Filed 11/12/26 Kanawah v. Exhibit Works, Inc. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
LESLIE JEAN KANAWAH, B339976
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV20823
v.
EXHIBIT WORKS, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lynne M. Hobbs and Lee Arian, Judges.
Affirmed.
Wilshire Law Firm, Daniel DeSantis; Esner, Chang, Boyer
& Murphy, Holly N. Boyer and Rowena J. Dizon for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
YorkSmith, Mary Childs, Michael Sabongui, Meri
Andreasyan; Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and Don
Willenburg for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________
INTRODUCTION
The “going and coming” rule generally precludes employer
liability for an employee’s negligence occurring during the
employee’s ordinary commute to and from work. There are, as
one might imagine, exceptions to this rule, which are the subject
of this appeal. Here, Thomas Paul crashed into plaintiff Leslie
Jean Kanawah’s vehicle, causing serious injuries including
amputation of her legs. Paul was an employee of defendant
Exhibit Works, Inc. He was on his way to his job site when the
accident happened. Exhibit Works admitted Paul was negligent
but argued that the “going and coming” rule precludes finding
that Paul was acting within the scope of his employment when he
caused the accident. Rather, Exhibit Works argues, Paul was
merely commuting to work. Plaintiff contended that numerous
exceptions to the rule impose liability on Exhibit Works for Paul’s
negligence.
The trial court granted Exhibit Works’s motion for
summary judgment, finding no applicable exceptions to the going
and coming rule. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The material facts are undisputed. In the evening of
November 9, 2021, plaintiff Kanawah’s vehicle was stalled in the
third westbound lane of the I-10 freeway because of a prior
collision. Paul, an employee of defendant Exhibit Works, was
also in the third lane, driving a large Chevrolet truck at an
unsafe, high rate of speed. Paul was driving from his home to
work at the Los Angeles Convention Center. He crashed into
plaintiff’s car, causing severe injuries. Both of plaintiff’s legs
2
were amputated and, among other injuries, she suffered a
fractured pelvis and fractured vertebrae.
Paul’s employer, Exhibit Works, designs, builds and
dismantles customized exhibition booths for its clients at
conventions and fairs held in various locations around the
country. Its employees, called “builders,” construct and decorate
the booths. The builders do not report to a fixed workplace every
day. They travel directly to the location venue where they are
building the booths, which they construct out of wood, metal and
glass. The booths can be as large as 30,000 square feet.
Since 2019, Paul has been employed by Exhibit Works as a
builder. Because Paul is a builder, his work site always changes,
depending on where he is building. He has no regular co-workers
with whom he works on various job sites. At the time of the
accident he did not have a set work schedule. For jobs in
Southern California, Exhibit Works scheduled “round-the-clock,”
“all over the place” shifts that varied “quite a bit.” Paul worked
12-hour days, clocked in at the worksite “once I start building,”
and was paid on an hourly basis.
Every employee except apprentices receives “show-up
pay”—$10 for showing up to work on local projects in Southern
California. In her pleadings and in deposition, plaintiff refers to
show-up pay as travel pay.
Paul has travelled to project sites throughout Southern
California and has also traveled out-of-state to construct booths
in Chicago, Charlotte, Fort Lauderdale, Memphis, Austin,
Orlando, Houston, St. Louis, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Cincinnati,
Seattle, New York, and Miami. When he (or any employee) is
required to travel out-of-state to construct a booth, Exhibit Works
pays for actual travel time to and from the out-of-state job site.
3
For projects in Southern California, Paul used his personal
vehicle to drive to and from the various worksites. Paul has
received show-up pay for local jobs. For example, on November
11, 2019, Exhibit Works paid Paul show up pay and parking
while he worked to set up a booth at the Los Angeles Auto Show.
In March 2020, while building a booth for another event, Paul
was paid show-up pay. Paul’s experience getting show-up pay
and parking at job sites varied. He testified that on some
occasions, he received both show-up pay and parking; on other
occasions, he received show-up pay for all days on a multi-day
job, but parking only for a few days; on other occasions he
received parking for some of the multi-day jobs, but no show-up
pay.
Paul was not required to have a personal vehicle as a
condition of employment and never used his vehicle to do errands
or other work tasks on behalf of his employer. He used his
vehicle to commute to and from his job sites.
