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P. v. Baldasaro CA4/2

P. v. Baldasaro CA4/2
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11:20:2026

Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Baldasaro CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E086399

v. (Super.Ct.No. FRE03818)

ROBERT BALDASARO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,

Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Dismissed.

Kristina L. Fox, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

1
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,

Arlene A. Sevidal, Collette C. Cavalier, and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General,

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Robert Baldasaro appeals from the trial court’s order

denying his request for recall and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1. We

asked for supplemental briefing on several issues. We conclude the appeal must be

dismissed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and

attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 2). The court found true several firearm

enhancement allegations, one prior serious felony allegation, and one prior strike

allegation. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 12022, subd. (a)(1),

12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of five

years, and a total indeterminate term of 100 years to life plus life with the possibility of

parole.

On August 21, 2024, counsel for defendant filed with the court a copy of an

Application for Commutation of Sentence that defendant had sent to the Governor, along

with a cover letter asking the court to exercise its discretion to review defendant’s case

1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated.

2
under section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill No. 600. (Reg. Sess. 2023-2024; Stats. 2023,

ch. 446.)

On October 4, 2024, the court held a hearing. Defendant and his attorney did not

appear, but the prosecutor and a conflict panel attorney were present. The court ordered

counsel present to meet and confer with attorney Fox on whether she or the conflict panel

would be proceeding with the case. In the meantime, the court appointed the conflict

panel attorney to represent defendant.

The People filed an opposition brief.

Defendant had no contact with his counsel and was not sure if she had filed a reply

brief. Thus, he asked a friend of his, who was an attorney and parole expert, to write a

letter to the court to point out some “inaccurate information/argument” in the

prosecutor’s opposition brief, particularly with regard to defendant’s parole proceedings.

The court held a hearing on May 23, 2025. Defendant was present with his

appointed conflict panel attorney. The court indicated that it reviewed all the documents

submitted, including additional briefing defense counsel submitted that day. The court

asked defense counsel if she wanted to be heard on the request for recall and

resentencing. Defense counsel said she would submit to the court and added:

“[A]ctually we invite the Court to have a hearing, and we request the Court to conduct a

hearing and grant our request to have [defendant’s] sentenced [sic] lowered accordingly

due to the interest of justice.” The court then asked the People if they wanted to be heard.

The People submitted on their opposition, requested that the court not even hold a

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section 1172.1 hearing, and noted that the court could simply decline to exercise its

discretion and said, “that decision is not appealable.”

The court agreed that it had discretion to accept defendant’s invitation and hold a

hearing regarding his sentence but stated the following: “In the Court’s view, there has to

be something alleged to justify the Court in exercising that discretion. Sometimes there’s

a change in the law. Sometimes there’s a change in the sentencing scheme or penalties.

Sometimes there’s a change, for example, gang enhancements that were alleged or found

true prior to 2012. [¶] Those statutes have been changed, so those would all be things

that would be significant changes in the law and sentencing that would cause the Court to

have reason for the Court to exercise its discretion for resentencing. In this case, I tend to

agree with the People that there is—there are no facts that would cause the Court to

exercise its discretion to recall the sentence and have a hearing regarding resentencing.

In this case, [defendant] was the actual shooter who killed one victim and seriously

wounded a second victim. [¶] The penalties for those offenses, and the use of firearm

enhancements, are the same as they were. So given the nature of the offenses, no change

in the law or sentencing schemes, . . . and the defendant’s prior history, and the

supplemental information that was provided regarding the defendant, . . . there’s nothing

there to—that in my mind would justify exercising my discretion to recall the sentence

and resentence the defendant.”

The court concluded: “So the defendant’s request for the Court to exercise its

discretion under 1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for resentencing is

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denied for the reasons indicated.” The court also mentioned that defendant might be

eligible for parole. Defendant said he was granted parole twice and explained the

circumstances. The court said, “I don’t have anything to do with that. That’s all between

you and the parole board.”

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court’s Order Is Not Appealable

Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his invitation for recall of

sentence and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill No. 600. He

contends the court erred in denying his request for relief, and the matter must be

remanded for a resentencing hearing. He also contends his appointed counsel rendered

ineffective assistance (IAC) by failing to communicate with him, file a reply brief, “grasp

the factual posture of the case,” and advocate for him at the hearing. The People argue

that defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because the court’s order is nonappealable.

