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Wasco Recreation and Park Dist. v. Wasco Tiger Sharks Swim Club CA5

Wasco Recreation and Park Dist. v. Wasco Tiger Sharks Swim Club CA5
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11:10:2026

Filed 11/10/26 Wasco Recreation and Park Dist. v. Wasco Tiger Sharks Swim Club CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WASCO RECREATION AND PARK DISTRICT,
F088830
Cross-complainant and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-22-100328)
v.

WASCO TIGER SHARKS SWIM CLUB et al.,
OPINION
Cross-defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Bernard C.
Barmann, Judge.
Porter Scott, William E. Camy and David R. Norton for Cross-complainant and
Appellant.
Schwartz & Janzen, Steven H. Schwartz and Noel Macaulay for Cross-defendants
and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Wasco Recreation and Park District (District) was sued by plaintiff
Tyna Powell for injuries allegedly suffered by Powell from a trip and fall accident that
occurred on District park property. Powell alleged she had come onto the property in
order to watch her grandson compete in a swim meet held by Wasco Tiger Sharks Swim
Club (Swim Club).
District tendered its defense to Swim Club and Swim Club’s insurer, respondent
HDI Global Specialty, SE (HDI) (collectively, respondents). After the tender was
rejected, District cross-complained against Swim Club and HDI. District alleged that
Swim Club had rented its park facilities to conduct the swim meet at the park’s
community pool (the community pool), that Swim Club had agreed to defend and
indemnify District against claims such as Powell’s claims, and that HDI had issued an
insurance policy endorsement naming District as an additional insured on Swim Club’s
insurance policy. District asserted causes of action against respondents for indemnity,
apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, and breach of contract.
After District filed its cross-complaint, Powell amended her complaint to
substitute Swim Club in as an additional named defendant in place of DOE 11.
District appeals from a judgment rendered in favor of Swim Club and HDI after
the trial court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment. In addition, District
appeals from an earlier order in which the court denied District’s motion for summary
adjudication of issues in its favor—i.e., whether Swim Club and HDI owed District a
duty to defend it against Powell’s complaint, and whether they breached that duty.
We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to vacate its order granting
respondents’ motion for summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion.
We affirm the court’s order denying District’s motion for summary adjudication and
remand the case for further proceedings.

2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Procedural Background

A. Powell’s Lawsuit
On February 9, 2022, plaintiff Tyna Powell sued District, the City of Wasco, the
County of Kern, and Does 1 to 50, alleging that, on or about Saturday, June 19, 2021,
Powell suffered injuries from a trip and fall accident (the subject incident) that occurred
on District property commonly known as Barker Pool Park located at 1280 Poplar
Avenue, Wasco, California (the park). 1 Powell alleged causes of action against District
and all other defendants for (1) allowing a dangerous condition to exist on public
property; (2) premises liability; and (3) general negligence.
Powell alleged that, on or about June 19, 2021, she had entered the park in order to
watch her grandson compete in a swim meet and “stepped into a pothole in a grassy area
of the park causing her to trip and fall. At the bottom of the hole was a sprinkler valve
box.” Powell alleged “the sprinkler valve box in the grassy area of the park near the
playground and [community] pool was negligently and carelessly installed, owned,
maintained, repaired, managed, constructed, controlled, [and] inspected by
[d]efendants[,]” including all DOE defendants. Powell alleged “the sprinkler valve box
… was in a condition of disrepair so as to constitute a tripping hazard and danger to
members of the general public, including [Powell]” and that defendants “had actual
and/or constructive notice” of the hazard and “failed to warn members of the general
public, including [Powell], of said danger or to remedy the danger.”

1 Powell submitted a government claim to District in connection with the subject
incident on September 3, 2021, within three months of the subject incident.

3.
B. District’s Cross-Complaint Against Respondents
District tendered the defense of Powell’s lawsuit to respondents on November 9,
2021, and renewed its tender on December 14, 2021, and again on April 1, 2022.
Respondents declined to provide District with a defense.
On April 19, 2022, District cross-complained against respondents, alleging causes
of action for indemnification, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, and breach of
contract. District alleged that, on June 17, 2021, two days before the subject incident,
Swim Club had executed a “Facility Use Agreement” (FUA) in which Swim Club agreed
to hold District harmless and to defend and indemnify District in connection with suits of
the type brought by Powell. District further alleged that Swim Club was required under
the FUA to “ ‘procure and maintain, for the duration of the [Swim Club’s] use period …
commercial general liability insurance’ ” naming District and “its officer, employees,
agents, and volunteers as additional insureds prior to the [Swim Club’s] use of the
facility,” which insurance Swim Club procured from HDI (the HDI policy).
C. Powell adds Swim Club to her lawsuit as a named defendant
On July 25, 2022, Powell amended her complaint to substitute Swim Club into the
lawsuit as a defendant in place of DOE 11.
D. District’s First Amended Cross-Complaint
On February 8, 2023, District filed its first amended cross-complaint (FACC)
against respondents alleging the same causes of action set forth in its original cross-
complaint—i.e., indemnification, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, and breach of
contract. The breach of contract cause of action included a claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
District also alleged the FUA constituted a “whole park rental, not merely a rental
of the [community] pool area” of the park, that “had [District] rented merely the
[community] pool area, [it] would have charged [Swim Club] a lesser fee,” and that
Swim Club “guests were permitted to use, and did in fact use, other areas of the park,

4.
including the area of the subject incident.” District alleged that it “agreed ‘to not rent
shelters in [the park][ 2] or hold Recreation Swim on [Swim Club] Meet days.’ ”
In its cause of action for indemnification, District alleged it was entitled to a
defense and indemnification from Swim Club under the terms of the FUA, and from HDI
under the terms of the HDI policy, and related HDI certificate of insurance and HDI
endorsement naming District as an additional insured (collectively, the HDI policy
documents). In its cause of action for apportionment of fault, District alleged that, if
Powell prevailed in her suit against District, it “is entitled to an apportionment of fault
between [it]” and respondents. In its cause of action for breach of contract/breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, District alleged that Swim Club breached the
FUA, and HDI breached the HDI policy, by refusing District’s tenders of defense. In its
cause of action for declaratory relief, District sought a declaration of its rights and duties
with respect to Swim Club under the FUA, and with respect to HDI under the HDI policy
documents.
E. District’s Motion for Summary Adjudication and the Trial Court’s Ruling
On May 30, 2023, District filed a motion to summarily adjudicate four issues in its
favor: (1) that Swim Club was required to defend District against Powell’s complaint;
(2) that Swim Club breached its contractual obligation to provide District with a defense;
(3) that HDI was required to defend District against Powell’s complaint; and (4) that HDI
breached its contractual obligation to provide District with a defense. Respondents
opposed the motion.
On August 15, 2023, the trial court heard and denied District’s motion. A formal
order denying the motion was entered on November 21, 2023.

2 District alleged that “shelters … are covered areas located throughout the park that
people may rent from [District] and have exclusive access to during the period of the
rental.”

5.
F. Powell Settles and Dismisses Her Claims
On February 5, 2024, Powell dismissed Swim Club as a defendant. On April 22,
2024, Powell, having settled her claims, dismissed her complaint in its entirety.

G. Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Court’s
Ruling
On February 2, 2024, respondents filed their motion for summary judgment as to
District’s FACC. The motion did not include a request for summary adjudication.
District opposed the motion.
In their motion, respondents contended that the FUA’s indemnification clause
“does not cover events occurring outside the portions of [the park] actually leased by
[Swim Club]” and “will not be construed to apply to common areas of [the park] under
the control of the District.” Respondents also argued that Swim Club is not a joint or
concurrent tortfeasor and, as a result, it has no liability to Powell under a theory of
equitable/comparative indemnity or contribution.
Respondents further contended the HDI policy “is limited to claims arising out of
liability resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of the [c]ommunity [p]ool in
question, and [Powell’s] injury occurred in other areas of the park.” (Italics omitted.)
Respondents also contended that HDI “is being sued solely as an insurer, and did not
cause or contribute to the accident,” “has no conceivable liability to [Powell],” and
cannot be considered a joint or concurrent tortfeasor.
On August 12, 2004, the trial court ruled on the parties’ respective objections to
evidence in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, and entered its order granting
respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
The trial court found that the undisputed evidence and legal authorities presented
to it demonstrated that “[Powell’s] injury did not occur in the [c]ommunity [p]ool area …
but in grassy or common areas of [the park]”; that the FUA’s indemnification clause
“does not apply to events occurring in the common areas of [the park], including the

6.
location of” the subject incident; and that “[t]o the extent that any indemnification clause
in the [FUA] … purports to apply to events occurring in the common areas of [the park],
such is not enforceable.”
The trial court also found Swim Club “leased the [c]ommunity [p]ool, [but] not the
entirety of [the park]”; had no duty to “maintain, inspect for, warn against or remedy any
defects in the common areas of [the park], or to prevent injuries occurring in such
common areas”; had no duty “to repair, remedy, or warn against any holes that might
have been in the common areas of [the park]”; “had no notice of any dangerous
conditions in the common areas of [the park]”; did not proximately cause any of Powell’s
injuries; is not a “joint or concurrent tortfeasor[] with the District, vis-à-vis [Powell]”;
and that no claim for “equitable indemnity, contribution and/or apportionment … will lie
against [Swim Club].” The court determined that “[t]he claim against [Swim Club] does
not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to
[Swim Club]” and that it was District that “had the responsibility to inspect, maintain,
repair, remedy or otherwise address any defects in landscaping or maintenance in the
common areas of [the park].”
With regard to matters affecting HDI, the trial court found that District did not
state a viable claim against HDI for equitable indemnity or contribution because “HDI is
being sued solely as an insurer and is not alleged to have caused or contributed to …
[Powell’s] injury”; that the HDI policy documents “appl[y] ‘only with respect to liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to
[Swim Club] and shown on the [HDI policy] Schedule”; that “[t]he only portion of the
premises shown on the [HDI policy] Schedule … is the ‘Wasco Community Pool,’ not
[the park] as a whole”; and that “[t]he declaratory relief cause of action against HDI is
derivative of the other substantive causes of action, and cannot survive their failure.”

7.
H. The Judgment on District FACC, Notices of Entry, and Appeal
On August 14, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Swim Club and
HDI, and against District on District’s FACC (FACC judgment).
On August 30, 2024, respondents served notice of entry of both the trial court’s
order granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and the FACC judgment.
On October 23, 2024, District filed a notice of appeal of the FACC judgment and
the trial court’s ruling on District’s motion for summary adjudication.
Additional facts are discussed below as necessary to address District’s claims of
error.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
This appeal concerns competing motions for summary adjudication and summary
judgment filed at different points in the litigation. Summary judgment motions and
summary adjudication motions are “subject to the same rules and procedures.” (Lunardi
v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 807, 819; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (f)(2) 3 [“A motion for summary adjudication … shall proceed in all
procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.”].) “Both [motions] are
reviewed de novo.” (Lunardi, at p. 819.)
“The moving party must point to undisputed facts that compel adjudication or
judgment in its favor. If the moving party is successful, the opposing party must then
raise triable issues as to the other’s assertions of undisputed fact.” (Lunardi v. Great-
West Life Assurance Co., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 819.) “ ‘We liberally construe the
opposing party’s evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the opposing party.
[Citation.] We consider all evidence in the moving and opposition papers, except that to

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise stated.

8.
which objections were properly sustained.’ ” (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
418, 432 (Brown).) “The trial court’s stated reasons for granting [or denying] summary
judgment [or summary adjudication] are not binding on us because we review its ruling,
not its rationale.” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878; Judicial
Council of California v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1090.)
II. District’s Contentions
On appeal, District contends that the protection afforded by the FUA’s defense
and indemnity provision was not limited “to some narrow sliver of the property or to
claims that could be traced back to [Swim Club’s] affirmative maintenance work.”
Rather, the protections extended to “claims and liabilities arising out of or in any way
relate to [Swim Club’s] use or occupancy of District property.” Similarly, District
contends the HDI policy “independently imposed a defense obligation [on HDI]
whenever the complaint and known facts created a potential for coverage.”
District argues the trial court erred by “importing a ‘common area’ limitation into
the FUA and by treating the absence of an express contractual duty to maintain or repair
park landscaping or sprinkler systems as dispositive of the defense obligation” and should
have recognized that the FUA’s defense and indemnity provision and the HDI policy
entitled District to an “immediate defense once [Powell’s] complaint alleged claims
potentially embraced by the FUA and [HDI policy documents].”
District contends the record contains “evidence that [Swim Club’s] meet-day use
extended well beyond the pool, including evidence that the event operated as a whole-
park rental” and that the trial court erred in making certain evidentiary rulings in
connection with respondents’ summary judgment motion.
III. The Summary Judgment Motion Brought By Swim Club and HDI
The motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication raise the same
duty of defense issues. We first consider District’s challenge to the summary judgment

9.
motion brought by respondents because the facts were more fully developed in the
context of that motion. The following facts are not disputed unless otherwise stated.
A. The FUA
On June 17, 2021, District and Swim Club signed the FUA, which was effective
for the period of June 1, 2021, through July 31, 2021—thus encompassing the date of the
alleged subject incident. Recitals in the FUA read, as follows: “District is the controlling
manager of the Wasco Swimming Pool located at the Northeast corner of Poplar and
Poso Street,” and “Swim Club desire[s] to use the swimming pool for [its] purpose of
conducting competitive swimming league and [to] have the right to sell light concessions
during each meet.” The FUA also contains, without limitation, the following provisions:
“District does her[e]by agree to allow … Swim Club to use existing facilities for
the sole purpose of … Swim Club swim meets, practice for the same[,] and [the] selling
of light food items and drink items or contract[ing] with a food facility at said meets.
This will include a facility walk through at the beginning and end of [the] season.”
“District agrees that the … Swim Club will be [the] sole provider for all light concession
activities for all meets and activities sponsored by … Swim Club.”
“Swim Club does hereby agree to pay to the District for the cost of electricity for
lighting the [community] pool and deck at $20.00 per hour for all scheduled meets and
practice[s] when lights are in use.” “Locking and unlocking restrooms, buildings and
gates will be sole responsibility of … Swim Club and not the District. The District will
provide 6 sets of keys to the … Swim Club for their season.” “District agrees to not rent
shelters in [the park] or hold Recreation Swim on … Swim Club Meet days.”
“District agrees to maintain the pool to the degree that swimming can be safely
conducted” and that “[t]his will include trash removal during regular District hours,
restroom cleaning, chemical balancing, and pool circulation.” “Swim Club agrees to
police the deck, guard room and restrooms for trash and personal items left on decks or at
the pool.”

10.
“Swim Club … agree[s] … to pay the District a roster fee of $20.00 per registered
swimmer for … Swim Club.” “Swim Club also agree[s] to pay $200.00 for each A Meet
and $100.00 per B Meet … and one [District] staff [member] at the rate of $14.00 per
hour for 8 hours of general maintenance for each meet. … Swim Club will provide a list
of duties to be performed by District employee. The list is to be agreed by [Swim Club’s]
President and [District’s] Manager.”
“Swim Club agree[s] to have a responsible certified coach on deck at all times that
… Swim Club are in/on the pool premises.” In addition, Swim Club agreed “to have a
designated representative at all times on the premises during the use of District
property/facilities.”
“Swim Club … agree[s] … to be responsible for any and all repair cost of
damages to any District facility or equipment while under their care and control which
derives from … Swim Club[’s] negligence.”
The FUA also required Swim Club to procure and maintain commercial general
liability insurance with coverage in specified amounts.
In addition, the FUA contains the following provision which is of particular
relevance to the appeal, and which we set out in detail:

HOLD HARMLESS AND INDEMNIFICATION: … Swim Club
assume[s] full responsibility for accidents or damages which may
arise out of use of the District Property, including without limitation
from maintenance and cleanliness of the facilities or property usage.
In that regard; … Swim Club … shall indemnify, defend, and hold
harmless … District, its officers, employees, and agents from any
and all losses, costs, expenses, claims, liabilities, actions, or
damages, including liability for injuries to any person or persons or
damage to property arising at any time out of or in any way related
to … Swim Club’s use or occupancy of a facility or property
controlled by … District, unless solely caused by the gross
negligence or willful misconduct of … District, its officers
employees, or agents with this agreement and use of Property.
“Swim Club shall indemnify, defend, and hold harmless … District,
its officers, employees, and agents from any and all losses, costs,
expenses, claims, liabilities, actions, or damages, including liability

11.
for injuries to any person or persons or damage to property arising at
any time out of or in any way related to … Swim Club’s use or
occupancy of a facility or property controlled by … District, unless
solely caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of …
District, its officers[,] employees, or agents.”
Aside from naming conventions used to refer to the parties, there are no defined terms
within the FUA.

