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Masoud v. JPMorgan Chase Bank CA4/1

Masoud v. JPMorgan Chase Bank CA4/1
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10:27:2026

Filed 10/27/26 Masoud v. JPMorgan Chase Bank CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

NORA MASOUD, D085594

Plaintiff and Appellant,
(San Diego Super. Ct.
v. No. 37-2015-00035457-CU-
OR-CTL)
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Reversed.
Foley Law Center and Michael T. Stoller, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Glenn Jeffrey Plattner and David James
Root, for Defendants and Respondents.
Nora Masoud appeals the order granting summary judgment for
JPMorgan Chase and U.S. Bank National Association on her claim of
wrongful foreclosure, asserting there was no admissible evidence that the
banks possessed authority to foreclose. We agree, as the banks not only
failed to lay the foundation for a predecessor bank’s documents necessary
to establish this authority, but their affiant lacked independent personal
knowledge about indispensable facts concerning Masoud’s mortgage. Finding
no other basis for this authority in the current record, the judgment must
be reversed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Masoud’s Mortgage Loan

Masoud bought a home in San Diego in October 2000 with a loan from

Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.1 Her loan was secured by a deed of trust and
an accompanying note giving the holder the right to demand that the trustee

foreclose on the mortgage were she to default on her payments.2 In July
2005, Masoud refinanced her loan with WaMu for the third and final time.
Later in 2005, WaMu decided to securitize some of its mortgage loans
by executing pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) to sell them into
trusts, including the one relevant here: the “WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2005–AR14” created in October 2005 (AR14 trust).

1 Multiple Washington Mutual entities were involved in the transactions
described below. Neither party indicates that the role of any specific
Washington Mutual entity is relevant to this appeal; and so, we use “WaMu”
to refer to these entities generally.
2 Because we decide this appeal on evidentiary grounds, we do not delve
into the details of deeds of trust or this securitization process we describe
below. Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 926–
928 (Yvanova) provides helpful background into these areas.

2
The trust documents initially identified WaMu as the servicer of the trust
and LaSalle Bank National Association as its trustee. Eventually, U.S. Bank
National Association (U.S. Bank) became the trustee and served in that role
at all relevant times. JPMorgan Chase N.A. (Chase) and U.S. Bank
(together, the banks) maintain that WaMu transferred Masoud’s mortgage
loan to the AR14 trust, although no assignment of this interest
was contemporaneously recorded.
In September 2008, WaMu failed after the housing market crash.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as WaMu’s appointed receiver,
sold substantially all of the failed bank’s assets to Chase. Accordingly, Chase
maintains that it took over WaMu’s role as servicer of the AR14 trust.
Around the same time, Chase informed Masoud that it would be servicing
her loan.
In February 2011, the banks executed a limited power of attorney
(POA) that gave Chase authority to take certain actions reserved for the
trustee of the AR14 trust (i.e., U.S. Bank), including to foreclose on mortgage
loans in default. Claiming to be acting under this authority, Chase initiated
foreclosure proceedings on Masoud’s loan in September 2011 after she had
fallen behind on her payments. That same month, Chase executed and
recorded two documents: (1) as the successor in interest to WaMu, an
assignment of the beneficial interests in Masoud’s mortgage loan to U.S.
Bank as trustee of the AR14 trust (the 2011 assignment), which Washington
testified was meant to memorialize the earlier transfer of her mortgage to the
AR14 trust even though the effective date of the assignment was September
6, 2011, and (2) a notice of default and election to sell the property under
California’s nonjudicial foreclosure procedures. Masoud’s property was
eventually sold at a trustee’s sale in October 2018.