They assert the court’s denial of defendant’s request did not affect his substantial rights

because section 1172.1 does not permit a defendant to file a petition for recall and

resentencing under that section. Defendant replies that case law establishes the order is

appealable since the court’s denial of the request after appointing counsel, allowing

briefing, considering input from the public, and holding a hearing, affected his substantial

rights. We conclude the order appealed from is not appealable; thus, the appeal must be

dismissed.

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A. The Court’s Order Is Not Appealable

“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s

judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People

v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) Section 1172.1 does not address the

appealability of a court’s order denying a defendant’s request for court-initiated recall

and resentencing. (People v. Olea (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 889, 897 (Olea).) Whether

defendant’s appeal can go forward turns on section 1237, subdivision (b), which

authorizes an appeal from a postjudgment order if it affects a criminal defendant’s

“‘substantial rights.’” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 992 (Hodge);

§ 1237, subd. (b).)

A trial court may rule on postjudgment matters only if the Legislature has

provided it with jurisdiction to do so. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330,

337.) Section 1172.1 (former § 1170.03) provides an exception to the general rule that a

trial court loses jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun by authorizing a recall

and resentencing procedure that may be invoked when, for example, the Secretary of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommends resentencing. (§ 1172.1,

subd. (a)(1).) Assembly Bill No. 600 amended section 1172.1 to allow a court to

resentence a defendant “on its own motion” when “applicable sentencing laws at the time

of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.”

(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2; Hodge, supra, 107

Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) Accordingly, effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1,

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subdivision (a)(1), now provides that “the court may, on its own motion, . . . at any time if

the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently

changed by new statutory authority or case law, . . . recall the sentence and commitment

previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not

previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided

the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1),

italics added; Hodge, at p. 992.)

Notably, section 1172.1, subdivision (c), expressly states that “[a] defendant is not

entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section” and if a

defendant requests relief, “the court is not required to respond.” (Italics added.)

Accordingly, a defendant who files “an unauthorized request for resentencing has

no right to a ruling.” (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) Consistent with barring

a defendant’s petition, section 1172.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of his

or her appeal rights only “[a]fter ruling on a referral authorized by this section . . . .”

(§ 1172.1, subd. (d), italics added.) Presumably, if the Legislature had contemplated an

appealable order from a ruling on a defendant’s petition, it would not have limited the

advisement of appellate rights to rulings resulting from a referral made by a qualifying

agency or official.

In Hodge, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from the summary denial of a

defendant’s request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1 and held that a “trial

court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall [a defendant’s] sentence [does] not

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affect [a defendant’s] substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the

trial court had no statutory obligation to act at all on [the defendant’s] request.” (Hodge,

supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) Since “a defendant has no right to demand that the

trial court actually make such a decision,” the “trial court’s choice not to make one does

not deprive the defendant of any right, much less a substantial one.” (Id. at p. 996.)

Hodge further explained that a contrary conclusion would result in an arbitrary

rule where, if a trial court does not respond to a defendant’s request for recall and

resentencing, there would be no order to appeal, but if the court informs a defendant that

it will take no action on the request (as was the case here), the defendant would be able to

appeal that decision. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) The court in Hodge

found “such an irrational and arbitrary result” seemed unlikely to have been intended by

the Legislature. (Ibid.)

We agree with the reasoning of Hodge and join other Courts of Appeal that have

followed it and concluded that a trial court’s decision declining to exercise its discretion

to recall a sentence under section 1172.1 on its own motion, pursuant to a defendant’s

resentencing request, is not appealable. (People v. Brammer (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th

675, 696 (Brammer); People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1044-1047

(Brinson); People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 997-999 (Roy); People v.

Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 694-697 (Faustinos).) Given the plain language

of section 1172.1, subdivision (c), an order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request

for relief under the statute cannot be said to affect his substantial rights. (Faustinos, at

8
p. 697 [“A defendant never has a right to a trial court initiation of a section 1172.1

resentencing. We lack any ‘discernable criteria’ to review such a decision. [Citation.] A

trial court’s discretionary decision not to initiate a proceeding on its own motion cannot

be legal error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”]; Hodge, supra, 107

Cal.App.5th at p. 997 [“section 1172.1 places no constraints on the trial court’s decision

declining to initiate reconsideration of a sentence on its own motion”].) In other words,

because a defendant has no right to the court’s initiation of recall and resentencing

proceedings on its own motion under section 1172.1, the order denying such relief cannot

be said to affect a defendant’s substantial rights. (See Brinson, at p. 1049.)

We note defendant’s contention in his supplemental brief that “[t]he jurisdictional

conditions required by Assembly Bill [No.] 600 exist here.” Specifically, he claims that

section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), “conferred jurisdiction because applicable sentencing

laws had, in fact, changed.” However, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), provides “the

court may, on its own motion, . . . at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the

time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case

law, . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the

defendant.” (Italics added.) While a change in a sentencing law or sentencing laws is a

reason a court may choose to recall a defendant’s sentence, such a change does not

abrogate the prerequisite in section 1172.1 that the trial court initiate the recall on its own

motion. The statute makes it clear that, if the sentencing laws have changed, then the

court may “on its own motion” recall a defendant’s sentence. (See Faustinos, supra, 109

9
Cal.App.5th at p. 695.) It is undisputed that the court here did not initiate a recall “on its

own motion.” As the record establishes, and defendant himself asserts, he “invit[ed] the

Court to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1.” Thus, contrary to defendant’s

claim, section 1172.1, subdivision (a), did not confer jurisdiction for the court to act here,

since the court did not initiate a recall.

In sum, defendant did not have a right to file a section 1172.1 petition, the trial

court had no obligation to even issue an order in the first place or to advise him of any

appellate rights connected to its order, and the court’s decision on his request is not

appealable. (§ 1172.1, subds. (c) & (d); Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 697;

Brammer, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 696 [a court that receives an unauthorized

section 1172.1 petition may exercise its discretion to recall the sentence on its own

motion but “an order declining to exercise such discretion is not appealable and we lack

the authority to rule on the merits”].)2

B. Olea and Craig

Defendant relies upon two published cases that have held that when a court

engages with a defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence, takes certain procedural

steps, and the record reflects the court considered the section 1172.1 invitation on its

merits in denying it, the resulting order is appealable. In Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at

p. 901, the court held the denial of the defendant’s request for resentencing under

2 In light of our conclusion that the court’s order is not appealable, we decline to
address defendant’s other arguments that the court abused its discretion in denying his
invitation and that his counsel rendered IAC and “cost [him] a chance to be re-
sentenced.”

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section 1172.1 was appealable because the circumstances “differ[ed] from Hodge, Roy,

and Faustinos such that the order issued affected Olea’s substantial rights.” (Olea, at

p. 901.) The court found it “noteworthy that the trial court took a number of procedural

steps that did not take place in the aforementioned cases, including appointment of

counsel at Olea’s request, ordering the release of subpoenaed records from the CDCR to

the defense, ordering the defense to provide copies of these records to the People, and

setting a contested hearing on Olea’s request, at which Olea appeared remotely.” (Id. at

p. 901.)

The trial court in Olea held a hearing at which it heard arguments from both

parties, “and made statements in its final ruling that reflected it had reviewed the original

sentence in full, along with the briefs and attached exhibits. Though the court indicated

that it was declining Olea’s invitation to recall and resentence him, it also stated that it

found the original sentence to be ‘just’” and explained its reasoning for that conclusion

on the record. (Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) “[T]he trial court chose not only

to respond, but it did so in a manner which effectively mirrored those rights afforded to a

petitioner after a resentencing request has been initiated by one [of] the enumerated

agencies in section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(1) . . . .” (Id. at p. 902.) Accordingly, “the

trial court effectively evaluated and denied Olea’s petition on the merits, thus affecting

Olea’s substantial rights.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165,

1173 (Craig) [finding order appealable where trial court “took most of the same

procedural steps the superior court in Olea did”].)

