Filed 11/4/26 Gillespie v. Superior Court CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CRYSTAL GILLESPIE,
D088222
Petitioner,
(Super. Ct. No. SCD307508)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SAN DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on petition for writ of mandate challenging
an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Melinda Lasater, Judge.
Relief denied.
Jo E. Super, Chief Deputy, Office of the Primary Public Defender and
Katie A. Nagler, Deputy Public Defender for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Linh Lam, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, Valerie Ryan, Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Reilly
McFadden, Deputy District Attorney for Real Party in Interest.
INTRODUCTION
Crystal Gillespie seeks writ of mandate directing the trial court to
vacate its order denying her application for pretrial mental health diversion
under Penal Code1 section 1001.36. The trial court determined Gillespie was
ineligible for diversion and did not reach the question whether she is suitable
for diversion. The court found that Gillespie suffered from three diagnosed
mental disorders but ruled she was ineligible on the grounds that none of the
disorders was a significant “motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing
factor” to her involvement in the grand theft she was alleged to have
committed. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
Gillespie contends the trial court erred by relying on expert opinion
testimony that should not have been considered because it was based on
reasoning that was “assisted” by “unreliable and unverifiable” artificial
intelligence (AI). She contends the court also applied the wrong legal
standard when assessing eligibility, and that its findings were not supported
by substantial evidence.
We decline to disturb the court’s credibility finding that the expert’s use
of AI had no impact on the independence of the expert opinion, and we
conclude the court applied the correct legal standard when it assessed
Gillespie’s eligibility for diversion. While the evidence presents a close case,
we also conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Gillespie’s mental disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of
the charged grand theft. Gillespie’s request for relief is therefore denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Grand Theft Charge
In April 2025, as captured by video surveillance, Gillespie and two
other individuals spent about 50 minutes selecting merchandise from a
Marshalls store and loading it into shopping carts. Loss prevention officers
called law enforcement after observing the group leave the store and load the
items into a U‑Haul truck.
The police located the U‑Haul truck traveling on a nearby street and
tried to initiate a traffic stop. The driver refused to pull over and led the
officers on a 15‑minute, nine‑mile, high-speed chase. When the truck finally
stopped, the driver fled on foot and Gillespie was found hiding in the cargo
area. The police recovered $1,673 worth of Marshalls merchandise and a
blue Marshalls shopping cart in the back of the truck. According to the police
report and the testimony at the subsequent preliminary hearing, “a glass
pipe with a bulbous end and burnt residue” was found under the driver’s
seat.
When Gillespie was arrested, she claimed she never went inside the
Marshalls and was in the back of the U-Haul truck fixing her bike. But when
confronted with the video surveillance footage, Gillespie admitted to going
inside the Marshalls.
The San Diego District Attorney filed a complaint charging Gillespie
with grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) while acting in concert with two or more
people (§ 12022.65, subd. (a)), and alleging that she had a prior strike
3
conviction (§ 667, subds. (b) through (i)). Gillespie was held to answer on the
charge and all allegations.
II.
Motion for Pretrial Mental Health Diversion
In January 2026, Gillespie filed a motion for pretrial mental health
diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. She asserted she had been diagnosed
with three qualifying mental disorders and the disorders played a significant
role in her commission of the charged grand theft.2 She submitted a report
from Dr. Lauren Vickerman, forensic psychologist. Vickerman reviewed the
felony complaint, the police reports, and Gillespie’s medical records from
mental health care she received from May 2021 to November 2022, and
conducted an 85-minute clinical interview of Gillespie.
The People opposed mental health diversion. They conceded Gillespie
had been diagnosed with three qualifying mental disorders that satisfied the
requirements of section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1), specifically bipolar I
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and methamphetamine use disorder.
2 Section 1001.36, subdivision (b), sets forth two requirements for a
defendant to be eligible for mental health diversion. First, the defendant
must have been “diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the disorder must have been “a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) “If
the defendant satisfies the statutory eligibility requirements, the court must
next consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion under
the four criteria set forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c), all of which must
be met.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679 (Gomez).)
Here, as noted, the trial court based its ruling on a finding that Gillespie was
ineligible for diversion and did not reach the question of suitability. We
therefore limit our discussion of the evidence and the parties’ contentions
relevant to the eligibility requirements only.
