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In re D.G. CA2/3

In re D.G. CA2/3
By
11:20:2026

Filed 11/20/26 In re D.G. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re D.G., A Person Coming B351431
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 20CCJP00561B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.G. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed
in part, conditionally reversed in part, and remanded.

Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.G.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant A.G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s orders:
summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
388 petitions asking the court to reinstate her reunification
services; issuing a temporary restraining order under section
213.5 protecting the dependent child’s caregiver from mother;
and terminating parental rights on the grounds the court
improperly denied mother a continuance of the section 366.26
hearing, erred in denying mother’s request for a bonding study,
and erred in failing to apply the parental-benefit exception to
adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Father also appeals from
the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights but solely
on the ground the Los Angeles Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) and the juvenile court did not comply
with the initial inquiry requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
related California law (§ 224 et seq.). DCFS concedes the
error and does not oppose a conditional reversal of the order
terminating parental rights as to father and remanding
the matter for a proper ICWA inquiry. We conclude mother
has demonstrated no prejudicial error. Nevertheless, we
conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

2
as to both parents and remand the matter to ensure a proper
ICWA inquiry. We otherwise affirm the court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
1. Background and section 300 petition
The family consists of mother, father, and D.G. (born
August 2024). Parents had a history of referrals and dependency
cases as to other children from 2003 to 2023. As relevant here,
the juvenile court sustained petitions filed on maternal half-
sibling B.A.’s behalf in July 2014, based on domestic violence
between mother and B.A.’s father; and in October 2015, based
on B.A.’s father’s use and sale of methamphetamine out of
the home and mother’s failure to protect B.A. In 2020, DCFS
filed another petition alleging mother had tested positive for
methamphetamine while B.A. was in her care, and had an
unstable mental health condition, but the petition was dismissed
in January 2021 when B.A. turned 18.
In September 2023, mother and father had a baby girl
together who was born prematurely. In October 2023, the baby
died in the hospital at 15-days old. Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine at the baby’s birth. DCFS evaluated the case
out, as it could not determine if mother’s drug use while pregnant
caused the infant’s medical condition that led to her death.
Less than a year later, in August 2024, DCFS received
a referral that mother had given birth prematurely to D.G.
Mother had pre-eclampsia, diabetes, and tested positive for
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. D.G. was

2 Because father challenges the order terminating parental
rights solely on ICWA grounds, we discuss the facts relating to
his appeal in the Discussion section.

3
placed in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and on
oxygen for respiratory difficulty. D.G.’s urine tested positive
for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl,3
and his meconium tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine. Mother tested positive for cocaine on
August 22, 2024. DCFS obtained a removal order for D.G.
the next day.
On August 27, 2024, DCFS filed a petition on D.G.’s
behalf under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), based on
allegations, as relevant to mother, that D.G. tested positive
for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl at birth;
mother’s use of those drugs during her pregnancy and history of
substance abuse, including methamphetamine; D.G.’s maternal
half-sibling’s dependency case; parents’ history of domestic
violence and mother’s failure to enforce the restraining order;
and mother’s failure to protect D.G. from father’s violence.
Mother denied using illicit drugs during her pregnancy
and claimed hospital records showed D.G. was born drug free.
Mother also denied she had ever used drugs, and denied the
juvenile court’s involvement with B.A. was due to her substance
abuse or that she had tested positive for drugs in 2020.
The court detained D.G. from parents at the initial hearing
—noting he was still in the hospital—and ordered parents
to have monitored visits twice weekly for two hours each visit;
they were not to visit the child together. D.G. was placed in
maternal aunt Ms. G.’s home. Ms. G. wanted to support her

3 Mother also received fentanyl as part of the anesthesia
for her C-section procedure.

4
nephew but told DCFS she felt harassed by parents. If mother,
father, and paternal grandmother “continue[d] to make indirect
threat[s] and insult her,” she would give a 14-day notice to have
D.G. placed elsewhere.
After a delay, mother signed a Regional Center consent
form on October 15, 2024, to refer D.G. to services. In an
October 29, 2024 child family team (CFT) meeting, mother said
“she was not going to participate in a substance abuse program
because she is not a current user of drugs and has never used
drugs in the past.” She repeatedly stated D.G. “ ‘was not born
with drugs in his system’ ” because she never used drugs. Mother
participated in monthly therapy, as she had for years, to address
“life stressors and depressive moods.” Mother began a parenting
program on September 26, 2024, and completed six of 12 sessions
as of October 22. She also attended 10 AA meetings in October.
On November 4, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the
petition, declared D.G. a dependent of the court, and removed
him from parents. The court ordered reunification services for
parents with monitored visits “to occur at least twice a week for
2 hours in duration.” The court noted the current restraining
order prohibited father from contacting mother. Mother’s
court-ordered case plan required her to participate in a
six-month-minimum drug treatment program with aftercare,
weekly random and on-demand drug testing, and a 12-step
program with court card and sponsor; a domestic violence
support group; parenting classes; and individual counseling
to address case issues, including domestic violence, parenting,

5
and substance abuse and its effects on children. Mother was
to have a “psych evaluation” if her therapist recommended it.4
2. Reunification period
As of January 31, 2025, D.G. continued to live with Ms. G.
On December 2, 2024, D.G. was found eligible for Regional
Center services. His first therapy appointment was scheduled
for January 30, 2025.
DCFS reported mother had been compliant with her case
plan but had had two positive tests for methamphetamine on
January 9 and 21, 2025. She denied drug use. On December 9,
2024, mother enrolled in an outpatient substance use disorder
program. A January 13, 2025 progress letter stated mother had
“good attendance, good communication, and good punctuality.”
She also had attended individual substance abuse counseling
sessions in the program. Mother’s overall progress toward
treatment, goals, and objectives was “fair.” Her abstinence
from substance use was “questionable.” She tested positive
for methamphetamine on December 17, 2024, tested negative
on January 2, 2025, and was a no-show on January 7, 2025.
A January 29, 2025 updated progress report stated mother
was a no-show for her drug test on January 23. Mother had
“ ‘been demonstrating consistent engagement in treatment,’ ”
by attending twice-weekly telehealth sessions. Nevertheless,
mother continued to deny using methamphetamine despite her
recent positive tests. Her program was “ ‘unable to proceed with

4 Mother filed a notice of appeal from the November 4, 2024
orders. This court dismissed that appeal under In re Phoenix H.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 838. (Case No. B342206.)

6
developing a relapse prevention plan’ ” because mother would
not acknowledge the positive test results.
Mother completed the required 12 sessions for her
parenting program on November 20, 2024, and a total of 20
in-person sessions on December 20, 2024. Mother was meeting
with her individual therapist monthly and looking for a domestic
violence program. Mother was having twice-weekly monitored
visits with D.G. at a DCFS office. At the January 15, 2025 CFT
meeting, the team agreed mother would have eight consecutive,
negative drug tests before her visits would be liberalized.
DCFS acknowledged mother had made progress in
her services, but it was concerned that she continued to deny
substance use. In DCFS’s assessment, mother “still ha[d] not
made the necessary changes to display that she [wa]s ready
for unmonitored visits with minor or has been willing to
acknowledge how her behavior affects the safety of the minor.”
DCFS’s initial case plan assessment noted parents were
“antagonistic against the caregiver.” They had asked Ms. G.
to “bend the rules” for them. At the February 3, 2025 progress
hearing, the court “urge[d]” mother to enroll in an inpatient
treatment program “if she has any chance of getting this
child back in her care and custody.”
In its six-month review report filed April 30, 2025, DCFS
reported that D.G. seemed “to be thriving” under the care of
Ms. G. and her husband. D.G. began Regional Center services
in January. Due to Ms. G.’s concerns, all communications now
were through the social worker. Ms. G. was concerned for
her and her family’s safety. She did not want mother to know
where she lived. Ms. G. believed mother might lie about her

7
or the quality of the care she provided to D.G. so that DCFS
would remove D.G. from her home.
Mother continued to deny current or past use of
methamphetamine. DCFS was concerned mother was “not
making appropriate progress in treatment because she ha[d]
yet to admit she struggles with a drug issue.” On February 4,
2025, mother said she had called an inpatient program and
was on the waitlist.
Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on
February 7 and March 28, 2025. She again denied drug use.
Mother tested negative on January 31, February 14, March 3 and
10, and April 14. Mother also missed some tests. As of April 1,
2025, mother had been attending her outpatient program class
only once a week. As of April 15, mother continued to deny
substance use and, as a result, could not be placed in a more
intensive substance abuse program.
On February 24, 2025, mother enrolled in a 26-session
domestic violence support group. Mother was engaged and a
good participant in the group sessions. Mother continued to see
her individual therapist. But on April 10, 2025, the therapist
told the social worker that mother denied substance use and
said she did not need help. The therapist planned to meet with
mother in person on April 28. Mother consistently visited D.G.
twice a week. She brought toys, blankets, diapers, clothes, food,
and a stroller to visits. Mother acted appropriately during visits.
Despite mother’s enrollment in an outpatient substance
abuse program, in DCFS’s assessment, she had not addressed
her substance use and thus had not gained the skills necessary
to avoid her triggers. Mother had “not made the necessary
changes to display that she [wa]s ready for unmonitored visits.”

