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Payton v. Lumier CA2/5

Payton v. Lumier CA2/5
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11:19:2026

Filed 11/19/26 Payton v. Lumier CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SALLYANNE PAYTON, B346859

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV07767)

LUMIER, LLC et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Barbara M. Scheper and Rolf M. Treu, Judges.
Affirmed.
A.O.E. Law & Associates and Anthony O. Egbase for
Defendants and Appellants.
Forry Law Group and Craig B. Forry for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Plaintiff and respondent Sallyanne Payton (Payton) sued
defendants and appellants Lumier LLC (Lumier) and Liudmila
Viktorovna Kirsanova (Kirsanova), Lumier’s managing member,
for financial elder abuse, fraud, and false promises (among other
causes of action) in connection with the sale of real property.
Following a one-day bench trial, the court announced a proposed
oral decision in Payton’s favor that was later memorialized (with
some modifications) in a final judgment. We consider defendants’
various arguments for reversal: whether the trial court erred by
not issuing a written statement of decision in advance of the final
judgment; whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings on the aforementioned causes of action, on Kirsanova’s
personal liability, and on punitive damages; whether emotional
distress damages were recoverable and supported by substantial
evidence; whether the court abused its discretion in excluding a
potential defense witness; and whether the court’s verdict
constitutes an impermissible double recovery.

I. BACKGROUND
In 2003, Payton, a law professor, became the owner of a
multifamily home on West 22nd Street in Los Angeles (the “22nd
Street property” or “the property”). Many years later, in
September 2021, after she had retired from teaching, Payton sold
the property to Lumier for $800,000.1

1
In the summer of 2021, Lumier purchased three properties
from Payton. In addition to the 22nd Street property, Lumier
purchased a property on 89th Street in Los Angeles and one on
Bandera Street in Montclair.

2
To finance its purchase of the property, Lumier obtained a
new first trust deed loan in the amount of $600,000 and executed
a purchase money second trust deed loan in favor of Payton in
the amount of $215,000 (the Note). The Note provided as follows:
“I/We jointly and severally, promise to pay [Payton] . . . [¶] the
principal sum of [$215,000] with interest from October 1, 2021[,]
on unpaid principal at the rate of 4.0000 per cent per annum,
payable in monthly installments . . . beginning on . . . November
1, 2021, and continuing until . . . October 1, 2022, at which time
the entire principal balance together with interest due thereon,
shall become due and payable.” The Note provided further:
“Should default be made in payment of any of the installment of
principal or interest when due, the whole sum of principal and
interest shall, at the option of the holder of this note, become
immediately due and payable. . . . If action be instituted on this
note, I/We promise to pay such sum as the Court may fix as
attorney’s fees.” The Note was signed by Kirsanova as Lumier’s
managing member.2
In March 2022, six months after transferring the property
to Lumier and not receiving any of the payments due under the
Note, Payton sued defendants. In her verified second amended
complaint, which is the operative pleading, Payton averred
defendants never had any intention to pay her any of the money
due under the Note and asserted causes of action for fraud,
financial elder abuse, negligent misrepresentation, false promise,

2
As Lumier’s managing member, Kirsanova also signed a
number of other documents relating to Lumier’s purchase of the
property, including the purchase agreement and joint escrow
instructions, amended escrow instructions, and the deed of trust.

3
constructive fraud, breach of written contract, quiet title,
cancellation of deeds, and declaratory relief. Payton also alleged
that there existed a unity of interest and ownership between
defendants such that Kirsanova was Lumier’s alter ego. She
sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and her
attorney fees.
On the date trial was set to begin in December 2024, the
trial judge advised she was retiring at the end of the month and if
the trial lasted longer than eight hours and a statement of
decision were required, the court would not have time to prepare
a written statement of decision, receive proposed objections, and
then issue a final judgment before retiring. The court also
explained that if there were a proper and timely request for a
written statement of decision and it could not prepare one before
retiring, the matter would have to be retried before a different
judge.
Payton’s attorney volunteered that an oral statement of
decision would be “perfectly acceptable” because he believed trial
would take less than eight hours. Although defendants’ counsel
expressed concern the trial might last longer than eight hours
and did not “want to take the risk for that issue,” he did not
object to an oral statement of decision and stated “[w]e can toss
the coin, but I don’t want to retry the case again because
prosecutor plaintiff’s defects [sic].”
The case proceeded to trial and three witnesses testified:
Payton, Kirsanova, and Kirsanova’s husband Eduardo Antonio
Canas (Canas).
Payton, who was 78 years old when she sold the 22nd
Street property to Lumier, testified she considered the property,
which she had “set aside for [her] retirement,” to be an “asset