4
They conceded the diagnoses triggered a presumption under section 1001.36,
subdivision (b)(2), that her mental disorders were “a significant factor in the
commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
[they were] not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to
[her] involvement in the alleged offense.” To rebut the presumption of a
causal nexus, the prosecution relied on a report from its own mental health
expert, Dr. Nicole Friedman.
A. Dr. Lauren Vickerman’s Report
Vickerman diagnosed Gillespie with severe bipolar I disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and severe methamphetamine use disorder.
She provided the following opinions about Gillespie’s symptoms and the
connection between her mental disorders and the charged offenses.
Gillespie “present[ed] with a significant history of mood dysregulation
consistent with bipolar I disorder,” and her “manic and depressive symptoms
have resulted in significant functional impairment including legal issues,
increased substance use, interpersonal issues, and difficulties with housing
and employment.” Her generalized anxiety disorder created heightened
anxiety, difficulty asserting boundaries, and increased susceptibility to peer
pressure. And her severe methamphetamine use disorder was characterized
by “[e]vidence of psychological dependence, tolerance, and withdrawal,” as
well as “significant life impairment.” Vickerman explained that “the
substance use disorder has contributed to episodes of impaired judgment,
impulsivity, and behavioral disinhibition, particularly during periods of acute
intoxication.”
Gillespie’s methamphetamine use disorder was in early remission at
the time of Vickerman’s diagnosis. Gillespie reported she first used
methamphetamine at age 15, but “discontinued use at age 22 upon becoming
5
pregnant and remained abstinent for approximately 4.5 years.” But then, a
few years before she committed the instant offense, she relocated to
San Diego and experienced a “a severe return of problematic
methamphetamine use.” She became homeless and lost custody of her son,
and “her continuous use persiste[d] until . . . [her] arrest served as a
significant wake-up call and motivator for change.” She reported that she
had obtained stable housing and remained abstinent since her arrest.
Vickerman’s written report included a detailed history of Gillespie’s
mental health background as recorded in medical records from the
Areta Crowell Center, where she was treated from May 2021 to November
2022. Significant here, the records document a manic episode and a
psychiatric hospitalization in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Gillespie “was
removed from her . . . hotel through the Welfare to Work program in August
[2021] following a manic episode.” And in February 2022, she was reported
to have “had a significant emotional episode, resulting in a [Welfare and
Institutions Code section] 5150 psychiatric hold[3] at Sharp Grossmont
[Hospital].”
3 “When a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to
others, or to themselves, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, professional
person in charge of a facility designated by the county for evaluation and
treatment, member of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of a
facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, designated
members of a mobile crisis team, or professional person designated by the
county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into
custody for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis
intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment in a facility
designated by the county for evaluation and treatment and approved by the
State Department of Health Care Services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150.)
6
During her interview with Vickerman, Gillespie also described a
history of “multiple psychiatric hospitalizations under [Welfare and
Institutions Code section] 5150 . . . occurring frequently between 2013 and
2018.” She described a history of manic episodes, and “reported that during
manic episodes, she engaged in problematic behaviors including excessive
spending, hypersexual activity, and going days without sleep.”
When Vickerman asked Gillespie about the charged offense, she stated
her motivation was “feeling anxiety and a desire to be accepted by the group.”
Gillespie explained “feeling pressure to be accepted by the group she was
with, despite not getting along well in that social circle. [She] stated she was
not taking her prescribed psychiatric medication at the time of the alleged
incident.” She said she was “ ‘not typically a thief,’ ” and acknowledged her
decision to participate was “ ‘not a wise decision in the first place.’ ” In terms
of her bipolar diagnosis, Gillespie reported she was “experiencing a ‘low’ mood
at the time of the offense. She also reported that she was ‘very high on meth’
at the time of the incident and was using methamphetamine daily.” She
attributed her actions to wanting acceptance and suppressing her anxiety,
and said “her decision[-]making would have been different if she had been
sober, and she had difficulty setting boundaries when not sober.” Vickerman
characterized Gillespie as “a fair historian” who “demonstrated fair insight.”