8
Nor had mother acknowledged “how her drug use affect[ed] the
safety” of D.G. Because it did not appear to DCFS that mother
would “make necessary changes in order to safely parent her
child,” it recommended the court terminate her reunification
services.
In a May 2, 2025 last minute information report (LMI),
DCFS reported that, on April 24, 2025, mother “was exhibiting
‘weird behaviors’ and appeared to be hyper focused” at her
outpatient program. Mother was asked to test, but she refused.
Mother had tested on April 21. On April 23, DCFS received
a positive test result for methamphetamine.
On May 5, the court set a contested hearing on the
termination of reunification services at parents’ request. The
court admonished mother that she should be in an inpatient
program. The court noted mother had continued to test positive
for methamphetamine. Mother’s counsel noted mother had
submitted a negative hair follicle test that she had performed
on January 3, 2025.5
On June 11, 2025, DCFS filed a report for the contested
hearing. Mother had stopped attending her outpatient program.
She was discharged as of June 2. On June 9, 2025, mother
enrolled in Mariposa Recovery Center (Mariposa), an inpatient

5 In its next report, DCFS stated it received that lab report—
purportedly from Omega Laboratories—on May 5. Mother said
she found the facility and paid for the test, as well as a second
test on April 11, 2025. After investigating, DCFS learned the
test results were fraudulent—the information had been altered—
and had not been issued by Omega Labs.

9
substance abuse treatment program. Mother tested negative
for drugs on May 6, May 13, May 19, and May 30. She was a
no-show on June 5. Mother’s visits with D.G. remained
consistent. D.G. appeared comfortable with mother. Mother
expressed concerns about Ms. G.’s care of her son. The social
worker, who completed monthly welfare assessments of D.G.
in Ms. G.’s home, had found no evidence of neglect by Ms. G.
In LMIs filed June 18 and July 7, DCFS confirmed mother
had attended her April 28 and May therapy sessions and had
attended 10 domestic violence sessions but had missed two.
Mother left Mariposa on June 11. She was a no-show for drug
testing on June 5, 12, and 17. She canceled a visit with D.G.
on June 12 because she wasn’t feeling well and also missed
a therapy session that day. Mother said she hadn’t checked
the drug test website because she had gone to the hospital
after feeling unwell due to a change in her insulin. She tested
negative on June 26. The social worker met with mother on
July 3. Mother still denied drug use and had not re-enrolled
in a substance abuse program.
On July 8, 2025, the court found parents’ progress in their
case plans had been unsubstantial, terminated their family
reunification services, and set the matter for a section 366.26
hearing on November 4.6

6 Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition from
the order setting the section 366.26 hearing. In appellate case
no. B347472, mother’s counsel filed a no-issue letter and this
court deemed the writ inoperative.

10
3. Post-reunification period: July–November 2025
DCFS filed its section 366.26 report on October 27, 2025,
including a Caden C. analysis.7 D.G. remained in Ms. G.’s care.
She wanted to adopt him. He was receiving Regional Center
services, including weekly occupational therapy. Mother, who
was the holder of D.G.’s educational and developmental rights,
did not always respond to the case coordinator about D.G.’s
services. Mother didn’t believe D.G. required services and that
he would “reach milestones when he [wa]s ready.” Because
mother had minimized D.G.’s need for services, DCFS believed
“there is a likely chance that mother will diminish any future
developmental needs that the child may have or any services
recommended for his continued growth and well-being.” Mother
also continued to deny D.G.’s prenatal exposure to drugs.
Mother consistently visited D.G. During visits, she fed,
changed, and comforted him, spoke and sang to him, and engaged
with him “frequently.” Mother responded “consistently and
warmly” to D.G.’s needs. She was “sensitive” to his “cues and
emotions.” D.G. appeared to be comfortable with mother. The
social worker had to “step in and educate the parents on simple
parenting skills as well as child developmental milestones,”
however. Mother did not want to transition D.G.—then
one year old—from a bottle to a sippy cup, as the pediatrician
had recommended, even after the social worker explained
the transition would help with speech delay, dental health,
and oral motor development.

7 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.)
(articulating the factors relevant to determining the parental-
benefit exception to adoption).

11
DCFS was “unable to determine” how D.G.—who was
preverbal—viewed his parents. He was “generally happy to
meet and interact with all people, familiar or unfamiliar.” D.G.
was observed to interact with mother and father “in a similar
manner” as he did with the social worker or other DCFS staff.
D.G. “often smile[d] and rarely crie[d] or expresse[d] feelings
of fear or discomfort around new faces.” DCFS believed that,
at his young age, D.G. would not be negatively affected if his
visits with parents ceased. In DCFS’s opinion, the “security,
finality, and the sense of belonging that adoption would provide
for the child significantly outweigh[ed] the potential harm of
severing the relationship the child currently has with his mother
and father.” DCFS continued “to have concerns about mother’s
ability to provide long-term care for [D.G.] due to [his] emotional,
development, and social needs” and “given her own on-going
needs.”
In its status review report, filed October 28, 2025, DCFS
noted that mother continued to raise unfounded issues about
Ms. G.’s care of D.G. Ms. G. told the social worker about false
accusations. In mid-October, a Regional Center supervisor
called Ms. G. about mother having reported bruises on D.G.’s
face. The social worker assured Ms. G. that DCFS staff had not
seen any such bruises during mother’s monitored visits.
Ms. G. also told the social worker that she no longer was
comfortable responding to parents’ text messages and answering
their Facetime calls. She did not want parents to “manipulate or
alter the messages.” Instead of spending time with D.G. during
Facetime calls, parents criticized and harassed Ms. G. Ms. G.
also said acquaintances reported that mother told them she
knew where Ms. G. lived, and “if parental rights are terminated

12
or [the] adoption finalized, [Ms. G.] ‘has something coming for
her,’ ” implying she planned to harm Ms. G. They said mother
also had shown them a video claiming it was Ms. G. abusing D.G.
According to Ms. G., mother wanted to have D.G. removed from
Ms. G.’s care and placed with a paternal aunt because Ms. G.
would not give mother “unlimited access” to D.G.
Ms. G. also reported that, on October 20, 2025, she
was followed from her daughter’s school by “an unmarked or
unrecognized vehicle.” On October 25, while hosting a birthday
dinner, a man wearing blue latex gloves approached her home
and demanded food and drink, while observing the gathering.
Ms. G. believed mother, father, or both had hired the man to
spy on her. At 3:52 a.m. the next morning, mother received
a text message in Spanish from an unknown number. The
translated message stated:
“Look, you son of a bitch, you drunk, fucking whore,
throwing a party, and where did you leave my son?
You damn daughter of a bitch, you asked for it out
loud, you lying son of a bitch, you have no heart or
mercy for anyone, because my dad is at your level,
just don’t cry, you damn, fucking, hypocritical, lying,
stupid bitch, just remember how much damage your
lies and your stories caused my family, my dad will
take care of you soon, you fucking, fucking, whore.”
Ms. G.’s friend called the number the next day. Mother
answered the phone. Father then got on the phone and asked
who was calling. Ms. G.’s friend ended the call. Ms. G. called
the social worker in tears stating she was “fearful and tired of
being harassed by parents.” Ms. G. was afraid of parents, whom
she believed were capable of harming her and her family.

13
The social worker monitored a visit for mother on
October 24, 2025. Mother inspected D.G.’s body and said she
noticed “small bumps” on D.G. “again.” The social worker told
mother the bumps weren’t there when she picked D.G. up for
the visit—they did not appear until after the child began to
interact with mother and the toys she had brought. After further
inspecting D.G., mother told the social worker he had lice nits
on his back. The social worker showed mother it was just fuzz
from D.G.’s clothing.
On October 28, mother told the human services aide (HSA),
who was monitoring the visit, that D.G.’s body was cold and he
was losing weight. The social worker arrived to check on mother
and D.G. Mother believed D.G. was anemic due to his premature
birth and should drink from a bottle. The social worker assured
mother D.G. was not anemic nor had lost weight. She had
to remind mother D.G. was eating solid foods and of the
pediatrician’s recommendation that he transition to a sippy cup
given his oral development and speech delay.
DCFS continued to recommend adoption planning. Ms. G.
and her husband had been caring for D.G. since he was weeks
old. They had a deep love for D.G. and said they would accept
him into their family as their biological child. Their children
considered D.G. to be their brother. DCFS also recommended
the court designate Ms. G. as the educational and developmental
rights holder for D.G. given mother’s lack of response to the
Regional Center.
In the meantime, on October 16, 2025, mother filed
a section 388 petition asking the court to reinstate her
reunification services. Mother asserted her circumstances
had changed based on her participation in her case plan.