The business model for Exhibit Works depends on its
employees arriving at the various event locations because the
booths are constructed or assembled on site. Exhibit Works uses
construction tools for its projects. It uses a company vehicle or
rents a truck to transport the bigger tools (for example, table
saws, chop saws, shop vacs, skill saws, routers) to the job site.
The union contract states that screwdrivers and hammers are
tools employees are required to supply, so if a builder shows up
without them, the employer has the option to send the employee
home. The testimony in the record is that “typically” Exhibit
Works did not send employees without tools home or decide not to
use them.
4
Paul testified he had his own drill sets, hammer,
measuring tools, screwdrivers, a pry bar, kneepads, staple guns,
safety glasses and a work belt in his toolbox, which he brought to
the worksite “every time.” His toolbox was a one-foot tall, rolling
Craftsman toolbox that weighed about 40 pounds filled with
tools, but was very light itself. By declaration, Paul testified the
worksites “usually have all the tools on hand, but it’s kind of in
good faith to bring your own as well.” He testified, “They give
you tools when you get there if you don’t have them, but it’s
better if you have your own and bought them yourself. It just
makes you look better.” “I try to bring as many tools as possible.”
He was unsure what the company’s expectation was, but
testified, “I think it’s good manners to bring your own tools.”
The undisputed evidence in the record is that bringing
personal hand tools to worksites was at most an option, not a
requirement as far as Exhibit Works was concerned, and the
union provision was not enforced against Paul or anyone else.
Exhibit Works acknowledged that it benefits when builders bring
smaller tools to the worksites because the work can be completed
in a timely manner.
At the time of the accident, Paul was building an exhibition
booth for the Los Angeles Auto Show at the Los Angeles
Convention Center. Exhibit Works paid Paul show-up and
parking while he worked on this project. The accident occurred
on November 9, 2021. On November 6, 2021, he worked a 12-
hour day shift. On November 7, 2021, he worked a 12-hour night
shift. On the evening of the crash, Paul was on his way to the job
site to start another night shift at 8:00 p.m. The crash occurred
at approximately 7:30 p.m. Paul had his toolbox with him in his
truck at the time of the accident.
5
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In her complaint plaintiff alleged that at the time of the
accident, Paul was in the course and scope of his employment
with Exhibit Works, using his truck “for work purposes,” “for the
benefit and/or at the request of Defendant EXHIBIT WORKS,
INC.” Plaintiff alleged Paul was negligently “operating the
subject vehicle at the implied or expressed request of and/or to
the benefit of Defendant Exhibit Works, Inc.”
Exhibit Works admitted Paul’s negligence caused the
accident. It denied liability for Paul’s negligence, moving for
summary judgment on the ground that the “going and coming
rule” barred plaintiff’s action against Exhibit Works, and the
rule’s exceptions for “incidental benefit,” “required-vehicle,”
“inherent risk,” and “special errand” did not apply. Exhibit
Works contended Paul was commuting from his home to work in
his personal vehicle and not performing any sort of work errand
or activity or providing any “service incidental to his
employment.” It also argued Paul was not required to use his
personal vehicle for work purposes during the work day and it did
not pay him for his use of his vehicle, for travel time, or for
mileage.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing triable issues of
material fact existed as to the several exceptions to the “going
and coming” rule. Plaintiff contended that the evidence showed
Exhibit Works hired Paul to work remote satellite projects across
the state and paid him travel pay and parking; Paul was bringing
his construction tools in a 40-pound rolling toolbox to the job site
as a required condition of his employment; Exhibit Works
benefited from Paul bringing his tools because it allowed the
employer to timely complete the project for its clients; and the
6
“inherent risk” exception to the going and coming rule applied
because Exhibit Works’s graveyard shift scheduling created a
risk of fatigue and rendered Paul dangerous on the roadway.
In connection with the motion for summary judgment, the
trial court overruled all evidentiary objections of the parties. It
granted summary judgment in favor of Exhibit Works,
determining that “Paul was driving to work and his vehicle was
used for personal use at the time of the incident. Accordingly,
Defendant has met its burden on summary judgment to show
there were no triable issues of material fact as to whether Paul
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the
incident as he was driving to work.” The burden then shifted to
plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact as to whether any
exception to the going and coming rule applied. The trial court
found 1) no evidence of an incidental benefit to Exhibit Works
from Paul’s commute to the Los Angeles Convention Center job
site; 2) no evidence that Exhibit Works required Paul to use his
car for work; 3) no evidence that transportation of the work tools
required a special route or increased the risk of injury; 4) no
evidence that Paul was engaged in a special errand; 5) no
evidence of “inherent risk” due to the scheduling of Paul’s shift
because “Paul finished his graveyard shift at 8 a.m., and was
reporting to work at 8 p.m., and thus he had 12 hours to rest.”
