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Brothers International Desserts v. Hernandez CA4/3

Brothers International Desserts v. Hernandez CA4/3
By
10:21:2026

Filed 10/21/26 Brothers International Desserts v. Hernandez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

BROTHERS INTERNATIONAL
DESSERTS,
G065867
Cross-complainant and
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2025-
01454220)
v.
OPINION
ADELINA HERNANDEZ,

Cross-defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed. Request for judicial notice. Denied.
Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee, Max W. Gavron, Kwanpom
“Mai” Tulyathan and Kym Kanenaka; Polaris Law Group and William L.
Marder, for Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Garrell Cohon Kennedy, Jeffrey Michael Cohon, John M.
Kennedy and Lindley P. Fraley, for Cross-complainant and Respondent.

* * *

Plaintiff Adelina Hernandez settled employment claims with her
former employer, Brothers International Desserts, then sued it on behalf of
“herself and all other aggrieved employees.”
She now appeals from an order denying her anti-SLAPP motion
to strike Brothers’ cross-complaint for breach of contract. She claims Brothers
had no probability of prevailing because “a breach of contract claim premised
on the filing of a PAGA representative action is legally invalid and cannot
satisfy prong two of the anti-SLAPP statute.” Whatever the viability of the
PAGA claim, Brothers sufficiently showed Hernandez’s individual claims
against it breached the release. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
When Hernandez’s employment with Brothers ended, Brothers
“decided to negotiate a severance agreement . . . to compensate her for her
alleged claims” regarding wages and meal/rest breaks.1
The parties signed a separation agreement containing a release.
In exchange for $6,720, Hernandez agreed she had “been paid and or received
all leaves, compensation, wages, bonuses, commissions to which [she] may be
entitled.” She also agreed to “knowingly and voluntarily release[ ] and forever
discharge[ ]” Brothers “of and from any and all claims, known and unknown,

1 We draw these facts from an uncontroverted declaration by

Brothers’ head of human resources. (See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 385 (Baral) [court must accept opposing party’s evidence as true].)
2
asserted and unasserted, which [she] has or may have against [Brothers] as
of the date of execution of this Separation Agreement . . . .”
Hernandez later sued Brothers for a Labor Code violation “on
behalf of herself and all other aggrieved employees.” The complaint alleged
“Plaintiff was employed by” Brothers and “was and is the victim of the
policies, practices, and customs of [Brothers] complained of in this
action . . . .” It further alleged Brothers failed to “timely provide meal and
rest breaks,” pay correct “meal and rest period premiums,” pay “sick pay and
overtime wages,” and issue accurate “wage statements to Plaintiff and
aggrieved employees.” The complaint “prays for judgment for herself and all
others on whose behalf this suit is brought.”
Brothers filed a cross-complaint against Hernandez, asserting
she breached the release by filing a lawsuit “alleging claims that were waived
and released by the Agreement,” after “she affirmatively confirmed in the
Agreement that she was paid all wages and owned [sic] no further money.”
Hernandez filed an anti-SLAPP motion (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16, subd. (b)), which the trial court denied. It accepted the parties’
agreement that Brothers’ cross-complaint arose from Hernandez’s petitioning
activity. It then found Brothers showed a probability of prevailing because it
“produce[d] evidence that the individual claims in the lawsuit breached the
provisions in the” release.
DISCUSSION
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.” (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) First, the cross-defendant must establish that the
challenged claim arises from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
(Ibid.) Second, if the cross-defendant makes the required showing, the burden
shifts to the cross-complainant to establish a probability of prevailing. (Ibid.)
3
We review a trial court’s order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Park
v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1067.)
Brothers concedes its cross-complaint satisfies the anti-SLAPP
statute’s first prong. “[T]he filing of a complaint in breach of a general release
is a writing made in connection with an issue under review by a judicial body
and therefore satisfies the first prong of the analysis.” (Mundy v. Lenc (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1408–1409.)
On the second prong, we agree with the trial court that Brothers
sufficiently showed a probability of prevailing on its cross-complaint because
Hernandez’s “individual claims in the lawsuit breached” the release. The
declaration from Brother’s head of human resources sufficiently showed the
parties entered into the release, Brothers performed its obligations by paying
Hernandez, she breached the release by suing Brothers, and Brothers
suffered damages.2 (See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51
Cal.4th 811, 821 [breach of contract elements].)
While Hernandez contends Brothers cannot possibly prevail
because “wholesale PAGA waivers” like that in the release “remain
unenforceable,” her complaint against Brothers also alleged individual
claims. She sued “on behalf of herself” as well as on behalf of others and

2 We deny Brothers’ request for us to take judicial notice of (1) a

complaint filed against Brothers in a different lawsuit and (2) an order
entered in that litigation. (See Planning & Conservation League v.
Department of Water Resources (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 726, 774 [denying
request “as immaterial”].)
4
alleged she “was and is the victim” of Brothers’ misconduct. Hernandez has
not shown the release of her individual claims is unenforceable.3
Because her individual claims were sufficient to breach the
release, it is immaterial whether Hernandez can still prosecute her PAGA
claims as a headless PAGA action. (Compare Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 1001, 1005, review granted Apr. 16, 2025, S289305 [arbitration
agreement enforceable against employee’s headless PAGA action because
“every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim”] with
Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
69, 78–80, review granted May 14, 2025, S290182 [arbitration agreement
unenforceable because plaintiff did not assert “individual component” of
PAGA claims].) The issue here is not whether Hernandez can prevail against
Brothers on some aspect of her complaint. The issue here is whether Brothers
can prevail against Hernandez on its cross-complaint.
Hernandez unpersuasively contends that Brothers cannot prevail
because the release is entirely unenforceable. First, Hernandez asserts
“California courts have squarely prohibited” enforcing agreements like the
release. But as Brothers notes, her cited cases concern predispute arbitration
agreements. (See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Kindercare Education LLC (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 967, 971 [arbitration agreement made at outset of employment].)
None concern postdispute releases. Second, while Hernandez contends

3 For that matter, it is not clear that a postdispute release of

PAGA claims is unenforceable. “Of course, employees are free to choose
whether or not to bring PAGA actions when they are aware of Labor Code
violations” and “waivers freely made after a dispute has arisen are not
necessarily contrary to public policy.” (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los
Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 383, overruled on another ground in
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639.)
5
Brothers was required to notify the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency of the agreement, her cited statute covers only settlement of
litigation. (See Labor Code, § 2699, subd. (s)(2) [“The superior court shall
review and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to this
part,” and “[t]he proposed settlement shall be submitted to the agency at the
same time that it is submitted to the court”].) It does not require notification
of a prelitigation release.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Brothers shall recover its costs on appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P. J.

SERVINO, J.

6





Description Affirmed. Request for judicial notice. Denied. Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee, Max W. Gavron, Kwanpom “Mai” Tulyathan and Kym Kanenaka; Polaris Law Group and William L. Marder, for Cross-defendant and Appellant. Garrell Cohon Kennedy, Jeffrey Michael Cohon, John M. Kennedy and Lindley P. Fraley, for Cross-complainant and Respondent.
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