4
essential to [her] welfare as a senior citizen”; accordingly, she
relied on the expectation of receiving $215,000 when she sold the
property to Lumier. She testified further that she never had any
direct communications with defendants, never received any of the
payments due under the Note, and defendants never tendered
the $215,000 to her; if they had, Payton “would have taken the
tender and we would not have [had] the lawsuit.” Payton
testified that had she known defendants would not honor their
obligations under the Note, she never would have agreed to sell
the property to them. The sale of the 22nd Street property to
Lumier caused Payton to suffer “substantial economic damage,”
including loss of rental income from the property. Defendants’
failure to honor their obligations under the Note caused Payton
to feel “betrayed,” which gave rise to feelings of “frustration[ and]
anger.”
Kirsanova, a licensed real estate broker, was called as an
adverse witness by Payton pursuant to Evidence Code section
776. Kirsanova testified she formed Lumier in 2017 and was its
“only member”; the “LLC,” she explained, “is me.” She stated she
never personally met with or spoke to Payton.
Kirsanova admitted Lumier did not make any of the
required payments under the Note. She admitted further that,
following the purchase of the 22nd Street property, Lumier
borrowed more than $421,000 through loans secured by other
properties but did not use those funds to pay Payton any of the
monies owed under the Note. In addition, Kirsanova testified
that from “time to time” ownership of various properties was
transferred from Lumier to her personally without any
consideration being paid by her to the company. When pressed
about whether she should have paid Lumier for the properties

5
the company transferred to her, she expressed confusion, “I don’t
understand. What would I pay to Lumier? . . . [¶] . . . [¶] What
consideration? . . . How could I pay? I had no money to pay.” She
also testified that prior to the filing of the lawsuit she never
received a payment demand from Payton and that she never tried
to contact Payton about payments due under the Note even after
Payton filed suit.
Canas, a licensed real estate broker and the defense’s only
witness, testified that after Lumier acquired the 22nd Street
property he became its manager. He found the property, which
was purchased “as is,” to be in a state of some disrepair, rating it
a four out ten, with ten being “beautiful.” He affirmed that his
wife Kirsanova did not make any payments on the Note.
During Payton’s rebuttal case, she introduced a passage
from Kirsanova’s deposition in which Kirsanova testified that
when she signed the Note, she did not have the intention to make
payments as required by the Note’s terms; rather, “the intention
was to start pay[ing] as soon as we were . . . financially . . . able.”
After the conclusion of testimony, the court gave the parties
a proposed oral statement of decision on the record.3 The court
indicated it would find in Payton’s favor on all claims with the
exception of the financial elder abuse cause of action. The court
would find against Payton on that claim because there was no
evidence “defendants knew that [Payton] fell within the protected

3
The reporter’s transcript of the trial confirms that trial
(including the taking of evidence, argument and responses to
court questions by counsel, and the court’s proposed oral
statement of decision) were all completed on a single calendar
day, December 9, 2024.

