legal news


Register | Forgot Password

Marriage of Goblirsch CA5

Marriage of Goblirsch CA5
By
11:06:2026

Filed 11/6/26 Marriage of Goblirsch CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of MEGAN GOBLIRSCH and
CLINTON GOBLIRSCH.

MEGAN GOBLIRSCH, F090912

Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FL-21-001675 )

v.
OPINION
CLINTON GOBLIRSCH,

Appellant.

THE COURT *
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Alan K.
Cassidy, Judge.
Clinton Goblirsch, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Law Offices of Lindsey A. Bannerman, Lindsey A. Bannerman, for Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Snauffer, J. and Harrell, J.
In March 2022, Megan Goblirsch obtained a three-year domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) against her then-husband, Clinton Goblirsch. 1 The couple
were divorced later that year. In March 2025, Megan sought to renew the DVRO against
Clinton. After a bench trial, the trial court renewed the DVRO for five years. Clinton
appealed. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Megan and Clinton were in a relationship for almost 17 years, married for close to
11 years, and had two minor daughters born in 2011 and 2014, respectively. Megan filed
a petition for dissolution of marriage in July 2021, and a judgment of dissolution was
entered in December 2022. The parties were involved in ongoing custody proceedings
regarding their minor daughters. Under a June 1, 2023 custody order, Megan had sole
legal and sole physical custody, while Clinton had supervised visitation.
March 2022 DVRO
In March 2022, Megan obtained a three-year DVRO against Clinton. The DVRO
named Megan as the sole protected party. It included an “order to not abuse,” a “no-
contact order,” and a “stay-away order.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The DVRO’s “order to not abuse” prohibited Clinton from, among other things,
“[d]isturb[ing] the peace” of Megan. (Capitalization omitted.) The “order to not abuse”
explained: “ ‘Disturb[ing] the peace’ means to destroy someone’s mental or emotional
calm. This can be done directly or indirectly, such as through someone else. This can
also be done in any way, such as by phone, over text, or online.” (Capitalization
omitted.)
The DVRO’s “no-contact order” prohibited Clinton from contacting Megan,
“directly or indirectly, by any means, including by telephone, mail, email, or other
electronic means.” (Capitalization omitted.) The “no contact order” specified that

1 We will refer to the parties by their first names for clarity.

2.
Clinton was permitted to “have brief and peaceful contact with” Megan to “communicate
about [their] children for court-ordered visits,” and that he was permitted to have contact
with the children “only during court-ordered contact or visits.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Finally, the DVRO’s “stay-away order” required Clinton to stay at least 100 yards
away from Megan, her home, her workplace, and her vehicle. The stay-away order
permitted Clinton to “briefly and peacefully exchange [the] children for court-ordered
visits” and to “visit with [the] children for court-ordered contact or visits.”
March 2025 DVRO Renewal Request
In March 2025, Megan filed a request to renew the DVRO for five years. 2 The
matter proceeded to a bench trial on December 15, 2025. Megan was represented by
counsel, while Clinton represented himself. Megan testified on her own behalf; she was
the only witness to testify at trial. Clinton did not testify or present any evidence on his
behalf.
Megan’s Trial Testimony
Incident on Christmas Eve 2024
Megan testified that Clinton had violated the 2022 DVRO, while it was in effect.
Asked how he had violated the order, Megan described an incident that occurred on
Christmas Eve 2024, at Megan’s home. Megan noted that she and her daughters were at
her “parents’ house doing Christmas” at the time. However, Megan was able to remotely
observe the front door area of her own home through a Ring doorbell video surveillance
system. Megan saw a friend of Clinton’s, who lived around the corner from her, drop off
giftwrapped presents at her house.
Megan stated: “I just saw the presents were delivered and that somebody
delivered them, and it looks like the car that lives around the street from me.” The

