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Marriage of L.G. and P.V. CA4/3

Marriage of L.G. and P.V. CA4/3
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10:27:2026

Filed 10/27/26 Marriage of L.G. and P.V. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of L.G. and P.V.

L.G.,
G065960
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 25D004546)
v.
OPINION
P.V.,

Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michele Bell, Judge. Affirmed.
L.G.,1 in pro. per., for Appellant.
P.V. in pro. per., for Respondent.

1 Due to the sensitivity of the facts and allegations, we refer to

the parties by their initials.
L.G. appeals from the trial court’s issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO). The court found P.V. made credible accusations of
abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Family Code section 6200
et seq. (DVPA).2 L.G. contends the proceedings before the court violated his
due process rights. We disagree and find L.G. forfeited all arguments not
supported by citation to the law or record. However, even if we did not find
the arguments forfeited, we find the court provided L.G. with a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and did not abuse its discretion in issuing the DVRO.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
P.V.’S REQUEST FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER
P.V. and L.G. are married but are currently in dissolution
proceedings. They have not lived together for almost three years. The request
for the restraining order was filed in the dissolution action, but the history of
the parties’ relationship and the dissolution are not described in the record
before us.
P.V.’s request for a DVRO identified two incidents of abuse.3 The
first incident took place almost three years ago and described in detail
forcible sexual contact committed by L.G. with L.G. physically restraining
P.V. while P.V. cried and begged L.G. not to do it. P.V. wrote in the request
this incident caused her mental trauma, although she was initially “in denial

2 All further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless

otherwise specified.

3 Neither P.V.’s original DVRO request nor L.G.’s response to the

DVRO is included in the record. On our own motion, we augment the record
on appeal with these documents, which were filed in Orange County Superior
Court case No. 25D004546. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

2
of being a victim.” P.V. did not recognize she had suffered abuse until she was
told by her therapist that she was a victim of sexual assault. The second
incident was described as communication that took place just prior to the
filing of the request. P.V. explained L.G. had continued to contact her by text
message despite the fact P.V. blocked him from calling and asked him to stop.
P.V. stated she “want[ed] nothing to do with him yet he continue[d] to contact
[her]. He is very emotionally abusive. This triggers [her] because of what has
happened in the past. It brings [her] a lot of anxiety.”
L.G.’s response to the request described the allegations as “false
accusations” and indicated “[t]here was no abuse.” The response further
explained, “I think she’s doing it because she’s angry and wants to harm me
because for [sic] everything that has happened. On two occasions I had to call
the police because she came to my apartment to cause problems.” L.G. also
added, “I don’t want to harm her in any way.”
II.
THE DVRO HEARING
A. Both Parties Offered Testimony and Evidence
The trial court questioned both parties. The court first examined
P.V. and asked P.V. about the alleged sexual abuse. P.V. explained at first
she did not understand the incident to be abuse because “he was my
husband” then and she believed “that he was able to force me even though I
told him ‘No.’” P.V. explained she came to understand it was abuse through
therapy. P.V. testified the marriage ended around the time of the abuse.
P.V. also testified about an additional incident, which took place
about a month after the alleged sexual abuse. P.V. was seated on the driver
side of a truck and L.G. punched the passenger side, damaging the window.

3
The trial court asked P.V. about the months leading up to the
hearing and P.V.’s communications with L.G. P.V. explained she told L.G.
“there’s no reason for us to speak about anything because” he is in another
relationship and “we don’t have to speak anymore.” However, P.V. stated,
“he’s always asking me” to speak and saying “that he needs to speak to me.”
P.V. explained this conduct caused her a lot of anxiety because of “[h]is
reactions from the past” and she is “not sure if he’s capable [of doing] them,
again, to me.” The court asked P.V. why she was concerned about her safety
at the time of her testimony and P.V. responded, “he tries to look for me in
whatever way he can” and she felt unsafe.
At the end of P.V.’s testimony, the trial court asked L.G. if there
was anything he wanted the court to ask P.V. L.G. responded, “What does she
really want from me? Why is she doing this?” The court did not ask these
questions, but asked L.G. what other questions he had, to which he
responded, “That would be all.”
The trial court next examined L.G. and during his testimony, the
court asked L.G. what he wanted the court to know about the claim he
sexually abused P.V. L.G. responded the accusations were “false” and “didn’t
happen.” L.G., however, admitted to punching the vehicle. He explained he
had asked to speak with P.V., and while she was willing to speak, “she never
allows me to speak” and “[t]hat day she was acting like a little girl.” “She
call[ed] me very upset and because of that, I hit the windshield.”
With respect to the parties’ continued communication, L.G.
offered call logs and text messages. The call logs showed P.V. called L.G. on
many occasions within the past year and that on some days they spoke for
lengthy periods of time. After reviewing the logs, the trial court questioned
P.V. again and asked why she contacted L.G. so often. P.V. responded L.G.

