Filed 11/19/26 In re F.B. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re F.B., a Person Coming Under B349318
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02299A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.M.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed in part, dismissed
in part.
Erika A. Williams, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
J.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition
order removing her son, F.B. (born July 2024), from her physical
custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.1
She argues that the court deprived her of a meaningful
disposition hearing and that insufficient evidence supported the
removal order. We disagree and affirm.
Mother also contends the social services agency failed to
satisfy its inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., ICWA) and state law
implementing ICWA, and the court erroneously failed to make an
ICWA finding. Because these arguments are not ripe for review,
we dismiss this aspect of the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Dependency Petition and Detention
In late July 2025, the Los Angeles Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging mother’s
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code, and undesignated references to rules
are to the California Rules of Court.
2 We do not recite the entire factual and procedural background,
as the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its history.
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847, 851.)
2
neglect of F.B. The reporting party was Tiffany P., a resource
(foster) parent for other children under DCFS’s supervision.
Tiffany P.’s friend, Adrian L., agreed to babysit F.B. while mother
visited the dentist. He did not consider mother to be a friend,
though he had known her for some months. Mother alarmed him
by disclosing that she gets “‘angry’ at the baby” and was “‘ready
to throw in the towel’” and “‘surrender’” him at a police station.
Adrian L. connected mother with Tiffany P.
On July 26, 2025, Tiffany P. met mother, who was
“paranoid,” “unable to sit still,” and behaving “erratic[ally].”
Mother said she smoked marijuana almost daily and had smoked
cocaine with F.B.’s alleged father, James J. (father). 3 She
described father as violent.
Tiffany P. was disturbed by mother’s interactions with F.B.
Mother “lash[ed] out” when the baby looked at her, and when he
reached for her, she pushed him away and told him to “‘go away.’”
(Italics omitted.) Mother said she kept F.B. in his playpen and
“isolat[ed]” him. She said, “‘[T]ake [F.B.] away from me, put him
in the system,’” citing her mental health and a lack of support.
Mother said she had already tried to leave F.B. with a neighbor.
Though she was going to Las Vegas the next day, Tiffany P.
agreed to care for F.B. overnight. Tiffany P. decided to take F.B.
on the trip after mother said she could not take F.B. home, and if
she did, she would “just ‘leave him in the playpen all day.’” When
they returned three days later, mother continued to express she
wanted F.B. to be taken away. She also said she wanted to leave
F.B. with father.
3 Father acknowledged possible paternity but said he did not
want to be involved with the child. Though notice of the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing was provided to him, he did not appear.
3
Mother told the social worker she was overwhelmed by
financial problems, lack of support, and sleeplessness. She said
she had postpartum depression since F.B.’s birth but had not
seen a doctor. Asked about symptoms of psychosis, mother
replied she “‘may have had an out of body experience’” that day
and when she left F.B. with Tiffany P. She admitted saying she
wanted F.B. to be taken away.
Mother claimed F.B. was conceived when father raped her.
Father, she said, was “‘a cokehead’” who had a criminal history.4
On the evening of July 31, 2025, mother left eight lengthy,
“incoherent” voicemails for the social worker, disparaging father
and calling him a “‘woman beater.’”
During the assessment of her home, mother showed the
social worker a bag of marijuana she stored in a kitchen drawer.
Though the apartment smelled of marijuana, mother denied
smoking in front of F.B. She said she would put him in a playpen
in the bedroom, close the door, and smoke outside. Mother said
she smoked “about 3 blunts” per week, plus hits from a THC vape
pen, and had used cocaine with father. She initially declined to
drug test,5 and she rejected the social worker’s offer of resources
for substance abuse counseling.
DCFS proposed a safety plan whereby F.B. would stay with
Tiffany P. for seven days. Mother agreed to this arrangement but
refused the social worker’s request to see an
4 DCFS reviewed a criminal history that included lengthy prison
terms for, among other offenses, attempted murder and assault with a
firearm.
5 Mother eventually drug tested in August and September 2025.
Her tests showed high levels of marijuana metabolites.
4
obstetrician/gynecologist (OB/GYN) to evaluate her postpartum
depression.
In early August 2025, F.B. was ordered removed from
mother and placed with Tiffany P. DCFS filed a dependency
petition alleging mother’s failure to protect F.B. due to her
mental and emotional problems and substance abuse.
