Filed 10/30/26 In re D.M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE

In re D.M. et al., Persons Coming B350222
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02425)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

REBECCA C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Reversed.
Panda Kroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 In July 2025, appellant Rebecca C. (Mother) gave
birth to twin girls. Mother and both twins tested positive for
methamphetamine. Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) detained the twins from Mother and
their father, Raphael C. (Father C.), placing the children with a
maternal aunt. One month later, DCFS filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300 petition on behalf of the twins,
alleging that Mother’s substance abuse and Father C.’s status as a
sex offender placed the twins at risk of harm. The petition further
alleged that Mother’s substance abuse placed at risk her three other
children—D.M. (then age 11), M.M. (then age 10), and C.M. (then
age 6) (collectively, the M. children)—whom she shares with her ex-
husband, Jose M. (Father M.).2 During the period pertinent to this
case, the M. children resided exclusively with Father M., and
Mother visited the M. children several times per week.
At the October 2025 combined adjudication and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition in its entirety and
exercised dependency jurisdiction over all five children. The court
then immediately terminated jurisdiction over the M. children
with an “exit order”3 granting Father M. sole physical custody of
the M. children and restricting Mother to monitored visits.
Mother now asks us to reverse the court’s jurisdictional
findings concerning the M. children and the resulting exit order.

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Neither Father C. nor Father M. is a party to this appeal.

3 “Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation upon
terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child.” (In re J.M.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112.)

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She contends that DCFS failed to establish the required nexus
between her substance abuse and any risk of serious physical harm
to the M. children. (See In re Gilberto G. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 52,
62 (Gilberto G.) [a parent’s substance abuse supports dependency
jurisdiction only where the abuse “makes the parent or guardian
unable to provide regular care for a child and . . . this inability
caused the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates
a substantial risk of such harm or illness”].) We agree. The record
contains no evidence that Mother’s substance abuse rendered her
unable to care for the M. children. To the contrary, every person
DCFS interviewed told the investigating social worker that Mother
appeared sober and behaved appropriately during visits with
the M. children. Further, by the time of the adjudication hearing,
Mother had enrolled in a substance abuse treatment program and
consistently had tested negative for any substances.
Accordingly, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

A. DCFS Referral and Investigation
On July 28, 2025, DCFS received a five-day referral reporting
that Mother and her newborn infant twins had tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine at the hospital following
delivery. Mother had no prior DCFS referral history. During the
ensuing investigation, a DCFS social worker interviewed Father M.,
paternal aunt (Father M.’s sister), the three M. children, Mother,
Father C., Father C.’s landlord, maternal aunt, and maternal
grandmother.
Father M. told the social worker that he and Mother were
married for several years, but separated after Mother cheated

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on him with Father C. He explained that Father C. had coached
the M. children’s soccer team through 2023 or 2024. Father M.
reported that, following the separation, the M. children had been
living with him for the past three to four years “due to [M]other’s
housing and financial instability.” This “was a voluntary decision
agreed” upon by Mother and Father M., and “there [was] no family
law order” mandating the arrangement. (Capitalization omitted.)
Father M. said the M. children were enrolled in school and “doing
well.” He further reported that the children loved Mother, and
that Mother “ha[d] not placed [the children] at risk for any abuse
or neglect.” In addition, Father M. reported that the M. children
never slept over at Mother’s house, and that other family members
always were present when Mother visited the children. Father M.
denied that Mother ever took the M. children to Father C.’s home.
Finally, Father M. told the social worker it was “very surprising”
to hear that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine.
Although Father M. was unfamiliar with the signs or symptoms
of substance use, he explained that “none of [the M. children]
was . . . born with drugs in [his] system.” Further, Mother “visit[ed]
[the M. children] . . . almost on [a] daily basis and not once [had]
[she] ever acted out on the children or given any indication that she
was under the influence while visiting her children.”
Paternal aunt reported that she lived in Father M.’s home
with the M. children. She told the investigating social worker that
“the children [were] well cared for in the home,” and that she or
Father M. always were present in the home whenever Mother
visited the M. children.
Each of the three M. children reported that they did “not
know what drugs look[ed] like,” and that they had never seen
Mother “[do] or say anything to make [them] feel sad or scared.”
In addition, each child stated that Mother visited almost every day

