Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Garcia CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B346003
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA101222)
v.
CARLOS GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Carlos Garcia (defendant) was
driving under the influence of alcohol when he collided with two
vehicles and seriously injured another driver. He faced criminal
charges in connection with the collision and was convicted of
several offenses, including hit and run causing serious injury to
another person. Defendant contends his hit and run conviction
cannot stand either because the trial court was required to
instruct the jury on the defense of unconsciousness on its own
motion or because his trial attorney was constitutionally
ineffective in failing to request such an instruction. We consider
whether substantial evidence at trial required giving an
unconsciousness instruction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct and Investigation
Around 8:47 p.m. on the evening of September 9, 2023,
defendant crashed his pick-up truck into vehicles driven by Jamie
Grant (Grant) and Ashley Sage (Sage). Grant’s car was sent
across opposing lanes of traffic and hit a wall. Sage was initially
trapped in her car, with her door wedged shut, and defendant’s
truck caught fire nearby. Brennan Parker (Parker), who was
then assigned to the Los Angeles County Fire Department’s
ambulance squad, testified that he “assume[d]” defendant’s
airbags deployed.
Grant, along with her daughter, who was also in her car,
were transported to a hospital for treatment of minor injuries.
Bystanders helped pull Sage from her car and carry her away
from defendant’s burning truck. Sage was in “excruciating pain”
and felt her leg “fold” a few inches above her knee when she tried
to stand. She required two surgeries and had a rod inserted in
2
her leg. She had to use a wheelchair, walker, or cane for several
months, and she was still in pain when she testified at trial in
March 2025.
Within an hour of the accident, Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies Matthew Kerr and Adam
Prince responded to a medical aid call “for a person laying on the
sidewalk partially in the street.” They found defendant on a
sidewalk. Parker was also on the scene, and he saw defendant
“laying on his back with his feet kind of propped up off the curb”
one or two blocks away from the collision site.
Parker examined defendant on the scene.1 Defendant said
there was nothing wrong with him physically. Defendant’s eyes
were “sluggish and dilated,” which suggested to Parker that he
may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Parker believed
defendant had been drinking because he was “holding back from
wanting to give any information.” Parker testified that although
he did not observe any signs of head trauma, slow or slurred
speech might be signs of head trauma. Parker determined
defendant had “no medical complaints” based on, among other
things, his normal vital signs and his ability to answer questions
appropriately and make conscious decisions. Parker’s team
“always offer[s]” transport to a hospital for evaluation, but
defendant declined the offer.
Deputy Prince searched defendant and noted he smelled of
alcohol and slurred his speech. Deputy Prince also noticed a
contusion on defendant’s left arm. Deputy Kerr confirmed with
LASD deputy Samuel Curameng, who was at the scene of the
1
Deputy Prince’s body-worn video documenting this
evaluation was played at trial.
3
collision, that defendant’s address matched the address to which
the abandoned truck was registered. Deputies Kerr and Prince
transported defendant back to the collision site, where Deputy
Curameng spoke with him. Deputy Curameng testified
defendant’s eyes were glossy and bloodshot, he had a “heavy
odor” of alcohol, and his speech was “slow, mumbled, and
slurred.”2 Among other things, defendant told Deputy Curameng
he was passed out because he was “tired from work.”
Deputy Curameng administered two preliminary alcohol
screenings (commonly referred to as a breathalyzer test) shortly
after 10:00 p.m. Prior to the test, on the drive to the collision
site, Deputy Prince monitored defendant to make sure he did not
vomit, drink, eat, or do anything else that might compromise the
results. The first test indicated a blood alcohol level of 0.147
percent and the second indicated 0.145 percent.3
Deputy Curameng transported defendant to a hospital for a
blood draw and read defendant his Miranda rights. After being
Mirandized, defendant stated he remembered leaving his house
and, “from there, [he] guess[ed] [he] blacked out or maybe, or
something.”4 Defendant said he did not remember which lane he
was driving in. He also said he “didn’t even remember hitting the
2
Video of Deputy Curameng’s interaction with defendant
was played at defendant’s criminal trial.
3
LASD detective Charlie Upchurch testified the machine
used to perform these tests was not checked for accuracy within
prescribed time limits but it passed accuracy checks both before
and after defendant’s tests.
4
Deputy Curameng’s conversation with defendant was
recorded and played at defendant’s trial.
4
brakes. Like, [he] remember[ed] once crashing [sic], like [he] was
trying to hit the brakes or everything. But it, it already crashed.
