Filed 10/28/26 In re A.T. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re A.T., a Person Coming Under the H053768
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 24JV46738A)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found that minor
A.T. had committed one count each of felony and misdemeanor sexual battery (Pen.
Code, § 243.4, subds. (a) & (e)(1)) and sexual penetration of a person under the age of 18
(§ 289, subd. (h)), declared A.T. a ward of the court, and placed him on probation.1 On
appeal, A.T. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his request
for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) and that insufficient evidence supports his felony
conviction of sexual battery, as there was no evidence he exerted either psychological or
physical restraint on the victim. Finding no merit in A.T.’s arguments, we affirm.

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
 I. BACKGROUND
A. The Denial of DEJ
1. The First Juvenile Wardship Petition and Request for DEJ
In June 2024, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that
A.T. had committed a sexual battery against P.B.2 At A.T.’s arraignment, the prosecutor
requested that A.T. be placed in the Community Release Program (CRP), but the juvenile
court kept A.T. on “straight release” until the next hearing date.
At the July 2024 detention hearing, the probation officer indicated that he had
recently placed A.T. on CRP after learning that A.T. and his family had planned a
“missionary trip” to Cambodia to teach English to students. The probation officer
opposed A.T.’s trip due to the nature of his offenses and the young people with whom
A.T. would be working. The juvenile court continued A.T. on CRP and denied him
permission to travel to Cambodia. A.T., however, was permitted to travel elsewhere in
Asia for what “would strictly be a … family trip.” After returning from the trip the
following month, the trial court terminated CRP as it did not “feel that that is really
what’s going to keep the community safe” because there was no indication that A.T. had
violated any court directives.
A.T. subsequently requested DEJ, which the People opposed.3 Although A.T. was
statutorily eligible for DEJ under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790,
subdivision (a), the parties disputed whether he was also suitable for DEJ under Welfare
2
At the later jurisdiction hearing, P.B. indicated that he used to go by a different
first name, T.B. The offenses involving P.B. were charged under his former name.
3
A minor granted DEJ under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 et seq.
admits the allegations in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, and entry
of judgment is deferred; if the minor successfully completes DEJ, the juvenile court must
dismiss the charges. (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556, 558
(Martha C.); Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 791, subd. (a)(3); 793, subd. (c).)

2
and Institutions Code section 791, subdivision (b).4 The determination of suitability
“take[s] into consideration the defendant’s age, maturity, educational background, family
relationships, demonstrable motivation, treatment history, if any, and other mitigating and
aggravating factors in determining whether the minor is a person who would be benefited
by education, treatment, or rehabilitation.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 791, subd. (b).)
The People’s opposition described the offense allegedly committed by A.T. In
September 2021, A.T. met victim P.B. in front of a gender-neutral restroom at their high
school. After entering the bathroom, A.T. grabbed P.B. by the neck and pushed him
against the bathroom wall.5 A.T. then moved one of his hands from P.B.’s neck and
reached down P.B.’s pants, touching his labia over his underwear. P.B. had a panic
attack and curled up in a fetal position. A.T. eventually left the restroom. P.B. disclosed
the incident in November 2023 to a teacher. After this disclosure, two other students
reported that A.T. had been sexually inappropriate to them.
The People asserted that A.T. had a “pattern of sexually inappropriate behavior”
starting in September 2018, with the most recent incidents taking place in 2023. Despite
A.T.’s eligibility for DEJ, the People believed that he was unsuitable because the
behavior reflected issues that were “not being adequately addressed at home or through
treatment.” According to the People, A.T. was admonished about his behavior as early as
2018, but he persisted in similar misconduct until 2023. Discussing A.T.’s misconduct
with his mother K.N. was “ ‘ineffective in changing any behavior.’ ” And to the extent
that a 12- to 18-month sexual behavior treatment were necessary, A.T. would be unable
to complete the treatment within a one-year DEJ timeframe. Finally, the People argued

4
“The determination of whether to grant DEJ requires consideration of ‘two
distinct essential elements of the [DEJ] program,’ viz., ‘eligibility’ and ‘suitability.’ ” (In
re C.W. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 654, 659.)
5
When P.B. later testified at the contested jurisdictional hearing, he identified
himself as male but was assigned female at birth.

