Filed 10/19/26 Bell Canyon Assn. v. Bell Canyon Volunteer etc. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
BELL CANYON 2d Civ. No. B349236
ASSOCIATION, et al., (Super. Ct. No.
2025CUBT048325)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Ventura County)
v.
BELL CANYON VOLUNTEER
WILDLAND FIRE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Bell Canyon Volunteer Wildland Fire Department
(Department) appeals the order granting a preliminary
injunction forbidding it from using hydrants and driving fire
trucks in areas owned by respondents Bell Canyon Association
and Bell Canyon Equestrian Center, Inc. (collectively, the
Association). (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) The trial
court issued the injunction based on the Association’s allegations
of unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) and false
advertising (Id., § 17500). The Department contends, among
other things, that the Association failed to establish the
Department’s activities are likely to deceive the Association’s
residents. We will affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bell Canyon is an unincorporated community of about 2000
residents in eastern Ventura County. A two-lane road connects
Bell Canyon to the West Hills neighborhood in Los Angeles
County. It is the only route of entry and exit. The community
falls within the Ventura County Fire Protection District. The Los
Angeles City Fire Department maintains the closest station and
responds to the most urgent calls.
The Woolsey Fire destroyed 39 Bell Canyon homes in
November 2018. Several residents proposed forming a volunteer
fire company that could respond faster to emergencies in their
isolated location. They formed the Department as a non-profit
public benefit corporation in 2020. Donations from the
Association and individual residents enabled the Department to
buy three fire trucks and other firefighting equipment. The
Department responded to about 800 calls between 2020 and 2025
involving fires, fallen trees, traffic control, rattlesnakes, and
more. It entered into “facility use agreements” allowing it to park
trucks and store equipment on Association property. It carried a
liability insurance policy with limits of $10 million and named
the Association as an additional insured.
In early 2025, an insurance broker recommended the
Association distance itself from the Department because of
“various risk management and liability implications” of working
with a “non-licensed and non-accredited” fire department. The
Association sent the Department a list of “common sense and
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reasonable standards” to meet if it wished to continue operating
in Bell Canyon. This included, among other things, obtaining
liability insurance “with limits of at least $50 million” and
requiring all active volunteers to have either a “Red Card” or
state-issued firefighting certificate.1 A dispute arose over these
conditions as well as the Department’s leases and fundraising
efforts.
The Association sued the Department in July 2025 for
fraudulent business practices under the unfair competition and
false advertising laws. It alleged the Department misrepresented
itself as a “legitimate fire company” when soliciting funds from
the Association and its members. The trial court granted the
Association’s request for a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the Department from connecting to Bell Canyon’s
hydrants or using lights and sirens within the community. It
granted the request for a preliminary injunction after hearing on
September 17, 2025. The court entered a preliminary injunction
order on October 23 enjoining the Department from: “(1)
operating a fire truck within the Bell Canyon community; (2)
using a fire hydrant located in the Bell Canyon community; and
(3) obstructing or impeding fire suppression or emergency
response activities by a public entity, including the Ventura
County Fire Department and/or Los Angeles Fire Department.”
The Department’s notice of appeal identifies the September
17 minute order as the appealed ruling. The minute order is not
appealable because the trial court directed the parties to prepare
1 A “Red Card” is an interagency certification issued by a
federal, state, or local agency allowing a firefighter to work across
jurisdictional lines.
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a written order after ruling from the bench. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(c)(2).) The Department, however, included the October
23 injunction order as an exhibit to its petition for writ of
supersedeas and request for stay.2 We will take judicial notice of
the order on our own motion and exercise our discretion to treat
the premature notice of appeal as timely. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1).)
DISCUSSION
Preliminary Injunctions
A trial court considers two factors when deciding a motion
for preliminary injunction: “‘(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff
will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim
harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is
denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to
suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. [Citation.]’”
(Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177; see Code Civ. Proc., § 526,
subd. (a).) A reviewing court does not disturb the decision absent
abuse of discretion as to both factors. (Cohen v. Board of
Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286-287.) “[I]ssues of fact are
subject to review under the substantial evidence standard; issues
of pure law are subject to independent review.” (People ex rel.
Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1136-1137.)
The Department contends the trial court issued the
preliminary injunction in error because: (1) the Association failed
to show it will prevail on the merits on the issue of whether the
Department’s activities were likely to deceive under the unfair
competition and false advertising laws; (2) the Association failed
to allege or establish any predicate violation of law that would
2 We denied the petition in our order dated April 8, 2026.
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form the basis of a unfair competition claim; and (3) the balance
of harms weighs against enjoining the Department’s activities.
We discuss these contentions in the order raised.
Likelihood of Deception
The unfair competition and false advertising laws “in
similar language prohibit false, unfair, misleading, or deceptive
advertising.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General
Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 211.) Stating a cause of action
for injunctive relief under both laws requires a plaintiff “to show
that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) “‘“Likely to deceive”’” means “‘that it is
probable that a significant portion of the general consuming
public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the
circumstances, could be misled.’ [Citation.]” (Chapman v. Skype
Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 226.)
The parties submitted competing declarations and many
exhibits to the trial court on this issue. The Department’s
purported lack of “legitimacy” is the central theme of the
Association’s evidence. The Association describes the
Department generally as a group of rogue individuals who lack
the authority or adequate experience and training to serve as
first responders. It argues the Department acted deceptively by
presenting itself as the community’s official fire company and
soliciting hundreds of thousands of dollars in donations from the
Association and its members.
The Department denies its activities are likely to deceive,
stating it always made clear it was a non-profit, all-volunteer
entity operating separately from the Association and county fire
department. It describes itself as a stop gap provider of first
response services in the crucial minutes before county firefighters
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arrive from stations outside the canyon. Its ranks include EMTs,
certified emergency vehicle drivers, and professional firefighters.
The Department asserts it operates like thousands of similar
volunteer departments across the United States. It denies it
must obtain recognition from any municipal or county authority
to be “legitimate” or to operate.
We must, however, “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the court’s ruling.” (Integrated Dynamic Solutions,
Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1184.) Doing
so, we conclude the evidence supports the finding that the
Association is likely to succeed on the merits of this element of its
unfair competition and false advertising claims. The Department
actively operates red, functional fire apparatuses with official-
looking shields and equipped with lights and sirens. Volunteers
wear uniforms and turnouts. The record includes affidavits of
residents—including at least one former Department volunteer—
who state they would not have donated money or in-kind support
to the Department had they known it was not government-
sanctioned.
The record also includes communications from government
entities that, at minimum, create doubt about the Department’s
authority to operate within the Association’s boundaries. An
email dated March 26, 2025 from Ventura County Fire Chief
Dustin Gardner states, “All fire and rescue needs of Bell Canyon
are the sole jurisdictional responsibility of the Ventura County
Fire Protection District (VCFD). . . . Bell Canyon Volunteer
Wildland Fire Department (BCVWFD) is not a public entity.
VCFD is not affiliated with and does not operationally support,
oversee, or sponsor BCVWFD.” A letter dated May 16, 2025 from
Gardner to the Department states, “we write to inform you that
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the [VCFD] expressly denies your request for [VCFD] to
acknowledge the organization and existence of the Bell Canyon
Volunteer Wildland Fire Department under California Health
and Safety Code section 14825. [VCFD] does not recognize Bell
Canyon Volunteer Wildland Fire Department as a fire company
or public agency. [¶] The Bell Canyon community falls within
the jurisdiction of the [VCFD]. Due to the community’s
jurisdictional isolation from the rest of Ventura County, [VCFD]
has a closest resource agreement with the City of Los Angeles for
emergency response to immediate life safety threats.”