6
category of an elder under the statute.” Elaborating, the court
stated it understood “there is not necessarily an intent
requirement, [but it] th[ought] the defendant[s] at least ha[d] to
know that their actions [we]re affecting or could affect an elder in
an adverse way”; because there was “[n]ever any interaction
other than in writing” between the parties, there was no evidence
defendants knew Payton was an elder.
Continuing with its oral statement, the court remarked it
believed alter ego liability had not been established, “[s]o the
judgment would go against Lumier only.” The court awarded
Payton $150,000 in emotional distress damages, prejudgment
interest at four percent, $100,000 in punitive damages, and
ordered Payton be restored as the property’s title holder. The
court directed Payton to prepare a proposed judgment on a
Judicial Council “JUD-100 form” for the emotional distress
damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and unpaid
late fees due under the Note. The court specified, however, that
the damage award would not include the $215,000 in principal
due under the Note. In addition, the court directed Payton to
prepare a set of orders restoring ownership of the property to her
and established a schedule for the parties to file objections to
either the oral statement of decision or the proposed judgment.
Payton filed a proposed judgment on a JUD-100 form
awarding her a total of $280,129.24, and proposed orders
restoring title to the property to her. Concurrently, she objected
to the oral statement of decision. She argued the Elder Abuse
and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,4

4
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

7
§ 15610 et seq.) (the Elder Abuse Act or the Act) did not require
defendants to know either her age or that their fraudulent
conduct affected or could affect an “elder” in an adverse manner.
Payton also urged the court to find both defendants jointly and
severally liable for financial elder abuse.
Defendants objected only to the proposed judgment. They
maintained that Kirsanova could not be found liable on the
financial elder abuse cause of action because she was not the
buyer of the 22nd Street property and Payton failed to establish
Kirsanova as Lumier’s alter ego. Accordingly, they requested
Kirsanova be stricken from the proposed judgment.
On December 30, 2024, the trial court entered judgment for
Payton utilizing a JUD-100 form. The judgment awarded her a
total of $280,129.24 as follows: $252,632.92 in damages,5
$27,496.32 in prejudgment interest at the annual rate of four
percent, and attorney fees and costs to be awarded later
according to proof. The judgment was entered against both
Lumier and Kirsanova. The court also signed orders quieting
title to the 22nd Street property in Payton’s favor and voiding the
deed that was recorded in favor of Lumier following the
September 2021 sale.
The case was subsequently reassigned to another judge for
further proceedings and Payton moved for an award of $174,720

5
The record indicates the damage award includes emotional
distress and punitive damages ($150,000 plus $100,000), but it is
unclear from the record whether the remaining $2,632.92 in
damages reflects late charges owed under the Note, which the
court agreed should be included.

8
in attorney fees.6 She argued she was entitled to her attorney
fees as the prevailing party at trial under the terms of the
parties’ contracts, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Elder
Abuse Act. Lumier opposed the motion. It contended Kirsanova
was not liable for Payton’s attorney fees because she signed the
Note on behalf of Lumier only, not on her own behalf. The trial
court continued the hearing on the fees motion after learning
defendants would be moving to vacate the judgment.
That motion was filed in February 2025. Defendants
argued the judgment was infirm and reflected a clerical error
because it was entered against both defendants even though the
court’s proposed statement of decision indicated it would be
entered against Lumier only.
Payton opposed the motion to vacate. She argued there
was no clerical error by the trial court in rendering judgment;
rather, after considering the parties’ respective objections to the
proposed statement of decision and the proposed judgment, the
trial court exercised its judicial discretion and reached different
conclusions as to Kirsanova’s personal liability (on an alter ego
theory) and defendants’ liability under the Elder Abuse Act.
Payton additionally argued any error resulting from the trial
court’s exercise of its judicial discretion could be raised only
through a motion brought within 15 days of the mailing of the
notice of entry of judgment and defendants’ motion to vacate was
untimely because it was filed almost two months after notice of
entry was mailed.

6
At around the same time, Payton also sought $11,528.74 in
costs. The record does not include a ruling on Payton’s costs
memorandum.

9
The trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motion to
vacate in April 2025.7 In a minute order dated that same day, the
court denied the motion. The court found defendants had not
shown the judgment was the result of clerical error rather than
an exercise of judicial discretion; the record, the court observed,
showed the judge that presided at trial approved the final
judgment after considering the objections to its oral statement of
decision.
A few days later, the trial court held a hearing on Payton’s
motion for attorney fees. Defendants’ attorney did not appear.8
The court found Payton was entitled to attorney fees as the
prevailing party on the elder abuse cause of action and that both
defendants were liable for those fees. Because the total amount
of fees and their rates were found reasonable, the court awarded
Payton her requested fees of $174,720.