14
She provided proof that she completed a parenting class on
November 19, 2024; and letters from You Can Health Services,
a substance abuse recovery program, stating mother had enrolled
in the program on August 25, 2025, and as of October 9, 2025,
had been attending and actively participating in all scheduled
group and individual counseling sessions, was “actively working
toward building healthier relationships and making responsible
decisions for their future,” “continue[d] to be an excellent
example of recovery in progress,” and had tested negative for
“all mind-altering substances” on September 10, 2025. Mother
stated the change would be in D.G.’s best interest because,
“My child needs to be home with me[.] I have the house ready
for him[.] I will provide my child with love[,] stability[,]
medical care[,] food and shelter, unconditional love and [a]
safe environment.” She attached photos of a crib, clothing,
diapers, and toys she had set up for D.G.
On November 4, 2025, the court held the section 366.26
hearing. The juvenile court denied mother’s section 388 petition,
finding no sufficient change of circumstances to justify a hearing,
and it was not in D.G.’s best interest. The court noted mother
had completed her parenting class but only “recently enrolled in
her drug programs.” Mother’s counsel argued mother had been
testing consistently and was “doing everything that the court has
required.” She asked the court to set a hearing on the petition.
The court noted it had ordered mother to complete a six-month
drug and alcohol program, which she had just started. The court
stated, “So if she shows that she’s finished these programs, we
can certainly re-address it.” The court found D.G.’s permanent
plan was adoption and continued the section 366.26 hearing to
February.

15
The court also ordered Ms. G. be the sole holder of
educational and/or developmental rights for D.G. The court
granted Ms. G. a temporary restraining order preventing either
parent from coming within 100 yards of Ms. G. based on the
incidents Ms. G had reported to DCFS. The court set a hearing
for a permanent restraining order on November 24, 2025.
On November 24, 2025, DCFS filed a section 388 petition,
along with an ex parte application, asking the court to reduce
parents’ monitored visitation “to Facetime contact once per week
in a neutral setting.” DCFS had ongoing concerns about parents’
“inability to adequately and safely engage” with D.G. during
visits, and their “inability to understand his developmental
milestones.” DCFS also was “worried about the continuous
harassment” parents were engaging in against Ms. G.
that could potentially harm D.G. as it was “leading to a
sabotaged placement.” Mother also had tested positive for
methamphetamine on October 30, 2025. She had “appeared
unke[m]pt” during the earlier-reported October 28 visit, and
the social worker “had concerns about mother’s mental health
status during this visit.”
DCFS also noted parents spent their time during visits
“inspecting” D.G. and “making false accusations of marks and
bruises on the child.” DCFS reported that neither the social
worker, the HSA, nor any of D.G.’s other service providers—
who had weekly contact with D.G.—had seen any of the “bumps,
scratches, bruises, lice and other things” that mother reported.
Mother had tried to report Ms. G. for unsubstantiated abuse
and neglect to the Regional Center and others. DCFS repeated
its earlier report of Ms. G.’s allegations of parents’ misuse of

16
their Facetime calls and mother having made indirect threats
against Ms. G.
On November 5, 2025, mother’s new substance abuse
therapist at You Can Health Services, told the social worker
mother had attempted to “manipulate staff at You Can Health
so that ‘they can take her side and back her up in court.’ ”
Mother also had “made some concerning statements during
sessions that ha[d] raised some safety concerns for others.”
She suspected mother continued to abuse substances. The
next day, the therapist reported that, during a session, mother
“talked a lot about her sister [Ms. G.] and that if any significant
statements were made,” she would notify the social worker.
On November 24, 2025, the court re-issued the TRO
against parents and set a new order to show cause hearing for
December 16. The court set DCFS’s section 388 petition for
hearing on that same date. The court modified parents’ visits
to once a week, monitored Facetime calls, pending the hearing.
During the hearing, Ms. G. testified the car that had previously
followed her in October picked up mother’s friend, who was in
the courtroom as mother’s support that day.
4. Post-reunification period: December 2025–
March 2026
a. Granting of restraining order and denial of
DCFS’s petition
In a December 11, 2025 LMI, DCFS included Ms. G.’s
report that, at the last court hearing, mother and her friend
had insulted her in the waiting area. Ms. G. was afraid of what
mother would do when she left. Maternal grandmother, who
lived in Mexico, had begun calling Ms. G. demanding that she
give D.G. back to mother.

17
The hearing on the restraining order and DCFS’s petition
went forward on December 16. Ms. G. testified about being
followed and about the October 25 incident—the man who
appeared at her birthday party had posed as an unhoused
person and spoken to “everybody that was . . . there.” Ms. G.
also testified she believed mother had written the threatening
text message, pretending to be father. The message was written
in all upper-case letters, but father usually wrote messages in
all lower-case letters, while mother usually wrote hers in all
upper-case letters. Ms. G. believed father was involved with
the message—by its reference to his dad taking her out—but
had not written it. Ms. G. testified she had had issues with
mother harassing her since D.G. was placed with her. She feared
for her and her family members’ life or safety. Mother also
testified. She denied all of Ms. G.’s accusations. Parents’ counsel
asked the court to deny the restraining order request. Mother’s
counsel said mother would follow a stay-away order. She argued
Ms. G.’s testimony about mother harassing her was based on
speculation. Counsel argued there was no evidence of any safety
risk to D.G. to support DCFS’s section 388 petition.
After hearing argument, the court first ruled on the
restraining orders, stating:
“There is no question in my mind that mother and
father got together, and after they found out that
the child wasn’t even present at this birthday party,
ripped off this text to [the caretaker] . . . in such
threatening language that you can’t look at this and
say anything else, but this is scary . . . with father
indicating that, ‘Don’t worry. My dad will take care
of you soon. You fucking, fucking whore.’ And this

18
is like the culmination of a year, a year and a half,
of both parents filing all of these referrals, claiming
the caretaker has done this and done that. All of
them have been denied. [¶] I do find that there is
ample evidence by clear and convincing evidence
that there is a risk to the caretaker.”
The court granted a one-year restraining order restraining
parents from getting within 100 yards of Ms. G. The court
denied DCFS’s petition finding there was not a sufficient change
in circumstance. The court found the Facetime visits were
inadequate, and parents should continue to have in-person visits,
which had gone “fine.” The court continued the matter for the
February 3, 2026 section 366.26 hearing. Mother filed notices
of appeal from the restraining order and the earlier denial of
her section 388 petition.
b. February 3, 2026 hearing and leadup
DCFS filed LMIs on January 15 and 23, 2026. DCFS
continued to recommend adoption as D.G.’s permanent plan.
Ms. G. and her husband were committed to providing D.G.
permanency and on-going care. Mother and father had been
visiting D.G. weekly. Each arrived sober and with “essential
baby supplies,” as well as with toys and activities to engage D.G.
Mother and father gave D.G. hugs and kisses and each was
attentive to his needs.
Due to DCFS staff availability, mother was now visiting
D.G. once a week for four hours. During visits, mother interacted
and played with D.G., fed and changed him, and lulled him
to sleep—sometimes forfeiting the rest of her visitation time
so as not to wake him up. Mother also Facetimed paternal
grandmother and aunt during visits. D.G. did not engage with

19
them because he was preverbal. During the December 30, 2025
visit, mother asked the social worker why DCFS was being unfair
and tried to talk about Ms. G. and her past. Mother said the
past social worker didn’t do her job because it was in D.G.’s best
interest to be in mother’s care. When the social worker asked
mother about her positive tests for methamphetamine, mother
denied drug use and said the tests were false. Mother referred
to the negative hair follicle test and argued the past social
worker and supervisor had lied about the test results having
been falsified. Mother also claimed Ms. G. was an alcoholic and
DCFS had done nothing about it. DCFS remained concerned
by mother’s behavior and refusal to acknowledge her substance
abuse.
Mother filed a second section 388 petition on February 3,
2026. She asked the court to reinstate reunification services
“and unmonitored visits with discretion to liberalize.” Mother
attached a November 24, 2025 certificate of completion for
a domestic violence prevention program; negative drug test
results from August 25, September 10, October 10 and 31, and
November 26, 2025 and January 20, 2026; and her declaration.
Mother declared she had been participating in a substance
abuse program, a domestic violence program, and individual
counseling. She was “learning that sobriety is a process,
everything is step by step and requires consistent practice”
and that she must remain sober “to make good decisions and
move forward in life.” Mother had daily calls and weekly coffee
with her sponsor and participated in a recovery support group
through her church. Mother stated she had learned to recognize
the signs of domestic violence and “would not let [her] child
be around domestic violence or live in a home with domestic

20
violence.” Individual counseling was helping mother with
her “mental and emotional stability.” Mother stated she let
D.G. know she is his mother, and he understands her “because
he smiles and is happy when he sees” her.
At the February 3, 2026 hearing, mother objected to the
termination of parental rights and asked the court to set the
matter for contested hearing on the application of the parental-
benefit exception to adoption. Father’s counsel joined in the
request and also asked that the court order a bonding study.
Mother’s counsel joined in the request for a bonding study.
The court stated, “No bonding study. The court’s not going to—
there is no real reason. Mother—first of all, father hasn’t been
visiting . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Recently [has been visiting], but not for
a long time. . . . Both parents are . . . [¶] . . . spotty in visits.”
Mother’s counsel argued mother had consistently visited
throughout the case. The court continued the matter for
a contested section 366.26 hearing on March 25, 2026.
c. March 25, 2026 hearing and leadup
As of DCFS’s March 16, 2026 interim review report,
Ms. G. continued to provide D.G. “with a loving, stable, and
positive environment.” The social worker had observed Ms. G.
to be attentive and loving toward D.G., and D.G. “to be well-
bonded to Ms. G. and her family.” D.G. would become excited
when he saw family members. They treated him as “their own.”
Mother had maintained consistent visitation with D.G.,
although she had to cancel visits on February 20 and March 13,
2026, because she wasn’t feeling well. Mother had weekly
monitored visits with D.G. on Thursdays and Fridays for
two hours each visit. She brought food, clothes, and toys
to her visits, interacted with D.G., and kept him entertained.