The Ventura County Public Works Agency sent a letter in
April 2025 warning the Department not to connect its equipment
to the community’s hydrants. A cease and desist letter followed
in May. The Department received a third letter from the agency
in June stating, in part, “Only the Ventura County Fire
Protection District and other public entities authorized to provide
firefighting services within the jurisdiction may use the
Waterworks District’s fire hydrants for emergency fire
suppression and related purposes. The [Department] is not a
public entity. Nor has it been acknowledged or recognized by the
Ventura County Fire Protection District as a fire company.” The
Association also produced evidence that the Department may
have improperly registered its fire trucks as exempt vehicles and
used exempt plates.
We do not decide here if the Association has proven the
Department’s activities are likely to deceive. (See Hunt v.
Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 999 [“In determining the
propriety of preliminary relief, neither the trial court nor an
appellate court may undertake a final adjudication of the
lawsuit.”].) We leave this task to the trier of fact at trial.
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Predicate Violations
“‘“By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section
17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as
unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes
independently actionable.”’ [Citation.] ‘Virtually any law —
federal, state or local — can serve as a predicate for a [UCL]
action.’ [Citation.] When a statutory claim fails, a derivative
UCL claim also fails.” (Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185.) The Department contends the
Association did not allege or establish a predicate violation when
seeking injunctive relief under the unfair competition law.
The Association alleges the Department exists and operates
illegally because it “is not a recognized and organized fire
company pursuant to Health and Safety Code § 14825.” Section
14825, subdivision (a) states, “Fire companies in unincorporated
towns may be organized by filing a certificate signed by the
foreman or presiding officer and by the secretary, with the Fire
and Rescue Operational Area Coordinator in the same county, or
other county agency as designated by ordinance of the county
board of supervisors.” The Department argues the statute is a
mechanism for volunteer fire companies to seek formal
recognition but does not mandate it. It asserts VCFD never
ordered it to cease operating and declined to recognize the
Department only to limit its exposure to workers compensation
claims from volunteer firefighters.
The trial court did not resolve or even discuss if a volunteer
fire company must obtain recognition under Health & Safety
Code section 14825 to operate legally. It did not need to at this
stage of the proceedings. As stated above, VCFD’s emails and
letters give the Association grounds to question the Department’s
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authority to operate within the Association’s boundaries. The
Public Works Agency’s letters support allegations that the
Department violated local rules and regulations when it
connected to Bell Canyon hydrants. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the court’s ruling, this evidence supports the finding
that “there is a reasonable probability that plaintiff will be
successful in the assertion of [its] rights.” (Continental Baking
Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528; see Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton
Ins. Services v. Robb (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1812, 1820
[“Regardless of whether the trial court has granted or denied an
application for a preliminary injunction, if the evidence before
that court was in conflict, we do not reweigh it or determine the
credibility of witnesses.”].)
Balance of Harms
The Department contends the balance of harms inquiry
weighs against enjoining its services. It warns the preliminary
injunction will place the residents of Bell Canyon at risk by
preventing the Department from responding to emergencies
before VCFD or LAFD can arrive. It highlights instances when it
provided early fire suppression services and arrived at rescues
before firefighters arrived.
These risks are counterbalanced by VCFD’s May 2025
letter, which states “[LAFD] responds to Bell Canyon just like
any other portion of the City of Los Angeles, providing immediate
stabilization to all fire/rescue incidents until properly relieved by
[VCFD]. This ensures that residents and visitors of Bell Canyon
receive immediate access to emergency care, while the
administrative, financial, and regulatory aspects of fire/rescue
response are handled by [VCFD].” The Association also cites its
insurance broker’s concern about potential uninsured liability as
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a factor in favor of enjoining the Department’s operations. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by assigning more weight
to the Association’s evidence on this issue.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed.
Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Mark S. Borrell, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Probal G. Young and
Christian S. Vendenberghe, for Defendant and Appellant.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Brent A.
Kramer, and James Gilbert, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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