II. DISCUSSION
None of defendants’ arguments for reversal is persuasive.
The argument that the court erred by not issuing a written
statement of decision fails for multiple reasons: defendants did
not request a written statement, they acquiesced in the court’s
decision to provide an oral statement, and the record confirms
trial was completed in one calendar day such that the court was
not obligated to prepare a written statement of decision even if

7
The record does not contain a reporter’s transcript or
settled statement memorializing what occurred during the
hearing on defendants’ motion to vacate the judgment.
8
The record also includes no reporter’s transcript or a settled
statement of the hearing on Payton’s motion for attorney fees.

10
one had been properly requested. The trial court’s findings on
the financial elder abuse, fraud, and false promise causes of
action are supported by substantial evidence: Kirsanova testified
she never made any of the payments required under the Note and
conceded at deposition that she never had any intention to
comply with the Note’s terms. Substantial evidence also supports
the liability and damages terms of the judgment: Kirsanova
testified she treated the company as an extension of herself and
its assets as her own; Kirsanova testified defendants’ failure to
abide by the terms of the parties’ agreement was not an innocent
error, but part of a deliberate plan to disregard Payton’s rights
under the Note; and Payton described feeling strong emotions as
a result of defendants’ fraudulent conduct. Finally, by failing to
oppose Payton’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of a
purported oral agreement and by failing to raise any concerns in
the trial court about a possible double recovery, defendants
forfeited those contentions on appeal.

A. A Written Statement of Decision Was Not Required
Former section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in
pertinent part, provides as follows: “The court shall issue a
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its
decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial
upon the request of any party appearing at the trial. The request
must be made within 10 days after the court announces a
tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one
calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one day
in which event the request must be made prior to the submission
of the matter for decision. . . . [¶] The statement of decision shall
be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree

11
otherwise; however, when the trial is concluded within one
calendar day or in less than 8 hours over more than one day, the
statement of decision may be made orally on the record in the
presence of the parties.”9 (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1590(n) [“When a trial is completed within one day or in less
than eight hours over more than one day, a request for statement
of decision must be made before the matter is submitted for
decision and the statement of decision may be made orally on the
record in the presence of the parties”].)
The trial court was not required to issue a written
statement of decision because there was no proper request for
such a statement. Defendants never requested a statement of
decision, either before or after the trial. While Payton did
initially request a statement of decision prior to trial, she
effectively withdrew that request when she agreed on the day of
trial to accept an oral statement decision—and defendants
acquiesced to an oral statement too when stating they could “toss
the coin” (as to whether trial would exceed eight hours).
Furthermore, even if the parties had not acquiesced in the
proposal for an oral statement of decision, the court was still
authorized to provide an oral (rather than written) statement
because trial was completed in one day.
That the trial court later amended its oral statement of
decision in the terms of the judgment that was entered after
considering the objections filed by the parties was not, as
defendants suggest, improper. Rather, that is how the rules
permit the process to work. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(k)

9
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 was amended in 2025
in ways immaterial to the issue in this appeal.

12
[“The court may order a hearing on proposals or objections to a
proposed statement of decision or the proposed judgment”], italics
added; Bay World Trading, Ltd. v. Nebraska Beef, Inc. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 135, 141 [“Because judgment had not yet been
entered, the trial court had inherent power to amend its
statement of decision to award prejudgment interest. Even after
a court has issued a written decision, the court retains the power
to change its findings of fact or conclusions of law until judgment
is entered”]; see also In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1029-1030.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Judgment
1. Standard of review
In reviewing a judgment following a bench trial we “apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s
findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this deferential standard of
review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the
judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings. [Citation.]” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “The testimony of a
single witness may be sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence.” (Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 962, 969.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before
the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate

13
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.)