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In his reply brief and supplemental brief, defendant argues that the court here took

several procedural steps, as in Olea and Craig; thus, under the holdings of those cases, he

has a right to appeal the court’s denial of his request to recall his sentence. However,

Olea and Craig are distinguishable. At the hearing in Olea, defense counsel argued the

merits of why the defendant deserved a reduced sentence, including numerous mitigating

factors, such as his childhood trauma, efforts at rehabilitation he had made in prison, and

changes to his thought processes. (Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.) The Olea

court ultimately denied the defendant’s request to recall and resentence him, noting that it

found the original sentence to be just, considering his “‘extremely abhorrent and

shocking actions.’” (Ibid.) Similarly, in Craig, the defendant argued the merits of why

he deserved resentencing, including that he was young at the time of the offense, and he

had done a lot of rehabilitative work since that time. The prosecutor referred to the

defendant’s prison file and pointed out his rule violations, recounted the details of the

crime, and expressed doubt in his plan for employment. The Craig court discussed the

facts of the case and declined to resentence the defendant because it was not impressed

that he had a job waiting for him, did not find it persuasive that he was young at the time

of the offense and had since rehabilitated himself, and believed he should be held to his

plea agreement. (Craig, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1169-1170.)

In contrast, the parties’ arguments in the instant case focused on whether the court

should accept defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence and hold a resentencing

hearing in the first place. Defense counsel stated, “[W]e invite the Court to have a

12
hearing, and we request the Court to conduct a hearing and grant our request to have

[defendant’s] sentence[] lowered accordingly due to the interest of justice.” The People

“request[ed] the Court not to even hold a hearing under 1172.1” and stated, “The Court is

not required to hold any hearing at all. The Court can simply decline to exercise its

discretion and that decision is not appealable.” The court agreed that it had discretion to

accept defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence and have a resentencing hearing.

However, it denied “the defendant’s request for the Court to exercise its discretion under

1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for resentencing” and briefly referenced

“the nature of the offenses, no change in the law or sentencing schemes . . . the

defendant’s prior history, and the supplemental information that was provided regarding

the defendant.”3

The trial court’s actions and statements do not indicate it was exercising its

discretion to recall and resentence defendant “on its own motion.” (§ 1172.1,

subd. (a)(1).) Instead, the court expressly stated that “defendant’s request for the Court to

exercise its discretion under 1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for

resentencing is denied.” Moreover, we cannot say the court’s comments in declining

3 We note defendant’s claim in his supplemental brief that the court “identified
changed sentencing laws as a qualifying basis, evaluated whether such changes and other
facts existed, weighed the offense and [defendant’s] role, his prior history, the
postconviction information, and ultimately found ‘nothing’ justified recall.” However,
we do not read the court’s brief comments as such. To the extent defendant is claiming
the “changed sentencing laws” the court identified “as a qualifying basis” were the gang
enhancement laws the court mentioned, the court merely referenced those as an example
of a change in the law that could justify a court in exercising its discretion to recall a
sentence. (“Sometimes there’s a change in the sentencing scheme or penalties . . . for
example, gang enhancements that were alleged or found true prior to 2012.”)

13
defendant’s invitation amounted to a decision on the merits which included the

postconviction factors set forth in section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), which a court is

required to apply where it has decided to recall and resentence a defendant on its own

motion.4

We conclude this is not a case where the trial court effectively evaluated and

denied defendant’s invitation after conducting the equivalent of a hearing on the merits.

Thus, Olea and Craig are inapposite.

Moreover, we agree with the People, that by making a court’s thorough and

careful exercise of its discretion in determining whether to accept a defendant’s invitation

for the court to resentence him on its own motion subject to review, but its decision to

ignore the invitation or otherwise not respond to it not appealable, a court is

“disincentiviz[ed]” from taking a critical look at such invitations and exercising its

discretion in a transparent way. We respectfully decline to do so.

Here, after looking at the matter carefully, the court plainly did not recall the

defendant’s sentence on its own motion. Since defendant had no right to bring such a

request, its denial could not have affected his substantial rights.

4 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), provides: “In recalling and resentencing
pursuant to this provision, the court shall consider postconviction factors, including, but
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”

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DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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Description Defendant and appellant Robert Baldasaro appeals from the trial court’s order denying his request for recall and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1. We asked for supplemental briefing on several issues. We conclude the appeal must be
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