The trial court concluded there were no “triable issues of material
fact to show that any exception to the going and coming rule
applies. The Court finds no established exception to or limitation
of the going and coming rule is applicable.” Plaintiff timely
appealed.
7
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or
proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that
there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (a)(1).) “A cause of action has no merit if either of
the following exists: [¶] (1) one or more of the elements of the
cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that
element is separately pleaded. [¶] (2) A defendant establishes an
affirmative defense to that cause of action.” (Id., subd. (o).)
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. (Shiver v.
Laramee (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 395, 400.) A defendant moving
for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production to
make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the defendant meets the initial burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact
exists as to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2).) “A triable issue of material fact exists only if ‘the evidence
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact
in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.’ ” (Shiver, at p. 400.) The plaintiff
“ ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action.’ ” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465,
476–477.)
“ ‘An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of
evidence. It is not created by “speculation, conjecture,
imagination or guess work.” [Citation.] Further, an issue of fact
8
is not raised by “cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory
assertions” [citation], or mere possibilities.’ ” (Spinner v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
172, 183; Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1404 [plaintiff cannot “rely on assertions
that are ‘conclusory, argumentative[,] or based on conjecture and
speculation,’ but rather [is] required to ‘make an independent
showing by a proper declaration or by reference to a . . . discovery
product that there is sufficient proof of the matters alleged to
raise a triable question of fact’ ”].)
We take the facts from the record that was before the trial
court when it ruled on the motion. (State Dept. of Health Services
v Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1034–1035.) We
liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence
in favor of that party. (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007)
42 Cal.4th 713, 717.)
B. Applicable Law
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for those torts committed by employees acting within the
scope of their employment. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the negligent act was committed within the
scope of employment. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d
707, 721 (Ducey); Chang v. Southern California Permanente
Medical Group (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 154, 164–165.)
Conduct is within the scope of employment if it is
“reasonably related to the kind of tasks that the [employee] was
employed to perform” or if it is “reasonably foreseeable in light of
the employer’s business or the [employee’s job] responsibilities.”
(CACI No. 3720.) Whether an act is within the scope of
9
employment is a question of fact. (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at
p. 722.) However, the issue becomes a question of law when the
facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.
In that case, we independently consider whether the prevailing
party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Tryer
v. Ojai Valley School (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1480 (Tryer).)
Generally, an employee is outside the scope of employment
while engaged in the ordinary commute to and from their place of
work. (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722 [employee not within
the scope of employment while commuting even though employee
drove as far as 45 miles to clean homes and brought cleaning
supplies].) This is known as the “going and coming” rule, based
on the theory that the employee is not rendering services directly
or indirectly to the employer during the normal everyday
commute. (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d
956, 959–961 (Hinman).) Thus, the employment relationship is
suspended from the time the employee leaves work until he or
she returns, because the employee is not ordinarily rendering
services to the employer while traveling. (Tryer, supra,
9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481 [employer not responsible for torts
committed by an employee who is going to or coming from work];
Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
458, 470 [just because employers have to employ workers and
workers have to get to and from their work does not mean their
commute is part of the enterprise risk of the employer]; Newland
v. County of Los Angeles (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 676, 686 [no
employer liability where employee was driving a routine
commute to and from work on the day of the accident, was not
required to use his personal vehicle for work purposes that day,
and the employer did not otherwise benefit from employee’s use
10
of a personal vehicle that day]; Jorge v. Culinary Institute of
America (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 382, 397 (Jorge) [no employer
liability for accident during employee’s commute home even
though employee frequently drove his personal vehicle in
connection with work duties, employer paid him travel time and
mileage when he drove to work locations away from the Institute,
and he agreed to make his car available for off-site events as an
accommodation to the employer].)
