Filed 10/6/26 P. v. Lawrence CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084068

v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI21001253)

TYRESE WILLIAMS LAWRENCE, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John Wilkerson,

Judge. Affirmed with directions.

Benjamin Kingston, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Stephanie

H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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 INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Tyrese Williams Lawrence of first

degree murder, burglary, shooting at an inhabited dwelling, and being a felon in

possession of a firearm. On appeal, Lawrence argues that his firearm possession

conviction violates the Second Amendment under the standard articulated in N.Y. State

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen). He also argues that the

punishment for his burglary conviction must be stayed under Penal Code section 654

because there is insufficient evidence to support the murder conviction under a theory of

premeditation and deliberation.1 We direct the trial court to correct a clerical error in the

abstract of judgment, but we otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Killing and Investigation

On May 1, 2021, 17-year-old Angel M. was shot in the stomach inside the home

where he lived with his mother and his two older brothers. He died an hour later at the

hospital.

Angel’s brother, Calvin M., identified 20-year-old Lawrence as the shooter, and

video surveillance from outside his house confirmed his account, showing Lawrence

kicking open the front door and holding Calvin and Angel at gunpoint. Police found

Lawrence’s gun in a yard three houses down the street, and they arrested him the

1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

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following day. Lawrence’s friend, Garyeon Land, told police that, shortly before the

shooting, Lawrence had argued with Calvin over Calvin’s use of Lawrence’s gun the

night before.

The People filed an information charging Lawrence with first degree murder

(§ 187, subd. (a)); shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246); first degree burglary

(§ 459); and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). As to the

murder count, the information alleged firearm enhancements for personal use

(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); personal discharge (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and personal

discharge causing death of a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), as well as the

special circumstance that the murder was committed during the course of a burglary

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)). As to the shooting count, the information alleged that

Lawrence used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to the burglary count, the complaint

alleged that a non-accomplice was present in the residence (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The

information also alleged that Lawrence had suffered two prior strikes (§§1170.12, subds.

(a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a),

1192.7, subd. (c)).

B. Trial

At trial, Calvin testified that he had known Lawrence and Land since middle

school. Lawrence and Land were members of the PJ Watts gang and Calvin associated

with the gang. In late April 2021, Lawrence and Land were looking for a place to sleep,

and Calvin invited them to stay at his house. On April 29, they arrived at Calvin’s home

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separately, in their own cars, each with their own gun. When they were not carrying

them, Lawrence and Land stored their guns in a dresser in Calvin’s bedroom.

Calvin’s home was equipped with multiple security cameras. Footage from those

cameras showed that at 1:30 a.m. on May 1, 2021, Calvin left the house wearing a face

mask and a backpack, placed a gun in the backpack, drove off in Lawrence’s car, then

returned about 20 minutes later. Land testified that he talked to Calvin later that morning

at about 2:30 a.m. During that conversation, Calvin told Land that he (Calvin) had used

Lawrence’s gun to shoot up a house belonging to someone who had stabbed him (Calvin)

months earlier. During his first day testifying, Calvin said that he took Lawrence’s gun

out of his dresser, went out to buy snacks and, on the way home, removed two bullets

from Lawrence’s gun and threw them out of the window. However, on his second day

testifying, Calvin said that he had actually stopped at a dirt hill near his house and fired

the gun twice into the ground.

Both Calvin and Land testified that, around noon on May 1, Lawrence became

angry and confronted Calvin when he noticed his gun was missing two bullets.

According to Calvin’s testimony, Lawrence approached him about the missing bullets

when he was in front of his house working with Land on Land’s car. Calvin admitted

that he had used the gun and assured Lawrence that he would replace the bullets.

Lawrence became upset and began pressuring Calvin about the bullets, telling him that

“he needs bullets, and he needs bullets now.” Lawrence challenged Calvin to a fight.

When Calvin saw that Lawrence was going to get his gun, Calvin closed the gate to his

front yard, told Lawrence to stay out, ran inside his house, and closed the front door.

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Before entering the house, Calvin grabbed a large construction tile from his front yard to

use as protection against Lawrence.