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B. The Summary Judgment Proceedings

Masoud filed her initial complaint in October 2015, and in January
2019, a judgment of dismissal was entered after the court sustained the
banks’ demurrer without leave to amend. We reversed and remanded this
matter so that Masoud could assert a claim of wrongful foreclosure. (Masoud
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (May 26, 2020, D075582) [nonpub. opn.]
(Masoud).) She alleges in what is now the operative complaint, among other
things, that her mortgage was never transferred to the AR14 trust and
therefore neither Chase nor U.S. Bank possessed the authority to foreclose.
The banks moved for summary judgment, claiming there was no triable
dispute that Masoud’s loan had been transferred to the AR14 trust. They
supported their claim with two declarations by Dorothy Washington, a
Chase “authorized signer” who does not indicate she ever worked at WaMu.
Washington did not describe her job responsibilities or indicate that she
possessed any knowledge about these kinds of trusts or the procedures any
bank had used to set them up. Rather, she based her testimony solely on the
contents of the records Chase maintained in connection with Masoud’s loan—
including records received from WaMu—all of which she claimed met the
requirements to admit them as business records under Evidence Code section

1271.3
The main document Washington relied on is a one-page excerpt from a
computer printout entitled “legal loan listing” for the AR14 trust (AR14 loan
listing). This document, which has an entry for Masoud’s loan, appears to
have been run by WaMu before the AR14 trust closing date and purports to
identify the loans that someone thought or intended would become part of

3 Later undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

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the trust. As Washington describes it, this printout was the “mortgage loan
schedule” required by the PSA even though the markings on the document do
not identify it as such. She also testified that the 2011 assignment “merely
memorialize[d] in a recorded document the fact that the beneficial interest
in the loan had been transferred from WaMu to the AR-14 trust” in 2005.
Finally, she claimed that the AR14 trust has always possessed the original
note for the loan.
For her part, Masoud contended that a document WaMu submitted
to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission showed her loan
had been transferred to a different trust before the AR14 trust was created.
She also objected to Washington’s declaration testimony for lack of personal
knowledge and failure to satisfy the business records exception to the
hearsay rule for any of the documents she testified about.
The trial court granted the banks’ motion. It started by overruling
Masoud’s objections to Washington’s declaration, including to find that she
had “provided sufficient foundation and authentication for the documents
attached to her declaration.” The court also sustained the defendants’
objections to Masoud’s evidence that her loan was transferred to a different
trust. Crediting Washington’s testimony that Masoud’s loan had been
transferred to the AR14 trust, the court found there was no triable
controversy that Chase, through the power of attorney it executed with U.S.
Bank, was authorized to foreclose on Masoud’s loan.

DISCUSSION

In reversing the judgment of dismissal, we observed that “it remains a
factual question as to which persons or entities held the beneficial interest in
the deed of trust at the time of the foreclosure.” (Masoud, supra, D075582.)
Masoud claims this is still an open question because the banks did not proffer

5
admissible evidence that the AR14 trust held this interest as required to
meet their initial burden to show they had authority to foreclose on her

mortgage.4 She further contends that even if the banks could make the
required showing, there was enough admissible countervailing evidence
for her claim to survive summary judgment. The banks disagree in both
respects.
“The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) The moving party “bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact” (id. at p. 849), either that “ ‘one or more elements of’
the ‘cause of action’ ” in question “ ‘cannot be established,’ ” or that “ ‘there
is a complete defense’ thereto’ ” (id. at p. 853). “[I]f he carries his burden
of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected
to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the

4 The court’s rulings on Masoud’s objections to Washington’s testimony
were not addressed in detail in the parties’ briefs. Accordingly, we requested
supplemental briefing on three questions: “(1) On what basis could
Washington, as a Chase employee, possess personal knowledge that WaMu
transferred its interest in Masoud’s loan to the [AR14] trust in 2005, as
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (d)? [¶] (2)
Similarly, on what basis could Washington satisfy all the elements of
Evidence Code section 1271 for any WaMu documents created in 2005 ... ?
[Citations]. [¶] (3) If Masoud’s objections had been sustained, could Chase
have satisfied its initial burden to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact?” In addition, the statements
in Washington’s second declaration merely expound upon the testimony of
her first declaration, and thus we treat Masoud’s objections as covering both
declarations.