2. Substantial evidence supports the finding on
the financial elder abuse cause of action
The Elder Abuse Act was enacted to protect elders, defined
as “any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older”
(§ 15610.27), and dependent adults from abuse and neglect
(Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 841, 858). The Act protects against both “[p]hysical
abuse” and “[f]inancial abuse.” (§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1) & (3).)
Financial elder abuse occurs when an elder is wrongfully
“deprived of any property right, including by means of an
agreement . . . .” (§ 15610.30, subd. (c).) The elements of a cause
of action for financial elder abuse are (1) the defendant took, hid,
appropriated, obtained, or retained plaintiff’s property; (2)
plaintiff is at least 65 years of age or a dependent adult; (3) the
defendant took, hid, appropriated, obtained, or retained plaintiff’s
property for a wrongful use, with the intent to defraud, or by
undue influence; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the
defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s
harm. (§ 15610.30; CACI No. 3100.)
“[A] party may engage in elder abuse by misappropriating
funds to which an elder is entitled under a contract.” (Paslay v.
State Farm General Ins. Co. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 639, 656.)
“[T]o establish a ‘wrongful use’ of property to which an elder has
a contract right, the elder must demonstrate a breach of the
contract, or other improper conduct.” (Id. at 657.) Where, as

14
here, the plaintiff alleges financial elder abuse occurred by
breach of contract, the plaintiff must show “the party who
violates the contract actually knows that it is engaging in a
harmful breach, or reasonably should be aware of the harmful
breach.” (Id. at 658; see also id. at 658, fn. 15 [“the legislative
history [of section 15610.30] does not demonstrate an intent to
deem mere breaches of contract actionable instances of elder
abuse”].) At one time, a plaintiff was required to prove a
defendant’s “bad faith” in depriving an elder of his or her
property, but that showing is no longer a required element.
(Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 860 & fn. 18; Cameron v. Las
Orchidias Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 507 [“A
plaintiff is not required to prove bad faith or fraud to prevail on a
claim of financial elder abuse”].)
The evidence at trial established each of the required
elements for financial elder abuse. When Payton was more than
65 years old, defendants obtained from her the 22nd Street
property and they did so via their express promise in the Note to
pay her $215,000 in monthly installments at four percent
interest. At the time they entered into the Note, defendants had
no intention of complying with its terms. After signing the Note,
defendants failed to make any of the required payments despite
the cash flowing into their accounts from other loans. In view of
the Note’s acceleration clause and attorney fees provision,
defendants reasonably should have known that their failure to
make any payments would constitute a breach that would cause
Payton to suffer harm. As a direct result of defendants’ conduct,
Payton suffered various financial losses, including the loss of the
principal and interest payments she expected under the Note and

15
the rental income she lost when she sold the property to
defendants.

3. Substantial evidence supports the fraud and
false promise findings
“The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of
falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance;
(4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” (Robinson
Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 990,
citing Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)
“‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud
and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the
intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that
may be actionable fraud. [Citations.] [¶] An action for
promissory fraud may lie where a defendant fraudulently induces
the plaintiff to enter into a contract.” (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th
at 638; accord, Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1443, 1453 [“The elements of promissory fraud (i.e.,
of fraud or deceit based on a promise made without any intention
of performing it) are: (1) a promise made regarding a material
fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of
the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3)
intent to deceive or induce the promisee to enter into a
transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promisee; (5)
nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6)
resulting damage to the promise”].) In establishing the intent not
to perform, “[i]t is insufficient to show an unkept but honest
promise, or mere subsequent failure of performance. [Citation.]

16
‘“[S]omething more than nonperformance is required to prove the
defendant’s intent not to perform his promise.” [Citations.]’”
(Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production
Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1183.)
The trial court’s findings of fraud and false promise are
supported by substantial evidence. To induce Payton to sell the
22nd Street property to them, defendants promised in writing—
as evidenced by the Note and related documents—to pay her
$215,000 plus interest within a year’s time. Payton relied on that
promise in deciding to sell the property to them. It was
uncontested defendants never made any of the required
payments under the Note. And in addition to defendants’
nonperformance, the evidence at trial showed defendants—as
Kirsanova conceded at her deposition—never had any intention
to perform in accordance with the Note’s terms; they would pay
Payton only when it was financially convenient for them to do so.
Defendants’ failure to contact Payton about their
nonperformance, both before and after the filing of the lawsuit, is
additional circumstantial evidence of defendants’ intent to never
abide by the Note’s terms.