Vickerman concluded that Gillespie’s untreated severe mental illness,
active substance abuse, and environmental stressors (including homelessness
and lack of social support) “directly contributed to . . . [her] involvement in
theft, evasion, and related offenses,” and “[t]he nexus between her psychiatric
and substance use disorders and the alleged criminal behavior is supported
by her clinical presentation, self-report, and the circumstances of the offense.”
7
Addressing the psychiatric symptoms Gillespie experienced from
bipolar I disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, Vickerman noted that
she was not taking her prescribed medicine when the charged offense was
committed and opined that this resulted in uncontrolled symptoms. She
explained, “Research indicates that bipolar I disorder is associated with
elevated impulsivity and impaired decision-making and risk-taking, even
outside of manic phases[;] while bipolar depression commonly involves
hypersomnolence and marked social withdrawal that further interfere with
everyday functioning. Comorbid generalized anxiety disorder is also linked
with greater symptom severity, poorer psychosocial functioning, and
executive-function deficits, including inattention and decision-making, which
together can further compromise risk assessment and judgment when mood
symptoms are untreated. . . . Gillespie described being in a ‘low’ at the time,
with symptoms consistent with a depressive episode. Her generalized anxiety
disorder contributed to heightened anxiety, difficulty asserting boundaries,
and increased susceptibility to peer pressure. [She] reported feeling pressure
to be accepted by peers, and this, in combination with her anxiety and
substance use, increased her likelihood of participating in the offense.”
(Italics added.)
As to Gillespie’s methamphetamine use, Vickerman explained that
“Gillespie was actively using methamphetamine daily and reported being
‘very high on meth’ during the offense. Acute intoxication with
methamphetamine is associated with significant impairment in judgment,
impulse control, and decision-making. Her severe methamphetamine use
disorder contributed to risky, impulsive behavior and poor decision-making at
the time of the incident.” Vickerman’s report noted that drug paraphernalia
8
had been found by police officers in the U-Haul when they searched it after
Gillespie was arrested.
Gillespie filed a supplemental expert report by Vickerman. Vickerman
updated her original report after reviewing additional police reports and the
preliminary hearing transcript, which both recounted that Gillespie initially
lied to police about her involvement in the theft. In her supplemental report,
Vickerman acknowledged Gillespie’s description of events during the clinical
interview differed in some respects from the account reflected in the
preliminary hearing but maintained there was a nexus between Gillespie’s
mental health diagnoses and the alleged offense.
B. Dr. Nicole Friedman’s Report
Friedman’s assessment of Gillespie was based on the arrest report, the
complaint and charging documents, Gillespie’s motion for diversion and
supplemental filing, including both of Vickerman’s expert opinion reports,
and the People’s opposition. Friedman did not interview Gillespie, but she
reviewed two short surveillance videos of the alleged offense (each 30 seconds
or less in length). Important here, Friedman disclosed in her report that she
had used AI to help generate the report. Friedman stated, “AI was used to
help organize timeline and symptoms and[/]or behaviors to demonstrate the
nexus.”
Friedman’s report included a section that briefly addressed Gillespie’s
medical records and pre-offense mental health history. In that section,
Friedman incorrectly reported that, prior to the date of the offense, Gillespie’s
medical records contained “[n]o documentation” of an acute psychiatric
hospitalization, manic episode, psychotic symptoms, or severe functional
decompensation.
9
Friedman agreed with Vickerman that Gillespie’s diagnosed mental
disorders “are clinically associated with impaired judgment, increased
impulsivity, and heightened susceptibility to environmental influence.” But
she disagreed with Vickerman’s opinion that the disorders were motivating,
causal, or contributing factors in the charged conduct.
Addressing the psychiatric symptoms Gillespie experienced from
bipolar I disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, Friedman opined: “While
[Gillespie’s] diagnoses are associated with impaired judgment, increased
impulsivity, and susceptibility to environmental influence, the available
records do not identify objective evidence of psychiatric symptoms present at
or near the time of the offense. The offense conduct of entering the store with
co-defendants, participating in the coordinated collection and transport of
merchandise, and being found inside the U-Haul [truck] was characterized by
organized, goal directed, and collaborative actions, as well as subsequent
organized and strategic post-offense behavior, including denial and
alternative explanation. These behaviors reflect intact executive functioning
and reality testing. There is no documentation of acute psychiatric
decompensation, such as mania, psychosis, or severe anxiety, temporally
linked to the offense.”