[¶] . . . [¶] Like it was over with. But [he] d[id] remember that
[he] was, [he] crashed into a car that was already crashed, but
[he] d[id not] remember crashing into the car.” Defendant
subsequently stated he “remember[ed] crashing a car, but [he]
d[id not], like fully remember, if the car was crashed or if it
stopped and then [he] crashed it. But [he was] pretty sure it was
crashed already . . . .” Asked whether “it was[ ] too late” by the
time he “realized [the other car] was there,” defendant responded,
“It was blank. Like, I don’t even remember hopping off my car
and going to the sidewalk.” He speculated someone “pulled” him
from his vehicle and “once [he] woke up,” first responders “were
checking [him]” and “[he] was like, what the hell happened?”
Defendant consented to a blood draw, administered around
2:10 a.m., which indicated a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent.5
While defendant was at the hospital awaiting the blood test, a
doctor examined him, ordered x-rays, and placed a cast on his left
arm.
B. Trial, and the Defense
Defendant was thereafter charged with driving under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (a); count one), driving with a 0.08% blood alcohol
content causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count two),
and hit and run driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury
5
More precisely, the criminalist who analyzed the sample
testified “[t]he reported average result[ ] was a 0.08 percent. The
duplicate result[ ] was a 0.90 to 0.89 percent [sic]. And the
average of the two is a 0.089 percent plus and minus 0.04 percent
in certain measurements.”
5
to another person (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count three).
The charging document alleged as to all counts that defendant
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Sage. (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Great violence and great bodily harm were
also alleged as sentencing aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)).
Trial proceeded in April 2025 and the prosecution
presented evidence of the offense and investigation facts we have
already described.
In the defense case, retired LASD criminalist Ed Barley
testified concerning the reliability of the preliminary alcohol
screening (breathalyzer test) and blood test. Among other things,
he discussed the adequacy of Deputy Prince’s observation of
defendant prior to the breathalyzer test, how defendant’s injured
arm might have impacted his breathing, and general issues in
determining blood alcohol levels from breath and blood samples.
Dr. Ryan O’Connor, an emergency room doctor, testified
about signs of head trauma. He emphasized, however, he was
not opining on whether defendant suffered a head injury, stating,
“I am not his doctor. [¶] I haven’t reviewed any medical records,
other than the paramedic reports, so I am not diagnosing him
with any specific condition.” Dr. O’Connor testified from general
experience that “[a] concussion can be a bit of a difficult diagnosis
to make, especially in the emergency room setting. [¶] A
concussion diagnosis is made when there is some sort of head
injury and then symptoms associated with that head injury.
There is not a specific emergency room test that you get to
diagnose concussion.”
Dr. O’Connor also testified a field examination by
paramedics cannot rule out a head injury. He told the jury that a
6
concussion is “a not uncommonly missed diagnosis in the
emergency room, for a variety of reasons,” including that
“concussion symptomology can be somewhat subtle or situation
dependent.” Among other things, patients might “have
something called a distracting injury[,] [m]eaning that if you
have, for example, a broken arm, you might not be noticing so
much that you are a bit nauseous and have a headache and some
blurred vision” because the arm “really, really hurts.” Symptoms
of mild traumatic brain injury or concussion might include
“nausea, blurred vision, headache, difficulty concentrating,
slurring speech, confusion, difficulty focusing, memory issues,
feeling discoordinated, like difficulty with balance and walking,
[and] trouble with reading or writing fluently[,] . . . [a]nd each
patient might experience different symptoms . . . .” Dr. O’Connor
testified an individual suffering from a concussion might “lose
memory for a period of time around the head injury,” and they
“often will perceive that they have lost consciousness” despite
talking to people during that period. The patient might
characterize this experience as “blacking out.” Dr. O’Connor
noted that “black[ing] out” is “layman terminology” and “not
specific,” but simply being unable to recall what is happening
does not fit “the medical definition of unconsciousness.”
Dr. O’Connor further testified that people who interact
with people who later perceive themselves to have been
unconscious due to a head injury might say the person in
question was not “unconscious. He was talking and answering
questions. Maybe seemed a little confused. Maybe kept on
asking the same question over and over again.” By contrast, “if
someone consumes enough alcohol to the point that they lose
consciousness, they are pretty profoundly unresponsive, difficult
7
to arouse, they don’t suddenly regain consciousness and act in a
cognitive fashion.” Dr. O’Connor opined a person who loses
memory as a result of a head injury might be capable of “fleeing
from a burning car” because this “doesn’t require complicated
amounts of cognition.” Similarly, the pain of a broken bone “can
cause fear and [a] fight or flight response.”
In closing argument, defendant’s trial attorney argued
defendant did not “willfully” walk away from the collision:
“We . . . heard testimony in this case from Dr. O’Connor. And we
know that there is a reasonable probability that, in fact, at the
time of the accident—shortly after the accident, [defendant’s]
brain simply wasn’t recording new information into his memory
bank. If you are experiencing that sort of condition, I don’t think
you are in any sort of state to make a willful decision.”6
Defendant’s attorney suggested there was “circumstantial
evidence” that defendant’s behavior “was attributed to head
trauma,” including paramedic Parker’s testimony “that he looked
at the car and he would assume that the airbag deployed.”