4. Substantial evidence supports the alter ego
finding against Kirsanova
“‘The alter ego doctrine arises when a plaintiff comes into
court claiming that an opposing party is using the corporate form
unjustly and in derogation of the plaintiff’s interests. . . . In
certain circumstances the court will disregard the corporate
entity and will hold the individual shareholders liable for the
actions of the corporation[.]’” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 486, 510.) “‘The essence of the alter ego doctrine

17
is that justice be done. “. . . [L]iability is imposed to reach an
equitable result.” . . . Thus the corporate form will be disregarded
only in narrowly defined circumstances and only when the ends
of justice so require.’” (Id. at 511, quoting Mesler v. Bragg
Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300-301.)
Under California law, “the alter ego doctrine extends to
LLCs [citations], and generally requires the proponent to
demonstrate two elements: (1) a unity of interest and ownership
such that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual do not exist; and (2) an inequitable result if the
corporate identity is not disregarded.” (JPV I L.P. v. Koetting
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 172, 189.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Kirsanova should be held liable for the actions of Lumier as
the company’s alter ego. Testimony and trial exhibits established
Kirsanova founded Lumier, was its managing partner and only
member, signed the purchase documents for the 22nd Street
property on behalf of Lumier, and regarded the company as
interchangeable with herself—in her words, the “LLC is me.” In
addition, the evidence showed Kirsanova treated the assets in
Lumier’s real estate portfolio as her own, transferring ownership
of properties from the company to herself without paying any
consideration to the company for the properties.10 The alter ego
finding was well-supported.

10
Because Kirsanova was transferring valuable real estate
from the company to herself, there was a risk that if the
judgment was rendered against Lumier alone, the company
would not have the assets to pay the judgment owed to Payton.

18
5. Substantial evidence supports the punitive
damages award
The Elder Abuse Act permits imposition of punitive
damages under Civil Code section 3294. (§ 15657.5, subd. (d).)
“In a civil case not arising from the breach of a contractual
obligation, [the fact finder] may award punitive damages ‘where
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.’ (Civ. Code,
§ 3294, subd. (a).)” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
686, 712.) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant
with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) “‘Malice’” is
defined as intentional injury or “despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294,
subd. (c)(1).)
“‘[P]unitive damages should not be allowable upon evidence
that is merely consistent with the hypothesis of malice, fraud,
gross negligence[,] or oppressiveness. Rather some evidence
should be required that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the tortious conduct was the result of a mistake of law or fact,
honest error of judgment, over-zealousness, mere negligence[,] or
other such noniniquitous human failing.’” (Tomaselli v.
Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1288, fn. 14.)
Here, there is substantial evidence defendants’ failure to
abide by the terms of the parties’ agreement was not an innocent
error or an honest mistake, but part of a deliberate plan to
disregard Payton’s rights under the Note and deprive her of the

19
monies owed thereunder. Despite promising in writing to
embark immediately on a fixed schedule of monthly payments,
defendants never made a single payment owed to Payton under
the Note. Moreover, at no time prior to the filing of the lawsuit
did defendants communicate with Payton about their default. As
Kirsanova confessed at her deposition, defendants never intended
to abide by the Note’s terms; they intended to pay Payton only
when they were “financially . . . able,” with their ability to pay
determined by some undisclosed metric other than available
funds in their bank accounts.

