Filed 10/16/26 P. v. Chavira CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085976
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD198803,
SCD237678, HC 26525)
ROBERT CHAVIRA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Reversed with instructions.
Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Linh Lam, Valerie Ryan, and
Emmaline Campbell, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jo Super, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Troy A. Britt, Deputy Public
Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Robert Chavira pleaded guilty to attempting to dissuade
a witness (Pen. Code,1 § 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). This crime qualified as both
a strike pursuant to section 667, and a serious felony as described in
section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(37). This was Chavira’s second strike, and
serious felony prior offense.2
Six years later, in 2012, a jury convicted Chavira of multiple felonies.
In that case, the People alleged the 2006 conviction as a serious felony and
strike prior along with a 2003 serious felony and strike prior. The trial court
sentenced Chavira under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12).
Chavira filed a habeas corpus petition alleging he received ineffective
assistance of counsel during his 2006 plea because his trial counsel did not
advise him that the dissuading offense was a strike. The trial court granted
the petition after an evidentiary hearing. The People appealed, arguing that
the trial court erred by finding that Chavira made the requisite showing of
prejudice based solely on Chavira’s uncorroborated testimony. We agree with
the People and reverse.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The record suggests this may have been Chavira’s third strike prior
and third serious felony prior. His 2006 probation report shows that in 1995
Chavira pleaded guilty to first degree burglary. However, Chavira’s 2012
probation report is unclear if the 1995 burglary was of the first or second
degree. Either way, it remains that at no time did the prosecution, defense
counsel, or trial court ever identify this conviction as a strike and,
consequently, neither do we.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Background
In 2006, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged Chavira with
four counts of making a criminal threat (§ 422), assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), false imprisonment (§§ 236,
237, subd. (a)), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and giving false
information to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). The charges were based on
allegations that upon learning that his fiancée, Sarah Anaraki, crashed his
car, Chavira pulled Anaraki down the stairs inside her friend’s residence, put
her in a headlock, tried to drag her outside, and threatened to kill Anaraki
and her three friends (Samira Abdul-Jalil, Antoinette Jordan, and Yahira
Cordero). Prosecutors also alleged that when arrested Chavira gave a false
name and possessed a stolen watch.
The District Attorney’s office subpoenaed Abdul-Jalil and Cordero to
testify at the preliminary hearing on May 4, 2006, but when they failed to
appear, the trial court granted the People’s request to dismiss the case. The
prosecution then refiled the charges against Chavira, adding one count of
attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)) and two counts of
disobeying a court order (§ 273.6).
The dissuading charge stemmed from Abdul-Jalil and Cordero’s failure
to appear at the preliminary hearing. District Attorney Investigator
Chirstina Pierce attempted to drive Abdul-Jalil and Cordero to the hearing,
but when she went to the designated address, she saw three females driving
away in a car that matched the description of Chavira’s. Investigator Pierce
later obtained statements from Abdul-Jalil and Jordan reflecting that
Anaraki attempted to pay them in exchange for not testifying against
Chavira. Both Abdul-Jalil and Jordan also stated that Cordero accepted
3
money from Anaraki. Abdul-Jalil and Jordan described receiving several
offers, including vacations and a $3,000 payment to each of them.
Additionally, the prosecution obtained recordings of jail calls between
Chavira and Anaraki in which Chavira proposed “offer[ing] Yahi eight,” and
Anaraki responded, “I don’t need to offer them that much. I’m gonna offer
them three, each of them.” Chavira and Anaraki discussed that “Ann’s going
for sure,” Anaraki did not get a chance to offer “Ann” anything because she
does not want to talk and does not care about money, and what “Ann” says
“could mean a big difference.”3 Anaraki also mentioned getting enough
money for a bribe.
The new disobeying a court order charges were based on the jail calls
because a criminal protective order was in place barring Chavira from
contacting Anaraki.
Abdul-Jalil and Jordan appeared at the next preliminary hearing, set
for May 19, 2006. Instead of proceeding with the preliminary hearing,
Chavira entered a negotiated plea. In exchange for dismissing the balance of
the charges, Chavira admitted guilt to one count of receiving stolen property
and one count of dissuading a witness; he faced a seven year maximum
prison sentence.
The parties memorialized the plea in a form. Item 7c of the form
stated, “I understand that my conviction in this case will be a serious/violent
felony (“strike”) resulting in mandatory denial of probation and substantially
increased penalties in any future felony case.” Dissuading a witness is a
strike offense (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(37)), but Chavira did not
initial the box for item 7c. Instead, the form had an “X” through it, showing
3 “Ann’s” identity is unclear.