Courts have recognized several exceptions to the “going and
coming” rule. (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722.) In Hinojosa v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150 (Hinojosa),
Justice Tobriner set out a detailed history of the rule, noting that
its application must be flexible, permitting exceptions where the
employee was doing more than just commuting to and from the
workplace. (Id. at pp. 151, 153–158.)
One recognized exception is when the employee’s trip
involves an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to
commuting trips by ordinary members of the work force. (Fields
v. State of California (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1395.)
Payment for travel time and expenses, or travel to accomplish a
special errand at the request of the employer may indicate such a
benefit. (Ibid.) In Hinman, our Supreme Court stated:
“[A]lthough the employment relationship is ordinarily suspended
when the employee is going or coming, ‘the employer may agree,
either expressly or impliedly, that the relationship shall continue
during the period of “going and coming” . . . . Such an agreement
may also be inferred from the fact that the employer compensates
the employee for the time consumed in traveling to and from
work.’ ” (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 961–962.)
11
Another recognized exception to the rule applies where the
employee is expressly or impliedly required or expected to furnish
his own means of transportation as part of the job. (Smith v.
Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 814, 816, 820 [social
worker required to use own vehicle to visit clients not covered by
the going and coming rule]; CACI No. 3725 [“In general, an
employee is not acting within the scope of employment while
traveling to and from the workplace. But if an employer requires
an employee to drive to and from the workplace so that the
vehicle is available for the employer’s business, then the drive to
and from work is within the scope of employment.”].) Put
another way, the “ ‘obligations of the job reach out beyond the
premises, making the vehicle a mandatory part of the
employment environment.’ ” (Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
p. 160.)
A third exception is for a negligent act committed while the
employee is engaged in a special errand for the employer while
driving. (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722.) This exception has
three factual components: (1) the activity is extraordinary in
relation to the employee’s routine duties; (2) the activity is within
the course of the employee’s employment; and (3) the activity was
undertaken at the express or implied request of the employer for
the employer’s benefit. (Feltham v. Universal Protection Service,
LP (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1072.)
Special errands include situations where an employee goes
on a business errand for the employer leaving from his workplace
and returning to his workplace or where an employee is called to
work to perform a special task for the employer at an irregular
time. Some examples are obtaining or returning tools (Tarasco v.
Moyers (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 804, 809); attending a social
12
function where attendance was expected and benefitted the
employer (Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 790–
791); returning from a service call for the employer’s business
when the employee is on call at home for the employer’s business
(Robinson v. George (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 245).
When an employee is conferring “incidental benefits” for
the employer, the going and coming rule does not apply.
Examples include where the employee traveled to night school at
the employer’s request (Dimmig v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 860, 866–869); and where the employee
commuted in a company car because the employer required
access to or use of the car during the workday (Lazar v. Thermal
Equipment Corp. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 458, 463).
Finally, as relevant here, another exception applies where
an employee endangers others because of a risk inherent in or
created by the employer. (Bussard v. Minimed, Inc. (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 798, 801, 804–806 [employer created inherent
risk when employee, sickened at the workplace by toxic pesticide
and unfit to drive, got into an accident as she drove home early
from work].) This exception applies where the employer’s
enterprise creates inevitable risks as a part of doing business.
(Bailey v. Filco, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1558–1559.)
In sum, the going and coming rule excludes “the ordinary,
local commute that marks the daily transit of the mass of
workers to and from their jobs; the employment, there, plays no
special role in the requisites of portage except the normal need of
the presence of the person for the performance of the work.”
(Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157.) In Hinojosa, employees
were required to drive their own cars around the workplace after
they arrived at work. It was an “extraordinary situation in which
13
the job was structured, and dependent upon, transportation from
one place of work to another.” (Id. at p. 162.) In contrast is
Tryer, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at page 1482, where the employee
worked at two different locations for her employer. The court
held the employee “merely commuted between two designated
school campuses” as part of her work, but the employer “never
required [the employee] to use her vehicle.”
C. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that Paul’s drive to the Convention
Center worksite falls within several exceptions to the going and
coming rule as a matter of law.
Preliminarily, we find no disputed issues of material fact.
Plaintiff takes issue with the legal effect of the undisputed facts
in the record. But the material facts themselves are not in
dispute.
1. Was Paul’s Commute Ordinary?
First, plaintiff contends that Paul did not have an ordinary
commute in that there was no fixed place of business that he
reported to and no fixed hours. We find those facts immaterial.