Defendant’s attorney further argued “circumstantial evidence
also tells you that [defendant] had symptoms of head trauma.
Right? Slurred speech. Can’t stand up straight. And, more
importantly, the idea that he can’t remember what’s going on.
He described this as blacking out.” Defendant’s attorney asked
the jury to consider whether video evidence showing defendant
responding to questions when deputies found him on the
sidewalk was consistent with Dr. O’Connor’s testimony that
6
The hit and run instruction given in this case, based on
CALCRIM No. 2140, explains a defendant’s conduct must be
willful.
8
someone who has passed out from drinking too much is not easily
stirred.
Defendant’s attorney additionally urged the jury to
consider whether it was “possible that this young man was in
such a severe collision that he was so disoriented that his brain
was basically operating on a fight or flight response. And that at
the view of his car being involved in flames, that he gave that
sort of primitive response that Dr. O’Connor told us is expected in
a person experiencing that sort of condition and simply went
away from the scene on this, sort of, limited intellectual ability he
had at the time due to the injuries.” Defendant’s attorney
emphasized “the circumstantial evidence would tell you that
whoever walked away from this collision was also pretty banged
up. [¶] Unfortunately, he was not the only one banged up in this
case, and he wasn’t the one who was the most severely
injured . . . . But you can tell, based on your own experience, that
whoever left this car, regardless of anything to do with alcohol,
would probably be very dazed and confused.”
C. Conviction and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, found the
great bodily injury allegation true, and found the aggravating
factors proven. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years
in state prison: the middle term of two years on count two plus
three years for personal infliction of great bodily injury and a
consecutive term of one year on count three.7
7
The trial court imposed and stayed the same count two
sentence on count one.
9
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks reversal of his hit and run conviction
because the jury was not instructed on the defense of
unconsciousness. No matter whether framed in terms of an
asserted sua sponte instructional duty or ineffective assistance of
counsel for not requesting the instruction, the argument fails.
There is no substantial evidence that defendant’s condition was
caused by anything other than voluntary intoxication (assuming
he was in fact unconscious for a time), and an unconsciousness
defense is unavailable when that is the case. (People v.
Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417.)
A. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Give an
Unconsciousness Instruction on Its Own Motion
1. Legal principles relevant to unconsciousness
“Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication,
is a complete defense to a criminal charge. [Citations.] To
constitute a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of
coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can
exist ‘where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time,
conscious of acting.’ [Citation.] If the defense presents
substantial evidence of unconsciousness, the trial court errs in
refusing to instruct on its effect as a complete defense.
[Citation.]” (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 417, italics added;
see also Pen. Code, § 26 [“All persons are capable of committing
crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] . . . [¶]
Four—Persons who committed the act charged without being
conscious thereof”].) Because it is “presume[ed] that a person
who appears to act in an apparent state of consciousness is
conscious[,] . . . the burden is on a criminal defendant to produce
10
evidence rebutting this presumption of consciousness.
[Citation.]” (People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 804.)
Consistent with these principles, CALCRIM No. 3425
instructs as follows: “The defendant is not guilty of
unconscious when he or she is not conscious of his or her actions.
[Someone may be unconscious even though able to move.] [¶]
Unconsciousness may be caused by (a blackout[,]/ [or] an epileptic
seizure[,]/ [or] involuntary intoxication[,]/ [or]
based on voluntary intoxication.] [¶] The People must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conscious
when (he/she) acted. If there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant acted as if (he/she) were conscious, you should
conclude that (he/she) was conscious, unless based on all the
evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that (he/she) was
conscious, in which case you must find (him/her) not guilty.”
2. Analysis
Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant was
legally unconscious when he left the collision site, he produced no
substantial evidence this condition was due to a head injury
rather than alcohol. “‘Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient
to “deserve consideration by the jury,” that is, evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 120; People v. Ramon (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 843, 851 [“a mere possibility is nothing more than
speculation,” and “[s]peculation is not substantial evidence”]; see
also People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 290 [evidence
11
supporting an instruction on a defense theory is assessed in the
light most favorable to the defendant].)
Defendant contends the severity of the collision, standing
alone, is substantial evidence supporting the inference that he
suffered a head injury. But the mere possibility that persons
involved in such collisions may suffer head injuries is not
substantial evidence that defendant himself did; there is, for
instance, no evidence that the occupants of the other cars
defendant hit suffered head injuries. (Ramon, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at 851.) More to the point, there was no evidence at
trial that defendant ever complained of a head injury, neither
Parker (the paramedic) nor hospital staff who treated his injured
arm treated him for a head injury, and there was no physical
evidence of a head injury (much less an injury that would induce
unconsciousness (see, e.g., People v. Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
681, 687, 704 [a defendant who suffered “lacerations on his
forehead” was not entitled to an unconsciousness instruction on a
charge of leaving the scene of an accident where there “was no
evidence to support a finding that [the] defendant’s head
lacerations resulted in unconsciousness”])).