Friedman further explained: “The available records do not identify
objective evidence of psychiatric symptoms present at or near the time of the
offense, and the behavior described includes coordinated, goal-directed
actions, and subsequent strategic reasoning which reflects intact executive
functioning and reality testing. At the same time, such organization is not, in
itself, inconsistent with psychiatric impairment, as individuals with these
conditions may exhibit disinhibition, reward driven decision[-]making, and
susceptibility to co-defendant influence without overt disorganization.
10
However, in the absence of documented symptom expression temporally
linked to the offense, and given the presence of organized, purposeful
behavior, there is clear and convincing evidence that[ ] Gillespie’s mental
disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.”
As to Gillespie’s methamphetamine use, Friedman did not credit
Gillespie’s report that she was “ ‘very high on meth’ ” during the offense. Her
specific reason for not crediting Gillespie was a lack of evidence in the record
to corroborate her “self-report.” Friedman explained, “while . . . Vickerman
reports that . . . Gillespie endorsed methamphetamine use . . . at the time of
the offense, this self-report is not independently corroborated in the
contemporaneous records[;] nor does the available evidence demonstrate
observable impairment consistent with substance intoxication . . . during the
commission of the offense.” Friedman did not acknowledge or address the
drug paraphernalia that had been found by police officers under the driver’s
seat in the U-Haul truck.
III.
Trial Court’s Denial Order
At the diversion hearing in March 2026, the trial court received both
expert reports into evidence, overruling Gillespie’s objection to the admission
of Friedman’s report based on her use of AI. Defense counsel asserted the
report was unreliable and should be excluded because the prosecution would
be unable to establish that Friedman’s reliance on AI satisfied the
11
Kelly/Frye4 test for the admission of evidence that is based upon the
application of a new scientific technique.
The court rejected the contention, stating that use of AI was “very
common” and “just because something involves AI” does not mean “that
automatically, there’s a problem with it.” The court interpreted Friedman’s
report to disclose that AI was used to develop a timeline and said the defense
would be entitled at the hearing to probe further about Friedman’s use of AI
to arrive at her opinion.5
Friedman, but not Vickerman testified at the hearing. She confirmed
her opinion that Gillespie’s mental disorders did not play a role in her
commission of the charged offense.
Friedman explained the symptoms of people with bipolar I disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder in an acute phase of the illness can overwhelm
their decision-making ability. But in her view, when not experiencing an
acute phase of the illnesses, someone with Gillespie’s diagnoses has “the
ability to think calmly, understand consequences, [and] be more grounded in
reality.”
Friedman explained that people with bipolar I disorder can have “a
manic phase, . . . racing thoughts, impulsivity, reckless behavior” and
4 People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly); Frye v. United States (D.C.
Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013. The test requires “a preliminary showing of general
acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community.”
(Kelly, at p. 30.)
5 Gillespie asserted Friedman’s report should be excluded for a second
reason. She claimed Friedman violated her privacy rights by putting her
medical records “in the public sphere . . . without a court order” when she
disclosed their content to the AI platform that she used. Gillespie did not
renew this objection to the report in her petition for writ of mandate, and so,
we do not address it.
12
psychosis can be a part of that where the person would experience “things
that make them not grounded within reality, such as hallucinations or
paranoia. Sometimes people can have an overwhelming sense of panic or
anxiety” that impact their decision-making. She explained generalized
anxiety disorder “could lead to paranoia, so interpreting the world where it
always is feeling like a frightening place” and that “fear . . . could lead to . . .
panic attacks for someone with generalized anxiety disorder, and that would
be more of that physiological response that’s accompanying the cognition.”
Friedman opined that Gillespie’s observable behavior on the video
surveillance footage “looked pretty goal-directed” and “demonstrate[d] intact
cognitive functioning” that was inconsistent with manic impulsivity or
psychosis. She explained, “It appears that the individuals understood what
they were doing at the time and at that store and loading things into the U-
Haul [truck], and that [Gillespie] was participating in a group activity where
everyone was behaving in the same manner.” The video showed “there was a
strategy or reasoning behind what it was that she was doing.” The offense
was not committed “in a state of disorganized behavior[;] it was more
planful. . . . And it [was] strategic . . . as opposed to not being that way[.] [¶]
And there was coordination. . . . [T]here were other people involved doing the
same things that she was partaking in at that time. So it didn’t have, if you
will, that impulsive, chaotic type of sense that might be when someone is an
acute, manic state.”