3
that A.T.’s behavior—its repetition and his pattern of targeting transgender students who
were “ ‘shy’ ” and less likely to advocate for themselves—made formal probation a more
appropriate intervention.
The People included with their opposition the report of a district attorney
investigator. The investigator had spoken with several students and the victims in the
case and had determined that A.T. had a history of engaging in inappropriate behavior,
unwanted touching, and unwanted sexual advances dating back to his time in middle
school. The People also attached the detention hearing report, which included police
reports; in one, A.T.’s teacher stated that A.T. always physically imposed himself on
other students and that she had to tell A.T. to give other students space. According to the
teacher, when K.N. was told of A.T.’s “behavior[al] issues,” K.N. seemed unconcerned
and would laugh.
The People also included the suitability hearing report prepared by the probation
department, which after a meeting with A.T. and K.N. in June 2024, found A.T. suitable
for DEJ based on his maturity, educational background, family relationships,
demonstrable motivation, and treatment history.
In addition to the instant offense, the suitability hearing report also summarized
A.T.’s prior history: (1) In 2018, A.T. inappropriately touched M.B. even after being told
to stay away from her; (2) In January 2022, A.T. wrapped his hands around a transgender
student’s neck; the student believed that A.T. “ ‘wanted sexual stuff’ ”; (3) In March
2022, there was an anonymous voicemail claiming that A.T. had been inappropriate with
elementary school students, and when contacted, neither A.T. nor K.N. seemed
concerned; (4) In March 2022, A.T. put a condom in another student’s pocket, and one
witness said that A.T. had also put two of her friends in choke holds; (5) In August 2022,
A.T. asked a transgender student (L.N.) to be his boyfriend,6 and A.T. quickly turned the

6
L.N.’s pronouns are they/them.

4
relationship sexual, putting his hands down L.N.’s pants and pulling L.N. onto his lap
against their will; (6) In May 2023, another student (Q.) reported that A.T. had made
inappropriate comments toward her and had placed his hand on her thigh and through a
hole in her jeans; (7) Also in May 2023, A.T. was dating another student, S., and A.T. put
his finger in S.’s vagina for approximately 30 minutes—S. grabbed his hand and
squeezed it but A.T. did not understand that she wanted him to stop; and (8) In May
2023, A.T. pulled a knife out on another student and said he could kill the student.
According to the school vice-principal, the victims shared commonalities including that
they “were small, short in stature, shy, have colored hair, piercings, and mostly identify
or hang out with the transgender group.”
According to the report, A.T. presented to the probation officer as “mature” and
“respectful.” A.T. lived with K.N. and his younger brother, with whom he reported
having a good relationship. He had graduated from high school, where he had
participated in school sports and band, and planned to attend college in the fall. A.T.
seemed open to participating in services the probation department provides. Although
the probation officer had concerns about the alleged offense, she nonetheless believed
that A.T. was a suitable candidate for the DEJ program.
2. The Amended Petition and the Suitability Hearing
Before the November 2024 DEJ suitability hearing, the district attorney amended
the petition to allege a second count of sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)) against an
unspecified Jane Doe (later identified as L.C.).
At the suitability hearing, the probation officer testified that the new allegations of
the amended petition did not change the probation department’s opinion that A.T. was
suitable for DEJ. Defense counsel argued that the juvenile court could order DEJ for a
period of up to three years, if a longer treatment program were needed, and that A.T.’s
supervision on DEJ would be no different than supervision on probation. The probation