Dr. O’Connor’s testimony that a head injury could not be
ruled out—because head injuries and intoxication have
overlapping symptoms and because many head injuries go
undetected—suggests nothing more than a mere theoretical
possibility that does not constitute substantial evidence. Indeed,
Dr. O’Connor expressly disclaimed he was offering any opinion on
whether defendant actually suffered a head injury. Defendant’s
professed inability to recall exiting his truck in his conversation
with Deputy Curameng is not probative of a head injury, either.
Although defendant suggested he remembered events prior to the
12
accident—implying the accident triggered his lapse in memory—
some of his own statements indicated he “blacked out” prior to
the accident. Moreover, defendant never mentioned a head
injury, and he attributed his passing out to being tired from
work. In this context, defendant’s inability to recall leaving the
collision site is not substantial evidence that he was unconscious
due to a head injury. (People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d
1, 10 [distinguishing earlier cases and holding there is no
“ineluctable rule of law” that “a defendant’s inability to
remember or his ‘hazy’ recollection supplies an evidentiary
foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness”].)
Defendant alternatively argues that even if there is no
substantial evidence to warrant an unconsciousness instruction,
his mere reliance on an unconsciousness defense independently
required giving the instruction. This argument runs contrary to
our Supreme Court’s unambiguous holding that such an
instruction is required only if supported by substantial evidence.
(Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 417-418.)
Defendant’s counterargument, which relies on our Supreme
Court’s statement in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 that
“[a] trial court must instruct on unconsciousness on its own
motion if it appears the defendant is relying on the defense, or if
there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case” (id. at 887) ignores the context of this phrasing.8 We do not
read Rogers to hold that a trial court is required, on its own
8
It also appears defendant relied on the head injury theory
to cast doubt on whether his actions were willful—not to cast
doubt on whether he was conscious.
13
motion, to give any instruction on which a defendant appears to
rely no matter how weak or nonexistent the evidence is to
support it—that would be an odd holding indeed.
The snippet of Rogers defendant relies on to argue the
contrary cites People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, and
that case cites People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703. (Rogers,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at 887.). In both Sedeno and Breverman, the
high court contrasted (1) the trial court’s duty to give a sua
sponte instruction on a defense the defendant relies on or that is
consistent with the defense theory of the case with (2) the trial
court’s duty to give a sua sponte instruction on a defense that is
inconsistent with the defense theory of the case. (Sedeno, supra,
at 718 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on unconsciousness where
the defendant “elected a defense that presupposed that he was
conscious at the time of the killing”]; Breverman, supra, at 157.)
In neither Sedeno nor Breverman did our high court suggest a
trial court is bound to instruct a jury on defenses for which there
is no substantial evidence. (See Sedeno, supra, at 717 [“Had [the
defendant] expressly relied on [an unconsciousness] defense and
requested an instruction thereon, we would be forced to conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to entitle him to the
instruction”]; id. at 718 [“It is not error to refuse a request for
instructions on self-defense when there is no evidence from which
it can be inferred that the defendant feared great bodily harm or
death at the hands of the victim, or when the defendant has
denied acting in self-defense and claimed the death was
accidental. [Citation.] A fortiori, a [s]ua sponte instruction is not
required”]; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 162 [“a trial court
errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser
included offense which find substantial support in the evidence.
14
On the other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct on theories
that have no such evidentiary support”]; People v. Shelmire
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1058 [“neither in Sedeno nor in any
later case has the high court . . . require[d] instruction on a
defense for which there was no substantial evidence”].)
Moreover, subsequent case law and the bench notes for
CALCRIM No. 3425 are consistent with our reading of Rogers,
Breverman, and Sedeno. (See, e.g., People v. Villanueva (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 41, 49 [“A trial court is required to instruct sua
sponte on any defense . . . only when there is substantial evidence
supporting the defense, and the defendant is either relying on the
defense or the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s
theory of the case”]; Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3425 [“The
court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it
and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a defense if there is
substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is
relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory
of the case”].)
The trial court here was not obligated to instruct the jury
on an unconsciousness defense for which there was no
substantial evidence.
B. Defendant’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective for
Failing to Request an Unconsciousness Instruction
As we have explained, there was no substantial evidence to
support giving an unconsciousness instruction in this case. That
defeats any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See, e.g.,
People v. Smith (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 298, 313, fn. 24 [rejecting
claim of ineffective assistance based on the defendant’s attorney’s
15
failure to request an instruction because there was “no
substantial evidence” to support the instruction]; see also People
v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189 [“In assessing claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether
the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that
is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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