C. Emotional Distress Damages Were Available and
Their Award to Payton Is Supported by Substantial
Evidence
“‘Whether a plaintiff is “entitled to a particular measure of
damages is a question of law subject to de novo review.
[Citations.] The amount of damages, on the other hand, is a fact
question . . . [and] an award of damages will not be disturbed if it
is supported by substantial evidence.”’” (Madani v. Rabinowitz
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 602, 610; accord, Tan Jay Internat., Ltd. v.
Canadian Indemnity Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 695, 708
[“Determinations concerning emotional distress—its existence
and the appropriate compensation for it—are left to the finder of
fact, . . . , based on an entire evidentiary record, including the
reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it”].)
Although damages for emotional distress are generally not
awarded for fraud or negligent misrepresentation (Devin v.
United Services Auto. Assn. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1162; but
see Robinson Helicopter, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 989-990, 993), such
damages are available for financial elder abuse (Atlas v.

20
Davidyan (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1097-1098 [“Although a
plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress damages on a claim of
fraud solely affecting property rights, the complaint also includes
claims of financial elder abuse, . . . for which such damages are
an appropriate remedy”]; accord, Cameron, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th
at 519 [affirming award of $250,000 in emotional distress
damages for financial elder abuse where landlord refused to re-
rent to plaintiff the rent-stabilized apartment she had lived in for
52 years]).
The term “emotional distress” refers to “the full gamut of
intangible mental suffering, including not only physical pain, but
also ‘fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification,
shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension,
terror[,] or ordeal.’” (Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair
Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 48, fn. 4;
accord, Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d
889, 892-93; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn.
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 433.) Although the law does not
compensate emotional injuries which are “trivial or transitory”
(Tan Jay, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at 708), there is no requirement
that a plaintiff’s emotional distress be profound in nature
(Capelouto, supra, at 892-893 [discussing “‘mental suffering
naturally ensuing from the acts complained of’” and not requiring
that such suffering be severe]; Crisci, supra, at 433 [same];
accord, Tan Jay, supra, at 708 [“Upholding . . . an award [of
emotional distress damages] does not require proof of
bankruptcy, physical illness or injury, nor courtroom
demonstrations of the destruction of personal peace of mind or
well-being”]). Competent proof of emotional distress may be
made by the testimony of the plaintiff alone. (Tan Jay, supra, at

21
708 [“a [factfinder] may properly rely on the testimony of one
person to reach its conclusion”].)
Substantial evidence supports the award of emotional
distress damages. The trial court heard testimony from Payton
that the 22nd Street property was an asset “essential” to her
retirement and welfare as a senior citizen. She testified further
that when defendants failed to make any of the promised
payments due under the Note, she not only suffered “substantial”
economic damage, but she also felt “anger[ed],” “frustrat[ed],” and
“betrayed.” Having had the opportunity to view Payton’s
demeanor, as well as listen to her testimony, the trial court was
entitled to reasonably conclude that her emotional distress
arising from the fraud perpetrated on her was neither trivial nor
transitory. (Crisci, supra, 66 Cal.2d at 433 [“damages for mental
distress have also been awarded in cases where the tortious
conduct was an interference with property rights without any
personal injuries apart from the mental distress”].)

D. Defendants Forfeited their Argument that the Trial
Court Erred by Precluding Evidence About a
Purported Oral Modification
1. Additional background
Before trial, Payton moved in limine to exclude, among
other things, any evidence that defendants were excused from
their obligations under the Note based on a purported oral
agreement by the parties that allowed defendants to make
payments under the Note only when they were financially able to
do so (motion in limine No. 1). Payton maintained that
introduction of evidence of any such purported oral agreement
was barred by the terms of the parties’ escrow instructions and

22
various provisions of the Civil Code. In addition, Payton argued
the parties’ dual-representation real estate agent Angela Dowell
(Dowell),11 who purportedly told defendants they did not need to
make any payments under the Note until they chose to do so,
lacked the authority to make any such representation.
Defendants did not file an opposition to motion in limine No. 1 or
to any of Payton’s other motions in limine.
On December 9, 2024, the day of trial, the trial court
granted motion in limine No. 1, as well as Payton’s other motions
in limine, because they were “well taken” and defendants did not
oppose them.
At trial, when Kirsanova’s attorney asked her why she
never made any of the installment payments required by the
Note, Kirsanova testified: “I didn’t make those payments because
we were told that we can have time to start repairing the
property . . . . And I didn’t have any information from [Payton]
that she changed her mind or she needs me to pay money or
whatever. I always pay. I have never been late on any loan
payment.” She testified further that it was Dowell who told her
defendants did not need to make any payments due under the
Note. Payton objected on the ground that Kirsanova’s testimony

