Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Aguirre CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083031
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF080926)
EDWARD STANLEY AGUIRRE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
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Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, and Alana C.
Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal is before us for reconsideration in light of recent Supreme Court
precedent. In our original opinion issued on March 13, 2025, we held that defendant and
appellant Edward Stanley Aguirre was not eligible for resentencing relief under Penal
Code1 section 1172.75, because the punishment for the enhancement for a prison prior
enhancement, imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b), had been stricken.
(People v. Aguirre (Mar. 13, 2025, E083031) [nonpub. opn.] (Aguirre I).) Subsequently,
the Supreme Court transferred the cause to this court for reconsideration in light of the
decision in People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57 (Espino) and we invited supplemental
briefing. In light of the holding of Espino, we reverse and remand the cause to the
superior court with directions to conduct a full resentencing.
BACKGROUND2
We adopt the background information set forth in our prior opinion, People v.
Aguirre I, supra, E083031:
“Defendant Edward Stanley Aguirre plead guilty to burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)
[fn. omitted] and admitted four strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2), 1170.12, subd.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 We omit a summary of the facts of the offenses they are not relevant to the issue
on appeal.
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(c)(2)), two prior serious felony conviction allegations (§ 667, subd. (a)), and one prior
prison term allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to a
determinate 10-year term consecutive to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
Additionally, the court imposed but stayed a one-year term on the prior prison term
allegation.
“The trial court denied resentencing for defendant under section 1172.75 because
it considered defendant ineligible. The court did however strike the punishment for the
prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b).”3
Defendant appealed the denial order. In our prior opinion, we held that Defendant
was not entitled to a full resentencing because the punishment for both the enhancements
had been stricken and therefore had not been “imposed and executed” within the meaning
of section 1172.75, to qualify for a resentencing hearing. (Aguirre, supra, E082960.) On
May 28, 2025, the Supreme Court granted review, deferring further action pending
consideration and disposition of a related issue in the then pending case of People v.
Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). (People v. Aguirre (May 28, 2025, S290312)
[2025 Cal. Lexis 3483].)
3 We assume the trial court struck the punishment for the prior prison term
enhancement because that same prior conviction had also been used to impose a “nickel”
enhancement (five years) for a serious felony prior pursuant to section 667, subdivision
(a). (People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1149-1153 [sections 667 and 667.5
enhancements cannot both apply to the same prior offense]; People v. Perez (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 801, 805 [where a sentencing court improperly imposes five-year prior
serious felony enhancement and a one-year prison term enhancement for the same
conviction, the court should strike the punishment for the prior prison term
enhancement].)
3
On August 13, 2025, the Supreme Court issued an order holding this matter for a
new lead case, and that further action was deferred pending the disposition of a related
issue in the still pending case of Espino. (People v. Aguirre (Aug. 13, 2025, S290312)
___Cal.5th___ [2025 Cal. Lexis 5355].) On July 2, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Espino, holding that even where punishment for a prison prior enhancement
has been stricken, a defendant is entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. (Espino,
supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 60, 66.)
On September 30, 2026, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this
court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Espino.
(People v. Aguirre (Sept. 30, 2026, S290312) ___Cal.5th___ [2026 Cal. Lexis 5578].)
We vacated our prior decision and invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing.
Defendant has submitted a supplemental brief, but the People have not.
DISCUSSION
Enacted January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b), to eliminate sentence enhancements for prior prison terms
unless the enhancements related to prior terms were for sexually violent offenses.
(Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.) The
purpose of the statute is to “reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration” by
“eliminat[ing] prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually
violent offense[s].’ ” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.) Section 1172.75,
subdivision (a), which was added to implement Senate Bill No. 136, states, “Any
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision
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(b) of Section 667.5, . . . is legally invalid.” (See People v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
1118, 1126 (Cota).)
The statute requires the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and county correctional administrators to identify “persons in their custody
currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement” under section
667.5, subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon receipt of the list, the sentencing
court must verify that the “the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement
described in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) If so, the sentencing court must
recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); Cota, supra, 112
Cal.App.5th at p. 1127.)
At the hearing to determine eligibility for resentencing, a sentence less than the
original sentence must be imposed due to the elimination of the enhancement, unless the
court finds a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. “[T]he phrase ‘lesser
sentence’ need not refer to a shorter sentence; rather, it can be understood to mean that
the new sentence must eliminate whatever adverse effects flow from the now-invalid
prior prison term enhancement, even if those effects do not take the form of a longer term
of imprisonment.” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 62, citing Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 1060.) The court must also apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)-(2).)
Following the enactment of section 1172.75, conflicting interpretations were
issued by the Courts of Appeal, resulting in diverse outcomes, which we do not need to
address here. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1057, 1066, fn.2.) The Supreme
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Court’s opinion in Rhodius clarified that “It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature
also intended for section 1172.75 to accomplish this purpose through its full resentencing
procedures for defendants whose judgments contain now-invalidated section
667.5[, subdivision] (b) enhancements, regardless of whether the enhancements were
stayed or executed.” (Id., at p. 1065.)
This left the question of whether resentencing was required for defendants as to
whom the enhancement was imposed but the punishment therefor was stricken, a
question answered in the affirmative in Espino: “The question in this case is whether an
enhancement was ‘imposed’ even though the sentencing court struck the punishment for
the enhancement. The answer is yes.” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.) The court
explained “It is true that the potential effects are not the same as when an enhancement is
stayed. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1061 [‘when a sentence is stayed, the trial
court retains the ability to “lift the stay and impose the term under certain
circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated’ ”].) But that does
not mean the potential effects are nonexistent, or that the Legislature would have believed
them to be so.” (Espino, at p. 65.)4
4 For persons committed to state prison, the CDCR relies on the information
contained in the sentencing minutes and the abstract of judgment to determine the
defendant’s release date, eligibility for educational programs, as well as to determine
where the defendant should be housed, based on a classification score determined by
ascribing points for various elements of the sentence. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,
§§ 3075 [initial intake], 3077 [criteria for county assessment program], 3078.3 [criteria
for alternative custody program exclusion], 3269 [criteria considered for inmate housing
assignments], 3375 [classification process], 3375.1 [inmate placement based on
classification score].) Inclusion of now-invalid enhancements can result in errors in a
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The opinion in Espino concluded by holding that while the punishment for the
defendant’s prison prior enhancement had been stricken, it had been imposed, and was
now invalid, rendering the defendant entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75.
(Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 66, citing Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1068.) This is
because even before enactment of section 1172.75, subdivision (a), the Supreme Court
had held that when a part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing
“ ‘ “a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its
sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.” ’ ” (Espino, at p. 65,
quoting People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
In the present case, the punishment for the prison prior enhancement was stricken.
As such, Defendant is in the same position as the defendant in Espino and is entitled to
the same relief. Defendant seeks an order that the cause be remanded to the superior
court for a full resentencing hearing pursuant to the mandate of Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th
at pages 60 and 66. We therefore reverse the order denying Defendant’s petition for
recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, and remand the matter to the superior
court to conduct a full resentencing hearing, pursuant to the holding of Espino.
defendant’s classification score, and impact the availability of rehabilitative or
educational programs for the inmate, among other things.
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DISPOSITION
The order finding that Defendant is ineligible for resentencing is reversed. The
cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a full resentencing
hearing, pursuant to section 1172.5, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J.
FIELDS
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J.
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