Paul did have a commute to a worksite. That it was not “fixed” is
immaterial. He was given a location to which to report when he
worked. Getting there “marks the daily transit of the mass of
workers to and from their jobs; the employment, there, plays no
special role in the requisites of portage except the normal need of
the presence of the person for the performance of the work.”
(Hinojosa, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 157.) Of note is Anderson v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 254, which held
that reporting to work at different and constantly changing
remote locations did not render the employee’s regular commute
14
to and from work part of his job or mean that he was acting
within the course and scope of his employment during his trip
home, even with a transportation allowance. Paul got no
transportation allowance, and so is even more clearly within the
going and coming rule.
We find Henderson v. Adia Services, Inc. (1986)
182 Cal.App.3d 1069 apt. There the employer was a temporary
services agency which sent its employees from their homes
directly to various businesses to perform services for which the
employer was paid. The employer did not defray travel expenses
or compensate the employee for travel time. In affirming
summary judgment in favor of the employer, the court held: “The
only distinction between this case and the usual case applying
the ‘going and coming’ rule lies in the fact that [the employee] did
not report to the same location each day that he worked.” (Id. at
p. 1077.) The court declined to view the employee’s travel as
anything more than the usual case of an employee commuting to
and from work, given that there was no requirement that he use
his automobile to reach his assigned jobsite, there was nothing
extraordinary about his commute on the date of the accident, and
the employee worked normal shifts (as opposed to being called in
on an ad hoc basis). (Id. at pp. 1077–1078.)
2. Did The Employer’s Occasional Travel Fee Put Paul
on the Clock While He Commuted?
Plaintiff next argues that the going and coming rule does
not apply here because Paul was paid for travel time when he
traveled out of state and, on occasion, as here, received “travel”
and parking fees for local jobs. Indeed, he had received a show-
up fee a few months earlier when he worked the same venue.
Courts have recognized an exception to the rule where the
15
employer compensates the employee for travel time. (CACI
No. 3727 [“If an employer has agreed to compensate an employee
for the employee’s commuting time, then the employee’s conduct
is within the scope of employment as long as the employee is
going to the workplace or returning home.”].)
Plaintiff cites Hinman as instructive. In Hinman, like
here, the employee drove directly to and from the location of the
jobsite until the job was completed. He struck a police officer
with his car while commuting home from his worksite. The union
contracts under which the employee worked provided for the
payment of “ ‘carfare’ ” and “travel time” depending on the
location of the job site. On the particular job he was working at
the time of the accident, the employee “received an hour and a
half per day as his round-trip travel time and $1.30 for his travel
expense.” (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 959.)
The issue of whether the employee was acting within the
course and scope of his employment while commuting went to the
jury. The jury found in favor of the employer. The Supreme
Court reversed and held as a matter of law that the employee
was acting within the course and scope of his employment during
the commute because the employer paid “carfare” and travel time
for the job. (Hinman, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 962–963.) The
Supreme Court noted that the employer had no control over the
method or route of transportation used by the employee. Yet the
court found the employee was on company time at the time of the
accident and engaged in the very conduct contemplated by the
employer. The court also highlighted the benefit the employer
received by providing actual travel time pay and expenses to
reach a labor market in another area. “We are satisfied that,
where, as here, the employer and employee have made the travel
16
time part of the working day by their contract, the employer
should be treated as such during the travel time, and it follows
that so long as the employee is using the time for the designated
purpose, to return home, the doctrine of respondeat superior is
applicable.” (Id. at p. 962.) Significantly, the court continued:
“We also need not decide now whether the mere payment of
travel expenses without additional payment for the travel time of
the employee . . . reflects a sufficient benefit to the employer so
that he should bear responsibility to innocent third parties for
the risks inherent in the travel.” (Id. at pp. 962–963.)
Plaintiff argues the facts here parallel the facts of Hinman
because Paul received a travel fee and parking expenses for
commuting to various locations. We disagree. The record here
reflects that Exhibit Works paid for actual travel time only when
it sent Paul out of state. For local jobs, Exhibit Works, on
occasion, paid a travel “show-up” fee and/or parking fee. Paul’s
hourly pay commenced when he clocked in at the jobsite.