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existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id. at p. 850.) We review an
order granting a summary judgment motion de novo. (Id. at p. 860.)
“A beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust who conducts an illegal,
fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property may be liable to the
borrower for wrongful foreclosure.” (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 929.)
“A foreclosure initiated by one with no authority to do so is wrongful for
purposes of such an action.” (Ibid.) Because “only the original beneficiary, its
assignee or an agent of one of these has the authority to instruct the trustee
to initiate and complete a nonjudicial foreclosure sale,” the banks bore the
initial burden to prove that they fit into one of these categories. (Ibid.; accord
Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366,
1378 [bank not entitled to summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure claim
because it failed to show a chain of ownership that would establish it was the
true beneficiary under the deed of trust].)
We start with Masoud’s evidentiary objections to the AR14 loan listing
because this document is the linchpin of the banks’ case. Computer printouts
“are admissible and are presumed to be an accurate representation of the
data in the computer,” but if they are “offered for the truth ... they must
qualify under some hearsay exception, such as [section] 1271.” (Aguimatang
v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 769, 797.) As noted, the
trial court—erroneously in Masoud’s view—found that Washington was
competent to lay the business record foundation for the AR14 loan listing.
We review this ruling for abuse of discretion. (See Alexander v. Scripps
Memorial Hospital La Jolla (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 206, 226.)
The foundational elements of section 1271 are: (a) “The writing was
made in the regular course of a business”; (b) “The writing was made at
or near the time of the act, condition, or event”; (c) “The custodian or other

7
qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation”;
and (d) “The sources of information and method and time of preparation
were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” Although the contents of the
AR14 loan listing suggest that it was made in the regular course of WaMu’s
business, the document does not, on its face, establish any other section
1271 elements. It bears no markings indicating it is an exhibit to the PSA
that established the AR14 trust or who and how the data was created.
Washington’s testimony does not fill these gaps. “ ‘The key to
establishing the admissibility of a document made in the regular course of
business is proof that the person who wrote the information or provided it
had knowledge of the facts from personal observation.’ ” (People v. Selivanov
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 775 (Selivanov).) “The witness called to present
this proof ‘need not have been present at every transaction to establish the
business records exception; he or she need only be familiar with the
procedures followed.’ ” (Ibid.) But here, Washington fails to explain why
she believes the AR14 loan listing is the mortgage loan schedule to the PSA
or how the document was created. Indeed, she does not mention in her
declaration the obligation to give this second explanation even though it
is required by section 1271 “in every instance.” (People v. Nelson (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 698, 710, internal quotation marks omitted.)
The banks argue that Washington can lay this foundation merely
because the document now belongs to Chase, her employer. Other California
courts have rejected this argument in similar circumstances. (See, e.g.,
Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler (2025) 118 Cal.App.5th Supp. 19,
35 [employee’s familiarity with the record-keeping practices of its employer,
a successor creditor, was insufficient to lay business records foundation for
documents created by original creditor]; Midland Funding LLC v. Romero

8
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 9 [same]; cf. Selivanov, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
p. 775 [prosecution witnesses’ general familiarity with accounting principles
and the software used to create a defendant’s document was insufficient to
meet section 1271].) As one such court aptly explained: “At best, all Mr.
Roberts’s declaration and testimony establish is that respondent, as assignee
from the creditor, received records originating from Citibank concerning
the account in question. This falls short of the foundation necessary for
admission of business records as against a hearsay objection.” (Sierra
Managed Asset Plan, LLC. v. Hale (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 9; see
id. at p. 8.) So too here.
To this same end, the banks refer us to four out-of-state decisions:
two federal opinions addressing summary judgment motions where the
courts credited testimony from affidavits the banks contend were similar to

Washington’s;5 and two other cases—one collecting federal authorities and
one applying Massachusetts law—where employees of successor companies
laid the business records foundation for predecessor companies’ records their
employers acquired.6 The banks fail, however, to make a reasoned argument
for us to disregard on-point California authorities in favor of cases applying
evidentiary rules that do not require the “identity and mode of preparation”
of a document be described. (Compare § 1271, subd. (c) with Fed. Rules
Evid., rule 803(6) and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 78 (2026).) Nor do we

5 See Burke v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D. Cal., Sept. 15, 2016,
No. C 13-04249 WHA) 2016 WL 4916926, at page *2; Kelley v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank NA (In re Kelley) (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2016) 545 B.R. 1, 3.
6 See Phillips v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. (N.D. Ala., Apr. 5, 2013,
No. 5:09-cv-2507-TMP) 2013 WL 1498956, at page *2; JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. v. Niakaros (Mass. Land Ct., Dec. 13, 2016, No. 13 MISC 479399
(RBF)) 2016 WL 7211800, at page *2.