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and that they enjoyed spending time with her. During an
initial interview, the children told the social worker that other
family members were present whenever Mother visited them
in Father M.’s home, and that they never visited Mother’s home.
During a later interview, 10-year-old M.M. told the social worker
that “[M]other would take them to the park, buy them food, cook for
them[,] or take them to a relative’s house.” And six-year-old C.M.
reported during that later interview that he and his siblings had
visited Father C.’s home, where Mother resided, on at least one
occasion. The investigating social worker reported that the children
appeared clean, neat, and “developmentally on target” during the
interviews.
Mother—who appeared “to be sober [and] speaking
coherently” during her interviews—told the investigating social
worker that she had been using methamphetamine “on and off”
for the preceding 10 years. She said that she did not use any
other substances and that no one in her family knew of her
methamphetamine use. Mother denied being addicted and
said she used the drug only when she went out with friends,
as frequently as one to two times per month. In addition, she
denied using the drug while pregnant with any of the M. children.
Initially, Mother told the social worker she stopped using
methamphetamine once she found out she was pregnant with the
twins. She claimed her positive test must have resulted from a
“contact high” she experienced while spending time with a friend
who was using methamphetamine. Later, however, Mother
admitted she had used methamphetamine a few days prior to the
twins’ delivery because she had been “experiencing stress related to
[F]ather [C.’s] sexual battery case.” Mother told the social worker
she had not used any methamphetamine since giving birth to
the twins and that she was willing to participate in voluntary,

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on-demand drug tests. As to the M. children, Mother confirmed
Father M.’s report that the children lived exclusively with
Father M., and that she visited the children only in the presence
of other family members.
Father C. reported that he and Mother had been together for
approximately five years and that he had never witnessed Mother
use any drugs. He further reported that “he had never used drugs
or . . . alcohol so he would not know what to look for when someone
was abusing drugs.” As to his sex offender status, Father C.
explained that he previously had worked as a soccer coach at a
high school, and a female student had alleged that he slapped her
on the buttocks. He said his lawyer pressured him to plead guilty,
and in June 2025, “he took [a] plea deal, which resulted in no jail
time,” but required him to register as a sex offender. As to the
M. children, Father C. reported that he and the children “[had]
contact,” and that he assisted Mother (then unemployed) in
financially supporting the children.
Father C.’s landlord “reported having no concerns for any
child abuse or neglect and stated . . . there are no kids who live
with . . . [M]other.”
Maternal aunt told the social worker she was “very shocked”
to hear that Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine. She
explained that she and Mother were “sisters who grew up together,”
and that Mother had “never show[n] any signs or indications that
she was using drugs.” Maternal aunt further reported that she had
three children of her own, and that “when [M]other’s children and
her children visit[ed], [M]other [was] very appropriate and caring.”
Finally, maternal grandmother told the social worker that
she too “was shocked to hear that . . . [M]other had drugs in her
system.” Maternal grandmother reported she had never seen
Mother behave in a way that would suggest she was under the

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influence of drugs. Further, maternal grandmother reported that
the M. children, whom she visited on a daily basis, had never
disclosed any information suggesting that Mother was abusing
drugs.

B. Section 300 Proceedings
On August 15, 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
behalf of the twins and the three M. children. The petition alleged
that the twins’ positive toxicology screen for methamphetamine and
Father C.’s sex offender status placed the twins at serious risk of
harm. (See § 300, subds. (b)(1) & (d).) The petition further alleged
that Mother’s 10-year history of substance abuse and her current
use of methamphetamine placed all of the children at serious risk
of harm. (See § 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).)
At the August 18, 2025 initial hearing, the court detained
the twins from Mother and Father C., ordering that the infants
remain placed with maternal aunt. The court also detained the
M. children from Mother and ordered that they remain in the home
of Father M.
Approximately three weeks after the initial hearing, Mother
enrolled in a drug treatment program that required her to attend
classes Monday through Friday. The program included classes on
12-step recovery, relapse prevention, parenting, domestic violence,
anger management, peer support, daily reflection and self-esteem,
health education, and life skills. The program also included
individual therapy with a licensed marriage and family therapist
and random drug testing. Prior to the adjudication hearing, Mother
submitted progress reports from the program. Mother’s substance
abuse counselor reported that, although Mother typically missed
one day of class per week, she “[had] demonstrated an exceptional
and consistent commitment to her treatment goals.” Mother