Because there was no evidence of a policy of paying for
actual travel time, that is, essentially putting employees on the
clock as soon as they leave home for local jobs, we conclude that
occasional payment of a travel fee or a parking fee for local jobs
does not constitute an “incidental benefit” to Exhibit Works
under that exception to the going and coming rule.
3. Was There an Incidental Benefit to Employer Because
Paul Brought His Own Tools to Work?
Plaintiff also argues that the union contract required Paul
to bring small personal tools to the jobsite so that Paul’s everyday
commute with the tools conferred an incidental benefit to Exhibit
Works not common in a traditional commute. Put another way,
plaintiff contends Paul’s commute with his tools rendered his
17
commute an extraordinary benefit to the employer not within the
category of trips by ordinary members of the workforce.
We disagree. The evidence before the trial court was that
Exhibit Works did not punish, disqualify or fire employees who
did not bring their own small tools with them to work. Paul
himself testified that he brought his own tools in his own tool box
because it was the “polite” thing to do. That the union contract
may have required him to do so did not confer an incidental
benefit to the employer who neither enforced nor compelled
compliance with such a requirement.
“Transporting work materials—even essential ones—to
facilitate work does not warrant exception to the going and
coming rule ‘unless such materials require a special route or
mode of transportation or increase the risk of injury.’ ” (Jorge,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 406 [chef’s transportation of personal
set of knives and chef’s coat in his car is incident to the commute
and not part of the employment].) In this case, there is no
evidence that transportation of small work tools required a
special route or increased the risk of injury.
4. Was Paul Required To Use His Own Car for Work?
Plaintiff contends the requirement that Paul bring his own
basic tools implied a requirement that Paul drive his personal
vehicle to and from the jobsites. (Moradi v. March USA, Inc.
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 886, 895 [required vehicle exception
exists where the employer furnishes, or requires the employee to
furnish, a vehicle as an express or implied condition of
employment]; see CACI No. 3725.)
Plaintiff relies on Le Febvre v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 386 (Le Febvre), where the Supreme Court
refused to apply the going and coming rule to a volunteer fireman
18
who traveled from his home to a fire station to attend a drill. The
evidence revealed he used his own vehicle to travel to regularly
scheduled monthly drills and business meetings and in the event
of a fire, he would go to his fire station first or go directly to the
fire depending on directions of the fire chief and dispatcher. (Id.
at p. 387.) The court held “travel was plainly required by the
employment” and “the travel risk was incident to the
employment.” (Id. at pp. 388–389.)
We find Le Febvre inapt as it is a workers’ compensation
case, not a tort case. As Ducey points out, “In the ‘going and
coming’ cases, the California courts often cite tort and workers’
compensation cases interchangeably. As Mr. Witkin points out,
however, ‘This practice has been questioned, for compensation
rules were developed from a distinct social philosophy, with fault
eliminated as a test, and liberal construction of the act
required.’ ” (Ducey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 722.) As more recent
case law has stated, “[W]orkers’ compensation cases awarding
coverage do not necessarily provide reliable precedent for tort
cases because the version of the [going and coming] rule applied
in tort cases is more restrictive.” (Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne
Internat. Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 619 [workers’
compensation cases take a more expansive view of the test for
course of employment than tort cases because the policies
underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor granting
employees’ coverage].)
That Paul hauled his tools around in a 40-pound Craftsman
metal toolbox, necessitating transportation by private vehicle,
cannot be laid at the feet of the employer. There was no evidence
in the record that the employer enforced the union rule that Paul
bring small tools to the job site, let alone so many tools that a 40-
19
pound toolbox was a workplace necessity. We reject plaintiff’s
extrapolation that Paul was necessarily required to drive his own
vehicle to accommodate his employer’s alleged tool rules.
5. Did Paul’s Graveyard Shift Schedule Create an
“Inherent Risk” of Danger to Plaintiff?
Finally, plaintiff argues that the facts present an inference
that Exhibit Works is liable under the “inherent risk” exception
in that Paul may not have been sufficiently rested at the time of
the accident because he had worked a graveyard shift 12 hours
before the accident. We conclude, as did the trial court, that it is
speculation that Paul may not have been sufficiently rested
during the 12 hours between his shifts or that fatigue caused the
accident. Here, the car accident was not a foreseeable
consequence of Paul’s employment after a 12-hour break.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J. SCHERB, J.
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