2 The existing DVRO was extended pending the resolution of Megan’s renewal
request.

3.
presents were from Clinton to his daughters. Megan explained: “He gave them both
TVs, and on the TV he wrote, ‘for Dad’s house.’ ” 3 Usually, Clinton would send gifts
for the girls through the mail.
Clinton’s June 3, 2023 Text Message to Megan
Megan also read into the record a text message Clinton had sent her on June 3,
2023, shortly after a child custody order was issued in the parties’ custody matter on June
1, 2023. The text message stated: “ ‘I believe I did everything, but is there still
something else I can do for you to allow me to be part of [the girls’ lives]? Or was your
goal really always to eliminate me completely? It’s very clear that’s the goal of the court
which I know you knew and were advised. My disappointment with them is only second
to my disappointment in you. I’ll take no response as the answer I need.’ ”
2021 Incident
In addition, Megan mentioned an incident that occurred in 2021, prior to the
issuance of the original restraining order in March 2022. This incident occurred while a
temporary restraining order (TRO) was in effect, and it was addressed at the trial on the
original three-year restraining order. Megan explained: “Early on in the beginning when
[the TRO] was first ordered, [Clinton] showed up at the girls’ gymnastics.”
Megan’s Ongoing Concerns
On direct examination, Megan was asked about her concerns regarding Clinton’s
conduct. She responded: “I feel like he hasn’t taken any accountability this whole time,
and he continues to blame me for everything that’s happened.” Megan added that
Clinton had “done everything he can to try and get his kids back,” and that she felt that he
would retaliate against her for the custody situation. Megan explained: “I’m filing [for
renewal of the DVRO] because I’m worried as soon as it lifts, I’m going to have a

3 Megan also testified that the next day, Christmas Day, Clinton texted one of the
girls, “ ‘I love you very much, baby girl. You and sissy’s presents were dropped off
yesterday.’ ”

4.
barrage of text messages telling me how bad and evil of a person that I am and [that] I’ve
done everything I can to keep him away. And we’ve all finally had some mental peace,
and I feel like he’s going to change that as soon as the order lifts.”
On cross-examination, Megan repeated that she was concerned for her safety
because Clinton had not taken any accountability for the situation. Clinton asked Megan
to explain what she meant. Megan answered: “Being in a relationship with you for 17
years, I have known you through your highs and your lows and helped you through your
lows, and knowing what you’re capable of doing scares me that if this [DVRO] gets
taken away, it will happen again.” Megan added: “And I know you say that you have
moved on, but we have not moved on. And we’re working really hard to move on. And
if you are allowed to text me again or drop by the house whenever you feel like it, it puts
everything back. It puts all of the progress that we have made back.”
Megan testified that Clinton had not changed his behavior over the course of the
dissolution and custody proceedings and continued to blame Megan for keeping him
away from the girls. She said she wanted Clinton to get therapy so he would understand
the role he had played in the custody outcome. She wanted him to “actively participate in
the therapy,” and not merely go through the motions. Responding to a question from
Clinton, she stated: “I just want you to understand that your behavior has impacts. I
want you to understand that your – the way you speak, the way you treat everything has
impacts, and I want you to have a healthy relationship with [the girls].”
Clinton’s Text Messages to His Daughters
Megan also testified about various text messages Clinton had sent to the girls.
Clinton texted the girls on June 1, 2023, after the trial court issued a new custody order
(see above). Megan testified: “[Clinton] didn’t like it that he was going to get supervised
visitation and he was explaining to them why I was a bad person because he was still on
supervised visitation.” Megan noted that at that time, Clinton also told the girls that
Megan “was evil,” and made her “look bad to them.”

5.
Clinton sent the girls a follow-up text message on June 7, 2023, stating, in part:
“Daddy has to try and follow the [custody] orders as much as possible because it’s the
only way I will ever get to see you guys until you’re older. If I don’t, your mommy will
probably try to keep you away even longer or even do something else. It shouldn’t be
that way. It never should have been that way, but your mommy doesn’t want you to see
Daddy and refuses to agree to it even though she can. She has lied, manipulated, and
done everything she can to make it that way.”
Trial Court’s Ruling
After Megan’s testimony was completed, both parties presented closing
arguments. The trial court then ruled from the bench.
The trial court ruled: “The responsibility is on Petitioner to show that she
entertains an actual and reasonable apprehension about future abuse. Based on the
information presented, the [c]ourt does indeed find that [Megan] does actually entertain
a[n] apprehension of future abuse and that that apprehension is reasonable under the
circumstances, both as to the alleged – the offer of underlying facts and the subsequent
conduct by [Clinton] and his reluctance and virtual inability to abide by the [c]ourt’s
orders.” The court concluded: “Accordingly, the [c]ourt’s previously issued restraining
order will be extended for a period of five years.”
Clinton appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“The trial court’s ruling on a request to renew a [DVRO] is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) “ ‘[A]n abuse of
discretion occurs where “ ‘ “the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or
more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ashby v. Ashby
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509 (Ashby).)