4
that term did not apply. When accepting the plea, the trial court advised
Chavira that “[t]here would be increased penalties in the future if you’re not
law-abiding. And because of the strike, it will [substantially increase]any
punishment, and you’ll get no good-time credits.”4 There was no other
mention of strikes or serious/violent felonies by the court or counsel.
At sentencing, Chavira submitted a letter stating that due to Anaraki’s
positive influence, he has owned an automobile detailing business for over a
year, and he was in the process of buying a house. Chavira requested
probation, asserting a prison sentence would derail his efforts to become a
productive citizen. Chavira also asked the court to dismiss his strike. The
trial court denied both requests, sentencing Chavira to six years in prison for
receiving stolen property and a concurrent four years for witness dissuasion.
After his release from prison, Chavira committed a series of robberies
in 2011. In 2012, a jury convicted Chavira of conspiracy to commit robbery
(§ 182, subd.(a)(l)), eleven counts of robbery (§ 211), nine counts of false
imprisonment (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)), burglary (§ 459), arson (§ 451) and two
counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)).5 The jury
also found true numerous firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b),
12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Chavira as a third-striker to
4 It appears the trial court was advising Chavira of the plea form’s most
salient parts. It is unclear in this context whether the trial court was
intending to alert Chavira that he was pleading to a strike or referring to the
known strike already in his record.
5 San Diego Superior Court case number SCD237678.
5
298 years and eight months, plus 450 years to life.6 On appeal, this court
corrected a sentencing error regarding two of the firearm enhancements
resulting in an additional 3 years and four months. This court otherwise
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Chavira et al. (March 26, 2014, D063089)
[nonpub. opn.].)
B. Habeas Corpus Petition
In 2023, Chavira filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
California Supreme Court. Chavira argued that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction when sentencing him in 2012 because it breached his 2006 plea
agreement. According to Chavira, the plea deal presented by his trial counsel
did not include a strike offense. Chavira alleged that he “was advised by his
attorney Kerry L. Steigerwalt and was under the belief that he (Petitioner)
was not pleading to a serious/violent felony with consequences to augment a
future sentence.”
In their informal response, the People argued that Chavira failed to
demonstrate any breach of the 2006 plea agreement. However, the People
6 The December 3, 2012 minutes, are inconsistent with the court’s oral
pronouncement of its punishment. The sentencing transcript states the trial
court imposed a prison term of 298 years and eight months, plus 450 years to
life. The minutes reflect the court sentenced Chavira to 288 years, eight
months, plus 425 years to life. Where the trial court minutes and its oral
pronouncement of judgment conflict we adopt the trial court’s oral
statements. (People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324 [In a criminal
case, it is the oral pronouncement of sentence that constitutes the judgment”
(italics omitted)].) The discrepancy is immaterial to our analysis, however,
and we discuss it no further. We also note that in this case even if the trial
court had sentenced Chavira with a single strike under the same sentencing
matrix it used in 2012, Chavira would have received a sentence of about
144 years. Thus, whether sentenced using one or two strike priors, Chavira
would receive what amounts to a life without the possibility of parole
sentence.
6
recommended a reference hearing to determine whether Chavira received
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his 2006 sentence. The People
maintained that Chavira might not be able to prove prejudice but suggested
that resolving the factual issues pertaining to Steigerwalt’s advice was the
most prudent course to take.
The California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause,
returnable before the San Diego County Superior Court, as to why Chavira is
not entitled to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the
2006 plea negotiations. The California Supreme Court directed the trial
court to address three questions: First, “[d]id [Steigerwalt] understand that
attempting to dissuade a witness was a serious felony at the time Chavira
pled guilty? Second, did Chavira communicate to [Steigerwalt] during
negotiations with the prosecution that his decision would be motivated in
whole or in part by a desire to avoid pleading guilty to a strike-eligible
offense? And [third], did [Steigerwalt] advise Chavira that attempting to
dissuade a witness was or was not a serious felony before Chavira entered his
plea?”
In their return, the People conceded that “Steigerwalt rendered
deficient performance by apparently incorrectly advising [Chavira] in 2006
that his plea to attempting to dissuade a witness did not constitute a strike.”
The People argued instead that Chavira suffered no prejudice because he
would not have rejected the plea deal even if properly advised.