B. The Park Attributes and Swim Club’s Use of the Park
Swim Club is a “non-profit [organization] which conducts swimming practices
and an annual meet.” Swim Club used the community pool, its surrounding pool deck,
and restrooms (collectively, community pool surround) to conduct its practices and swim
meet.
Swim Club rented the community pool surround (and, according to District, the
entire park) pursuant to the FUA. Swim Club was holding a swim meet on the morning
of June 19, 2021, the date of the subject incident.
The park is a public park and, in general, is operated by District. However,
District disputes that it operated the park on the date of the subject incident, contending
that Swim Club operated the whole park that day pursuant to the FUA.
The park has numerous facilities and amenities, including the community pool
surround; “immediately adjacent covered bleachers”; “three ball fields”; “a community
hall”; “a District office”; “one or more parking lots”; “a maintenance area”; “a
playground”; “covered ‘shelters’ near the [community] pool and ball fields”; “acres of
grass and trees and … cement pathways traveling through them.” The community pool
surround “is separated from the remainder of the [p]ark by fences and gates.” Aerial
photographs depict the park as consisting of two large plots of roughly equal size
separated by Poplar Avenue in Wasco. It appears from the photographs that, on one side
of Poplar Avenue, there are the three ball fields. The plot on the other side of Poplar
Avenue houses the community pool surround, which is located near the center of the plot,
and other structures and buildings dispersed throughout.

12.
“Covered bleachers beside the [c]ommunity [p]ool [surround] were available for
[persons] wishing to view the swim meet[]” but District submitted evidence to the effect
that “the bleachers only had a capacity to seat approximately 50 to 75 people” and,
according to one witness, the swim meet drew “hundreds of hundreds of people,” which
he estimated at a total of “[a] few thousand.”
Swim Club’s website provided the following information for attendees: “The
A Meets are held on Saturdays and are the main event of a swim team. The day begins
early when families pack up all of their gear (shade canopies, lawn chairs, blanket, ice
chest, picnic items. … Families set up their ‘camp’ in designated areas—look for other
Tigershark families as we usually set up our gear in the same general area, although there
is no requirement to do this. … Swimmers and families ‘hang out’ in the camp area
socializing, stretching, and otherwise waiting for their events … Swimmers and families
come and go from the camp to the pool as they swim their event and cheer on the other
swimmers competing.” 4
C. The Subject Incident
Powell and her family were not Swim Club members. “Powell was present to
support her grandson who was a member of another swim team.” “When [Powell]
arrived at the [p]ark, she went to sit with family members on the grass, underneath a
canopy they had erected there.” Powell did not use the bleachers on the day of the
subject incident. She never entered the community pool surround or the bleacher area,
and never used the park shelters on the date of the subject incident.

4 The trial court sustained objections to the declaration of Allison Southard wherein
she discussed the information contained on Swim Club’s website. However, the court
overruled an objection lodged on the ground that the website information lacked
authentication, and Swim Club did not dispute the content of the website in its separate
statement response. As a result, we consider the referenced content of the Swim Club’s
website undisputed.

13.
At some point during the day of the subject incident, Powell “started to walk over
the grass and to the playground” in an effort to reach her grandson. Powell testified at
deposition, “I think I stepped on the side of the hole because it was covered with grass,
and my ankle rolled. And with the momentum, I went down, and it broke … my ankles,
all three bones. It snapped like a twig.” 5 Two aerial photographs depict the location of
Powell’s fall as being in proximity to the community pool surround, as opposed to other
facilities within the park. 6
In response to special interrogatories, Powell stated that the dangerous condition
she alleges caused the subject incident was a “[r]ecessed pothole containing a sprinkler
valve box that was concealed by grass with no barrier or warning that allowed pedestrians
to freely walk into a below grade pothole containing a sprinkler valve box.”
D. Select Deposition Testimony and Declarations
1. Joaquin Castillo
Joaquin Castillo was Swim Club’s head coach on the date of the subject incident.
He executed the FUA on Swim Club’s behalf and was the point person who interacted
with District with regard to Swim Club’s duties under the FUA.
Castillo averred that “Swim Club was not using [the shelters] to sell merchandise
or food or for any similar purpose.” He also averred Swim Club “does not tell or suggest

5 The trial court sustained a hearsay objection to Powell’s deposition testimony
wherein she was asked how she knew the grass was covering a hole and her response was
“[b]ecause you couldn’t see the hole, if you walk. It was a grassy area.” Powell testified
at deposition that she was told by her son, Troy Peltz, that she had stepped in a hole but
that he did not see her fall. Powell stated she “actually never saw the hole.” Peltz
testified that he did not witness the subject incident but was told by a family member in
the vicinity of the subject incident that his mother had “fallen into a hole that was there in
the park under [a] tree.”
6 The record on appeal does not specify the precise distance of the location of
Powell’s fall from the community pool surround.

14.
to people what portions of the [park] anyone—including members of the general public—
should use.”
Castillo declared that Swim Club “had nothing whatsoever to do with the baseball
fields, community hall, the District office and many other portions of the park, nor would
any member of the general public have been excluded from … [the park] during the swim
meet” with the exception of the community pool surround, and that it was “absurd” for
District to contend Swim Club rented the entire park.
According to Castillo, Swim Club has never had an ownership interest in the park;
“had nothing, whatsoever, to do with the irrigation system at the park”; “did not create
the hole”; “was never made aware of any grass-covered or sprinkler hole”; and was not
responsible for landscaping. (Italics omitted.) All inspections by Swim Club were of the
community pool surround and were conducted by Castillo. He averred he was never
asked by District or anyone else to inspect the grassy areas of the park and he never did
so.
Castillo stated that “[d]uring the operative period of the FUA,” Swim Club “never
maintained, inspected, or repaired” the park’s “common area landscaping”; “common
area walkways”; “sprinkler systems”; or “any landscaping deficiencies.” However, he
stated that during that period, “other entities and individuals inspected, maintained, and
repaired the common areas of [the] [p]ark.”
Castillo averred that “the only ‘facility walk throughs’ at ‘the beginnings and end
of the season’ that the District conducted with [him] related to fenced off [community]
pool and pool deck/restroom areas, which were closed off from [the] rest of [the] [p]ark”
and “the only work orders provided by the District for repairs were for ‘the pool area.’ ”
(Italics omitted.)
Castillo declared it was always his understanding that the FUA “relate[d]
exclusively to the rental of the [c]ommunity [p]ool [surround]” (italics omitted) and that

15.
was “how it was always represented to [him].” No one from the District “ever suggested
that it involved anything other than the [c]ommunity [p]ool [surround].”
At deposition, Castillo testified in a manner largely consistent with his declaration.
2. Chris Serna
Chris Serna (a.k.a. Maria Christina Serna) was the interim district manager at the
time of the subject incident. She provided a declaration in opposition to respondents’
summary judgment motion.
In her declaration, Serna authenticated the FUA and said that “District has
facilities that are available for rent. The District uses a fee schedule whereby renters pay
different fees depending on the type of rental.” She stated that, “[i]n contrast to a ‘whole
park rental,’ in 2021, the fee for up to 50 people to rent just the pool facility
[(presumably, the community pool surround)] was $185 for one hour and forty-five
minutes.”
Serna declared that she “discussed the terms of the FUA with [Swim Club]
president Joaquin Castillo. During these conversations, [she] explained that the FUA
encompassed a ‘whole park rental,’ and that [Swim Club] was paying a fee for a ‘whole
park rental.’ ” She also “explained that, pursuant to the ‘whole park rental,’ [Swim Club]
would have the power to exclude members of the general public from the park, including
but not limited to the grassy areas surrounding the pool and the covered shelters.” She
declared that Swim Club “paid a fee for a ‘whole park rental’ for the ‘A Meet’ on
June 19, 2021, the date of the subject incident.” According to Serna, “District understood
that on [Swim Club] swim meet days, including the day of the subject incident, [Swim
Club] expected its guests would have the right to use the grassy areas (including the area
where [Powell] alleges she fell) for pop up tents, chairs, ice chests, etc.” Although park
shelters are typically available for the public to rent, District did not rent them on Swim
Club swim meet days.