21
Their interactions were positive, and D.G. appeared “to be
comfortable” in mother’s presence. D.G. was nonverbal and
could not give a statement about the visits.
DCFS continued to opine that the stability and finality of
adoption of D.G. by his maternal aunt—who had cared for him
since he was a newborn and provided for his needs in a stable
and loving home—“significantly outweigh[ed] the potential harm
of severing the relationship the child currently ha[d] with his
mother and father.”
On March 24, 2026, mother renewed her section 388
petition and again asked the court to reinstate her family
reunification services and to grant her unmonitored visits or
custody “as appropriate.” Mother alleged, “I have demonstrated
substantial progress, including full compliance with my
outpatient program and therapy since 08/25/2025, with perfect
attendance, and active participation in treatment. I have
developed insight into my triggers applying effective coping
strategies, and remain committed to my recovery. I continue
to maintain sobriety, as evidenced by my most recent negative
urinalysis on 03/20/2026.” As for why mother’s requested orders
would be in D.G.’s best interests, mother argued, “I have been
regularly visiting [D.G.], and [D.G.] is very bonded to me. I have
demonstrated sobriety, consistent participation in counseling,
and development of coping skills show I can provide a safe,
stable, and nurturing environment for [D.G.]. Reinstating
services or allowing unmonitored visits/custody will support
the parent-child bond, promote emotional security, and benefit
[D.G.]’s overall well-being.”
Mother attached a March 23, 2026 progress letter from
You Can Health Services confirming her participation and

22
attendance since August 25, 2025. The counselor stated mother
had “demonstrated her readiness for change in her sobriety,”
identified her triggers for using illicit substances, developed
coping skills that she used daily to assist her with relapse
prevention, and had maintained her sobriety, testing negative
for all substances on March 20. The counselor was “pleased with
[mother’s] dedication to change” and the “positive progress” she
had made in the program. The counselor noted there were areas
mother needed “to strengthen and work towards developing,”
such as participating in things she enjoys and hobbies outside
of work. Mother attached negative drug test results from
February 16 and March 20, 2026, along with the negative tests
she had previously submitted. Mother again attached her
domestic violence certificate.
On March 25, 2026, the court denied mother’s March 24
section 388 petition without a hearing. The court noted it had
read and considered mother’s petition and said, “I’m going to
deny the 388 for a hearing as it’s not in the minor’s best interest
and certainly not a complete change of circumstance. Mother’s
still in a program; hasn’t completed anything. And . . . [has a]
history of . . . having cases where she is under the influence,
complies with the case plan, closes the case, and the next thing
you know, she’s got another child and does the same. So it’s . . .
not a sufficient change of circumstance.” The court continued
the section 366.26 hearing to allow father to attend from custody.
Mother filed a notice of appeal.
5. Termination of parental rights
In its April 6, 2026 LMI, DCFS noted that during
mother’s March 27 visit, an unknown male arrived, to whom
mother “hand[ed] the child over . . . to hold and play with.”

23
The individual was D.G.’s adult paternal-half sibling. The
social worker told mother to ask him to leave, as mother did
not ask permission for him to participate in the visit. Mother
gave the brother “a bundle of money” and he left. DCFS stated
the brother’s unexpected arrival was a safety concern, as DCFS
had not assessed him for visits.
On April 8, 2026, the court held the contested section
366.26 hearing. The court admitted DCFS’s reports into evidence
and took judicial notice of the prior sustained petition, minute
order, and case plans in D.G.’s maternal half-sibling’s case.
Mother appeared with counsel standing in for her “standard
court-appointed attorney.” Both counsel were from the same
firm. Counsel asked for a continuance so that mother’s appointed
attorney could be present, or, alternatively, so that mother could
retain private counsel. Counsel said mother did not wish to be
represented by her. After noting the hearing already had been
continued twice, and decisions needed to be made to move
forward with the child’s permanency, the court found no basis
to continue the matter. The court asked mother’s counsel if she
was “ready to proceed today,” counsel said that she was.
Mother’s counsel then called the social worker to testify.
The social worker had monitored mother’s visits with D.G. twice
a week for the past eight months. She described D.G.’s reaction
to seeing mother: he would smile and walk up to mother and
she would hug him, he often put his arms up to her, and he was
“very joyful” and “happy” and his mood was “[v]ery positive.”
When visits ended, the social worker said “[t]here really is no
difference. . . . Mother will take the child to the car, strap him in,
say her goodbyes, and it’s typically the end of that.” D.G. did not

24
cry when mother left. The social worker had not observed a bond
between D.G. and mother.
DCFS’s counsel asked the social worker her reasoning
for believing D.G. did not have a bond with mother. The social
worker answered, “Based on my observations of the child[’s]
behavior. More so, just the greeting any adult individual,
they’re very similar in nature. The way he greets me is the
same way he’s going to greet any other adult that approaches
him. Whenever we do have visitations and mom steps away
for the restroom, he [D.G.] does not cry, does not turn to look
for mom.” At that point, mother interrupted, “That’s a lie.
That’s a lie.” The social worker stated there was “no significant
behavior from the child or statements from the child,” noting the
child does not speak. Mother interrupted again, “Why are you
lying? You know you’re lying. You know you’re lying.” The court
admonished mother.
Mother then testified. Mother said that when D.G.
sees her, he is always happy to see her, runs toward her, and
asks her to hug him and carry him. Mother believed D.G.
reacted differently to her than to others and recognized her as
his mother. Mother testified D.G. cried when visits ended. She
said the social worker knew D.G. cried, because he was crying
while she was putting him in his car seat. When asked why
mother believed it would be harmful to D.G. to be adopted and
not to have a parental relationship with her, mother said he
knew she was his mother—the way he reacts to her when he
sees her and cries when it’s time to leave. On cross-examination,
DCFS’s counsel asked mother if she believed D.G. needed
Regional Center services. Mother answered that “[h]e does
need [the services] because he’s not . . . with me.” When asked

25
if she had been attending Regional Center services for D.G.,
mother responded, “They never allow me to.” Mother clarified
that she was told about the appointments, but DCFS did not
allow her to be part of the sessions. She said she was in contact
with D.G.’s therapist and asked how D.G. was doing, but DCFS
did not allow her “to be there with him” when she asked. Father
testified that D.G. smiled at everyone, but he always put his
hands up to him—he distinguished father from others.
Mother’s counsel argued the parental-benefit exception
applied and asked the court to order legal guardianship for D.G.
instead of terminating parental rights. Counsel “underst[oo]d
that mother’s version of events and the social worker’s are
different. That is to be expected. They do have different goals
in these proceedings.” She argued mother had “been consistent
in her statements” and asked the court to find them credible.
Counsel argued mother had shown D.G. had a substantial
positive attachment to her and terminating parental rights
would be detrimental to him based on “the extremely positive
visits that have continued throughout the life of this case and
the bond that has been demonstrated.”
D.G.’s counsel agreed “for argument’s sake” that there was
a beneficial relationship between D.G. and parents. She argued
that severing the relationship with parents did “not outweigh the
benefit of adoption and the home that [D.G.] has known his whole
life.” DCFS’s counsel asked the court to find mother’s testimony,
that she was not allowed to go to Regional Center appointments,
not credible. Counsel noted the interim review report discussed
“how [mother] was able to go to the appointments, but she chose
not to.”