5
officer confirmed that the department would supervise A.T. on DEJ “the same way I
would supervise someone … who was on formal probation.”
The People called the probation officer to testify. The probation officer testified
that she generally considers minors suitable for DEJ if their maturity, educational
background, family relationships, demonstrable motivation, and treatment history support
suitability, even if their offense conduct presents aggravating factors. The probation
officer considered A.T.’s alleged offenses to be predatory and his victims to be
vulnerable, but these factors did not change her assessment of the specified criteria or her
opinion of his suitability. The probation officer opined that a particular minor’s level of
supervision would typically depend on the minor and on their needs and not on whether
the minor was on DEJ or probation. But if A.T. were granted DEJ and failed to comply
with DEJ terms, the probation officer’s recourse would be limited to recommending
termination of DEJ rather than seeking revocation of probation. The probation officer
agreed that DEJ is generally considered a “lower sanction” than formal probation.
The probation officer recommended sexual behavioral therapy for A.T., but the
duration of therapy would depend on the recommendations of the assigned therapist.
Earlier, A.T. had been upgraded to CRP because of safety concerns over A.T.’s trip. But
A.T. had not violated any rules of his safety plan or CRP.
The juvenile court denied A.T.’s request for DEJ. The court reasoned that A.T.
was unsuitable because the alleged offenses reflected A.T.’s immaturity and the inability
of his family relationships—though strong—to prevent “subsequent allegations in this
case.” The court also noted the predatory nature of the offenses and the vulnerability of
the victims.
B. The Operative Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602 Petition
In July 2025, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office filed a third
amended wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,
subdivision (a), alleging that A.T. had committed two counts of sexual battery (§ 243.4.,

6
subd. (a); count 1 [between September 1, 2021, and June 15, 2022, against P.B.]; count 2
[between January 1, 2022, and June 15, 2023, against L.C.]) and one count of sexual
penetration of a person under the age of 18 (§ 289, subd. (h); count 3 [between January 1,
2022, and June 15, 2023, against L.C.]).
C. The Contested Jurisdictional Hearing
1. L.C.
L.C. attended the same high school as A.T. during her freshman and sophomore
years, and she dated him toward the end of her freshman year through her sophomore
year. L.C. described her relationship with A.T. as “toxic,” and she felt pressured into
sexual activities with him. A.T. would sometimes touch her in ways that she was
uncomfortable with, usually on the school campus. L.C. testified about five occasions
when A.T. touched her inappropriately:
In the summer of 2022, L.C. was sitting next to A.T. near the school elevators
when he reached into her underwear to touch her “vagina.” L.C. pushed his hand away
and told him not to do that.
In the beginning of her sophomore year in 2022, A.T. again touched her “thighs
and … vagina,” this time over her underwear. L.C. again told A.T. to stop and pushed
his hand away.
In the spring of 2023, A.T. took L.C. to a gender-neutral restroom and locked the
door behind them. When A.T. locked the bathroom, L.C. was scared but she did not try
to leave. A.T. then dragged her by the hand into one of the bathroom stalls. Locking the
bathroom stall, A.T. then unbuttoned and unzipped L.C.’s pants. L.C. protested when
A.T. tried to take her pants off. A.T. then sat down onto the toilet and pulled L.C. onto
his lap, facing him. A.T. pressed his hand against L.C.’s back, preventing her from
getting up (though she did not try to stand). L.C. described the pressure on her back as
“strong.”

7
 A.T. tried to kiss L.C. but she turned her face away. While trying to kiss her, A.T.
put his hand in L.C.’s pants and penetrated her vagina with two fingers. L.C. told A.T. to
stop and that it hurt, and he stopped after a couple of seconds. L.C. started crying after
A.T. stopped. L.C. felt she was “attached” to A.T. at the time so she could not leave the
bathroom. L.C. also felt scared after A.T. locked the bathroom door because she had
been unsure about what was happening, and she felt “stuck.” When A.T. locked the door,
L.C. did not think she was free to leave the bathroom. In part, L.C. thought that if she
left the bathroom, A.T. would have ended their relationship. She had also felt “frozen”
by her emotions, though A.T. had not held her down.
Again in the spring of 2023, A.T. touched L.C’s “vagina area” over her clothes
when they were kissing but stopped when she told him no.
And finally, in the spring of 2023 near the end of her sophomore year, A.T. was
kissing L.C. again when he put his hands on her thighs and then into her pants, touching
her pubic area over her underwear. L.C. again told him no and pulled his hand away.
2. P.B.
P.B. was friends with A.T. when they were both sophomores in high school. As
friends, P.B. occasionally held A.T.’s hands to help with P.B.’s anxiety.
About four or five months into their friendship—sometime in 2022—A.T. sent
P.B. a message asking to meet near the gender-neutral restroom. P.B. and A.T. went
inside the restroom, and A.T. locked the door. A.T. then put his hands around P.B.’s
neck, applying “moderate” pressure for about two minutes, saying nothing. P.B. was
“[v]ery scared,” his ears were ringing, and he started to feel lightheaded. A.T. then
moved one hand from P.B.’s neck and reached into P.B.’s pants over his “vaginal area.”
P.B. dropped to the ground in a fetal position and stayed there, trying to even out his
breathing. A.T. left the bathroom, and P.B. stayed behind for another minute or two
before also leaving.