16.
Serna was deposed as District’s person most knowledgeable of the park’s
“operation and maintenance”; “maintenance of facilities … including, but not limited to,
roads, fences, equipment, structures, sidewalks, trees, and landscaping”; “maintenance of
sprinkler systems”; and “inspection logs and/or maintenance sheets utilized for the
maintenance of facilities.” She testified as to the identities of four District employees “in
charge of maintaining the park” and further confirmed that she “oversee[s] the
maintaining of the park.” She confirmed that the maintenance department inspects the
park shelters and walkways daily and the grass around the shelters weekly. However, she
was also asked the following questions and gave the following answers: “[Q:] So given
the park[’]s approximate size of 5 acres, is there a way to make sure that there are no—is
there a way to make sure that all of the grass is inspected—is all the grass inspected at
[the] [p]ark?” “[A:] Staff does a—daily they walk through the property.” “[Q:] So they
walk through the entire 5 acres on a daily basis?” “[A:] Yes.”
At deposition, Serna testified that “when the maintenance department does a walk-
through, and they come upon an area that needs to be treated, let’s say, a hole in the
grass, they will immediately take care of it by filling it with dirt.” When asked how deep
the hole would have to be for maintenance to fill it, Serna testified: “If it is a hole, it
would be filled.” If a hole or divot is discovered “during [the [park’s] operational hours,
it is handled during that time frame.” She was asked the following questions and gave
the following responses: “[Q:] If a facility is rented out, would the renter of the facility
be in charge of maintaining a divot like this [presumably referring to the hole Powell
alleges she tripped over] at [the] [p]ark?” “[A:] I do not have an answer.” “[Q:] So if a
facility is rented out, in other words, you don’t know if they would be responsible for
filling in a divot like this?” “[A:] The renter would not be responsible for filling the
hole.” “[Q:] Would the renter be responsible for inspecting the grass at [the] [p]ark for a
divot like this?” “[A:] The renter would not be responsible for that.” (The latter two
questions were objected to, at deposition, on several grounds, including that the questions

17.
called for a legal conclusion. The objections were reasserted in opposition to
respondents’ summary judgment motion. The court overruled the objections.)
Serna further testified that, during the summer months, the sprinklers are checked
daily, and that if it is discovered that maintenance is required, the responsible member of
the maintenance crew “cautions off the area that needs repairing and fixes the sprinkler.”
Serna also testified that the park’s facilities are open to the public but are available
to rent. When asked if the public is still allowed in the park when the community pool is
rented out, she responded, “[i]t is an open public park.” When asked whether, upon
renting a park facility, the use of the park becomes exclusive, Serna clarified:
“Depending on the size of the rental—it is an open park, but depending on the size, a
usual rental of a pool is up to 50 people. So depending on the size of the event that is
scheduled is how, you know—a regular rental does not exclude anyone, nor does a big
rental, but depending on the size and how big of an event you are having does exclude
people.”

E. Respondents Did Not Demonstrate, as a Matter of Law, that They Had No
Duty to Defend and Indemnify District
1. Arguments Advanced by the Parties
In moving for summary judgment, respondents argued that District’s first cause of
action for indemnification was without merit because the FUA indemnification clause
“does not cover events occurring outside the portions of [the] [p]ark actually leased by
[Swim Club]” and “will not be construed to apply to common areas of [the] [p]ark under
the control of the District.” 7 HDI argued similarly with regard to potential coverage
under the HDI policy. Thus, respondents’ summary judgment motion as to this cause of

7 Swim Club also argued the first cause of action was without merit “to the extent
based upon the principles of equitable/comparative indemnity or contribution” because
Swim Club had “no liability to plaintiff” and was not a “joint or concurrent tortfeasor[]”
with regard to Powell’s claims.

18.
action was premised on the contention that respondents had no defense and indemnity
obligations because Swim Club did not rent the common area where the subject incident
occurred. The trial court largely agreed with this argument.
District contends Swim Club did rent the area where the subject incident occurred
and that the trial court erred by determining, as a matter of law, that Swim Club rented
only the community pool surround. District also contends the court erred by accepting
into evidence Castillo’s “subjective interpretation” of the FUA; by not accepting Serna’s
competing testimony which “explained the context of the FUA”; and by refusing to
consider evidence that Swim Club “invited its hundreds of fans to set up camp at the park
to watch the event.” District also contends the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that
Powell’s complaint alleged Swim Club controlled the area where the subject incident
occurred.
2. Analysis
“The interpretation of a written instrument … is essentially a judicial function to
be exercised according to the generally accepted canons of interpretation so that the
purposes of the instrument may be given effect. [Citation.] … [I]ndemnity agreement[s]
must be interpreted so as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citations.]
In interpreting an express indemnity agreement, the courts look first to the words of the
contract to determine the intended scope of the indemnity agreement. [Citation.] The
intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the ‘clear and explicit’ language of the
contract, and if possible, from the writing alone. [Citations.] Unless given some special
meaning by the parties, the words of a contract are to be understood in their ‘ordinary and
popular sense,’ focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the
circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (City of Bell v. Superior Court
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 236, 247–248 (City of Bell).)
In the FUA, District “agree[d] to allow [Swim Club] to use existing facilities for
the sole purpose of [Swim Club] meets, practice for the same and selling of light food

19.
items and drink items or contract with a food facility at said meets.” The term “facilities”
is not defined.
The FUA described certain attributes of the park with, arguably, more specificity.
For example, it obligated Swim Club “to police the deck, guard room and restrooms for
trash and personal items.” It required Swim Club to pay the cost of electricity to light the
“pool and deck.” The FUA also assigned Swim Club “sole responsibility” to lock and
unlock “restrooms, buildings and gates” but without reference to any specific location
within the park. It required a “responsible certified coach [be] on deck at all times that …
Swim Club are in/on the pool premises.” It required that Swim Club be responsible for
“damages to any District facility” while under Swim Club’s control and due to Swim
Club’s negligence. District agreed not to rent “shelters” in the park. The FUA also states
that the failure of Swim Club to procure insurance could result in District “deny[ing]
access to the facility.” The singular term “facility” is not defined.
Turning to the FUA’s indemnification clause, that provision states that “Swim
Club assume[s] full responsibility for accidents or damages which may arise out of [the]
use of the District Property, including without limitation from maintenance and
cleanliness of the facilities or property usage.” The additional terms “property” and
“District Property” are likewise undefined. The FUA required that Swim Club indemnify
District for claims “arising at any time out of or in any way related to … Swim Club’s
use or occupancy of a facility or property controlled by the … District.” The phrase
“property controlled by the … District” is not defined.
The FUA is not a model of clarity. The FUA does not specifically define the
leased premises or its perimeters, and it is not possible to determine the expanse of the
leased premises from the FUA alone. Nothing in the FUA precludes the possibility that
the leased premises included the grassy areas where family and friends congregated to
watch the swimmers compete, or, for that matter, that the FUA extended to the whole
park.

20.
Respondents, relying on Civil Code section 1654, argue that the FUA was drafted
by District, that ambiguities are to be strictly construed against District, and that “[t]his
rule is ‘applied with particular force in the case of adhesion contracts,’ which the FUA
manifestly is,” citing Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 801. 8 In
Badie, the court wrote: “[I]f the uncertainty [of an ambiguous contract] is not removed
by application of the other rules of interpretation, a contract must be interpreted most
strongly against the party who prepared it. [Citations.] This last rule is applied with
particular force in the case of adhesion contracts.” (Badie, at p. 801, italics added, citing,
among other authority, Civ. Code, § 1654 [“In cases of uncertainty not removed by the
preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the
party who caused the uncertainty to exist.”].)
The “preceding rules” referenced in Civil Code section 1654 include the following
rules: “A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and
lawful.” (Civ. Code, § 1636.) “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation,
if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1638.) “When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone, if possible; subject, however, to the other provisions
of this Title.” (Civ. Code, § 1639.) “A contract may be explained by reference to the
circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1647.) “If the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be
interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the
promisee understood it.” (Civ. Code, § 1649.)