26
After hearing argument, the court stated, “This always
turns out to be the most difficult hearing that the court has
before it to terminate or not. And I take this very seriously.”
The court found parents’ visits with D.G. had been consistent, but
there hadn’t “been . . . much, if any, change of the child’s conduct.
No running to a parent and hugging and kissing. No . . . crying
when the child’s leaving.” Mother again interrupted, “She’s
lying.” The court noted it was “unfortunate that this is a child
that’s young”—a little over one and a half years old. As to the
beneficial nature of D.G.’s relationship with parents, the court
noted D.G. had been out of parents’ care for “over a year and
a half.” Finally, the court found it would not be detrimental
to D.G. to terminate parental rights. The court stated, “There
is a home that he’s been living in since the case came in. And
the court has to weigh the severance to the benefits, and I find
clearly that the benefit here is to adopt this child.” The court
terminated parents’ parental rights and named the caretaker
as the prospective adoptive parent. Mother and father each
appealed from the order terminating parental rights. On
April 15, 2026, mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ
petition asking the appellate court to reverse the denial of her
section 388 petition and to order a full evidentiary hearing
and reinstatement of her visitation.8
DISCUSSION
We address each of the orders mother challenges below,
as well as father’s separate appeal based on ICWA.

8 On May 13, 2026, we consolidated appellate case nos.
B351431, B353711, and B353725 for all purposes under case no.
B351431. Mother does not appear to have filed the writ.

27
1. The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
mother’s section 388 petitions without hearings
a. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 388 allows a parent of a dependent child to petition
the juvenile court—at any time—to change, modify, or set aside
its prior orders “upon grounds of change of circumstance or
new evidence.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) Section 388 was designed
as an “ ‘ “escape mechanism” ’ . . . [to] allow[ ] the juvenile court
to consider a legitimate change in the parent’s circumstances
after reunification services have been terminated.” (In re
Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478 (Alayah J.).) It affords
a parent a last opportunity for continued reunification services
before the final resolution of custody status. (In re Marilyn H.
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).)
Section 388 petitions are “liberally construed in favor of
granting a hearing to consider the parent’s request. [Citations.]
The parent need only make a prima facie showing to trigger the
right to proceed by way of a full hearing.” (Marilyn H., supra,
5 Cal.4th at pp. 309–310.) The prima facie showing is twofold:
the parent must demonstrate “that circumstances have changed
since the prior court order, and that the proposed change
will be in the best interests of the child.” (Alayah J., supra,
9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478; In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
246, 250 (Anthony W.).)
“ ‘A “prima facie” showing refers to those facts which will
sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support
of the allegations by the petitioner is credited.’ [Citation.]
‘Whether [the petitioner] made a prima facie showing entitling
[the petitioner] to a hearing depends on the facts alleged in [the]
petition, as well as the facts established as without dispute’ ”

28
by the court’s records. (In re B.C. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 129,
141; see In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62 (K.L.) [“In
determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing,
the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history
of the case.”].) “ ‘While the petition must be liberally construed
in favor of its sufficiency [citations], the allegations must
nonetheless describe specifically how the petition will advance
the child’s best interests.’ ” (K.L., at p. 62; see also In re
Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 [petition “may not consist
of ‘general, conclusory allegations’ ”].)
Moreover, where reunification services have been
terminated, as is the case here, “the parents’ interest in the care,
custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount.
Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 317 (Stephanie M.).) Thus, “after reunification services
have terminated, a parent’s [section 388] petition for either an
order returning custody or reopening reunification efforts must
establish how such a change will advance the child’s need for
permanency and stability.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
503, 527 (J.C.).)
We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition
for an abuse of discretion. (K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.)
“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision
for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th
at pp. 318–319 [reversal warranted only where trial court’s
determination is “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently

29
absurd” ’ ”].) “ ‘The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits
reversal as an abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re Daniel C. (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.)
b. Mother’s October 16, 2025 section 388 petition
Mother contends she made a prima facie showing of
changed circumstances in her October 2025 petition. She notes
she had made progress in her services before filing her petition:
she had enrolled in an outpatient program on August 25, 2025,
tested negative for drugs on September 10, 2025, had completed
a parenting program in November 2024, and was participating
in monthly therapy. The court reasonably could find mother
did not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.
She had only just begun her outpatient program and still
denied having ever used methamphetamine and the accuracy
of D.G.’s meconium results, showing in utero exposure to
methamphetamine and amphetamine. And, after filing her
petition, but before the court ruled on it, mother tested positive
for methamphetamine. She also refused to acknowledge D.G.
required Regional Center services, ignored the pediatrician’s
recommendation regarding transitioning off the bottle, and
had made what the court could reasonably infer were false
accusations against Ms. G. regarding D.G.’s care.
Mother argues the juvenile court applied “a standard
more demanding than section 388 requires,” by requiring mother
to complete her six-month treatment program before it would
reconsider her section 388 petition. We disagree. After the
court denied the petition, mother’s counsel argued mother
was “doing everything that the court has required.” The court
responded that it had already ordered mother to complete a
drug program, but she only had just begun the program. The

30
court then noted that if mother finished her programs, “we can
certainly re-address it.” We construe the court’s statement as
finding mother’s very recent participation in her court-ordered
treatment program—after the termination of reunification
services—simply was not enough, even if true, to show changed
circumstances at that point.
Even if we were to conclude mother made a prima facie
showing of changed circumstances, the record supports a finding
that she failed to show reinstatement of her reunification services
may promote D.G.’s best interests—specifically, his need for
stability and permanency. (See Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake
National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1257 [appellate
court “review[s] the result the trial court reached, not its legal
reasoning,” and may “affirm on any ground supported by the
record”].) Mother alleged reinstating reunification services
would be in D.G.’s best interest because he “needs to be home”
with her, her home was ready for him, and she would provide him
with love, stability, and a safe environment. Mother’s conclusory
allegations were insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing.
(See K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 62 [allegations must
“ ‘describe specifically’ ” how the change “ ‘will advance the
child’s best interests’ ”].) Critically, mother had yet to take
responsibility for prenatally exposing D.G. to drugs or to
recognize his developmental needs. Construing mother’s petition
liberally, the court reasonably could find mother did not make
a prima facie showing that giving her more time to reunify with
D.G.—and thereby delaying his chance for permanency with
his aunt, who had provided for all his needs since he was weeks
old—would advance his interests in stability and permanency.
The court did not abuse its discretion.

31
c. Mother’s March 24, 2026 section 388 petition
Mother first argues she made a prima facie showing of
changed circumstances through her continued participation and
progress in services and negative drug tests. She also contends
the juvenile court improperly relied on her prior dependency
history—her history of entering programs and relapsing.
We disagree with mother that the court did not evaluate her
participation in her current programs when it concluded she
had not demonstrated changed circumstances. Rather, we
interpret the court’s statement that mother had not shown a
“complete change of circumstance,” as the court having found
mother had shown evidence of changing, rather than changed,
circumstances given her sobriety was very recent and in light
of her long-standing history of substance abuse. After all,
on October 30, 2025, less than five months earlier—and while
participating in her outpatient program—mother tested positive
for methamphetamine.
Nevertheless, assuming, without deciding, that mother
made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, we
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother
failed to make a prima facie showing that further reunification
services, unmonitored visits, or a return to her custody was in
D.G.’s best interest. Mother alleged the change would be in her
young son’s best interest because he was “very bonded” to her
and granting the petition would “support the parent-child bond,
promote emotional security, and benefit [D.G.’s] overall well-
being.” She argues the evidence of her continued sobriety,
participation in treatment and therapy, and appropriate
parenting of D.G. during visits, if proved, “could support a
finding that additional reunification services would promote

32
D.G.’s best interests by allowing [m]other to continue
demonstrating the sustained progress reflected in the petition.”
In essence, mother “is asserting it is in [D.G.’s] best
interests to preserve the biological parent-child relationship
that she has worked diligently to achieve.” (J.C., supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) But giving mother the ability to continue
to demonstrate her progress was not the issue at this stage
when reunification services had been terminated—it was D.G.’s
need for stability and permanence. (Ibid. [child’s best interests
“are not to further delay permanency and stability in favor of
rewarding Mother for her hard work and efforts to reunify”].)
As with her earlier petition, mother did not make a factual
showing of how another chance at reunification could advance
D.G.’s interests in stability and permanency. (See K.L., supra,
248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 62–63 [broad assertions that new
placement “ ‘can provide stability and a permanent placement
for the children’ ” did not constitute prima facie showing
that proposed placement changes would be in children’s best
interests].) D.G. had been living in a stable and loving home
with his maternal aunt Ms. G. and her family since shortly
after his birth. Ms. G. and her husband loved D.G. and treated
him as their own child. Their children thought of D.G. as their
brother. D.G. had “established a strong bond” with the family.
D.G. never lived with mother and her visits with him had always
been monitored. Mother’s visits with D.G. were positive, but D.G.
showed no adverse effects when visits ended or during the time
between visits. Moreover, Ms. G. had ensured D.G. received
Regional Services while mother denied that he required those
services.