8
 P.B. later told a teacher that he felt unsafe around A.T., though he did not tell the
teacher what had happened in the bathroom. And in November 2023, he told a different
teacher, J.T., about what happened with A.T.
3. L.N.
L.N. met A.T. when they were in 11th and 12th grade, respectively. L.N. and A.T.
started dating soon after they met but only for several days. One time, A.T. met with
L.N. outside the gender-neutral restroom, but A.T. became impatient because the
bathroom was occupied. So he then led L.N. to the girls’ locker room. Staying behind
the door to the locker room, A.T. reached up L.N.’s skirt and put his fingers inside their
vagina without their consent. L.N. froze and “everything just went blank.” L.N. said
nothing to A.T., and L.N. could not recall how the encounter ended.
4. J.T.
J.T. formerly taught at A.T.’s high school. In November 2023, after a guest
speaker talked to the class about sexual harassment and bullying, P.B. disclosed to J.T.
that A.T. had sexually assaulted him at a gender-neutral restroom. J.T. then contacted the
police.
D. The Juvenile Court’s Findings
Following the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found that the
People had proven the allegations in the petition true beyond a reasonable doubt. The
juvenile court found count 1 to be a misdemeanor and counts 2 and 3 to be felony
offenses. Thereafter, the juvenile court declared A.T. to be a ward of the juvenile court
and placed him on probation for a maximum term of three years eight months. A.T.
timely appealed.

9
 II. DISCUSSION
A. Suitability for DEJ
A.T. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request for
DEJ because the court’s conclusions about his maturity and family relationships lacked a
rational basis. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
If a minor is eligible for DEJ, the juvenile court “has the ultimate discretion to rule
on the suitability of the minor for DEJ after consideration of the factors specified in
[California Rules of Court,] rule [5.800](d)(3) and [Welfare and Institutions Code]
section 791, subdivision (b), and based upon the ‘ “standard of whether the minor will
derive benefit from ‘education, treatment, and rehabilitation’ rather than a more
restrictive commitment.” ’ ” (In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (Luis B.).)
Once directed by the juvenile court, the probation department must make an investigation
and take into consideration the required factors, further determining what programs will
accept the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 791, subd. (b).) But “[t]he court shall make the
final determination regarding education, treatment, and rehabilitation of the minor.”
(Ibid.; Martha C., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) The juvenile court in evaluating a
minor’s suitability for DEJ’s less restrictive treatment must independently review the
factors specified under Welfare and Institutions Code section 791, subdivision (b). (In re
Damian M. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 (Damian M.).) We review the juvenile court’s
determination of suitability for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
A.T. has not shown that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying him
DEJ. The juvenile court’s comments at the suitability hearing demonstrate that the court
properly considered the statutory factors described in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 791, subdivision (b).