8 Respondents have not adequately explained why the FUA should be deemed a
contract of adhesion.

21.
In order to give effect to the mutual intention of contracting parties, it is proper to
consider the “circumstances under which it was made, including the object, nature and
subject matter of the contract, and the preliminary negotiations between the parties.”
(Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enterprises (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 714, 723.)
“ ‘Both prior negotiations and prior conversations may be construed as well as the
subsequent acts of the parties in ascertaining the true intention of the parties to the
contract.’ ” (City of Stockton v. Stockton Plaza Corp. (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 639, 644.)
“If the language used is so ambiguous, indefinite, uncertain or unintelligible that it is
impossible to ascertain the intent even considering the surrounding circumstances, then
resort may be had to parol evidence.” (Marlin v. Robinson (1932) 123 Cal.App. 373,
376.)
Here, Serna averred under penalty of perjury that she discussed the terms of the
FUA with Castillo prior to Swim Club entering into the FUA and that she “explained that
the FUA encompassed a ‘whole park rental,’ that [Swim Club] was paying a fee for a
‘whole park rental,’ ” and that Swim Club “would have the power to exclude members of
the general public from the park, including but not limited to the grassy areas surrounding
the pool and the covered shelters.”
Contrary to respondents’ contention, interpreting the FUA to encompass the whole
park does not result in an absurdity. According to witness testimony, the swim meet
drew hundreds and even thousands of individuals to the park. Evidence suggests the
Swim Club knew supporters of the various competitors would use the grassy areas
around the community pool surround and, arguably, encouraged those supporters to set
up camp in those areas, which appears to include the location of the subject incident.
This is evidence that may be considered in determining whether the scope of Swim
Club’s use of District property extended to the grassy areas. In addition, Swim Club was
authorized to have concessionaires offer food and drinks to guests—an activity that likely
would have been conducted outside the confines of the community pool surround.

22.
District’s agreement to not rent park shelters on swim meet days is further evidence that
the parties may have contemplated that the leased premises, and/or Swim Club’s use of
District park property extended beyond the confines of the community pool surround.
Respondents argue that California case law has held that “the phrase ‘arising out
of the use and occupancy of’ and similar language … cannot be read to apply to injuries
sustained in common areas.” For this proposition, respondents cite to Morlin Asset
Management LP v. Murachanian (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 184, 187 (Morlin); City of
Oakland v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 735, 737 (City of
Oakland); Hollander v. Wilson Estate Co. (1932) 214 Cal. 582, 584–585 (Hollander);
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Discover Property & Cas. Ins. Co. (N.D. Cal. 2009) 2009
WL 2591394 (Fireman’s Fund); Hartford v. State of California (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th
1564, 1570 (Hartford); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (Colo.Ct.App.
2010) 240 P.3d 521 (Travelers); and Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau
(Fla.Ct.App. 1994) 629 So.2d 1064 (Hilton). The trial court relied largely on Morlin to
deny District’s summary adjudication motion. We discuss each of those cases below.
Morlin
In Morlin, a tenant “hired plaintiff’s employer to clean the carpets in his second-
floor suite.” (Morlin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.) As plaintiff was carrying a bucket
of soapy water and climbing the stairs to the tenant’s suite, he slipped, fell and suffered
injuries. (Ibid.) Plaintiff sued the owners of the building, and the owners “filed cross-
complaints against the tenant for equitable indemnity …; apportionment of fault;
declaratory relief; and express indemnity under the terms of the lease.” (Id. at pp. 187–
188, boldface type and italics omitted.) The tenant successfully moved for summary
judgment on the cross-complaints, and the owners appealed the resulting judgments. (Id.
at p. 189.)
The lease between the tenant and owner obligated tenant to defend and indemnify
the owner against claims and liabilities “arising out of, involving or in connection with,

23.
the use and/or occupancy of the Premises by Lessee.” (Morlin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at
p. 188.) The term “Premises” was defined to exclude common areas such as the stairwell
on which the accident occurred. (Id. at p. 189.) The Morlin court acknowledged that
“ ‘[i]n a remote sense,’ the accident would not have occurred if the tenant had not hired
[the plaintiff’s employer] to clean the carpets in his dental suite, and in that sense, the
accident could be said to arise from the tenant’s use of the suite.’ ” (Id. at p. 191.) The
court determined, however, that because the plaintiff’s slip and fall accident “occurred
outside the dental suite, in a common area over which the landlords have exclusive
control” the plaintiff’s injury “did not arise out of the tenant’s use of the dental suite.”
(Id. at p. 193.) The court reasoned, “[t]he connection between the tenant’s use of his
suite and the accident in the stairwell over which the tenant had no control is too remote
to have been within the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the lease.”
(Ibid.)
City of Oakland
In City of Oakland, the defendants leased an arena in the city’s municipal
auditorium building. (City of Oakland, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at p. 734.) A third party
who was attending the defendants’ event sued the city for injuries sustained from a “fall
caused by a defect in the walkway providing access to the easterly entrance of said
municipal auditorium.” (Ibid.) When the defendants declined the city’s tender of
defense, the city brought suit for a declaration of its rights under the lease. (Ibid.) The
relevant lease provision provided: “ ‘That the [defendants] will hold the [city] free from
any liability or claim for damages or suit for or by reason of any injuries to any person or
property … from any cause whatsoever arising out of the use and occupation of the
premises by the lessee.’ ” (Id. at p. 735.) The lease defined the premises as “the Arena
of the [city’s] Municipal Auditorium” “and no other space or accommodation except as
may be hereinafter expressly provided for.” (Ibid.; id. at p. 737.) The trial court, having
found that the place of injury was part of the premises the defendants leased, concluded

24.
the accident “arose ‘out of the use and occupation of the premises leased.’ ” (Id. at
p. 734.)
The City of Oakland court reversed the judgment after concluding that “the
indemnity provision only applied to the ‘premises’ as strictly defined in the lease,” and
that, although use of the walkway was envisioned “it would be unreasonable, in view of
the very restrictive language of the lease, to hold that the indemnity applied to injuries
incurred by conditions in those areas, particularly conditions over which defendants
would have no control but [the city] would.” (City of Oakland, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at
p. 737.)
Hollander
In Hollander, the plaintiff had leased the fourth floor of the defendant’s building, a
seven-story structure. (Hollander, supra, 214 Cal. at pp. 583–584.) The plaintiff and
another individual were injured when the elevator they were taking from the fourth floor
of the building to the street below suddenly dropped to the basement. (Id. at p. 584.) The
plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence and received judgment in his favor. (Id. at
pp. 583, 584.)
On appeal, the Hollander court considered whether the trial court had properly
stricken a defense based upon a provision in the plaintiff’s lease that provided “the
[defendant] should not be liable for damages ‘for personal injuries … arising from or
occasioned by any cause, matter or thing whatsoever; and [the plaintiff] hereby covenants
and agrees to hold [the defendant] free and harmless of and from any and all damages or
claims or liability … caused, arising during the term of this lease … in or about or
connected with this tenancy or the occupancy of said demised premises.” (Hollander,
supra, 214 Cal. at p. 584.)
The Hollander court affirmed the judgment, stating that the elevator was “in no
sense demised or put under the control or operation of the lessee,” was “as much
connected” with the other building tenants’ leased premises, and “was owned, controlled,