33
In short, after crediting the petition’s allegations and
evidence—and considering the history of the case—the court
reasonably could find mother did not make a prima facie showing
that a further delay to allow her more time to reunify with D.G.
would benefit him at this stage in the proceedings. (See In re
Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 465 [denial of section 388
petition without a hearing not an abuse of discretion where
parent failed to “make some factual showing that the best
interests of the child would be served by [the requested]
modification”]; see also Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 251–252 [“on the eve of the selection and implementation
hearing, the children’s interest in stability was the court’s
foremost concern, outweighing any interest mother may have
in reunification”].) We find no abuse of discretion.
2. The court did not abuse its discretion when it issued
a restraining order protecting Ms. G. from parents
a. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 213.5 authorizes the juvenile court to issue a
restraining order enjoining a person from “molesting, attacking,
striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying the personal property,
contacting . . . , or disturbing the peace” of the protected person.
(§ 213.5, subd. (a).) The court may issue the restraining order
to protect the child, or the child’s parent, legal guardian, or—
as is the case here—current caretaker, for up to three years.
(Id., subds. (a), (d).)
“Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does
not require ‘evidence that the restrained person has previously
molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or
battered the [protected person].’ ” (In re C.Q. (2013) 219

34
Cal.App.4th 355, 363 (C.Q.), quoting In re B.S. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) The court need only find “that the person
to be restrained has ‘ “disturbed the peace” ’—that is, engaged
in conduct that destroys a person’s mental or emotional calm—
of the person to be protected. [Citation.] Neither ‘evidence’ of
prior physical abuse nor ‘a reasonable apprehension of future
physical abuse’ is required.” (In re Lilianna C. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 638, 644.)
When a restraining order “arises in a dependency
proceeding, we must keep in mind that the ‘purpose of a
dependency hearing is to determine the best interests of the
child and to protect those interests. [Citations.]’ ” (In re A.M.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) “In determining whether or not
to issue the temporary restraining order,” the juvenile court must
“consider all documents submitted with the application” and may
“review the contents of the juvenile court file regarding the child.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(c)(7).)
We review the juvenile court’s issuance of a restraining
order for abuse of discretion and its factual findings
underpinning its order for substantial evidence. (In re S.G.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 670.) In conducting our review,
“ ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences
to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there is
substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance
of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (C.Q., supra,
219 Cal.App.4th at p. 364.)
b. Substantial evidence supported the restraining order
Mother contends substantial evidence did not establish
that she engaged in any conduct prohibited under section 213.5.

35
She argues the allegations established only Ms. G.’s belief that
unknown individuals had followed her, an unidentified man
had been sent to spy on her, and that mother had written the
text message she received from the unknown number.
Both Ms. G. and mother testified at the hearing on the
restraining order. The court also considered the documentary
evidence, including the text message Ms. G. included in her
declaration, and the record as a whole. The court found there
was “no question” in its mind that “mother and father got
together” and after learning D.G. was not at Ms. G.’s birthday
party, “ripped off this text . . . in such threatening language that
you can’t look at this and say anything else, but this is scary.”
The court found the text message was “like the culmination”
of both mother and father filing referrals claiming Ms. G. had
“done this and done that” over the past year, all of which had
been denied. The court found there was ample evidence of a
risk to Ms. G.
Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding. The
court reasonably could conclude that mother wrote—or wrote
with father—the threatening text message to Ms. G. Ms. G.
testified mother answered the phone when her friend called the
number from which the message was sent, and Ms. G.—who was
on the line—recognized her sister’s voice. Mother denied having
written the threatening text message, telling anyone to write it,
or being familiar with the phone number associated with the
message. We can infer the court found mother not credible
and Ms. G. credible.
The court reasonably could find the threatening message
on its own was conduct that disturbed Ms. G.’s peace. She
testified she feared for her safety and her family’s safety.

36
Moreover, the record supported the court’s finding that Ms. G.
was at risk. Not only did she receive the threatening message
that the court found mother and father sent, but before the order
to show cause hearing on the restraining orders, DCFS reported
that mother’s therapist was concerned about statements mother
had made about Ms. G.—so much so that the therapist thought
she might have to divulge her confidential communications
with mother to the social worker under Tarasoff.9 Evidence
in the record that mother had contacted the Regional Center,
essentially making baseless allegations that Ms. G. had abused
or neglected D.G., also supported the court’s implicit finding
that mother had disturbed Ms. G.’s peace.
Mother contends DCFS’s comments about mother’s
inspection of D.G. during visits and accusations about D.G.’s
physical well-being were not part of Ms. G.’s request for a
restraining order. The juvenile court, however, in determining
whether to issue the restraining order, was permitted to—and
did—review the case file. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(c)(7);
see also rule 5.630(e)(1) [“Proof may be by the application
and any attachments, additional declarations or documentary

9 Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17
Cal.3d 425, 431 [holding that when a psychotherapist determines
a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the
therapist has an obligation to use reasonable care to protect
the intended victim, including warning the victim or others];
but see Geffner v. Board of Psychology (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 19,
46, fn. 16 [noting Civ. Code § 43.92 limits Tarasoff to instances
where the patient has told the psychotherapist about a serious
threat of violence against a reasonably identifiable victim].)

37
evidence, the contents of the juvenile court file, testimony,
or any combination of these.”].)
As substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
findings, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
granting a one-year restraining order against mother, protecting
Ms. G.10
3. The court’s denial of mother’s request to continue the
section 366.26 hearing was not an abuse of discretion
Section 352 authorizes the juvenile court to continue a
hearing “upon a showing of good cause” unless doing so would
be contrary to the child’s interests. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1), (2).)
In considering the child’s interests, the court “shall give
substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution
of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with
stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged
temporary placements.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) We review the
juvenile court’s denial of mother’s request for a continuance
for abuse of discretion. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023)
14 Cal.5th 609, 637.) “Discretion is abused when a decision is
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd and results in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
166, 180.)
The juvenile court acted within its discretion. The court
noted it already had continued the section 366.26 hearing twice.
Indeed, the court had continued the hearing from November 2025
to February 2026 to March 2026 and finally to April 2026. When

10 We note the restraining order did not prevent mother
from participating in court-ordered visitation with D.G.

38
counsel asked for the continuance, she gave no reason as to why
mother’s regular counsel could not be at the hearing. Noting the
child’s need for permanency, the court found no basis to continue
the matter. We cannot conclude the court acted arbitrarily or in
a capricious or absurd manner in denying mother’s last-minute
request.11 Nor has mother shown the court’s refusal to continue
the section 366.26 hearing resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
When asked if she was ready to proceed, mother’s stand-in
counsel said, “I am, your Honor.” The record shows stand-in
counsel, who was from the same firm as mother’s regular
attorney, competently represented mother. She called and
questioned witnesses, including mother at mother’s request,
and argued on mother’s behalf that the beneficial parent
exception to adoption applied. Mother does not contend
her stand-in counsel’s representation was inadequate.
We find no prejudicial error.
4. The court did not err in finding the parental-benefit
exception to adoption did not apply
a. The parental-benefit exception to adoption
“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select
and implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification
efforts have failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–
852 (J.D.); Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 304; see also
§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If the court finds by clear and convincing

11 We also note mother’s oral request at the start of the
section 366.26 hearing did not satisfy the requirements of
section 352, subdivision (a)(3), which states “written notice
[of the continuance] shall be filed at least two court days prior
to the date set for hearing.” (Italics added.)

39
evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, as was the
case here, the court shall terminate parental rights unless the
parent establishes that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child under one of several statutory exceptions
set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c). (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.) These “ ‘statutory exceptions merely
permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to
choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’ ”
(Id. at p. 631.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) codifies one of
those exceptions, which is commonly referred to, among other
names, as the “ ‘parental-benefit exception.’ ” (See Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625, fn. 2.) The exception applies where
“[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact
with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); J.D., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.) Our Supreme Court has clarified
a “parent asserting the parental benefit exception must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, three things. The parent
must show regular visitation and contact with the child, taking
into account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the
parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship. And the parent must show that terminating
that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., at p. 636.) If the parent meets that burden,
“the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be
in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and

40
the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.”
(Id. at pp. 636–637.)
b. The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
mother’s request for a bonding study
Under evidence code section 730, the juvenile court may
appoint an expert to study the bond between a parent and
dependent child. (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 509
(M.V.).) We review the denial of a bonding study for abuse of
discretion. (In re P.S. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 541, 553.)
In Caden C., the mother submitted a bonding study to the
juvenile court. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 627.) Our
high court noted that, “[a]s in [the] case [before it], often expert
psychologists who have observed the child and parent and can
synthesize others’ observations will be an important source
of information about the psychological importance of the
relationship for the child.” (Id. at pp. 632–633.) As both
the juvenile and appellate courts “found the bonding study
informative,” the court urged juvenile courts to “seriously
consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing for a
bonding study or other relevant expert testimony.” (Id. at p. 633,
fn. 4.) However, the Caden C. court did not suggest that a
bonding study is appropriate or required in all cases. As our
colleagues in Division Eight of this court explained, “The purpose
of a bonding study is to obtain evidence of the existence and
nature of a relationship to assist the court in adjudicating the
applicability of the beneficial relationship exception, or as one
court put it, ‘to illuminate the intricacies of the parent-child
bond so that the question of detriment to the child may be fully
explored.’ ” (M.V., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 509; see also
In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 [“[t]here is no