9
find the banks’ speculation that they would be unable to find a former WaMu
employee to provide this foundation to be a compelling reason for us to relax
the well-established standards of section 1271 in this case. Suggestions
based on a claimed need to fine tune the practical application of statutes
should be “addressed to those responsible for their adoption.” (Perez v. Board
of Police Comm’rs (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 638, 647.)
We therefore conclude that the trial court’s finding that section 1271
was satisfied was erroneous because Washington did not provide the required
foundation. (See Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust (2004) 33 Cal.4th 523, 531 [“A
discretionary ruling predicated on a required finding of fact is necessarily an
abuse of discretion if no substantial evidence supports the fact’s existence”].)
This means the trial court also erred in crediting Washington’s testimony
that Masoud’s loan was transferred to the AR14 trust because she based it
on her review of an inadmissible document. (Chambers v. Crown Asset
Management, LLC (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 583, 601 [personal knowledge
found lacking where lay witness’s testimony was based solely on review of
inadmissible hearsay].)
The banks also contend that the 2011 assignment, the power of
attorney, and Washington’s testimony that the trust possessed the original
note all support affirming the judgment even were we to deem inadmissible
the AR14 loan listing and Washington’s testimony about it. We disagree.
Assuming without deciding the contents of the 2011 assignment and the
power of attorney were admissible, without Washington’s inadmissible
testimony, these documents merely show that Chase assumed it owned the
loan in 2011 and that it attempted to transfer the loan to the AR14 trust in
2011; this is not enough to carry the banks’ initial burden. (See Taylor v.
Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966, 982, fn. 8

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[initial burden must “be based on admissible evidence, including personal
knowledge and evidentiary fact, not legal conclusions, ultimate facts,
hearsay, conclusions, or impermissible opinions”].)
As for the representation that the trust possessed the original note,
the banks do not attempt to explain why that fact matters or why they were
entitled to enforce the note even though it contains no endorsement either
to the trust or “in blank.” (See Cal. U. Com. Code, §§ 1201, subd. (b)(21)(A),
3201, 3205, 3301, subd. (a); Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Chess (1976) 58
Cal.App.3d 555, 561–562; Smith v. Citimorgage, Inc. (In re Smith) (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2014) 509 B.R. 260, 265–267; In re Lee (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) 408
B.R. 893, 899–900.) We “may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that
are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning
by which the [party] reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ” (United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
With no other basis to deem admissible any of the banks’ proffered
evidence of the transfer of Masoud’s loan to the AR14 trust in 2005 (People v.
Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 205), we must reverse the judgment
because “a different result would have been probable” absent these erroneous
evidentiary rulings (Code Civ. Proc., § 475).7 We express no opinion on
whether the banks can cure these evidentiary deficiencies at a later
proceeding.

7 Relying on analogous testimony and a similar loan listing for the trust
to which Masoud contends her mortgage was actually assigned, the banks
argue that any error was harmless because the power of attorney covered
both trusts. The evidence about the other trust is inadmissible for the same
reasons we have rejected the AR14 loan listing and corresponding testimony
by Washington; thus, we decline to reach the merits of this argument.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed with directions to enter a new and different
order denying the banks’ motion for summary judgment. Masoud shall
recover her costs on appeal.

DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

RUBIN, J

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Description Nora Masoud appeals the order granting summary judgment for JPMorgan Chase and U.S. Bank National Association on her claim of wrongful foreclosure, asserting there was no admissible evidence that the banks possessed authority to foreclose. We agree, as the banks not only failed to lay the foundation for a predecessor bank’s documents necessary to establish this authority, but their affiant lacked independent personal knowledge about ind
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