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“actively participate[d] in sessions, applie[d] newly learned
parenting strategies, effectively manage[d] potential cravings, and
continue[d] to maintain her sobriety.” The counselor further
reported that Mother had successfully passed all required weekly
drug screenings since beginning treatment. Mother’s therapist
reported that she had not missed any therapy sessions. The
therapist further reported that, although “substance use [had]
been a significant part of [Mother’s] life,” “[M]other described [the]
experience [with DCFS] as a wake-up call and appear[ed] motivated
to regain custody of her children.”
At the October 13, 2025 combined adjudication and
disposition hearing, Mother asked the court to dismiss from the
petition all of the allegations against her. Alternatively, Mother
asked that the court dismiss the allegations concerning the
M. children, arguing that DCFS had failed to establish any nexus
between her substance abuse and a risk of harm to those children.
DCFS and minor’s counsel opposed Mother’s requests. They argued
that inconsistencies in the parties’ reports about the nature of
the M. children’s contact with Father C. and unsupervised contact
with Mother raised concerns about all the parents’ credibility. They
further argued that Father M.’s “lack of awareness about substance
abuse remain[ed] a serious safety concern.”
The juvenile court sustained the petition in its entirety and
exercised dependency jurisdiction over all five children. The court
then immediately terminated jurisdiction over the three M. children
with an exit order granting Father M. sole physical custody of the
children and restricting Mother to monitored visits.
Mother timely appealed the jurisdictional findings concerning
the M. children and the exit order. While her appeal was pending,
we granted Mother’s request that we take judicial notice of the

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juvenile court’s April 16, 2026 orders returning the twins to her
custody.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that no substantial evidence supports the
jurisdictional findings concerning the M. children. We agree.4
“[S]ection 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides the juvenile court
may declare a child a dependent child of the court when ‘[t]he child
has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child’ or ‘(D) [t]he inability of the parent or
guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or
guardian’s . . . substance abuse.’ ‘Thus, to obtain a jurisdictional
determination under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), an agency must
“prove three elements: (1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful
conduct or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation;
and (3) serious physical harm or illness.” ’ ” (Gilberto G., supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 61–62.) “For jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(D), the child protective agency must prove that
substance abuse makes the parent or guardian unable to provide
regular care for a child and that this inability caused the child to

4 Although the court terminated dependency jurisdiction
over the M. children at the combined adjudication and disposition
hearing, review of the challenged jurisdictional findings is
appropriate because they serve as the basis for an exit order
that restricts Mother’s visitation rights. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 283 [where a jurisdictional finding serves as the basis
for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights, such as by
restricting visitation, that jurisdictional finding remains subject to
challenge].)

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suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk
of such harm or illness.” (Gilberto G., supra, p. 62, citing In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 558.)
“Section 300 requires proof a child is subject to the defined
risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. [Citation.] . . .
[T]he ‘court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect
the child.” [Citation.] And a parent’s “ ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that
the conduct will continue.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Gilberto G., supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at p. 62.) But “ ‘ “ ‘[t]o establish a defined risk of harm
at the time of the hearing, there “must be some reason beyond
mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” ’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “We review . . . jurisdictional findings for substantial
evidence. [Citation.] We consider the entire record, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s findings
and affirming the order even if other evidence supports a different
finding.” ’ [Citations.] Substantial evidence, however, is not
synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘A decision
supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed
on appeal. [Citation.] Furthermore, “[w]hile substantial evidence
may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic
and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences
that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support
a finding [citations].’ [Citation.] The ultimate test is whether
it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question
in light of the whole record.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “We do not consider
the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Gilberto G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 62, italics omitted.)

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 The record here is devoid of any evidence that, at the time
of the adjudication hearing, Mother’s substance abuse placed the
M. children at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness:
The M. children lived exclusively with Father M. The adult family
members interviewed uniformly told DCFS that they had never
seen Mother behave in an inappropriate or unsafe manner during
visits with the M. children. The M. children themselves—all
old enough to converse with the social worker—likewise denied
any concerns about Mother’s behavior. And by the time of the
adjudication hearing, Mother had enrolled in a substance abuse
treatment program and had tested negative for substances
repeatedly.
DCFS argues “the evidence shows [M]other had more access
to the [M.] children than she indicated” to social workers, and
that Father M.’s “apparent obliviousness to [M]other’s usage”
posed a risk to the M. children. But even assuming that
Mother had frequent, unsupervised access to the M. children, no
evidence supports that Mother ever was under the influence of
methamphetamine while caring for the children. And Father M.’s
lack of familiarity with the signs of drug use does not constitute
evidence that Mother used methamphetamine around the
M. children. DCFS further argues that “[f]rom [M]other’s shifting
explanations of her drug abuse and the reality that her addiction
was serious enough that she could not remain sober even late
into her pregnancy, the juvenile court could conclude that
[M]other’s pattern of using methamphetamine and failing to
accept responsibility was likely to continue and posed a danger
to the children.” By the time of the adjudication hearing, however,
Mother had accepted responsibility for her methamphetamine use
and was actively participating in a substance abuse treatment
program.

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 We therefore conclude that DCFS failed to meet its burden of
establishing that Mother’s substance abuse placed the M. children
at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. Accordingly,
we reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings concerning
the M. children and the exit order resulting from those findings.

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s October 13, 2025 jurisdictional findings
concerning the M. children and the October 16, 2025 exit orders
concerning the M. children are reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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