4
had asked her to speak with him, but whenever it was her turn to speak, he
would hang up. P.V. also appeared to indicate an application on her phone
blocked L.G.’s calls, but he could still message her to ask to speak and this
appeared to be an explanation for why the calls came from P.V. herself.4 P.V.
further testified, “I have spoken to him because he’s always asked me to
speak with him.” However, when the court asked L.G. further questions, L.G.
explained he wanted the court to know “she has looked for me and . . . that I
needed to answer her.”5
B. The Trial Court Granted the Request for a Restraining Order
The trial court granted the DVRO request. The court stated it
found it to be a “close case,” but was persuaded the “evidence preponderates
in favor of the moving party.” The court found it was “clear” there was
ongoing communication between the parties and it could not “understand the
dynamics of why someone who would be victimized would still continue to
speak with their abuser,” but acknowledged “it regularly happens just like in
situations where someone is trying to manipulate the [c]ourt process.” The

4 The reporter’s transcript indicates P.V. testified she has an app

on her phone “where he can call me, he can dial and call me, but I could
receive his text messages.” (Italics added.) In her request, however, P.V.
stated, “He cannot call me because I installed an application to block his
calls. That is why he asked me to call him.” (Italics added.)

5 L.G. testified regarding an incident in October 2023 when he

called the police and filed a police report because P.V. had come to his
residence and was throwing clothing and other objects out the window. L.G.
contended P.V. was upset because she had asked him for $900 and he told
her he could only give her $600 a month. L.G. testified the police were
necessary because P.V. was throwing glass objects, which could have hurt
someone.

5
court noted the dissolution proceeding and that there were financial support
matters between P.V. and L.G.
The trial court concluded P.V. “established that she has been
attending ongoing therapy for a significant period of time,” and “that she has
anxiety when she thinks of the communication she needs to have with [L.G.]
… but that [L.G.] reaches out to her and she feels compelled to respond.” The
court found there was domestic violence and L.G. was the perpetrator. The
court made credibility determinations pursuant to Evidence Code section 780
and specifically found the testimony “credible regarding [P.V.’s] allegations of
sexual assault, destruction of personal property in the truck, and disturbing
her peace.” The court found P.V.’s “safety may be jeopardized” in the absence
of an order. The trial court issued a minute order that confirmed these
findings. The court ordered the DVRO effective for five years and among
other things, ordered L.G. not to abuse or contact P.V., and to stay at least
100 yards away from P.V.’s person, home, workplace, and vehicle.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
The DVPA’s purpose is “to prevent the recurrence of domestic
violence by ensuring a period of separation if such acts are proved.” (In re
Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 934.) For this reason, the
statute should be broadly construed. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.)
Under the DVPA, a court may issue a DVRO “‘if an affidavit or
testimony and any additional information provided . . . shows, to the
satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’” (In
re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 933–934.) A past act

6
or acts of abuse require a showing of preponderance of the evidence. (In re
Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) “‘[A]buse’” is
defined in relevant part to include “intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] or
attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury[,]” committing “[s]exual assault[,]”
“plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury to that person or to another[,]” and is “not limited to the actual
infliction of physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subds. (a)(1)–(3) & (b).)
“We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a [DVRO] request
for an abuse of discretion,” which includes a trial court’s failure to consider
evidence in issuing a DVRO. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, 65
Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) When reviewing the court’s decision “we may not
substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court” and “cannot reweigh
the evidence or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145.) “‘We review procedural due process claims de novo
because “the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a
question of law.”’” (Bailey v. Murray (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677, 684
(Bailey).)
II.
L.G.’S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS
L.G. argues he was deprived of due process and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard because evidence and testimony was “restricted.” He
further argues the trial court abused its discretion and failed to act as a
“neutral arbiter[ ].” L.G. contends he was prepared to present the following
evidence: “[p]olice documentation regarding the June 2023 incident[;]”
“[w]ritten communications between the parties[;]” “[c]ontextual evidence
concerning continued voluntary contact[;]” and “[e]vidence demonstrating
lack of ongoing threat.”