6.
“In reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence
rule.” (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1143.) “The inquiry is whether
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, not whether a contrary finding might
have been made.” (Id. at p. 1144.) “We accept as true all evidence tending to establish
the correctness of the trial court’s findings and resolve every conflict in favor of the
judgment.” (Ibid.)
“The trial court’s order ‘is presumed to be correct, and all intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent.
[Citation.] It is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.’ ” (Ashby,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 509.)
II. Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA)
The stated purpose of the DVPA (Fam. Code, 4 §§ 6200–6460), is to “prevent acts
of domestic violence [and] abuse” and “to provide for a separation of the persons
involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.)
As relevant here, the DVPA defines domestic violence as “abuse” perpetrated
against “[a] spouse or former spouse.” (§ 6211, subd. (a).) The DVPA authorizes courts
to issue restraining orders based on “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§ 6300, subd. (a).) The DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90, fn. 14; Gdowski v.
Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137.)
The DVPA defines the term “abuse” broadly. For example, the definition includes
causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, among other types of physical abuse, but
“[a]buse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (See § 6203,

4 Subsequent, undesignated statutory references are to Family Code.

7.
subd. (a)(1)–(a)(3), (b).) It also includes “disturbing the peace of the other party.”
(§§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320, subd. (a).)
“ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ” is defined as conduct that, “based on
the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other
party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) “This conduct may be committed directly or indirectly,
including through the use of a third party, and by any method or through any means
including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text messages … or other
electronic technologies.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
III. DVRO Renewals: Applicable Law
When a trial court has issued a DVRO after notice and hearing, it has broad
authority to renew it. A DVRO “may be renewed, upon the request of a party … at the
discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the
original order.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).) 5
Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Ritchie) is the seminal case
addressing DVRO renewals and interpreting the governing statute, section 6345. Ritchie
explained: “[S]ection 6345 makes it unnecessary for the protected party to introduce or
the court to consider actual acts of abuse the restrained party committed after the original
order went into effect.… Indeed the fact a protective order has proved effective is a good
reason for seeking its renewal.” (Ritchie at p. 1284.)
Ritchie, however, clarified that in contested cases, “the protected party is not
entitled to a renewal merely because [the party] desires one.” (Ritchie, supra, 115
Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Rather, “an objective test must be satisfied before a protective
order is renewed in contested cases.” (Id. at p. 1290.) Ritchie held: “A trial court should
renew the protective order if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

5 Section 6345, subdivision (a) provides that a DVRO shall have an initial duration
not exceeding five years, but may be renewed “either for five or more years, or
permanently.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).)

8.
the protected party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse.” (Ibid.)
Ritchie explained: “[T]his does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not
future abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence
demonstrates that it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to
find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” (Ibid.)
Ritchie addressed the factors that courts may consider when evaluating whether
the requesting party has a “ ‘reasonable apprehension’ ” of future abuse and a DVRO
may properly be renewed. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) “For one thing,
there is that existing order and the factual predicate for its issuance—typically prior acts
or at least threats of abuse.” (Ibid.) Ritchie noted: “[T]he mere existence of a protective
order, typically issued several years earlier, seldom if ever will provide conclusive
evidence the requesting party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse of
any kind should that order expire. But the existence of the initial order certainly is
relevant and the underlying findings and facts supporting that order often will be enough
in themselves to provide the necessary proof to satisfy that test.” (Id. at p. 1291.)
“Consequently, the trial judge ordinarily should consider the evidence and findings on
which that initial order was based in appraising the risk of future abuse should the
existing order expire.” (Id. at p. 1290.)
Ritchie further explained: “Also potentially relevant are any significant changes in
the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order. For
instance, have the restrained and protected parties moved on with their lives so far that
the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has diminished to the degree they no
longer support a renewal of the order? Or have there been no significant changes or even
perhaps changes that enhance the opportunity and possibility of future abuse?” (Ritchie,
supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.)
Finally, Ritchie noted that “the ‘burdens’ the protective order imposes on the
restrained party” may also be relevant, although “those burdens would never justify