11
At trial, Kirsanova and defendants’ attorney referred to the
parties’ dual agent as “Angela Doyle.” In their opening brief on
appeal, defendants continue to refer to “Angela Doyle,” while
Payton refers to the dual agent as “Angela Dowell.” We use
“Angela Dowell” because that is the name that appears on the
parties’ purchase agreement as the broker for both seller and
buyer.

23
violated the court’s ruling on motion in limine No. 1. The court
sustained the objection and struck the offending testimony.
After the parties rested, defendants advised the trial court
they nonetheless wanted to reopen the taking of evidence and call
Dowell to testify in rebuttal; they argued Dowell was a “key”
witness because she would testify about the parties’ “installment
payment waiver.” The court denied the request to reopen and
explained that Dowell would not be allowed to testify in light of
its ruling on unopposed motion in limine No. 1.

2. By failing to oppose Payton’s motion in limine
No. 1, defendants forfeited their argument on
appeal
Defendants maintain the trial court erred by refusing to
hear Dowell’s testimony about a purported oral modification of
the Note. Defendants forfeited any such argument by failing to
oppose Payton’s motion in limine No. 1. (Mangano v. Verity, Inc.
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 217, 221 [defendant who failed to oppose
motion in limine to exclude evidence forfeited his ability to argue
on appeal that the evidence was improperly excluded]; see also
Evid. Code, § 354 [a judgment or decision shall not be reversed
for the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the party brings
the matter to the trial court’s attention]; Southern California Gas
Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483, fn. 7 [“Because
Daneshrad did not file any opposition to the motions [for attorney
fees and to collect judgment] . . . , we conclude Daneshrad has
waived all arguments against the motions].)

24
E. Defendants Forfeited Their Argument about a
Potential Double Recovery
Defendants contend there are “serious questions of remedy
consistency and double recovery,” because Payton received both
the property and monetary damages and the written judgment
does not explain the basis for Payton’s damages award.
Defendants’ argument is forfeited for failure to raise the
issue below. Defendants had at least two opportunities in the
trial court to raise their concerns about a possible double recovery
by Payton. The first occasion was after Payton submitted a
proposed judgment. Although defendants objected to the
proposed judgment, they confined their objections to two issues:
whether Kirsanova, who did not sign the Note, should be liable
on the financial elder abuse claim and whether Payton had
shown Kirsanova to be the alter ego of Lumier. After the court
issued the final judgment, defendants had a second opportunity
to raise the double recovery issue with the trial court when they
moved to vacate the judgment. Once again, defendants elected
not to bring the potential double recovery to the attention of the
court. Having failed to raise the issue in the trial court, the issue
is forfeited. (Southern California Gas, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
483, fn. 7.)
Furthermore, even if defendants’ double recovery
contention had been preserved, it is still inadequately presented
in this court. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“We are not bound to develop appellants’
arguments for them”].) Insofar as we can discern from the
cursory presentation of the argument, it fails because the trial
court was alert to the possibility of an excessive award and did
not double Payton’s recovery by returning the property to her and

25
awarding her the $215,000 owed on the Note. Instead, the court
expressly stated on the record that the monetary damages did not
include the $215,000 in principal due under the Note and was
instead the aggregate sum of emotional distress damages,
punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and fees.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Payton is awarded costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.
We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

26





Description Plaintiff and respondent Sallyanne Payton (Payton) sued defendants and appellants Lumier LLC (Lumier) and Liudmila Viktorovna Kirsanova (Kirsanova), Lumier’s managing member, for financial elder abuse, fraud, and false promises (among other causes of action) in connection with the sale of real property. Following a one-day bench trial, the court announced a proposed oral decision in Payton’s favor that was later memorialized (with
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