Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Taylor CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A173050
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 17-CR-017553A)
TYRELL TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
Tyrell Taylor (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s order denying
his request for resentencing. We conclude that the order is nonappealable,
and therefore dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 2020, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 26 years in
prison.
On February 10, 2025, appellant, acting in propria persona, filed a form
titled, “Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing Pursuant to
Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code Section 1172.1.”1 (Capitalization altered.)
Appellant checked boxes asserting he was “eligible for consideration of a new
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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sentence” because of recent amendments to multiple statutes. In the section
of the form explaining why “it is in the interest of justice that my sentence be
recalled,” appellant argued that his “firearm use was punished under two
different sentence enhancement provisions,” contrary to People v. Rodriguez
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 501.
On February 20, 2025, the trial court issued a written order denying
the request. The order stated, “While the submission is presented on a form
‘Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing Pursuant to Assembly Bill
600 and Penal Code Section 1172.1,’ in substance the document alleges that
the court erroneously imposed multiple firearm enhancements when
sentencing Defendant on his plea in 2020. Accordingly, the court construes
the document as a motion seeking relief from an unauthorized sentence, and
the court treats it as such.” The court then found appellant “is not being
punished twice for the same firearm use, and Section 1170.1 does not bar
imposition of both” enhancements. Appellant filed an appeal from this order.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the order denying his section 1172.1 request for
resentencing is appealable as an “order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.”2 (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
Several cases have found such orders nonappealable because, while
section 1172.1 authorizes resentencing “ ‘ “at any time” upon the
recommendation of various designated correctional or law enforcement
authorities’ ” or on the court’s own motion “ ‘if the applicable sentencing laws
at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
2 Appellant does not contend the trial court properly construed his
request as one to correct an unauthorized sentence or, if so, that the court’s
order denying such a request is appealable.
2
authority or case law,’ ” the statute also “ ‘expressly denies defendants the
right to file a petition for resentencing under that section, and expressly
excuses the trial court from acting on any such request that a defendant
might nevertheless file.’ ” (People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040,
1045–1046 (Brinson); see § 1172.1, subd. (c) [“A defendant is not entitled to
file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant
requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required
to respond.”].) These cases have reasoned that, because “[a] defendant is not
entitled to file a section 1172.1 petition nor to receive a ruling if he
nevertheless files one,” it therefore “follows that an appeal from an order
acting on his petition (whether couched as a denial, dismissal, or any other
statement that the court is not acting) does not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights.” (People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696
(Faustinos); accord, People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996 (Hodge);
Brinson, at p. 1045; People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 998 (Roy).)
Appellant does not argue these cases are wrongly decided, but instead
contends they are distinguishable, relying on People v. Olea (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 889 (Olea) and People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165
(Craig). In Olea, the defendant filed a section 1172.1 resentencing request,
arguing his sentence “no longer served the purpose of which it was originally
imposed” because “he had taken significant steps towards self-improvement
while in prison.”3 (Olea, at p. 894.) The trial court appointed counsel,
3 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5) provides, “In recalling and
resentencing pursuant to this provision, the court shall consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record
and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence
that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if
any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that
3
received subpoenaed records from the prison and ordered them to be provided
to both sides, received opposition filings by the People, held a contested
hearing at which the defendant appeared remotely with his counsel, and
denied the defendant’s request in part because “it found the original sentence
to be just.” (Id. at pp. 895–896.) The Court of Appeal held the trial court’s
order denying resentencing was appealable, reasoning that “the present case
differs from Hodge, Roy, and Faustinos such that the order issued affected
Olea’s substantial rights. It is noteworthy that the trial court took a number
of procedural steps that did not take place in the aforementioned cases,
including appointment of counsel at Olea’s request, ordering the release of
subpoenaed records from the [prison] to the defense, ordering the defense to
provide copies of these records to the People, and setting a contested hearing
on Olea’s request, at which Olea appeared remotely. In particular, we note
that the subpoenaed records from the [prison] document Olea’s behavior and
activities in prison, which are explicitly listed in section 1172.1, subdivision
(a), as postconviction factors that the court ‘shall’ consider when evaluating
the merits of a request to recall and resentence. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).)” (Id.
at p. 901.) The court continued, “the trial court chose not only to respond, but
it did so in a manner which effectively mirrored those rights afforded to a
petitioner after a resentencing request has been initiated by one the
enumerated agencies . . . .” (Id. at p. 902.) “Considering the entirety of the
actions taken by the trial court following Olea’s initial petition—in
conjunction with merit-based statements made at the contested final hearing,
the trial court effectively evaluated and denied Olea’s petition on the merits,
thus affecting Olea’s substantial rights.” (Id. at p. 902.)
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. . . .”
4
In Craig, the defendant, with retained counsel, filed a section 1172.1
resentencing request attaching various documents, including prison records;
the People filed an opposition with additional prison records; the trial court
heard arguments at a hearing which the defendant attended remotely; and
the court denied resentencing on the ground that the sentence was the result
of a plea agreement and the court did “ ‘not find it persuasive that [Craig]
was young and that he has “rehabilitated” himself.’ ” (Craig, supra, 117
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1169–1170.) The Court of Appeal held the order
appealable: “The superior court did not issue an order declining to consider
Craig’s unauthorized petition. Instead, the superior court took most of the
same procedural steps the superior court in Olea did.” (Id. at p. 1173.)
“Though it did not have to consider Craig’s petition, the superior court not
only considered it, but did so in much the same way section 1172.1 requires
the court to respond to an authorized request . . . . In effect, the superior
court accepted Craig’s request to consider recalling his sentence and
resentencing him on the court’s own motion.” (Ibid.)
We agree with the People that Olea and Craig are distinguishable.4
Here, the court did not appoint counsel, consider opposition briefing, receive
any postconviction evidence, or hold a hearing. The court did not in fact rule
on the section 1172.1 request, instead construing it as a different type of
filing. None of the factors present in Olea and Craig which were relied on by
those courts to distinguish Hodge, Brinson, Roy, and Faustinos, were present
here. (See Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 902 [“the trial court chose not
only to respond, but it did so in a manner which effectively mirrored those
rights afforded to a petitioner after a resentencing request has been initiated
4 We therefore need not and do not decide whether, as the People
alternatively contend, the cases were wrongly decided.
5
by one the enumerated agencies”]; Craig, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173
[“In effect, the superior court accepted Craig’s request to consider recalling
his sentence and resentencing him on the court’s own motion”].) We conclude
the appealed-from order is nonappealable.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
(A173050)
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