25.
operated, and maintained exclusively by the defendant.” (Hollander, supra, 214 Cal. at
p. 585.) The court found it “unbelievable” that tenants would lease space in the building
“where the means of ingress to and egress from them was an elevator in the exclusive
control of a person without obligation of any kind … to use any care whatsoever to
maintain it in a safe condition.” (Ibid.) As further support for its decision to uphold the
trial court’s decision to strike the defense, the court relied on Civil Code section 1648,
which provides: “ ‘However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to
those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract.’ ”
(Hollander, at p. 585.)
The Fireman’s Fund, Hartford, Travelers and Hilton cases each raise similar
issues in the context of defense and indemnity provisions contained in insurance policies.
In Fireman’s Fund, an individual who desired to go to a book signing event at a
bookstore sustained injuries when she tripped over construction fencing footings on the
public sidewalk some 844 feet from the bookstore’s premises and fell. (Fireman’s Fund,
supra, 2009 WL 2591394, at p. *2.) The question was whether her claim was covered
under bookstore’s insurance policy, which extended coverage to “ ‘liability arising out of
[the bookstore’s] ownership, use, occupancy, or maintenance of the demised premises
and all areas appurtenant thereto.’ ” (Id. at p. 1.) The demised premises was clearly
defined and did not include the location of the trip and fall. (Id. at pp. 1–2.) The court
concluded there was no “causal connection” or “incidental relationship” between the
bookstore’s ownership, use, etc., of the leased premises; the bookstore was “not
instrumental in any of the acts that led to the injury”; and the lessee had no control over
the construction, the sidewalk, or the route taken by the injured party. (Id. at p. 4.)
Hartford is similar. There, a satellite business rented a booth at a state fair “for the
sole purpose of providing information, [and] displaying and selling certain equipment.”
(Hartford, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1566–1567.) The business owner was required to
obtain insurance to cover the State “ ‘but only insofar as the operations under [the rental]

26.
contract are concerned.’ ” (Id. at p. 1567.) The insurance endorsement in favor of the
State was similarly limited. (Ibid.) When the business owner’s grandchild was injured
while climbing bleachers in a neighboring area of the fairground, the State sought defense
and indemnity under the insurance policy. (Ibid.) The trial court found the policy did not
cover the incident. (Id. at p. 1568.) The appellate court affirmed, noting that the
complaint did not allege that the child was there to facilitate setting up the booth, and that
coverage “was strictly limited to the operations stated in the rental agreement.” (Id. at
pp. 1569–1570.)
In Travelers, the insurer of a shopping center sued the insurer of the shopping
center’s restaurant tenant for contribution after a diner left the restaurant, slipped and fell
in the shopping center parking lot, and sued the shopping center. (Travelers, supra,
240 P.3d at p. 522.) The Colorado trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
restaurant’s insurer and the appellate court affirmed. (Ibid.) The restaurant’s insurance
policy named the shopping center as an additional insured “ ‘but only with respect to
liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises
leased to [the restaurant] and shown in the Schedule.’ ” (Id. at p. 523.) The schedule
identified the leased premises but did not identify the parking lot or other common areas.
(Ibid.) The court determined that the diner’s “patronage of the restaurant was not
integrally related to her injury,” that the “visit to the restaurant did not expose her to any
increased risk of falling in the parking lot,” and that there was no “but-for” causation.
(Id. at p. 524.)
In Hilton, a hotel gift shop employee was injured in the hotel lobby as she was
going to work. (Hilton, supra, 629 So.2d at p. 1064.) The gift shop had obtained an
additional insured endorsement for the hotel “ ‘but only with respect to liability arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of’ the … gift shop.” (Id. at pp. 1064–1065.)
The gift shop employee sued the hotel and the hotel filed a third-party claim against the
gift shop’s insurer and the Florida trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the

27.
latter. (Id. at p. 1065.) The Hilton court rejected the third-party claim because “most
importantly, this accident did not physically occur on the premises which were covered
by the policy” and, secondly, “there was no physical connection between the accident and
the premises.” (Ibid.)
We do not find any of the above referenced cases to be dispositive of the issues
raised in this case. In each of those referenced cases, the court was able to determine the
boundaries of the premises by way of definition and/or exclusion. Here, there is
ambiguity as to the boundaries of the leased premises and whether it included the grassy
area where the subject incident was alleged to have occurred. Because there is
conflicting evidence as to the discussions that immediately preceded the execution of the
FUA, we are unable to say, as a matter of law, that the grassy area was (or was not) part
of the leased premises.
Similarly, we are unable to say, as a matter of law, that the potential liability to
persons outside the community pool surround was not within the contemplation of the
parties when the FUA was entered into. In addition to the conflicting evidence as to what
was discussed leading up to the FUA’s execution, evidence submitted in connection with
the summary judgment motion demonstrates that District had several years of previous
experience renting the park (or portions of the park) to Swim Club and that Swim Club
arguably encouraged guests and competitors to set up camp in the grassy areas.
Moreover, it is common knowledge that athletic meets that invite competitors from other
schools may draw any number of guests who will root for the competitors. Thus, unlike
the situation in Hollander, it is not “inconceivable” that the indemnity provision was
intended by Swim Club and District to extend to the grassy areas of the park where the
family, friends, supporters, and other competitors would likely be situated.
The trial court determined the FUA would be unenforceable if it “purports to
apply to events occurring in the common areas of [the park].” In explaining this
determination, the court referenced evidence that the court believed demonstrated the

28.
FUA did not constitute a whole park rental. To the extent this was the basis of the court’s
determination, the issue could not be determined as a matter of law.
Similarly, the trial court’s determination that Swim Club had no duty “to repair,
remedy, or warn against any holes that might have been in the common areas” was also
based, in part, on its determination that the leased premises extended only to the
community pool surround, which, as stated, could not be made as a matter of law. The
court’s determination was also based, in part, on evidence that demonstrated Swim Club
did not exercise control of the common areas of the park, and did not direct attendees to
use the common areas. However, as mentioned, there is evidence that Swim Club
arguably encouraged attendees and competitors to use the grassy areas to set up camp.
Even if Swim Club had no ability or opportunity to repair or remedy the alleged
cause of Powell’s injury, under a whole park rental, Swim Club would have had the
ability, right, and, arguably, an obligation to inspect the area for hazardous conditions and
to give warning of the condition. “ ‘ “[T]he duties owed in connection with the condition
of land are not invariably placed on the person [holding title] but, rather, are owed by the
person in possession of the land [citations] because [of the possessor’s] supervisory
control over the activities conducted upon, and the condition of, the land.” ’ ” (Alcaraz v.
Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1157–1158.) “[T]hose who own or occupy property have a
duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. [Citations.] To comply
with this duty, a person who controls property must ‘ “ ‘ “inspect [the premises] or take
other proper means to ascertain their condition” ’ ” ’ and, if a dangerous condition exists
that would have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care, has a duty to give
adequate warning of or remedy it.” (Staats v. Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 826, 833, fn. omitted.)
In any event, the indemnification clause in the FUA is not conditioned upon any
duty owed by Swim Club to inspect the property or to warn of dangerous conditions that
would be revealed upon a reasonable inspection. The provision states that “Swim Club

29.
assume[s] full responsibility for accidents or damages which may arise out of use of the
District Property, including without limitation from maintenance and cleanliness of the
facilities or property usage.” (Italics added.)
As mentioned, HDI also premised its defense against District’s indemnification
cause of action on its contention that the HDI policy documents only covered injuries that
occurred within the leased portion of the park, which consisted solely of the community
pool surround. Because the trial court could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the
leased premises consisted only of the community pool surround, neither Swim Club nor
HDI was able to establish, as a matter of law, that District’s indemnification cause of
action lacks merit.
A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).) Because respondents did
not demonstrate that District’s cause of action for indemnification lacks merit as a matter
of law, respondents were not entitled to summary judgment. 9
IV. The Summary Adjudication Motion Brought By District
District sought summary adjudication, pursuant to subdivision (f) of section 437c,
of the following four issues:—(1) that “undisputed material facts demonstrate the District
is entitled to a declaration that [Swim Club] is required to defend the District against
[Powell’s] complaint”; (2) that Swim Club “breached its contractual obligation to defend
the District against [Powell’s] complaint”; (3) that “HDI breached its contractual
obligation to provide the District a defense against [Powell’s] complaint”; and (4) that
“undisputed material facts demonstrate the District is entitled to a declaration that HDI is

9 Because respondents did not also move for summary adjudication, we need not
consider respondents’ assertions as to District’s remaining causes of action.