Friedman acknowledged that “[i]t looked like people were hurrying” on
the video footage, which would be consistent with someone experiencing an
episode of bipolar I disorder or generalized anxiety disorder. But, she
explained, hurrying was also consistent with the need to act speedily to
complete the theft before being detected. She further explained, “[I]f someone
13
is . . . in a manic state, it might appear to have some organization to it, but
you’ll also see traits of it being . . . impulsive, erratic, [and] disorganized.”
Friedman also found it significant that Gillespie cooperated with police
when she was arrested and initially lied to them about her involvement in
the charged theft offense. She testified this behavior “shows a level of
reasoning and understanding . . . that there was some wrongdoing.”
Friedman’s review of the record furthermore did not uncover evidence that
would lead her to a contrary conclusion. For example, she stated the police
report of statements Gillespie made after her arrest did not show she was
“out of touch with reality.” In her view, “there was no documentation
showing her behavior was not goal-oriented.”
Addressing Gillespie’s severe methamphetamine use disorder,
Friedman explained the symptomology includes a “strong desire to continue
with the substance or having the substance, heightened physiological
response that looks similar to or can be similar to these anxious disorders
that we were just discussing. It can also heighten or accelerate . . . some of
th[e] symptomatology [of bipolar I disorder] where someone can be on
methamphetamine, and it can look like they’re having a manic type of
episode with that impulsive behavior, reckless behavior, the racing thoughts.
But if we take them off the methamphetamine and they have time where
they’re no longer using, all of that subsides.” Friedman opined that nothing
in “any of the reports or material [she] reviewed . . . appeared to show
that . . . Gillespie was having an episode of methamphetamine use disorder”
at the time of the charged offense. She also saw no evidence of “substance-
induced psychosis or hallucinations.”
Friedman acknowledged she “did read in . . . Vickerman’s report
that . . . Gillespie had reported that she had been very high on
14
meth[amphetamine]” at the time of the charged offense. But Friedman did
not credit Gillespie’s claim that she was under the influence of
methamphetamine because she did not find evidence in the record to
corroborate it. Friedman acknowledged that “people can function high on
methamphetamine” without showing “signs and symptoms.” But she
expected that any use of methamphetamine by Gillespie during the charged
offense would have “perhaps” been corroborated “visually with the video,” or
would have been recorded in the police reports. She explained, “[T]here
weren’t statements that [Gillespie] made to the police at the time explaining
her behavior or what her own internal experience was.”
As for her use of AI, Friedman testified she uses ChatGPT under a
business associate agreement, meaning it prevents the inputs from becoming
part of the training model. She uses ChatGPT as “a thought partner . . .
particularly, in regard to the legal questions at hand.” She also uses it to
“rewrite” and “polish” her sentences. She could not provide her ChatGPT
inputs for the case because she deletes “everything” after she uses it. When
asked specifically if she prompted ChatGPT with any questions about the
potential nexus between Gillespie’s diagnoses and the charged offense,
Friedman remembered that she asked, “What would be, maybe, considered
nexus or causal effect.” But she repeatedly denied using ChatGPT “to come
up with an opinion.” She explained, “I used it more as an organizational tool;
not as something to opine or come up with my conclusions.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed to the statement in
Friedman’s written report that Gillespie’s medical records contained “ ‘no
documentation of acute psychiatric hospitalization.’ ” Friedman admitted the
statement was inaccurate and said that she left the information out of the
notes she provided to ChatGPT, but considered it when formulating her
15
opinion. To further impeach Friedman’s testimony, the defense presented
testimony from another expert, Kevin Diosdado, who ran Friedman’s report
through an AI detection program. Diosdado testified the AI program detected
the nexus section of Friedman’s report was “98 percent AI.”