Thereafter, F.B. was detained from mother following a hearing.
Before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, mother
contradicted some of her earlier statements. She denied saying
she did not want to care for F.B. She denied having symptoms of
postpartum depression and claimed that, despite undergoing
“many mental health assessments,” she had never been
diagnosed with mental health issues other than ADHD. Mother
admitted, however, that she had left F.B. “in the care of a few
people upon just meeting them.” She said Tiffany P. was her
“only support.”
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
September 2025, the court received DCFS’s reports into evidence
without objection from mother. Mother testified that she had
completed four parenting sessions and five individual counseling
sessions. She testified that she tried to pick up F.B. before
Tiffany P. took him to Las Vegas. She denied saying she wanted
F.B. taken away and said she was willing and able to care for
him. After mother finished her testimony, her counsel stated he
had no other evidence to present.
The court then invited argument. Mother’s counsel
requested dismissal of the petition and addressed the allegations,
5
the evidence offered in support, and mother’s testimony. After
hearing from the other attorneys, the court announced its ruling.
The court found insufficient evidence to support the
allegation that mother was “unable and unwilling” to provide
F.B. with care, supervision, and the basic necessities of life. It
found the “gravamen of the case” was her mental health problems
and substance abuse, and with treatment and help, she would be
able to care for F.B. It sustained the allegation that mother’s
mental and emotional problems rendered her incapable of
providing care and supervision. It sustained the allegation of
mother’s drug use after amending it to state that she is a “recent”
abuser of cocaine and marijuana, which “tends to” render her
incapable of providing regular care and supervision.
The court found that mother, by her own admission, was
overwhelmed, struggling financially, sleep-deprived, and
suffering from postpartum depression, and she appeared to be
self-medicating with marijuana. It found she was “not acting
protectively” and identified many circumstances to support this
finding. She refused to see an OB/GYN to address her
postpartum depression. She told others that F.B. would be
“‘better off elsewhere, just take him.’” She left F.B. with people
“she doesn’t even know.” Mother ignored F.B., rejected him when
he sought hugs, and left him in a playpen all day. Though
mother said she would not hurt F.B., she still indicated it would
be a “‘good idea’” for him to stay with Tiffany P. “‘for a while.’”
Mother relied on others to provide wipes, diapers, and food for
F.B. but was able to buy marijuana.
The court then found F.B. was a child described by
section 300, subdivision (b) and declared him a dependent. It
found that allowing F.B. to continue to reside in mother’s home
6
was contrary to F.B.’s welfare, basing this determination on the
facts it outlined, those found true in the sustained petition, and
the totality of the circumstances as represented by the documents
on file. Mother’s need for “significant help” was indicated by the
above-described facts, as well other issues including her refusal
to drug test. The court found mother was not credible in claiming
she had undergone many mental health assessments but none
indicated a need for treatment.
The court found DCFS’s efforts to prevent removal were
reasonable, given mother’s unwillingness to address her
postpartum depression. It ordered reunification services that
included a drug and alcohol program, drug tests, parenting
classes, individual counseling, and a psychiatric evaluation.
Before concluding, the court asked: “Is there anything further?”
Mother’s counsel did not respond.
Mother appealed from the disposition order.
DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err In Removing F.B.
From Mother’s Custody
1. Mother Was Not Deprived of a Meaningful
Disposition Hearing
Mother first argues that the juvenile court ordered removal
of F.B. without conducting a disposition hearing that afforded her
a meaningful opportunity to present and challenge evidence
relevant to removal. She contends that the court treated
disposition as uncontested and prevented her from giving further
testimony, confronting witnesses, cross-examining social workers,
and offering other evidence. DCFS argues that mother has
forfeited her claim of error by failing to object at the hearing.
7
Mother, who did not file a reply brief, does not respond to this
argument.
We agree with DCFS. A reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider challenges based on procedural defects or erroneous
rulings where an objection could have been but was not made in
the lower court. (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742,
754.) The forfeiture rule encourages parties to bring errors to the
attention of the juvenile court so that they may be corrected.
(Ibid.) Mother failed to challenge the hearing procedure below,
and hence, forfeits her claim of error on appeal.