7
C. Evidentiary Hearing
The trial court held a two day evidentiary hearing on Chavira’s habeas
corpus petition. The parties stipulated that Steigerwalt did not advise
Chavira that the section 136.1 offense was a strike.
Mr. Kerry Armstrong, Chavira’s 2012 trial counsel, testified on
Chavira’s behalf. Armstrong explained that in the 2012 case, he
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the 2006 strike because Steigerwalt
improperly advised Chavira. Armstrong also stated that Chavira went to
trial in 2012 despite knowing he was facing significant prison time.
Armstrong acknowledged that, consistent with the People’s no-deal policy
given the severity of the charges, he did not receive a settlement offer for his
client.
Chavira testified as well, stating that in 2006, Steigerwalt told him
that the dissuading charge was not a strike. Chavira claimed that if he had
known the offense was a strike, he would have taken his chances at trial.
Chavira explained that his goal was to avoid prison, and he wanted the
lowest sentence possible but not if it included a strike.
Chavira also testified that Steigerwalt never informed him that if
convicted of the 2006 charges, Chavira faced over 20 years in prison.
Steigerwalt advised Chavira of the seven-year maximum under the plea deal,
but reassured Chavira that he would receive one year in local custody.
Chavira acknowledged that he offered the prosecution information about a
“major drug kingpin” during plea negotiations, but the prosecutor was not
interested.
Regarding Anaraki, Chavira testified that she was his fiancée in 2006,
and maintaining their relationship was important to him. Chavira meant
8
what he said when he told Anaraki in the jail calls that he wanted to reform
himself. However, Chavira also maintained that the plea deal had nothing to
do with his relationship, and he thought that Anaraki was going to leave him
in any event.
Testifying about the dissuading charge, Chavira stated, “I conspired
with my — my wife.[7] And I gave her a call. I told her, ‘Look, if you tell
your friends not to testify against me, I’ll send them to Hawaii.’ And they —
and they took the bribe. And that was one of my key defenses for
impeachment on all of her witnesses in that case.” When asked if he
understood that dissuading witnesses is a crime, Chavira stated, “absolutely.
And that’s what I pled guilty to, obviously.” Chavira acknowledged that he
“attempted to dissuade those witnesses by Ms. Anaraki on recorded jail
calls,” “dissuading a witness was [his] plan A,” and that he “got caught.”
Chavira explained, “All I can tell you is that I attempted to dissuade the
witnesses. They took the money. Apparently got caught and ended up
showing up. So it backfired on me. That’s it. There’s nothing more to it.”
As for the other 2006 charges, Chavira stated that he was unsure if he
pushed Anaraki down the stairs and did not remember threatening to kill
her. Chavira acknowledged that he might have threatened Anaraki’s friends,
asserting that if he did, he did not mean it.
Regarding his criminal history, Chavira acknowledged that his 2012
conviction was the only case in which he did not plead guilty, and the People
did not offer any deals in that case. Prior to 2006, Chavira pleaded guilty in
seven felony cases, including a strike in 2003. Chavira asserted a few of his
7 Chavira and Anaraki got married while he was in prison.
9
guilty pleas were voluntary while others were under duress and due to his
attorneys’ incompetence.
Pierce testified on behalf of the People, explaining how she attempted
to take Abdul-Jalil and Cordero to the initial preliminary hearing. Pierce
stated that she subsequently obtained statements from Abdul-Jalil and
Jordan that Anaraki offered them money not to attend court, but Abdul-Jalil
and Jordan were prepared to testify at the second preliminary hearing,
resulting in Chavira’s guilty plea. Pierce obtained a statement from Cordero
as well, in which Cordero stated she was not offered a bribe and did not
support charges against Chavira.
The prosecutor from the 2006 case, Lucille Yturralde, testified as well.
Yturralde believed the 2006 charges against Chavira were very provable.
Even though Anaraki recanted, there was a 911 call that captured Chavira
making threats while the victims screamed and told Chavira to leave, the jail
calls provided evidence of witness dissuasion, and the witnesses’ statements
were corroborated. Yturralde stated that Chavira was charged with five
strikes, his exposure was over 20 years, and she would not have made a non-
strike plea offer.
Yturralde stated that the plea form’s failure to mention the strike was
an oversight, describing Steigerwalt as a savvy defense attorney who knew
exactly what was happening. Yturralde also confirmed that Steigerwalt
proposed a plea deal where Chavira would serve no additional time in
exchange for providing information regarding several unsolved crimes.