9.
denial of a renewed protective order where the ‘reasonable apprehension’ is of future acts
of physical violence.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) Potential burdens on
a restrained party include social stigma, employment consequences, and interference with
social life. (Ibid.)
Ritchie observed: “Furthermore, where children are involved, a protective order
designed to prohibit access to an abused spouse may have the collateral effect of limiting
the restrained party’s access to his (or her) children even when they are not potential
targets of abuse.” (Ibid.) Ritchie concluded: “Where the worst ‘danger’ the protected
party must fear is a few unwanted calls or letters or e-mail messages, the court may have
to weigh the seriousness as well as the degree of the risk against the significance of the
burdens the restrained party will experience if subjected to a continuing protective order.”
(Id. at p. 1292.)
IV. The Record Discloses Substantial Evidence to Support the DVRO Renewal
The trial court found that Megan had met her burden of proving she had a
reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Based on its underlying finding that Megan had
a reasonable apprehension of future abuse, the court renewed the DVRO for five years.
Clinton argues the trial court’s underlying factual finding is not supported by
sufficient evidence and the renewal of the DVRO was an abuse of discretion.
We disagree.
Here, while the record on appeal contains the original DVRO, it does not contain
any information about the evidence and findings on which the original order was based.
The record on appeal contains a reporter’s transcript of the trial on Megan’s DVRO
renewal request; based on the transcript, it does not appear that records pertaining to the
original DVRO were admitted into evidence or otherwise presented at the trial on the
renewal request.
In any event, here a three-year DVRO was issued in 2022. At trial on the 2025
DVRO renewal request, evidence was presented indicating that the parties had been

10.
engaged in ongoing, contentious child custody proceedings with respect to their two
minor daughters. The evidence indicated that Megan had sole legal and physical custody
of the girls, while Clinton was limited to supervised visitation. Megan testified that
Clinton had not taken accountability for his role in this outcome, blamed Megan for his
limited access to the girls, and remained stuck in a reactive state of mind, rather than
achieving a balanced and healthy outlook by actively engaging in therapy.
Megan presented text messages that Clinton had sent to her and to the girls, in
which he blamed Megan for separating him from his daughters. Megan’s testimony
indicated that the parties had not moved on from the circumstances that led to issuance of
the 2022 DVRO, and that Megan feared that Clinton would retaliate against her were the
existing DVRO allowed to expire. In addition, Megan testified: “I’m filing [for renewal
of the DVRO] because I’m worried as soon as it lifts, I’m going to have a barrage of text
messages telling me how bad and evil of a person that I am and [that] I’ve done
everything I can to keep him away. And we’ve all finally had some mental peace, and I
feel like he’s going to change that as soon as the order lifts.”
Clinton did not testify or otherwise present any evidence on his own behalf at trial.
Therefore, there was limited evidence before the trial court as to burdens placed on him
on account of the DVRO. To the extent Clinton was restricted to supervised visitation
with his daughters, he did not present evidence as to how renewal of the DVRO would
bear on the issue of custody, as distinct from other factors at issue in the parties’ separate
custody proceedings.
We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that Megan had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. We further
conclude that the court’s decision to renew the existing DVRO was not an abuse of
discretion. (See Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 180 [“ ‘The key
consideration for the court is not the type or timing of abuse, but whether the protected
party has a reasonable fear of future abuse.’ ”].)

11.
Clinton also argues that the trial court erred in finding he had violated the 2022
DVRO. He contends that the delivery of gifts for his daughters to Megan’s house on
Christmas Eve in 2024 was not a violation of the DVRO, because he did not personally
deliver the gifts. He further contends that the text message he sent to Megan after the
June 1, 2023 custody order was handed down, was similarly not a violation of the DVRO.
As an initial matter, these contentions are legally irrelevant. As mentioned,
section 6345, subdivision (a), expressly states that a DVRO “may be renewed, upon the
request of a party … without a showing of any further abuse since issuance of the original
order.” Further, Ritchie explained: “It would be anomalous to require the protected party
to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal of that original order. If this
were the standard, the protected party would have to demonstrate the initial order had
proved ineffectual in halting the restrained party’s abusive conduct just to obtain an
extension of that ineffectual order.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284; see
Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 515 [compliance with a DVRO does not preclude a
finding of reasonable apprehension].)
In any event, Clinton had violated the DVRO. The DVRO prohibited Clinton
from contacting Megan, except for “brief and peaceful contact” to “communicate about
[their] children for court-ordered visits.” 6 Here, the text message Clinton sent to Megan
on June 3, 2023, shortly after the June 1, 2023 custody order was issued, did not relate to
arranging court-ordered visits but rather excoriated Megan for the recent custody
determination. Furthermore, the DVRO’s “order to not abuse” prohibited Clinton from
“[d]isturb[ing] the peace” of Megan, which he arguably did by having his friend drop
gifts off at her front door. (Capitalization omitted.) Evidence was also presented that
Clinton had violated a temporary restraining order that was in place in 2021.

6 The trial court took judicial notice of this fact, noting: “The restraining order
allows for brief and peaceful contact as required by court-ordered visitation of the
children.”