41
requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a
bonding study as a condition precedent to” terminating parental
rights].)
Mother has failed to establish the juvenile court’s denial of
her request for a bonding study was an abuse of discretion. First,
we agree with DCFS that mother’s request for a bonding study
was “extremely belated.” In July 2025, the court set the section
366.26 hearing for November 2025. Mother did not ask for a
bonding study—by joining in father’s oral request for one—
until the day of the February 3, 2026 continued section 366.26
hearing—almost seven months after the court had announced the
original hearing date. That date was continued at mother’s and
father’s request to set the matter for trial, and again for father
to appear from custody, but as DCFS argues, mother’s request
for a bonding study at that late date would have substantially
delayed the final section 366.26 hearing, which would not have
been in D.G.’s best interest. Moreover, DCFS had completed its
assessment almost a year earlier in March 2025, finding it likely
D.G. would be adopted. “While it is not beyond the juvenile
court’s discretion to order a bonding study late in the process
under compelling circumstances, the denial of a belated request
for such a study is fully consistent with the scheme of the
dependency statutes, and with due process.” (In re Richard C.
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197 [noting “[b]onding studies
after the termination of reunification services would frequently
require delays in permanency planning”].)
Mother presented no compelling circumstances to the
juvenile court to justify the court granting mother’s last minute
request for a bonding study. Nor does mother do so on appeal.
Rather, she notes DCFS acknowledged it was “unable to

42
determine how [D.G.] views his parents, as [D.G.] is pre-verbal
and is unable to express how he feels regarding his relationship
with his mother or father,” but recognized D.G. “had positive
experiences with mother during visits.” Mother cites no
authority to support her apparent contention that, because
D.G. was preverbal and unable to express his feelings about
his relationship with parents, a bonding study was necessary.
(See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [absence of citation to authority permits
reviewing court to deem argument waived].) Nor did mother
argue below that a bonding study was necessary due to D.G.’s age
or some other reason. Mother simply joined in father’s request
that “a bonding study also be directed in advance” of the
contested hearing date and asserted she had been “consistently
visiting throughout this case.”
Mother contends a bonding study “would have provided
expert evidence regarding the significance of D.G.’s attachment
to [m]other despite his young age, his pre-verbal developmental
stage, and the limitations inherent in monitored visitation.” But
it is precisely because D.G. was so young and preverbal that the
juvenile court reasonably could find a bonding study would not
have been very helpful, especially this late in the proceedings.
As our colleagues in Division Eight also recognized, bonding
studies “are particularly informative in cases like Caden C., in
which the child was eight or nine years old and had a complex
parental relationship with both positive and negative aspects.”
(In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1179, italics added.)
Unlike the child in Caden C., D.G. was only 18 months old
and preverbal. He thus was too young to give a statement to a
psychologist to assist with an evaluation of his bond with mother.

43
Nor was there any evidence that D.G.’s and mother’s relationship
was complex. D.G. was removed from mother’s custody while
still in the hospital after his birth. He never lived with mother
and every visit with her was monitored. Moreover, the reports
before the juvenile court described mother’s interactions with
D.G.—observed every week by the social worker or HSA—
as positive and appropriate for the most part.
Mother argues “[r]ather than considering the evidence,
the juvenile court undertook the complex factual analysis
required by Caden C. without the benefit of the very type of
expert evidence the Supreme Court instructed juvenile courts
to seriously consider when requested and appropriate.” We
disagree. We conclude the juvenile court reasonably could
find it had sufficient evidence to evaluate the strength of the
attachment between D.G. and mother, such that delaying the
proceedings and the establishment of a “stable, permanent” home
for D.G. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)) was not warranted. The court thus
did not abuse its discretion when it found there was “no real
reason” for a bonding study.12 We find no abuse of discretion.
c. The court did not err in finding mother failed
to establish the parental-benefit exception
i. Caden C. standard and standards of review
The first element of the parental-benefit exception—
consistent visitation—is not at issue. The juvenile court found
there was “no question” mother’s visits were consistent. In

12 Mother notes the court also referred to father’s visitation.
It was father who made the initial request for a bonding study.
We can infer the court did not consider his visitation when it
denied mother’s joint request.

44
determining the second element—whether the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—
the court must “assess whether ‘the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship’ ” in light of various factors, “such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632, 636.)
To establish the third element of the exception, the parent
must show it would be detrimental to the child to sever the
parent-child relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
A court must determine “how the child would be affected by
losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like
for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s
life.” (Ibid.) The court acts in the child’s best interest by deciding
“whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the
security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’
[Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship
would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional
attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new
adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court
should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.] That subtle,
case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform:
does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh
‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a]
significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’
[Citation.] When the relationship with a parent is so important
to the child that the security and stability of a new home
wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to
the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.”

45
(Id. at pp. 633–634.) Because the child will not be returned to
live with the parent, even if the exception applies, “courts should
not look to whether the parent can provide a home for the child;
the question is just whether losing the relationship with the
parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on
balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
Whether a child’s relationship with a parent is such
that the child would benefit from continuing it is a factual
determination that we review for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) Because the
parent bears the burden of proof of establishing this element,
we ask “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (M.V., supra, 109 Cal.App.5th
at p. 508.) Because the determination of the third element—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child—requires the court to engage in a “delicate balancing”
and to assess “the likely course of a future situation that’s
inherently uncertain,” we review it for abuse of discretion.
(Caden C., at p. 640.)
ii. The court did not err in finding termination
of parental rights would not be detrimental
For purposes of mother’s appeal, we assume, without
deciding, that she established D.G. benefitted from their
relationship. We thus consider whether the juvenile court
abused its discretion in finding the benefit of adoption to D.G.
outweighed any harm he would experience from losing his
relationship with mother. We find no abuse of discretion.
At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, D.G. was about
20 months old. He had never lived with mother, having been
removed from her custody while a newborn and still hospitalized.

46
Mother visited D.G. regularly, as the court found, but those visits
always were monitored and totaled about four hours each week.
Mother was not otherwise involved in D.G.’s life. She did not
attend D.G.’s Regional Center services appointments—claiming
she wasn’t “allow[ed] . . . to”—or seem to understand his
developmental needs. She disregarded D.G.’s pediatrician’s
recommendations, and in mother’s view, her son only required
Regional Center services because he wasn’t with her.
In contrast, D.G. had lived with his maternal aunt and
her family since his discharge from the NICU. She had been
meeting all of his needs and provided him with “a stable and
loving home.” DCFS reported D.G. had “established a strong
bond” with Ms. G. and her family and had “flourished while
in her care.”
DCFS consistently reported that mother’s visits with D.G.
were positive. She brought baby supplies to the visits, changed
and fed D.G., engaged him in activities and with toys, was
affectionate, warm, and comforting, and was sensitive to his cues
and emotions. The social worker, who had monitored those visits
twice weekly since August 2025, testified D.G. smiled and walked
toward mother when he saw her, and was “very joyful,” “happy,”
and “[v]ery positive” during visits. But she also testified D.G.
did not look for mother or cry when she left the room. He had
no real reaction when visits ended. Mother would strap D.G.
in his car seat, “say her goodbyes,” and that “typically [was] the
end of that.” Moreover, the social worker said D.G. greeted her
similarly to any adult who approached him. DCFS also reported
that D.G. interacted with mother and father “in a similar
manner” as he did with the social worker and other DCFS staff.
Mother, on the other hand, testified D.G. would run toward her

47
and ask her to hug and carry him when he saw her, and cried
at the end of visits when she left.
The court noted D.G.’s conduct toward parents had not
changed “much”—during their monitored visits over the prior
year and a half—“[n]o running to a parent and hugging and
kissing” or “crying when the child’s leaving.” The social worker
testified D.G. would walk up to mother and often put his arms
up to her. In our view, the court’s comments related to its
observation that the evidence showed D.G.’s attachment to
parents had not grown stronger as visits continued. In any
event, we can infer the court credited the social worker’s
testimony over mother’s that D.G. was not upset when his visits
with mother ended. We will not reevaluate the court’s implicit
credibility findings. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640
[reviewing court does “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate
the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ”].)
Based on the above evidence, the juvenile court reasonably
could conclude D.G.’s emotional attachment to mother was not
so significant as to outweigh the benefits of adoption—security,
stability, a sense of belonging to an adoptive family, and
permanence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Mother contends the juvenile court failed to perform the
balancing required by Caden C. because it did not “reconcile”
the social worker’s testimony about D.G.’s positive reactions to
mother during their visits—smiling when he saw mother, acting
joyful, and greeting mother with affection—with its conclusion
that terminating the relationship would not be detrimental
to him. Mother further contends the juvenile court relied on
D.G.’s absence of behaviors “without considering the limitations
associated with D.G.’s age and developmental abilities”; and