Yturralde rejected that offer.
The trial court admitted recordings of Chavira’s jail calls to Anaraki.
As the trial court noted, the calls indicate that Chavira wanted out of custody
as soon as possible so he could be with Anaraki. Anaraki demanded that
10
Chavira get himself out of custody, stating she wanted to get on with her life.
Anaraki said she could never wait four years, and their relationship would
not work if Chavira was incarcerated for another year. Chavira reassured
Anaraki that four years was the maximum, he might get one year in county
jail under the plea deal, and he was going to do whatever he had to do to get
out of custody. Chavira also stated there was information on unsolved crimes
he could provide Steigerwalt, which would result in him being hated and
having to give up his past, but he could probably get placed in a work
furlough program. Chavira further stated that he had to change overnight
and become a good person, and that Anaraki had to accept that he was going
to be a “square.”
When ruling on the petition, the trial court accepted the People’s
concession, finding that Steigerwalt performed deficiently. The trial court
next turned to the questions posed by the California Supreme Court in the
order to show cause returned to the superior court. The trial court found that
Steigerwalt knew that the dissuading count was a serious felony at the time
Chavira pleaded guilty, but he did not communicate that to Chavira. The
trial court also concluded that Chavira did not communicate to Steigerwalt a
desire to avoid pleading guilty to a strike eligible offense, and that Chavira
did not know that the dissuading offense was a strike.
As for prejudice, the trial court found that “based on the evidence
presented,” there was a reasonable probability that but for Steigerwalt’s
errors, Chavira would not have pleaded guilty. The trial court therefore
granted Chavira’s petition.
About a month later, the People moved for reconsideration, arguing
Chavira failed to carry his burden in establishing prejudice. When
questioned by the People at the motion hearing, the trial court clarified its
11
findings. The trial court stated “that there was evidence that suggested that
[Chavira] might have taken any deal if he could get out of custody just so he
could be with [Anaraki]. And there may be some truth to that.” Further, the
trial court acknowledged that Chavira’s credibility was questionable, but it
nonetheless believed Chavira’s statement that he would not have taken the
deal had he known it included a strike. The trial court confirmed that
Chavira’s testimony was the “sole basis” for its prejudice ruling, and that
there was no corroborating contemporaneous evidence. Finally, the trial
court found credible the People’s two witnesses, the evidence that Chavira
had committed multiple strikes, and the People’s argument that the jail calls
established Chavira’s relationship with Anaraki was Chavira’s key priority.
Ultimately, the trial court denied the reconsideration motion and set
the matter for resentencing. The People’s timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
The People argue that the trial court erred by finding prejudice solely
based on Chavira’s testimony. They further contend that there is no
contemporaneous evidence supporting Chavira’s assertion that he would not
have accepted the plea deal if properly advised that dissuading a witness was
a strike offense. Chavira argues that prejudice should be presumed, and
alternatively, prejudice is shown under the totality of the circumstances. We
agree with the People.
A. Standard of Review
A habeas corpus petitioner must “ ‘ “prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, facts that establish a basis for relief.” ’ ” (In re Champion
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 965, 1007.) In reviewing an order granting a habeas
corpus petition following an evidentiary hearing “ ‘[w]e give great weight
to those of the [trial court]’s findings that are supported by substantial
12
evidence. . . . This is especially true for findings involving credibility
determinations. . . . [¶] . . . [I]n other areas we give no deference to the [trial
court]’s findings. . . . Whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and
whether any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions
subject to independent review.’ ” (In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 774.)
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining
“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two elements: a
defendant must show that their counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (In re Tellez (2024)
17 Cal.5th 77, 88 (Tellez).) “ ‘ “[W]hen a defendant claims that his counsel’s
deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea,
the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.’ ” ’ ” (In re Hernandez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
530, 546.)8
“In evaluating ineffective assistance claims asserting a failure to
provide adequate advisements, we consider the ‘ “totality of the
circumstances,” ’ including the ‘ “defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea
bargain” ’ and ‘the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable
outcome if he had rejected the plea.’ ” (Tellez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 88.)
Other relevant factors include the defendant’s stance at trial (In re Alvernaz
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 940), the difference between the bargained for term and
8 Contrary to Chavira’s claim, prejudice is not presumed in this case
because Chavira had “counsel, who appeared at all critical times and actively
represented him throughout the proceedings.” (People v. Hernandez (2012)
53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105–1106.)