At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Gillespie ineligible for
diversion. The court explained it had relied upon and was persuaded by
Friedman’s expert opinion including her opinion that Gillespie’s statement to
Vickerman that she was under the influence of methamphetamine when the
charged offense was committed was uncorroborated and should not be
credited. In the court’s words, “I don’t think that everything that somebody
does . . . who has a mental health condition is caused by that mental health
condition.” As for Friedman’s use of AI, the court found, “there was nothing
in . . . Friedman’s testimony that led me to believe that the opinions that she
gave and the reasons she gave for those opinions were impacted in any way
by the AI.”6
DISCUSSION
In May 2026, Gillespie filed a petition in this court seeking a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of mental health
diversion and we issued an order to show cause. Gillespie contends the trial
court erred when it denied her motion for mental health diversion because
substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that none of her
mental disorders was a significant “motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor” with respect to her involvement in the charged grand
theft. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) We disagree and conclude substantial
6 Gillespie filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied
for lack of changed circumstances.
16
evidence supports the court’s finding that the People satisfied their burden of
proof.
I.
No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting Friedman’s Expert Opinion
Gillespie first contends Friedman’s expert opinion should have been
excluded from evidence because of the way she used AI when preparing it. In
her view, Friedman’s testimony established that (1) she used AI to “formulate
her opinions,” (2) her use of AI constituted a novel scientific technique within
the meaning of Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, and (3) “[b]ecause [her] underlying
methodology could not be tested, reproduced, or meaningfully scrutinized, the
resulting opinions lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible
under Evidence Code sections 801 and 802.” Although we share Gillespie’s
concerns about Friedman’s reported use of AI, we must defer to the trial
court’s credibility findings and consequently find no error on that basis.
Our review is for abuse of discretion. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 (Sargon).) “The
abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls
for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The
trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the
facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.)
Evidence Code section 801 provides that, “[i]f a witness is testifying as
an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an
opinion as is: . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the
subject to which his testimony relates.” (Italics added.) Evidence Code
17
section 802 provides that “[a] witness testifying in the form of an opinion may
state . . . the reasons for his opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is
based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a
basis for his opinion. The court in its discretion may require that a witness
before testifying in the form of an opinion be first examined concerning the
matter upon which his opinion is based.” (Italics added.) Based on these two
provisions of the Evidence Code, our high court has concluded that trial
courts must exclude “expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a
type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons
unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.”
(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772; see also id. at pp. 769–772.)
When deciding whether expert testimony is inadmissible under these
two provisions, a trial court “must simply determine whether the matter
relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether that
opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture. The court does not resolve
scientific controversies. Rather, it conducts a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to
‘determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other information
cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that the expert’s general
theory or technique is valid.’ ” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) The
court’s goal “ ‘is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert
in the relevant field.’ ” (Ibid.) When assessing the underlying reliability of a
novel scientific technique, in particular, the proponent must demonstrate
“general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific
community.” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.)
18
We agree with Gillespie in principle that the use of AI by a forensic
psychologist to generate an expert opinion, at present, would constitute a
novel scientific technique. Any such opinion, therefore, would be
inadmissible absent an adequate foundation demonstrating the reliability of
the psychologist’s methodology, including the “general acceptance of the new
technique in the relevant scientific community.” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at
p. 30.) But Friedman testified repeatedly that she used ChatGPT “as an
organization tool,” and did not use it to generate her opinion. She testified
that ChatGPT “was not something that [she] used as creating [or] relying on
to come up with an opinion.” She explained, “My opinion relies on the totality
of the records that I reviewed, which includes . . . Vickerman’s report, that
includes the video, that includes understanding what the Penal Code [says].
So it’s not just what . . . what ChatGPT might have told me.”
The trial court accepted Friedman’s explanation as true and we are
required to defer to the court’s credibility findings. Thus, we must conclude
Friedman’s expert opinion was not inadmissible on the ground that it was
based on a novel, unestablished scientific technique. This is because,
according to her testimony, she used it to help organize and focus her
thoughts but then independently analyzed the evidence and drew her own
conclusions. (Cf. People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 159–160 [the use of
a “computerized fingerprint matching program” to identify a suspect was not
a novel scientific technique for purposes of Kelly/Frye when fingerprint
analysts independently confirmed the match by conducting a standard visual
comparison; People v. Johnson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1143–1151 [the
use of database searches to identify a potential DNA match was not a novel
technique for purposes of Kelly/Frye analysis when standard DNA testing
was independently conducted to confirm the match].)