48
“placed significant emphasis on the fact D.G. had not lived
with [m]other for approximately one and one-half years.”
We disagree. The court did not fail to perform the
balancing required under Caden C., or otherwise assess the
evidence improperly. At the hearing, the court stated it took its
decision “very seriously” and then went through each prong of the
Caden C. analysis. The court specifically stated it had to consider
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental
to the child and to “weigh the severance [of the parental
relationship] to the benefits.” The court heard the social worker’s
testimony and had DCFS’s reports describing D.G.’s positive
reactions to mother during their visits before it. We can infer
the court considered that evidence in determining, on balance,
the stability, security, and permanency of adoption outweighed
any detriment D.G. would experience from losing his relationship
with mother.
Nor can we find the court overemphasized the fact that
D.G., a preverbal toddler, had never lived with mother. To the
contrary, D.G.’s young age and the fact he had lived with Ms. G.
and her family essentially since his birth were factors the court
was required to consider under Caden C. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633 [in assessing application of parental-
benefit exception, courts consider, among other factors, the “ ‘age
of the child,’ ” “ ‘the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody,’ ” and “the benefits of a new adoptive home”].)
Although, “[i]n appropriate cases, the strength of the
relationship alone can support a finding that its termination
would have a ‘destabilizing’ effect on the child,” this was not
such a case. (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 820
(Andrew M.).) There is no question mother loves D.G. and

49
D.G. enjoys, and is happy during, his visits with mother.
But “[a] ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive some benefit
from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of
visitation” ’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory
preference for adoption.” (Id. at p. 818.) As discussed,
the evidence here did not support a conclusion that D.G.’s
relationship with mother was “ ‘so important’ as to outweigh
the benefits of adoption.” (Id. at p. 820, quoting Caden C., at
pp. 633–634.) There was no evidence that D.G. experienced
harm at the end of monitored visits or when mother stepped
away, or that he expressed any upset, distress, or longing for
mother in between their visits. (See Andrew M., at pp. 818–820
[parents did not establish that their very young child, who had
never lived with them, but shared an “affectionate connection
with the parents during visits and sometimes indicated
reluctance to leave,” would suffer any “meaningful detriment”
from terminating the relationship “to justify withholding the
‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘ “sense of belonging a new family
would confer” ’ ”].) On this record, the juvenile court reasonably
could conclude that D.G.’s loss of his relationship with mother
would not be detrimental when balanced against the benefits
of stability, security, and permanency he would experience
through adoption by Ms. G.
In short, “this case cannot be deemed the kind of
‘ “ ‘extraordinary case’ ” ’ in which preservation of parental
rights prevails over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive
placement.” (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 820.)
We find no error.

50
5. Father’s appeal based on ICWA
Father contends the order terminating parental rights
must be conditionally reversed to allow DCFS and the court to
conduct a more thorough ICWA inquiry of paternal relatives.13
Under California law implementing ICWA, the juvenile
court and DCFS “have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’
in every dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA
applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be an Indian
child.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131–1132 (Dezi C.),
quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) The duty “includes, but is not limited
to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,
extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
Extended family members include adults who are the child’s
“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law
or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)14 Once
the juvenile court or DCFS has a “reason to know” an Indian
child is involved, formal notice under ICWA must be given to
the child’s “parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, if any,
and the child’s tribe.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)

13 Mother and maternal aunt denied Native American
ancestry. Father does not contend DCFS or the court failed
to adequately inquire of maternal relatives.
14 Extended family member “has the same meaning as
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe,” if such
a law or custom exists. (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)

51
On August 15, 2024, father reported that he belonged to
the Torres Martinez Cahuilla Desert Indians and had multiple
relatives who lived on the reservation. He could not provide
the social worker with the names and phone numbers for his
relatives because they “didn’t have any phones.” That same day,
the social worker called the Torres Martinez Cahuilla Indian
Tribe and spoke to its ICWA representative. DCFS reported the
social worker “provided the information for father and the child.”
The ICWA representative said neither father nor D.G. were
registered with the tribe. She asked for father’s number so
she could try to get more information.
On August 16, 2024, the social worker asked father for
more information about his Native American heritage. Father
said he was not registered with a tribe, but his father (paternal
grandfather) was a member and he had five sisters who had
received grants based on their Native American ancestry.
Father did not give the social worker any names and said
he would have to get their numbers.
On August 28, 2024, at the initial hearing, father told
the court he thought one of his grandfather’s “people” may have
tribal ancestry, but his mother (paternal grandmother) told him
he had no tribal connection. He gave his grandfather’s name,
whom he said did not live on a reservation or belong to a tribe.
Father said his father was deceased and gave paternal
grandmother’s name and phone number, as the only person who
“would know.” Father also had given the social worker the name
of a paternal aunt to be assessed for placement. The court said
DCFS would talk to paternal grandmother to determine if she
had any additional information about Native American ancestry.
At that time, the court stated it had no reason to know D.G. was

52
an Indian child under ICWA. Father’s ICWA-020 form denied
tribal ancestry or membership.
On November 22, 2024, the social worker spoke with D.G.’s
half-sibling’s mother who said she believed father’s family was
from Mexico and gave the social worker the names of father’s
sisters. On February 10, 2025, father told the social worker he
was living with one of his sisters. He also said his father was
still alive and “really caring,” implying he had contact with him.
DCFS had phone or text contact with paternal
grandmother on January 16, 2025, and March 2, 2026. No ICWA
inquiry of paternal grandmother is reflected in the record. On
May 7, 2025, during a monitored visit, father called paternal
grandmother. He also tried to Facetime paternal aunt. On
January 23, 2026, DCFS reported that, during visits, the social
worker had observed father contact paternal grandmother and
paternal aunt through Facetime to show them video of D.G.
Father contends DCFS had the names and contact
information for paternal grandmother, and the names for
paternal great-grandfather and paternal aunts. Nothing in
the record shows DCFS ever contacted paternal grandmother
about D.G.’s or father’s potential Native American ancestry.
Nor does the record indicate DCFS tried to contact paternal
great-grandfather or paternal aunts about possible Native
American ancestry. Father contends DCFS thus failed to comply
with its duty of initial inquiry and/or further inquiry. Father also
notes DCFS failed to document the information it provided to the
Torres Martinez Cahuilla Indian Tribe or to follow up on father’s
claims that his sisters had received tribal grants and his relatives
lived on a tribal reservation. Father did not have the names of

53
his relatives, but DCFS did have the names of father’s sisters
and father had contacted at least one of his sisters during visits.
DCFS agrees father’s argument of inadequate ICWA
inquiry has merit and does not oppose a conditional reversal of
the order terminating parental rights and remand of the matter
to ensure proper initial inquiry is conducted under ICWA. We
agree DCFS failed to comply with its inquiry duties under ICWA
when it failed to contact paternal grandmother about D.G.’s
and father’s possible Native American ancestry and did not
follow up about paternal aunts’ alleged tribal grants.
We thus conditionally reverse the order terminating
parental rights as to both mother and father (Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1152) and remand the matter for the court to order
DCFS to interview paternal grandmother and other available
and ascertainable extended paternal relatives about D.G.’s
possible status as an Indian child under ICWA. (See also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(1), (f) [absent some exceptions court
may not terminate rights of only one parent because purpose of
termination of parental rights is to free child for adoption]; In re
Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 208 [because reinstatement
of father’s parental rights would preclude adoption,
reinstatement of mother’s parental rights was in child’s best
interest].) We note, however, ICWA does not require DCFS
to “ ‘cast about’ ” for investigative leads. (In re A.M. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 303, 323, disapproved on another ground in Dezi C.,
at p. 1152, fn. 18; In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053.)
Nor is DCFS’s inquiry obligation “ ‘an absolute duty to ascertain
or refute Native American ancestry.’ ” (In re D.F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 570.)

54
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s November 4, 2025 and
March 25, 2026 orders denying mother’s section 388 petitions;
December 16, 2025 order issuing a one-year restraining order
protecting the child’s caregiver; February 3, 2026 order denying
parents’ request for a bonding study; and April 8, 2026 order
denying mother’s request to continue the section 366.26 hearing.
We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s April 8, 2026 order
terminating parental rights as to both parents and remand
the matter for the juvenile court to ensure DCFS complies
with the inquiry requirements of section 224.2 as to available
and ascertainable extended paternal family members, and—
if applicable—the notice requirements of section 224.3, and
properly document its efforts. If after finding DCFS made a
proper and adequate inquiry and acted with due diligence, the
juvenile court determines there is no reason to believe the child
is an Indian child, the court shall immediately reinstate the order
terminating parental rights as to both parents. If the juvenile
court determines ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in

55
conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions.
(See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); §§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1), 224.3, 224.4.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ASHWORTH, J.*

We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

* Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.

56





Description Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s orders: summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 petitions asking the court to reinstate her reunification services; issuing a temporary restraining order under section 213.5 protecting the dependent child’s caregiver from mother; and terminating parental rights on the grounds the court improperly denied mother a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing, erred in denying
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