13
the likely term if the defendant were convicted at trial (People v. Espinoza
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320), and the possibility of a strike-free outcome
through further plea negotiations (Tellez, at p. 90).
However, “[a] defendant must provide ‘ “objective evidence” ’ to
corroborate assertions of prejudice, which can include ‘facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s [collateral]
concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the
defendant faced.’ ” (Tellez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 88.) “[A] defendant’s self-
serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—that with
competent advice he or she would have accepted a proffered plea bargain, is
insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to
prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence. A
contrary holding would lead to an unchecked flow of easily fabricated claims.”
(In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938.)
C. Chavira Fails to Establish a Reasonable Probability that He Would
Have Rejected the Plea Deal Had He Been Properly Advised
All the objective evidence indicates that Chavira would have accepted
the plea deal even if properly advised by Steigerwalt. The trial court
determined that Chavira did not communicate to Steigerwalt any desire to
avoid a new strike. That determination is supported by substantial evidence,
as there is no evidence of Chavira expressing such a desire to Steigerwalt or
anyone else.
Additionally, the jail calls with Anaraki and Chavira’s offer to provide
information to the prosecution indicate that Chavira prioritized the length of
his sentence. As the trial court found, Chavira “very much wanted to get out
of custody to be with” Anaraki, he “might have taken any deal” to accomplish
that, and Chavira’s relationship with Anaraki was Chavira’s “key priority.”
14
Chavira also expressed in the jail calls, his letter to the 2006 sentencing
judge, and his own testimony that he intended to reform himself and leave
his past behind, suggesting that the consequences of a second strike were not
relevant to his decision.
It is also unlikely that Chavira could have obtained a more favorable
outcome. Yturralde testified that she would not have offered Chavira a non-
strike deal in 2006, and that the charges against him, which included five
strike offenses, Chavira were “very provable.” The trial court found that
testimony credible. Indeed, Chavira apparently had no intention of
challenging the dissuasion count, admitting that he attempted to bribe
multiple witnesses and that he planned to rely on that fact to impeach those
witnesses’ credibility. Moreover, the prosecution had two witnesses for the
dissuasion charge, and that offense was further supported by the contents of
the jail calls.
As for the assault, false imprisonment, and criminal threats charges,
although Anaraki and Cordero were uncooperative, Abdul-Jalil and Jordan
were willing to testify, and the prosecution had a corroborating 911 call. At
the evidentiary hearing, Chavira did not deny assaulting Anaraki, and he
acknowledged that he might have threatened her friends. Chavira also
makes no attempt the challenge the counts alleging receiving stolen property,
giving false information to a police officer, or his disobedience of the order
barring contact with Anaraki as reflected in the jail calls. (See, e.g., Lee v.
U.S. (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 367 [“a defendant facing such long odds will rarely
be able to show prejudice”].)
Further, there was a significant disparity between the plea deal’s
seven-year sentence limit and the 25-year and 10-month maximum potential
punishment for all the 2006 charges. (§§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1), 148.9, subd. (a),
15
237, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1), 273.6, subd. (a), 422, 496, subd. (a), 667,
subds. (a)(1) & (e)(1), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170, subd. (h), 1170.1, subd. (a).) And
throughout his extensive criminal history, Chavira had a pattern of accepting
plea deals. He pleaded guilty in seven felony cases leading up to 2006,
including for one strike, and the only time he went to trial in a felony case
was in 2012 when the prosecution made no attempt to settle the matter.
The only evidence supporting Chavira’s claim is his own self-serving
testimony. This is insufficient to carry his burden to show prejudice. (In re
Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938.)
In any event, despite the great weight afforded to the trial court’s
determination of Chavira’s credibility, we must independently assess
prejudice under the totality of the circumstances. (In re Long, surpa,
10 Cal.5th at p. 774; Tellez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 88.) Based on the
objective evidence of Chavira’s priorities, the strength of the 2006 charges,
Chavira’s admission of the dissuading count, the disparity between the plea
deal and Chavira’s maximum potential sentence, and Chavira’s history of
accepting plea deals, Chavira fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that he would have rejected the plea deal had he been properly advised.
Chavira has not therefore established the prejudice-prong of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and his habeas corpus petition must be denied.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. On remand, the trial court shall enter an order
denying Chavira’s habeas corpus petition.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, Acting P. J.
BERMÚDEZ, J.
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