially.
In January 2019, when it served other parties, DCFS
did not serve Chris with notice of hearing the jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing. Chris was not present at the jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. In February 2019, the court ordered
no family reunification services for Chris.
DCFS contacted Chris in December 2023.3 Chris told the
social worker it was possible he was I.R.’s father. When asked if
he was interested in meeting I.R., Chris said he was unavailable.
When the social worker called again, the person said he was not

3 Prior to contacting I.R.’s alleged father, Chris, DCFS
contacted a different person with the same name, who was not
I.R.’s father.

6
Chris and did not know I.R. The social worker thought the
person who said he was not Chris was the same person who
earlier said he was Chris.
After he was located, Chris did not participate in any of the
dependency proceedings. Chris did not appeal from the order
terminating his parental rights over I.R.

DISCUSSION
In the context of dependency cases, fathers may fall into
one of four categories — alleged, biological (or natural),
presumed, and de facto. “ ‘An alleged biological father in
dependency proceedings is a man who may be the father of a
child, but whose biological paternity has not been established.
[Citation.] “An alleged father . . . does not have a known current
interest because his paternity has not yet been established.”
[Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Karla C. (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179.) A person who has established that he
is the biological father is referred to as a biological or natural
father. (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801.) “A man
who has held the child out as his own and received the child into
his home is a ‘presumed father.’ A ‘natural father’ can be, but is
not necessarily, a ‘presumed father’ and a ‘presumed father’ can
be, but is not necessarily, a ‘natural father.’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Presumed fatherhood, for purposes of dependency proceedings,
denotes one who “ ‘promptly comes forward and demonstrates a
full commitment to his paternal responsibilities — emotional,
financial, and otherwise[.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 801–802.) A de facto
father is a person who has assumed the role of a parent. (Id. at
p. 801.)
Pursuant to section 316.2, subdivision (b), each alleged
father must be provided notice that he is or could be the father of

7
the child, that the child is the subject of proceedings under
section 300, and that the proceedings could result in the
“termination of parental rights” and adoption of the child. An
alleged father is entitled to notice to challenge his paternity
status. (In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 257.)
Under section 361.5, subdivision (a), unless an exception
applies, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification
services to mother and a presumed father. (§ 361.5, subd. (a);
In re Jerry P., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 801.) A father who
fails to achieve presumed father status is not a parent entitled to
reunification services. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435,
452.) The juvenile court “may” but is not required to order
services for a biological father and must determine if such
“services will benefit the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a); In re
Joshua R. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025.) An alleged father
is not entitled to reunification services. (In re Paul H. (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 753, 760.)

A. Michael Does Not Show His Argument Is Cognizable
in this Appeal; Even Assuming it is Cognizable,
Michael Does Not Show Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel

1. Michael does not show this court has jurisdiction to
consider his section 388 petition
The only issue Michael raises on appeal concerns his
section 388 petition, not the order terminating his parental
rights. Michael did not appeal from the June 5, 2025 order
denying his section 388 petition. Michael did not file a habeas
corpus petition to challenge earlier child custody decisions. (See
In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373, 392 [parent may bring habeas

8
petition to challenge effective assistance of counsel in dependency
case].) The denial of the section 388 petition was an appealable
order. (§ 395.) Because Michael did not appeal from the latter
petition, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the order denying
his section 388 petition. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79.)

2. Michael demonstrates no ineffective assistance of
counsel
Michael argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because when Michael’s counsel filed the section 388 petition,
counsel did not argue DCFS failed to give notice of the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. A section 388 petition is
a proper vehicle to raise a due process challenge based on lack of
notice. (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477,
481.) As part of that argument, Michael contends that had his
counsel advanced a claim of lack of notice when counsel filed the
section 388 petition, it is reasonably probable Michael would have
obtained a more favorable result.
A parent raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
“must show deficient performance by counsel, prejudice from that
deficiency, and ‘promptness and diligence’ in pursuing relief.” (In
re Z.G., supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 391; In re Kristin H. (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1667–1668 [parent claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must show that it is “ ‘reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached in the absence of the error.’ ”].)
Michael does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel because he cannot show prejudice from counsel’s alleged
deficient conduct in failing to argue lack of notice of the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Even if the juvenile
court would have vacated the dispositional order denying Michael