12.
V. Judicial Bias
At the beginning of trial, the trial court revealed it had a professional connection to
Megan’s mother, Donna Powers, who was a court employee. Referring to the court’s
disclosure, Clinton argues that the court’s DVRO renewal order “demonstrates judicial
bias.”
Here, at the beginning of trial, the trial court stated: “Coming in this morning after
delivering some paperwork to the family law clerk’s office, the [c]ourt saw Ms. Donna
Powers in the hallway of the courtroom. Ms. Donna Powers was previously a courtroom
clerk in this courthouse for many years. I think she may have even [been] in this
department at one time or another. I’ve known Ms. Powers for many years.” The court
asked Megan’s counsel whether counsel intended to call Powers as a witness in the trial;
counsel responded in the negative. The court explained: “If you had expressed an
interest in calling Ms. Powers, I would be recusing myself. Because she will not be a
witness, I will not be recusing myself.”
Megan’s counsel noted that Powers was “presently designated … as one of the
two supervisors for visitation”; counsel added: “Visitation is not occurring at this time.”
The court asked Clinton for his input. Clinton stated: “I guess I’m going to take your
word for it if you’re saying that you’ll be impartial in terms of your decision.” The court
responded: “My point is that if Ms. Powers takes no part in this matter, I have …
absolutely no difficulty with it. If Ms. Powers is called as a witness in this case, I would
have to recuse myself.” Clinton and the court then had a brief discussion, but Clinton did
not object to the court presiding over the trial under the circumstances outlined by the
court, nor did Clinton move to disqualify the court. Thereafter, the court proceeded with
the trial; Powers did not testify.
Clinton’s argument is essentially that the trial judge “should have recused
himself.” However, Clinton does not provide a record citation showing he made this
objection at trial or moved to disqualify the judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3.) Failure to

13.
object in the trial court forfeits the issue on appeal. (See People v. Simon (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1082, 1103–1104; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218 [claim of judicial bias not preserved for review because of
failure to object in trial court].)
In addition, Clinton’s claim of bias is not supported by citation to legal authority
and is inadequately developed. It is forfeited for these reasons as well. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“conclusory
claims of error will fail”].)
Even considering the merits, Clinton has not shown that “[a] person aware of the
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge [was] able to be impartial.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).)
VI. Constitutional Claims
Clinton argues that the DVRO obtained and renewed by Megan “infringe[s] on
[his] fundamental liberty and parental rights protected by the 14th Amendment.”
However, once again Clinton has not shown he objected to renewal of the DVRO on
these grounds in the trial court. His argument is also not adequately developed or
supported by relevant legal authorities. Accordingly, we conclude Clinton has forfeited
this argument on appeal. (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078 [“Mere suggestions of
error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do
not properly present grounds for appellate review”]; Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [“[A]ppellant is required to not only
cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.”]; Singh v.
Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 [points asserted on appeal but not supported
by “ ‘adequate factual or legal analysis’ ” are forfeited]; In re S.C., supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 408 [“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal

14.
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support
the claim of error.”].)
Furthermore, Clinton was accorded due process in the renewal proceedings. Due
process requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard, and here Clinton had notice
and participated in a court trial before renewal of the DVRO. (See, e.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 348.) To the extent Clinton argues the DVRO
unreasonably impacted the issue of custody of his children, the custody matter was not
before the trial court, nor did Clinton present evidence on the issue.
Clinton also argues that renewal of the DVRO constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Again, Clinton has not shown he objected to renewal of the DVRO on these grounds in
the trial court; nor does he provide any legal authorities in support of his argument.
Megan responds that the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment does not apply in civil proceedings. (Ingraham v. Wright (1977) 430 U.S.
651, 667 [applicability of cruel and unusual punishment clause of Eight Amendment is
limited to criminal proceedings].) Megan’s point is well taken. Clinton’s argument fails.
Finally, to the extent Clinton raises new arguments for the first time in his reply
brief, we decline to consider them. (See, e.g., Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of
Palm Springs (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 607, 637, fn. 8 [“We do not consider arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief.”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order renewing the DVRO is affirmed. Megan Goblirsch is
entitled to her costs on appeal.

15.





Description -ooOoo- * Before Hill, P. J., Snauffer, J. and Harrell, J. In March 2022, Megan Goblirsch obtained a three-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her then-husband, Clinton Goblirsch. 1 The couple were divorced later that year. In March 2025, Megan sought to renew the DVRO against Clinton. After a bench trial, the trial court renewed the DVRO for five years. Clinton appealed. We affirm.
Rating
0/5 based on 0 votes.

    Home | About Us | Privacy | Subscribe
    © 2026 Fearnotlaw.com The california lawyer directory

  Copyright © 2026 Result Oriented Marketing, Inc.

attorney
scale