30.
required to provide the District a defense against [Powell’s] complaint.” (Boldface type
and some capitalization omitted.)
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action
within an action, … one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the
party contends … that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, … or that
one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A
motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a
cause of action, … a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (§ 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication: “A
plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that party’s burden of showing that there is no
defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action
entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-
complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a
defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

A. District Was Not Entitled to Summary Adjudication
“When a dispute regarding the meaning of a contractual provision exists, the court
must first determine whether on its face the language is capable of differing or
inconsistent reasonable interpretations. [Citation.] The test ‘is not whether [the
instrument] appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the
offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument
is reasonably susceptible.’ [Citations.] Accordingly, if the instrument is reasonably
susceptible to the interpretation urged, the court must receive any relevant extrinsic
evidence the party puts forth to prove its interpretation. [Citation.] If there is no material
conflict in the extrinsic evidence, the trial court must interpret the contract as a matter of

31.
law. Otherwise, it is a factual conflict dependent on the credibility of extrinsic evidence
to be properly resolved by the jury.” (City of Bell, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.)
1. Whether Swim Club Had a Duty to Defend District
In the FUA’s defense and indemnity provision, Swim Club agreed to take “full
responsibility for accidents or damages which may arise out of use of the District
Property, including without limitation from maintenance … of the facilities or property
usage.” Swim Club’s defense and indemnity obligations extended to “liability for
injuries to any person … arising at any time out of or in any way related to … Swim
Club’s use or occupancy of a facility or property controlled by … District, unless solely
caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of … District.”
District contends phrases such as “arising out of” or “in any way related to” have
been interpreted expansively by the courts and require “only a minimal causal
connection,” and the phrase “related to” expands the scope further, citing Acceptance Ins.
Co. v. Syufy Enterprises (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 321, 328–329. District argues that Swim
Club did not merely promise to defend “against claims caused by its own maintenance
work, or only within a narrowly defined pool enclosure,” it promised to defend “claims
‘arising at any time out of or in any way related to’ [Swim Club’s] ‘use or occupancy’ of
District property controlled by the District.”
Respondents contend that California case law has held that “the phrase ‘arising out
of the use and occupancy of’ and similar language … cannot be read to apply to injuries
sustained in common areas”—a theory and contention we have discussed in part III of
this opinion. As mentioned previously, however, District’s park manager, Serna, testified
that she discussed the terms of the FUA with Swim Club president Castillo and informed
him, prior to entering into the FUA, that Swim Club was renting the entire park and had
the right to exclude members of the public from the park. Castillo, for his part, declared
that he understood the FUA only related to the rental of the community pool surround,
and that “is how it was always represented to [him].”

32.
Due to the ambiguity of the FUA, the undetermined scope of Swim Club’s lease of
District park property, and the competing narratives of what was discussed during the
talks that preceded execution of the FUA, factual issues relevant to the question of
whether Swim Club owed District a duty to defend cannot be determined as a matter of
law, and remain unresolved.
2. Whether HDI Had a Duty to Defend District
In the insurance context, “[a] duty to defend exists if there is any potential for
coverage under the policy. [Citations.] However, ‘ “where there is no possibility of
coverage, there is no duty to defend.” ’ ” (Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1714.) Whether HDI had a duty to provide District with a
defense is not dependent upon whether Swim Club had a similar duty under the terms of
the FUA. (See American Casualty Co. v. General Star Indemnity Co. (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1524 [observing that, when an indemnitor is also required to obtain
insurance for an indemnitee, the insurance policy obtained contains separate and
independent promises of coverage from those set forth in the indemnity contract].)
HDI issued a policy that provided Swim Club with commercial general liability
coverage. Swim Club obtained a certificate of insurance and an additional insured
endorsement naming District as an additional insured. The additional insured
endorsement stated, in part: “SCHEDULE [¶] 1. Designation of Premises (Part Leased to
You):” and beside it, slightly offset in different font 10 was the Poplar Avenue address of
the park—“1280 Poplar Ave” followed by a large (i.e., approximately one and a half
inches) space and “Wasco, CA 93280.” The next two lines read: “2. Name of Person or
Organization (Additional Insured): [¶] 3. Additional Premium:” followed by a large
(approximately two and a half inches) space and then “Wasco Community Pool” in the

10 The use of a new font may have been due to the information being typed into what
was presumably a form document.

33.
aforementioned different font. Although not entirely clear, due to its positioning in the
endorsement and the fact that it has no conceivable relation to item 3, above (i.e.,
“Additional Premium”), the reference to “Wasco Community Pool” may have been
intended to be input in relation to item 2 above. 11 (The trial court, in its order granting
respondents’ motion for summary judgment, interpreted the reference to “Wasco
Community Pool” differently, i.e., as a description of the leased premises. 12)
The additional insured endorsement went on to state, in part: “WHO IS AN
INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or organization
shown in the Schedule but only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to you and shown in the Schedule
and subject to” stated exclusions that are not at issue. (Italics added.)
HDI issued a certificate of liability insurance which reads, in part: “This
certificate is issued as a matter of information only and confers no rights upon the
certificate holder. This certificate does not affirmatively or negatively amend, extend or
alter the coverage afforded by the [HDI policy].” (Capitalization omitted.) The
certificate stated the type of insurance was for commercial general liability and included
coverage for covered occurrences during a policy period that included the date of the
subject incident.
Generally speaking, and subject to various conditions and exclusions, the HDI
policy provided, in part, that HDI “will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which

11 The certificate of liability insurance issued by HDI in connection with the HDI
policy identified the certificate holder as “Wasco Community Pool” along with an
address for the certificate holder.
12 In its order granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court
wrote: “The only portion of the premises shown on the Schedule referenced is the
“Wasco Community Pool,” not [the] [p]ark as a whole ….”

34.
this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any
‘suit’ seeking those damages.”
Here, the HDI policy documents limited coverage to “liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased” to Swim Club. Thus,
whether the leased premises included the grassy area where the subject incident was
alleged to have occurred is relevant to the question of whether the HDI policy provided
coverage to District.
District argues that HDI was obligated to defend because the allegations of
Powell’s complaint “show a potential for coverage.” “[T]he duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify.” (Watts Industries, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1039.) “A liability insurer owes a broad duty to defend its insured
against third party claims that create a potential for indemnity.” (Ibid.) However, we
cannot conclude that a potential for coverage existed under the HDI policy, as a matter of
law, when the scope of the lease (i.e., whether it was limited to the community pool
surround) remains factually unresolved and undetermined.
“ ‘ “ ‘ “A policy provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two
or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.” [Citations.] The fact that a term is
not defined in the policies does not make it ambiguous. [Citations.] Nor does
“[d]isagreement concerning the meaning of a phrase,” or “ ‘the fact that a word or phrase
isolated from its context is susceptible of more than one meaning.’ ” [Citation.]
“ ‘[L]anguage in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a
whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the
abstract.’ ” [Citation.] “If an asserted ambiguity is not eliminated by the language and
context of the policy, courts then invoke the principle that ambiguities are generally
construed against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist (i.e., the insurer) in order
to protect the insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ortega Rock Quarry
v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 969, 977.) The language of the HDI

35.
policy must be construed with the circumstances of the case in mind, and this requires a
determination of whether the FUA constituted a lease of only the community pool
surround, or a greater area that included the alleged location of the subject incident.
Because this factual issue remains unresolved, summary adjudication on the issue was
not appropriate.
There are additional reasons we believe District is not entitled to summary
adjudication. We discuss those reasons below.