9
reunification services, Michael cites no evidence supporting the
conclusion that the court would have also ordered Michael
reunification services. As a biological father, Michael was
entitled to reunification services only if reunification services
were in D.C.’s best interest. (In re Joshua R., supra,
104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) In denying Michael’s section 388
petition, the juvenile court concluded reunification services were
not in D.C.’s best interest. (See Background, part 2, ante.)
Michael identifies no evidence supporting the conclusion that had
the court vacated the dispositional order, it would have been in
D.C.’s best interest to order reunification services. Therefore, he
has not shown prejudice from his counsel’s alleged deficient
conduct in failing to raise the notice issue when counsel filed the
section 388 petition in 2025.

B. Mother Demonstrates No Error in the Termination of
Parental Rights Over I.R. and Does Not Challenge
the Order Terminating Parental Rights Over D.C.

1. Mother shows no error in the order terminating
parental rights over I.R.
Mother argues DCFS never attempted to notify Chris of the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing and notes Chris was not
provided with reunification services. Mother requests that
parental rights over I.R. be reinstated. DCFS argues, inter alia,
mother has no standing to raise Chris’s lack of notice of the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. We conclude mother
does not show that parental rights over I.R. should be reinstated.
“An alleged father in dependency or permanency
proceedings does not have a known current interest because his
paternity has not yet been established.” (In re Emily R. (2000)

10
80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1352.) In general, an alleged father who
fails to become a party of record in the dependency court
proceedings has no standing to appeal an order terminating his
parental rights. (In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715–
716.) Although an alleged father who takes “immediate steps to
become a party once he was notified of the dependency
proceedings” may have standing to contest an order terminating
parental rights, Chris did not do so. (In re Paul H., supra,
111 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) Chris took no steps to become a party
even after learning about the dependency proceedings. (See
Background, part 3, ante.)
Thus, Chris has no standing to appeal from the order
terminating parental rights. Even if arguendo mother had
standing to assert Chris’s rights, here he has no right to
challenge the order terminating parental rights.
Mother cites no relevant authority involving the rights of
an alleged father to contest an order terminating parental rights.
For example, mother cites In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569,
572 in which this court held that the absence of notice to a
mother (not an alleged father) required reversal of an order
terminating parental rights. In In re DeJohn B. (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 100, 107, the social services agency failed to
notify the mother (not an alleged father) of a six-month review
hearing. In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109 also
involved inadequate notice to mother, this time, of a selection and
implementation hearing. (Id. at p. 1112.) In re Jorge G. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 125 also did not involve an alleged father’s
standing to challenge an order terminating parental rights. It
involved a challenge from parents incarcerated in Mexico to the

11
juvenile court’s jurisdiction and dispositional orders. (Id. at
p. 128.)

2. Mother’s appeal from the order terminating parental
rights over D.C. must be dismissed
Although mother noticed an appeal from the termination of
her parental rights over D.C. she raises no argument concerning
termination of her parental rights over D.C. An appealed-from
judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is mother’s burden to raise
claims of reversible error or other defects and present argument
and authority supporting those claims. Because mother failed to
do so, her appeal regarding terminating her parental rights as to
D.C. is dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994; In re
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 846.)

DISPOSITION
Michael C.’s and mother’s (D.H.’s) appeal from the juvenile
court’s order terminating parental rights over D.C. is dismissed.
The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights over I.R. is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.

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Description This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights over D.C. (born in 2015) and I.R. (born in 2017). D.C. was two years old and I.R. was 11 months old when they were removed from mother’s custody. D.C. did not have any relationship with his biological father, Michael C., who has appealed from the order terminating parental rights. I.R. did not have any relationship with his alleged father, Chris R., who did n
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