Mother’s argument is unpersuasive in any event. She
seems to argue that by failing to require argument and evidence
specific to disposition, the juvenile court violated her due process
rights and its obligation to receive evidence under section 358
and rule 5.690(b).6 The sole case mother cites, In re R.O. (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 586, does not support her argument. There, the
court gave the mother notice of a “confirmation hearing,” at
which the court would confirm the parties were ready to go
forward at a contested jurisdictional hearing two weeks later.
(Id. at p. 593.) When mother failed to appear at the confirmation
hearing, the court converted it into an uncontested jurisdictional
hearing and made findings against her over her counsel’s
objections. (Ibid.) Because “mother was not placed on notice that
this ‘confirmation hearing’ would or could be converted into an
6 Section 358, subdivision (a), provides, “After finding that a child
is a person described in Section 300, the court shall hear evidence on
the question of the proper disposition to be made of the child. . . .” In
pertinent part, rule 5.690(b) requires a court to “receive in evidence
and consider the social study, a guardianship assessment, the report of
any CASA volunteer, the case plan, and any relevant evidence offered
by petitioner [or] . . . the parent . . . .”
8
uncontested jurisdictional hearing if she failed to appear,” mother
was denied due process. (Ibid.)
Here, mother does not argue she lacked notice of the
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. She acknowledges
“the juvenile court is permitted to hold combined adjudication
and disposition hearings” (boldface and capitalization omitted),
commonly does so, and her counsel was prepared to address both
jurisdiction and disposition at the hearing. Mother acquiesced to
the admission of DCFS’s reports. She offered her own testimony
as evidence, and when she finished testifying, her counsel stated
he had no other evidence to present. Before concluding the
hearing, the court invited counsel to raise any unaddressed
issues, but mother’s counsel voiced no desire to do so. Reviewing
this issue de novo, we conclude that the court’s conduct provided
mother with due process and complied with section 358. (See In
re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236, 241 [procedural due
process claims are reviewed de novo because the ultimate
determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of
law].)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Removal
Findings
Mother alternatively contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding that F.B. could not be safely
returned to mother’s care under section 361, subdivision (c). We
disagree.
A dependent child may not be taken from the parent’s
physical custody under section 361 unless the court finds clear
and convincing evidence that there is or would be a substantial
danger to the child’s physical health, safety, protection, or
9
physical or emotional well-being if returned home, and that there
are no reasonable means to protect the child’s physical health
without removing the child. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1065.) The court must determine “‘whether reasonable
efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal
of the minor from his or her home’” and “‘shall state the facts on
which the decision to remove the minor is based.’” (Ibid., quoting
§ 361, subd. (e).)
“In determining whether a child may be safely maintained
in the parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider
the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, and the
parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) “The
parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been
harmed before removal is appropriate.” (In re T.W. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) We review an order removing a child
from parental custody for substantial evidence in a light most
favorable to the court’s findings. (In re K.S. (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 327, 341.)
Taking the clear and convincing evidence standard into
account, substantial evidence supports the removal of F.B. from
mother’s care. Mother was unwilling to address her mental
health and substance abuse problems. She minimized her drug
abuse by claiming marijuana was “‘not a drug’” because it was
“legal” and by suggesting F.B. was unaffected because she
smoked outside while leaving him unsupervised behind a closed
bedroom door. (See In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94,
105–106 [history of drug abuse, denial of drug problem, and
refusal to drug test and enter drug treatment supported finding
no alternative to removal].) Moreover, she repeatedly put F.B. at
10
risk by trusting near strangers to care for him, and she
considered leaving him with his father, whom she described as
violent and a “‘cokehead.’” Mother’s lack of a support system
meant no one could intervene if she had another lapse in
judgment. Though mother suggests there were alternatives to
removal, she fails to explain how anything short of constant
monitoring could protect F.B. if he were left unattended or with
near strangers.
Mother’s other arguments challenge the juvenile court’s
credibility determinations and the weight it assigned to evidence.
On a substantial evidence review, however, we do not reweigh
the evidence or exercise independent judgment. (In re Nathan E.
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 123.)
B. Purported ICWA Violations Are Not Ripe for Review
1. Additional Background - ICWA
Mother initially indicated she had Cherokee ancestry and
filed a parental notification of Indian status (ICWA-020) stating
that maternal great-grandmother, Betty E.B., was a member of a
Cherokee tribe. Mother later stated her belief was mistaken; the
correct tribal affiliation was Blackfeet.