10
 First, in finding that A.T.’s maturity weighed against a finding of suitability, the
juvenile court reasonably considered the circumstances of the alleged offenses as well as
A.T.’s pattern of behavior at school. There was ample evidence that A.T. had for years
engaged in sexually aggressive behavior with a series of minor victims. From this pattern
of behavior, immaturity was the most favorable inference the juvenile court could
reasonably have drawn. Beyond the allegations made by the victims in this case (L.C.,
P.B., and L.N.), other classmates also alleged that A.T. directed his inappropriate
behavior at them—through unwanted touching, putting a condom in another student’s
back pocket, and pulling a knife on another student—which were not charged in this case.
Intervention by school authorities did not deter these behaviors. In 2018, he was advised
to stop his inappropriate touching of student M.B., but he continued to do so. And one of
A.T.’s high school teachers had to continue to admonish A.T. about respecting other
students’ personal space when he was in her class.
Next, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that A.T.’s
family relationships did not weigh in favor of suitability, because K.N. had not responded
appropriately to prior warnings. K.N. merely laughed and seemed unconcerned when
A.T.’s teacher told her of A.T.’s behavior issues. She had also appeared unconcerned
when she was told of an anonymous voicemail that alleged that A.T. had been
inappropriate with elementary school students. After the filing of the petition, she
planned to take A.T. on a missionary trip during where he was to have an instructor’s role
vis-à-vis young children in Cambodia. The trial court could reasonably infer from this
information that K.N. did not appreciate the seriousness of the allegations against her son.
As to both the immaturity and the family relationships findings, A.T. argues that
the juvenile court disregarded his lack of inappropriate behavior in the months preceding
the suitability hearing. But we do not infer from the silence of the record that the juvenile
court did not consider these belated incident-free months in reaching its suitability

11
determination.7 (See People v. Hurtado (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 871, 878 [judgment or
order is presumed correct and error must be affirmatively shown]; People v. Presley
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1142–1143 [presumption is that judicial duty is properly
performed and a trial court is presumed to “ ‘ “ ‘distinguish admissible from inadmissible
evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which properly may
be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process’ ” ’ ”].) Instead, we infer that the
juvenile court weighed A.T.’s more recent behavior and found it inadequate to allay the
concerns raised by other evidence. Likewise, the existence of some evidence in the
record supporting a finding that A.T. had demonstrated maturity—his Eagle Scout status,
his demeanor when assessed by the probation officer—neither nullifies the evidence that
supported the juvenile court’s ultimate finding of immaturity nor undermines the court’s
reasoning. It is within the juvenile court’s “ultimate discretion” to rule on suitability.
(Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.)
The juvenile court could also rely on the circumstances of the charged offenses to
find A.T. unsuitable for DEJ. (See Martha C., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 562; see also
Damian M., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 4, 5–6 [manner of commission of current
offense is a proper basis to deny DEJ].) And the juvenile court properly considered the
pattern of A.T.’s offenses, including his continuation of inappropriate behavior and
incursion on personal space despite interventions by his teacher, as well as the vulnerable
nature of the victims in this case. The school vice-principal described the victims in this
case were largely those who identified as transgender, were smaller, and generally
described as shy—the juvenile court could therefore reasonably infer that A.T. was
selecting targets he believes would be easier to exploit.

7
Had A.T. wanted to provide more current information, he was entitled to do so,
as the juvenile court must consider at the suitability hearing “any … relevant material
provided by the child or other interested parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(f).)