7
It “‘is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal.’” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619.) Parties must
provide legal arguments in support of their claims with citation to legal
authority. (Sims v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 1059, 1081.) Any argument unsupported by citations to relevant
authority may be deemed to be waived. (Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc.
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303.) The same is true of arguments
unsupported by citations to the record. (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund
Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590.) These principles apply equally
to attorney and self-represented litigants, and L.G. is “not exempt from the
foregoing rules.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; see also
Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984 [self-represented litigants
are not entitled to “exceptionally lenient treatment”].)
In his briefing, L.G. does not cite to any authority, whether
statutory or case law, supporting his contentions. L.G. further does not cite
any instance in the record when L.G. attempted to offer evidence, but was
prevented from doing so by the trial court. L.G. does not in fact cite to the
record at any point in his briefing. Accordingly, we may deem these
arguments forfeited and affirm on that basis alone.
Nevertheless, we address what we understand to be the
substance of L.G.’s due process argument. “Due process requires ‘the right to
be heard in a meaningful manner.’” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) “‘A meaningful hearing requires an opportunity to
examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’” (Ibid.) “‘In a contested

8
restraining order hearing, the trial court is tasked with protecting the
fundamental due process rights of self-represented litigants both seeking a
restraining order or defending against the request, even when they do not
fully understand what those rights encompass.’” (Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 141, 149.) In carrying out this task, the “‘trial court has both the
discretion and the duty to ask questions of witnesses, provided this is done in
an effort to elicit material facts or to clarify confusing or unclear testimony’
and so long as the court does not ‘assume the role of either the prosecution or
of the defense.’” (Bailey, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 685.)
The trial court examined both L.G. and P.V. As to L.G., the court
provided him with an opportunity to respond to the allegation that he
sexually abused P.V. The court also asked him what evidence he sought to
introduce on his behalf, including the call logs discussed above. The court
examined P.V. regarding the content of the call logs seeking to understand
why P.V. continued to speak with L.G. The court gave L.G. the opportunity to
present other evidence and asked him open ended questions about whether
there was anything else he would like to present or like the court to know.
Apart from declining to consider a text message sent by P.V.’s friend, there is
no indication the court refused to consider documentary evidence offered by
L.G. or failed to provide him with an opportunity to present his account of
events. Thus, the record does not support L.G.’s contention he was prevented
from offering evidence. Further, inasmuch as L.G. argues that continued
communication between L.G. and P.V. demonstrated he was not a threat to
P.V., the trial court explicitly took their ongoing communication into

9
consideration. Nevertheless, the court found P.V. to be credible6 and found
evidence of abuse.
Based on our review, the proceedings before the trial court
provided L.G. with an opportunity to be heard in a “‘meaningful manner’” and
comported with due process. (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) Accordingly, we affirm.
DISPOSITION
The DVRO is affirmed. The parties shall each bear their own
costs.

MOTOIKE, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

SERVINO, J.

6 Regarding credibility, a “trier of fact is free to disbelieve a

witness, even one uncontradicted, if there is any rational ground for doing
so.” (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043.) “Only the trial judge
as a trier of fact is in a position to separate the truth from the exaggeration,
sometimes revealed by things like verbal hesitancy and body language which
are not picked up in a reporter’s transcript.” (Ibid.) We find no basis in the
record to disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations.

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Description the parties by their initials. L.G. appeals from the trial court’s issuance of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). The court found P.V. made credible accusations of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Family Code section 6200 et seq. (DVPA).2 L.G. contends the proceedings before the court violated his due process rights. We disagree and find L.G. forfeited all arguments not supported by citation to the law or rec
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