19
Pointing to evidence from which a reasonable factfinder might question
Friedman’s representation that she conducted an independent analysis,
Gillespie’s argues that Friedman delegated critical components of her forensic
analysis to ChatGPT in a way that compromised her independence. She
contends this evidence “established that [Friedman’s] use of ChatGPT
extended well beyond clerical organization and into substantive legal and
psychological analysis central to the court’s eligibility determination.”
Specifically, Friedman testified she used ChatGPT as a “thought partner.”
She posed legal questions about the Penal Code to help her understand the
relevant provisions, and she asked it to answer the central question critical to
her analysis: “What would be, maybe, considered nexus or causal effect.”
Despite claiming an independent review, she also failed to notice that her
written report, drafted with ChatGPT’s assistance, inaccurately stated that
Gillespie’s medical records contained “[n]o documentation” of an acute
psychiatric hospitalization, manic episode, psychotic symptoms, or severe
functional decompensation—a glaring error. We agree this evidence is
troubling and of the type that might lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude
that Friedman’s opinion was not independent, as she claimed, but rather
based on an unproven and unreliable delegation of her analysis to ChatGPT.
But the trial court drew a different conclusion. When asked what she
meant by a “thought partner,” Friedman analogized her use of ChatGPT to
using a colleague as a sounding board but ultimately coming to her own
conclusion as to her opinion. The trial court credited this account and
additionally analogized her use of ChatGPT to the use of an intern and
research attorneys by a partner at a law firm. The court explained, “there
was nothing in Dr. Friedman’s testimony that led me to believe that the
opinions that she gave and the reasons she gave for those opinions were
20
impacted in any way by . . . AI. So there are times when you think through
something[;] she called it a thought partner. But it’s a matter of
processing. . . . [I]n the end, you step back and make your own decision. And
it seemed to me that’s exactly what she was doing. And she supported it in
her testimony, and she supported it in her report too.”
“It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to
assess witness credibility.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970,
981.) “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on
appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.)
Applying these principles, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s credibility finding, and so, we are compelled to conclude there was no
abuse of discretion.
II.
The Record Contained Substantial Evidence Sufficient to Rebut the
Presumption of a Nexus Between the Charged Offense and Gillespie’s Mental
Disorders
The prosecution conceded Gillespie suffered from the three qualifying
diagnoses. Therefore, by statute, a causal link between Gillespie’s diagnoses
and the charged grand theft is presumed under section 1001.36,
subdivision (b)(2), unless it is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If the defendant has been
diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating
factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in
the alleged offense.” Gillespie contends the trial court erroneously relied on
21
the absence of evidence to purportedly establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, a lack of connection between her diagnoses and the charged offense.
We disagree and conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s
clear and convincing finding that Gillespie’s mental disorders were not a
significant motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the commission of the
charged offense.7
“[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a
finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for the level of
confidence this standard demands.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) “[T]he question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at
pp. 995–996, italics added.) “[W]e ask whether the evidence . . . has that
7 We reject Gillespie’s contention that the trial court erred by applying
the wrong legal standard when it assessed the evidence. She claims the court
used a “but for” test instead of considering whether Gillespie’s diagnosed
mental disorders were a “significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense” as required by section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2). She claims the
court did not understand and misapplied the burden of proof. Her
contentions are belied by the record. The trial court stated its understanding
of the governing burden of proof when it pronounced its ruling as follows:
“Just because [Gillespie] has the mental health diagnoses . . . doesn’t mean
that this particular act was caused by that mental health condition. There is
a presumption, though, that it was. [¶] And so the Court must consider that
presumption. And unless there’s clear and convincing evidence otherwise,
then the Court must find that she is eligible. If the logic of another mental
health expert makes more sense and is credible to the trier of fact, then an
opposing mental health expert can provide clear and convincing evidence that
the presumption should not hold; and specifically, that the conduct was not
the result of the mental health condition. And that’s what we have here.”
We find no error in the court’s understanding of the legal principles that it
was required to apply.
22
degree of clarity,” and we “view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact
may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at
pp. 1001, 1011–1012.)