12
 A.T. argues that the juvenile court’s stated reasons for denying DEJ lack a rational
basis in part because the probation officer testified that A.T. would receive the same level
of supervision on both DEJ and on probation. Indeed, A.T. claims that the juvenile court
rejected the notion that community safety requires his placement on probation, as the
court observed that “probation is not going to put [A.T.] on a higher level of supervision”
should DEJ be denied. But suitability for DEJ does not hinge solely on public safety
during the period of supervision but on whether A.T. will benefit from DEJ rather than a
formal probation grant. (Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123; see In re Sergio R.
(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 597, 608 (Sergio R.) [denial of DEJ appropriate when minor was
not a suitable candidate and “required more formal, restrictive measures”]; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 791, subd. (b).)
Further, A.T. ignores that although the juvenile court acknowledged that the
approximate level of supervision might be the same on both DEJ and formal probation,
placing A.T. on DEJ was still less restrictive. As the probation officer confirmed, there
are different procedures for a minor who violates the terms of DEJ and a minor who
violates the terms of probation. If a minor proceeds to a disposition and is later found to
have violated formal probation, the probation officer can initiate revocation proceedings
with the juvenile court and, if the violation were found true, the court could immediately
impose more restrictive consequences: “For ‘[Welfare and Institutions Code ]section 602
wards, an “additional alternative” to probation is commitment to a county home, ranch, or
camp.’ ” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 488; see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 777,
730, subd. (a), 726, subd. (a)(2) [permitting minor’s removal from physical custody of
parent if minor has been “tried on probation … and has failed to reform”].) Whereas a
minor on DEJ is not yet subject to any disposition order. Thus, if the minor is later found
to be performing unsatisfactorily on DEJ, the termination of DEJ would then require a
disposition hearing to determine A.T.’s appropriate placement, including whether A.T.

13
should be granted probation and, if so, on what terms. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 725, 726,
730, subd. (a)(1), 793, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(h).)
Indeed, the probation officer recognized—and the juvenile court impliedly
agreed—that DEJ is generally considered a “lower sanction” than formal probation. DEJ
emphasizes “ ‘rehabilitative protocols over incarceration,’ ” and is focused on “less
serious offenders … who have potential for rehabilitation.” (Martha C., supra,
108 Cal.App.4th at p. 561, italics omitted.) Successful completion of DEJ requires the
juvenile court to dismiss the charges in the wardship petition and the “arrest upon which
the judgment was deferred shall be deemed never to have occurred.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 793, subd. (c).) The prosecutor argued that a greater sanction was necessary to
“ensure that [A.T.] understands the gravity of his actions,” given that “the message was
not understood” when school officials had issued prior warnings. The trial court could
have reasonably agreed that the more serious consequence of formal probation was
required given the gravity and persistence of A.T.’s sexual aggression.
Accordingly, the juvenile court’s determination that based on the totality of the
record A.T. was someone who “required more formal, restrictive measures” and would
not benefit from DEJ does not exceed the bounds of reason. (Sergio R., supra,
106 Cal.App.4th at p. 608; Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 791, subd. (b).)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Count 2 (Felony Sexual Battery)
Next, A.T. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding that he committed a felony sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)) on L.C. as
there was no evidence of unlawful restraint. Reviewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the juvenile court’s findings (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026
(V.V.)), we disagree.

14
 1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The elements of a sexual battery under section 243.4, subdivision (a) are (1) the
“touch[ing of] an intimate part of another person”; (2) “while that person is unlawfully
restrained”; (3) “against the will of the person touched”; and (4) “for the purpose of
sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.” Unlawful restraint does not require
physical restraint. (People v. Perez-Robles (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 222, 230
(Perez-Robles).) “ ‘[A] person is unlawfully restrained when his or her liberty is being
controlled by words, acts or authority of the perpetrator aimed at depriving the person’s
liberty, and such restriction is against the person’s will.’ ” (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
Based on the circumstances of count 2—A.T.’s unwanted touching of L.C. in the
gender-neutral restroom—we find that there is substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that A.T. had
unlawfully restrained L.C.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was sufficient evidence
that A.T.’s acts had deprived L.C. of her liberty, compelling her to stay in the restroom.
(Perez-Robles, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 232–233.) After meeting with L.C. at the
restroom, A.T. and L.C. entered, and A.T. locked the restroom door, hampering L.C.’s
ability to exit. At that point, L.C. already testified that she felt fearful. And A.T.’s
actions continued—he “dragged” L.C. into a bathroom stall, creating another barrier for
her to leave, and he also locked that bathroom stall. Although the doors locked from the
inside and L.C. could conceivably unlock them, it is reasonable to infer that A.T.’s
locking both suggested to L.C. that A.T. intended to isolate her and that she might
encounter resistance if she tried to leave. L.C. in fact testified that she felt “locked in”
and “stuck,” and she believed that she could not freely leave the restroom. A.T. then
pressed his arm against L.C.’s back, pulling her onto his lap and maintaining “strong”
pressure. In addition to this physical pressure, L.C. testified that she felt “frozen” from