At the detention hearing, the court ordered DCFS to
interview all known relatives regarding F.B.’s Indian7 ancestry
and report its initial investigation in the jurisdiction and
7 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for
consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as
‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re
Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1, overruled on other
grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).)
11
disposition report. The court stated that DCFS was under an
“ongoing duty that exists throughout dependency of the case.”
Mother provided conflicting information about her familial
relationships. She initially stated she had no relatives, having
been raised in foster care. Later, mother identified a maternal
grandmother whose location and contact information she refused
to share. Mother stated she had no relationship with any
biological siblings, though a maternal aunt, Betty B., was in the
courthouse on the day of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
DCFS reported the progress of its inquiries in the
jurisdiction and disposition report. Father denied Indian
heritage. Mother reported that maternal great-grandmother was
deceased. Nonrelatives queried by DCFS denied knowing if the
family had Indian ancestry. DCFS emailed the Cherokee Nation
and furnished certified mail receipts for mailings to several tribes
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The juvenile court made no ICWA findings in its
jurisdiction and disposition orders.
2. The ICWA Questions Are Not Ripe for Review
Mother argues that the disposition order should be
reversed due to DCFS’s and the juvenile court’s noncompliance
with ICWA. She contends the court erroneously failed to make
an ICWA finding. She further argues that DCFS (1) failed to
address and provide notice based on “Maternal Step-Grandfather
R.C.’s” (boldface omitted) disclosure of tribal ancestry, (2) did not
make inquiries of F.B.’s maternal great-grandmother and
maternal aunt, and (3) failed to include “the correct names of
known paternal relatives” in notices served on certain Cherokee
12
tribes.8 DCFS asserts that mother’s challenges are premature, as
there has been no finding as to ICWA’s applicability or DCFS’s
compliance with the law’s requirements. Mother does not
respond to DCFS’s arguments, which we find persuasive.
Agencies and juvenile courts have “an affirmative and
continuing duty” in every dependency proceeding to determine
whether ICWA applies by inquiring of parents, extended family
members, and others whether a child is or may be an Indian
child. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131–1132; § 224.2,
subds. (a), (b).) When the agency has “reason to believe” that an
Indian child is involved, further inquiry is required. (Dezi C., at
pp. 1131–1132; § 224.2, subd. (e).) If the inquiry establishes a
reason to know an Indian child is involved, notice must be
provided to the pertinent tribes. (Dezi C., at p. 1133; § 224.3,
subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The court “may alternatively
make a finding that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were
‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no
reason to know the child is an Indian child, so ICWA does not
apply.” (Dezi C., at p. 1134, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
A claim challenging an agency’s compliance with ICWA’s
inquiry and notice requirements is premature when the juvenile
court has issued no final ruling, at or before the challenged
dispositional hearing, as to whether ICWA applied to the
proceedings. (J.J. v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447,
461.) This is because ripeness requires a controversy that is
8 Mother provided no citations to the record concerning a step-
grandfather, anyone with the initials R.C., or any paternal relatives,
and we found no references to such persons. Copies of notices served
on the Cherokee tribes do not appear in the record. Mother said
maternal great-grandmother was deceased.
13
sufficiently concrete to allow judicial resolution even in the
absence of a precise factual context, and “any perceived
deficiencies with ICWA inquiry and noticing may still be resolved
during the normal course of the ongoing dependency
proceedings.” (Ibid.; In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 904.)
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court reminded
DCFS of its continuing duty of inquiry. At the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the court made no findings about ICWA’s
applicability or the adequacy of DCFS’s inquiry and notice
efforts.9 Mother cites no authority suggesting the court was
obligated to make such findings at the disposition hearing, and
she does not point to anything in the record suggesting DCFS
ceased or planned to abandon its inquiries. Any deficiencies may
yet be resolved as the case proceeds below, and thus mother’s
claims of error are not yet ripe for review. (See In re L.B. (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 562, 565.)
9 We deny DCFS’s request for judicial notice of excerpts from a
March 2026 status review report, as the material is unnecessary to our
determination. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)
14
DISPOSITION
We dismiss mother’s appeal to the extent it challenges the
juvenile court’s failure to make an ICWA finding and the
sufficiency of DCFS’s compliance with ICWA inquiry and notice
requirements. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
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