Starting with Gillespie’s diagnosis of severe methamphetamine use
disorder, Gillespie claimed, consistent with her diagnosis, that she was using
methamphetamine on a daily basis and was “ ‘very high on meth’ ” during the
offense. She said that her decision-making would have been different had
she been sober. To rebut the presumption of a nexus between Gillespie’s
asserted methamphetamine use and the offense, Friedman opined that
Gillespie’s statement should not be credited because it was not corroborated
by the documentary evidence. Friedman explained the police report, in
particular, contained no record of statements by Gillespie or other evidence
that she was under the influence.
If the absence of information in the police report were the only basis for
Friedman’s opinion, we would agree with Gillespie that her testimony lacked
substantial evidentiary value. The People had the burden of proof; not the
other way around. “[T]he absence of evidence proving that [a] petitioner’s
mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the offenses is not
substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence
that petitioner’s mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the
offense[ ].” (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 404.)
Here, there was no evidence in the police reports, nor testimony by one of the
arresting officers, for example, to indicate that Gillespie “was not suffering
symptoms or that her mental health disorder[ ] [was] not a motivating,
causal, or contributing factor.” (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.) In
23
fact, to the contrary, Friedman failed to notice and address the presence of a
“glass pipe with a bulbous end and burnt residue” that was found in the U-
Haul truck under the driver’s seat.
But Friedman’s opinion was not solely based on the absence of
information in the police report. Friedman reviewed video footage of the
crime as it took place. This fact is dispositive to our analysis. As described
by Friedman, the surveillance video shows Gillespie removing items from
store shelves, placing them into a shopping cart, and removing them from the
store. While Friedman acknowledged that people can “function high” on
methamphetamine without showing symptoms, she explained that the
behavior she observed on the video was “coordinated,” “goal-directed,” and
“strategic.” She saw nothing “erratic or unusual” about Gillespie’s demeanor,
and based on her expertise and experience, she saw no “impairment
consistent with substance intoxication.” Gillespie points to no insufficiency in
the video to counter Friedman’s opinion or render it implausible. Substantial
evidence, accordingly, supports the trial conclusion it was highly probable
there was no nexus between Gillespie’s severe methamphetamine use
disorder and the charged offense.
Turning to Gillespie’s other diagnoses—severe bipolar I disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder—the trial court’s ruling presents a closer case.
As an initial matter, we agree with the district attorney that Friedman also
did not rely on an absence of evidence to opine that Gillespie was in neither a
psychotic nor manic state during the offense as a result of either of these two
diagnosed mental disorders. Friedman’s opinion was again founded in her
personal observation of the video surveillance footage. She observed no
behavior consistent with a psychotic or manic state, and she described
behavior that was “organized, goal directed, and collaborative,” which
24
“reflected intact executive functioning and reality testing.” Her opinion on
this point was buttressed by Gillespie’s ability to cooperate with the police
when she was arrested, which, as Friedman explained, “shows a level of
reasoning and understanding . . . that there was some wrongdoing.”
There is a different problem with this component of Friedman’s
opinion, however, and that is relevancy. Gillespie did not claim she was in a
manic or psychotic state during the offense. She claimed she was
“experiencing a “ ‘low’ mood,” which led her to “feel[ ] pressure to be accepted
by the group she was with” and this “increased her likelihood of participating
in the offense.” Her contention thus had nothing to do with being in a manic
or psychotic state.
Friedman’s written opinion testimony does not directly address
Gillespie’s actual contention and therefore failed to rebut the presumption of
a nexus. But in response to the trial court judge’s pointed questions at the
evidentiary hearing, Friedman testified, very generally, that the actions of
individuals, especially those who have received treatment for their illnesses,
are not always dictated by their mental illness. She opined that people with
Gillespie’s diagnoses have “the ability to think calmly, understand
consequences, [and] be more grounded in reality” when they are in remission
and not experiencing an acute phase of the illness. When Friedman’s
response to the trial court’s questions are considered in light of Gillespie’s
observed behavior on the video, which was “organized, goal directed, and
collaborative,” we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that clear
and convincing evidence rebutted Gillespie’s assertion that her disorders
were a significant factor in the commission of the offense despite not being in
a state of mania or experiencing a psychotic break.
25
The record thus contained sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusion that it was highly probable that Gillespie’s severe
methamphetamine use disorder was not a significant “motivating factor,
causal factor, or contributing factor to Gillespie’s involvement in the alleged
offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) Given this evidence, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it found Gillespie ineligible for diversion.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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