15
emotion. This physical restraint, combined with the psychological effects of A.T.’s
actions, sufficed to support the juvenile court’s finding that L.C. was restrained against
her will.8
Perez-Robles is analogous to this case. There, a massage therapist touched two
victims—both massage customers—inappropriately. (Perez-Robles, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 227–230.) The appellate court in part found sufficient evidence of
restraint because the defendant’s conduct “created a situation that caused [the victims] to
experience the common reaction to sexual assault …—namely, freezing in fear.” (Id. at
p. 232.) When the massage room door was closed, one victim felt scared and “ ‘freak[ed]
out,’ ” both questioning her own reaction and fearing what else the defendant might be
capable of. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found that the Perez-Robles defendant
“carefully orchestrated a series of events designed to provide him access to these
women’s bodies under circumstances where they were unable or at least less likely to
object when he touched them inappropriately.” (Ibid.) As in Perez-Robles, A.T. created
a set of circumstances—arranging to meet L.C. at the restroom, locking the restroom
door, pulling L.C. into the stall, further locking the bathroom stall, and then placing his
hand on her back—that caused L.C. to feel “frozen” and unable to leave.
A.T., however, argues that L.C.’s testimony establishes only that she was frozen
out of worry that her romantic relationship with A.T. would end if she left the bathroom.

8
A.T. argues that the juvenile court “impliedly rejected” any suggestion that L.C.
suffered a physical restraint. We do not imply findings in contravention of the judgment.
(See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [“ ‘ “[a]ll intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is
silent” ’ ”].) We also reject A.T.’s reading of the record: The juvenile court observed,
accurately, that “actual physical restraint is not required” and found sufficient evidence of
nonphysical restraint based upon L.C.’s description of her fear and her statement that she
felt that she had no control. The juvenile court’s reliance on nonphysical restraint does
not constitute a factual finding that L.C. was not physically restrained or an implied
rejection of L.C.’s testimony about the physical measures A.T. employed.

16
And a fear of a relationship ending, A.T. argues, is not evidence that L.C.’s “ ‘liberty is
being controlled.’ ” (Perez-Robles, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 230.) But L.C.’s stated
worry over her relationship with A.T. was only one aspect of the psychological pressure
testified to by L.C.; as described above, L.C. testified that she felt fearful based on the
totality of the circumstances surrounding her encounter with A.T. And as L.C. stated, she
felt frozen in place during the encounter. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable the judgment, a reasonable fact finder could infer that A.T. exerted unlawful
restraint under these circumstances. (See V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026.)
A.T. argues that his case is more like People v. Arnold (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 18.
In Arnold, the Fifth Appellate District found insufficient evidence of unlawful restraint
when the victim, who was the defendant’s student, “voluntarily accompanied defendant”
on a run at the school “knowing she would be alone with him and thinking something
might happen.” (Id. at p. 29.) When the defendant grabbed the victim and pulled her
towards him, kissing her and touching her breasts, the victim pushed him away and told
him no. (Id. at p. 22.) The defendant then ran down some stairs while the victim got
some water. (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, there was no evidence that at the time of
the unwanted touching, “[the victim’s] submission was unwilling and compelled by
defendant’s words, acts or authority.” (Id. at p. 29.) But Arnold is distinguishable. To
be sure, L.C.’s testimony suggests that she willingly accompanied A.T. to the restroom.
But it was A.T.’s later actions inside the restroom—locking the door, pulling her into the
stall, locking the stall, pressing his arm against her back—that caused L.C.’s fear. Thus,
at the time of the unwanted touching in this case, there was substantial evidence that L.C.
was unlawfully restrained.
Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports A.T.’s felony conviction of sexual
battery under section 243.4, subdivision (a).
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional order is affirmed.

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 LIE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

WILSON, J.

BROMBERG, J.

People v. A.T.
H053768