B. Additional Reasons Supporting the Denial of District’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication
1. Breach of Contract Issue
District has asserted a breach of contract cause of action premised on its
contention that Swim Club, under the terms of the FUA, and HDI, under the terms of the
HDI policy documents, each had a duty to defend, indemnify and hold District harmless
against Powell’s complaint, and that despite District having tendered its defense of the
complaint to both Swim Club and HDI, both refused to afford District with a defense.
District contends it “has incurred and will continue to incur damages, including but not
limited to attorney’s fees and costs to defend itself against [Powell’s] [c]omplaint.”
District’s motion for summary adjudication seeks to adjudicate whether respondents are
in breach of their alleged, respective contractual duties to defend District.
On appeal, Swim Club argues: “To the extent that the breach of contract cause of
action at least was at issue, it was limited to the duty to defend, leaving indemnification
and other matters unresolved. As such, it may have run afoul of [section] 437c[,
subdivision](f)(1), precluding a motion for summary adjudication unless it ‘completely
resolved’ certain matters,” citing Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 425, 436, disapproved on unrelated grounds in Crawford v. Weather

36.
Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 565, 569 13 for the proposition that an “issue of
duty can be resolved only if it completely disposes of cause of action” and Paramount
Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 238.
Undoubtedly, District could not have successfully moved to summarily adjudicate
its breach of contract cause of action based solely on the evidence it submitted in support
of its motion. “ ‘A cause of action for damages for breach of contract is comprised of the
following elements: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages.’ ” (Armstrong
Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1391, fn. 6.)
Absent from District’s evidence in support of its motion for summary adjudication and its
separate statement of undisputed facts is evidence of the amount of damages suffered by
District. In its motion for summary adjudication, District claimed it is “entitled to be
reimbursed for all costs and attorney’s fees it has incurred or will incur to defend against
[Powell’s] [c]omplaint” and argued “[t]he amount of those costs and fees should be
determined later by agreement of the parties or on a post-judgment motion, according to
proof.” “As damages are an element of a breach of contract cause of action [citation], a
plaintiff cannot obtain judgment on a breach of contract cause of action in an amount of
damages to be determined later.” (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, supra,
227 Cal.App.4th at p. 241.)
The question before us, however, is whether, under subdivision (f) of section 437c,
District may summarily adjudicate the limited issues of whether Swim Club breached the
FUA, and whether HDI breached the HDI policy—thus, adjudicating only one of the four

13 Crawford determined that Regan Roofing “was … mistaken insofar as it
concluded that, under the [defense and indemnity] agreements there at issue, the
subcontractors’ defense duties arose only if the subcontractors became liable for
indemnity” and stated it “will disapprove the Regan Roofing decision to that extent.”
(Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 565.)

37.
elements of its breach of contract cause of action. For reasons discussed below, we
conclude it may not.
In Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319 (Hood), an insurer brought
suit against its former agent for breach of a noncompetition clause contained in the
parties’ agreement, among other causes of action. (Id. at p. 322.) The former agent
cross-complained against the insurer for breach of contract and the commission of
various torts. (Ibid.) The insurer moved for summary adjudication of one or more causes
of action in the former agent’s cross-complaint but the trial court denied the motion
“because it failed to completely dispose of any of the causes of action in the cross-
complaint, as required by section 437c, subdivision (f).” (Ibid.) Thereafter, the insurer
amended its complaint and added a declaratory relief cause of action to determine that the
former agent breached the noncompetition clause, that it was entitled to terminate the
agreement containing the clause, and that “it was within its rights in doing so.” (Ibid.)
The insurer then moved to summarily adjudicate its declaratory relief cause of action,
which the trial court granted. (Ibid.) The Hood court ordered that a writ of mandate
issue directing the trial court to set aside its order granting the motion, and to enter a
different order denying the motion. (Id. at p. 324.)
The Hood court explained: “The issues invoked in [the declaratory relief] cause of
action already were fully engaged by other causes of action. Because they were,
declaratory relief was unnecessary and superfluous. [Citations.] ‘The declaratory relief
statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue which
can be determined in the main action. The object of the statute is to afford a new form of
relief where needed and not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the
determination of identical issues.’ ” (Hood, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 324, quoting
General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470; California Ins.
Guarantee Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1623–1624 [same].)
The court continued: “Here, the underlying cause of action already had matured and a

38.
declaration of rights adds nothing to those matters that were asserted and presumably will
be resolved in the underlying action.” (Hood, at p. 324.)
Here, the situation is comparable to that in Hood. District has asserted a cause of
action for breach of contract against Swim Club and HDI based on their alleged denial of
District’s demand that they provide it a defense against Powell’s claims. The cause of
action had already matured by the time District filed its FACC (although damages may
have continued to accrue). As in Hood, the issue of whether respondents breached their
alleged, respective obligations to provide District with a defense are appropriate for
determination in connection with District’s breach of contract cause of action, and may
not be determined under subdivision (f) of section 437c.
The trial court did not err in denying District’s motion for summary adjudication
on the issues of whether Swim Club and HDI breached their duties under the FUA and
HDI policy, respectively.
2. Duty to Defend Issue
District’s declaratory relief cause of action states that there is an actual
controversy between it and the respondents “concerning their respective rights and duties
because [District] contends that [Swim Club] and HDI are required to defend, indemnify,
and hold harmless [District] against [Powell’s] [c]omplaint.” In this cause of action,
District sought “a declaration of its rights or duties with respect to [Swim Club] and
HDI” under the FUA and HDI policy documents, respectively.
At the time of District’s motion, and at the time of the trial court’s ruling on the
motion, Powell was continuing to litigate her case against District. If a duty to defend
was owed, it was an ongoing duty at the time of District’s motion. (Watts Industries, Inc.
v. Zurich American Ins. Co., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039 [“defense duty … lasts
until the underlying lawsuit is concluded or the insurer shows that there is no potential for
coverage”].) However, Powell dismissed her complaint in its entirety in April 2024 and,
to the extent Swim Club and/or HDI had a duty to provide District with a defense to

39.
Powell’s lawsuit—an issue we do not decide in this opinion—that duty is no longer
ongoing.
“ ‘There is unanimity of authority to the effect that the declaratory procedure
operates prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrongs. It serves to set
controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or
commission of wrongs; in short, the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive
justice, to declare rights rather than execute them.’ ” (Osseous Technologies of America,
Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 367, quoting Travers
v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 931.)
“ ‘When … the cause of action has already accrued and the only question for
determination is the ultimate liability of one party on account of consequential relief to
which another is shown to be entitled, it has been held that the nature of the action is not
a cause for declaratory relief but is defined by the subject matter of the accrued cause of
action.’ ” (Travers v. Louden, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d at p. 930.) As was stated in
Travers, “we have found no authority for the proposition that declaratory relief is proper
procedure when the rights of the complaining party have crystallized into a cause of
action for past wrongs, all relationship between the parties has ceased to exist and there is
no conduct of the parties subject to regulation by the court.” (Id. at p. 929.)
“[W]hen the parties maintain a contractual relationship which will continue after
resolution of the immediate dispute, and may give rise to additional claims, declaratory
relief can help guide their future conduct and avoid multiple lawsuits.” (Cardellini v.
Casey (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 389, 396.) “ ‘ “The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to
‘serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural
relation.’ ” [Citation.] “Another purpose is to liquidate doubts with respect to
uncertainties or controversies which might otherwise result in subsequent litigation
[citation].” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “One test of the right to institute proceedings for
declaratory judgment is the necessity of present adjudication as a guide for plaintiff’s

40.
future conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.” ’ ” (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 647; Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2019)
3 Cal.App.5th 820, 837 [same].)
Here, the claim District has asserted in its declaratory relief cause of action has
fully matured and crystallized into its cause of action for breach of contract—albeit
during the course of litigation due to Powell’s dismissal of her lawsuit. A determination
on District’s declaratory relief cause of action would serve no practical purpose. There is
no longer a third party lawsuit (Powell’s lawsuit) to defend against, and no need for
guidance in order to stabilize an uncertain, ongoing legal relationship, or for guidance as
to the future conduct of the parties under the FUA or the HDI policy.
A determination on the questions of whether Swim Club or HDI owed District a
duty to defend against Powell’s lawsuit would have no effect other than to resolve an
element of District’s breach of contract cause of action. As was stated in Hood, “ ‘The
declaratory relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and
determining an issue which can be determined in the main action.’ ” (Hood, supra,
33 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.) As in Hood, “[h]ere, the underlying cause of action already
ha[s] matured and a declaration of rights [will] add[] nothing to those matters that were
asserted and presumably will be resolved in the underlying action”—i.e., in litigating
District’s remaining causes of action. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to vacate its order granting
respondents’ summary judgment motion in favor of Wasco Tiger Sharks Swim Club and
HDI Global Specialty, SE, and enter a new order denying the motion. We affirm the
court’s order denying Wasco Recreation and Park District’s motion for summary
adjudication and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

41.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

SANDHU, J.

42.





Description Porter Scott, William E. Camy and David R. Norton for Cross-complainant and Appellant. Schwartz & Janzen, Steven H. Schwartz and Noel Macaulay for Cross-defendants and Respondents. -ooOoo- Appellant Wasco Recreation and Park District (District) was sued by plaintiff Tyna Powell for injuries allegedly suffered by Powell from a trip and fall accident that occurred on District park property. Powell alleged she had come onto the property in
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