Seconds later, Lawrence kicked open the front door, pointed his gun at Calvin,

who was standing in the hallway to the immediate right of the front door, and again

demanded bullets. Hearing the commotion, Angel came out of the bathroom, which was

located further down the hallway, behind Calvin. Lawrence continued to demand bullets

and also kept saying, “PJ,” a reference to his gang, PJ Watts. Holding the tile in front of

him and Angel like a shield, Calvin backed down the hallway with his brother. Lawrence

ripped the tile out of Calvin’s hand, threw it to the floor, and continued to advance toward

the brothers. Angel was screaming at Lawrence and telling him to get out of the house.

According to Calvin, the altercation lasted a few minutes, then Lawrence left the

house, and Calvin went out onto the porch to survey the damage to the front door. While

Calvin was on the porch, he saw Lawrence running back toward the house, so he went

inside and double locked the front door. Lawrence kicked the door open again, and this

time Calvin and Angel retreated to the kitchen, which was located at the end of the

hallway, to the left. Lawrence followed them and pointed his gun at them. Angel asked

Calvin if they had a gun and screamed at Lawrence to get out of the house. Lawrence

aimed the gun at Angel, said, “Shut up,” then “PJs,” then shot Angel in the stomach.

After the gun fired, Calvin lunged at Lawrence, who aimed the gun at Calvin’s

face and pulled the trigger. The gun made a clicking sound but did not fire, and Calvin

began to wrestle with Lawrence for control of the weapon. During the struggle, Calvin

noticed that Land had entered the house and was pointing his gun at him. Calvin yelled,

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“You shot my brother,” then ran over to where Angel lay bleeding on the kitchen floor.

Land and Lawrence fled the house and Calvin ran after them but quickly returned to be

with Angel. A few minutes later, Land returned and stayed with them, putting pressure

on Angel’s wound, until the police arrived.

During the investigation and during a jail call with his mother, Land said that he

entered the house after Lawrence had already shot Angel. However, at trial, Land

changed his account and said that he was in the house when Angel was shot. According

to Land’s testimony, when he went inside the house to deescalate the situation, Lawrence

and Calvin were wrestling for control of the gun, and it went off accidentally during the

struggle. He could not tell who had pulled the trigger.

Video footage from the surveillance cameras at Calvin’s house, which the

prosecution played for the jury, captured the events that took place outside. The footage,

which we have reviewed, showed Calvin and Lawrence arguing on the sidewalk at 11:44

a.m. on May 1, 2021. About a minute and a half later, Calvin walked away from

Lawrence, into his front yard, and closed the front gate. Lawrence continued to yell

through the gate at Calvin, who was standing near the front porch. Lawrence then pushed

the gate open and approached Calvin, gesticulating aggressively, indicating he wanted to

fight Calvin. At 11:47 a.m., Calvin picked up a large tile from his front porch, retreated

into his house, and closed the front door. Lawrence walked out to the sidewalk and was

briefly out of the frame. Seconds later, Lawrence returned in the frame, holding his gun.

Lawrence raised his gun and cocked it as he approached the house. He kicked open the

front door and walked inside the home with his gun raised.

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 Footage from a security camera mounted outside the front door, facing the door,

showed that Lawrence remained inside the house for about two minutes. During that

period, Lawrence, Calvin, and Angel could at times be seen arguing through the open

front door. Lawrence then left the house, walked to his car, which was parked on the

opposite side of the street, and entered through the driver’s side door. Lawrence

remained in his car for about a minute, during which time Land approached him, and they

appeared to have a brief conversation. At 11:50 a.m., Lawrence got out of his car and

marched back toward Calvin’s house with his gun raised. Before kicking open the door a

second time, Lawrence fired two shots at the house.

After Lawrence had been inside the house for about 20 seconds, Land jogged

through the front door, presumably in response to hearing the gunshot that hit Angel.

Less than a minute later, Lawrence and Land left the house and Lawrence ran down the

street, out of frame. A minute later, Lawrence returned to his car and spoke with Land

for a few seconds before driving off. Land, who stayed behind, went back inside the

house.

When the paramedics arrived, they immediately transported Angel to the hospital,

where he died from the injury within about an hour of being shot. A forensic pathologist

testified that, had there not been some form of medical intervention before the

paramedics arrived, Angel would have died within minutes from blood loss.

During closing statements, the prosecutor argued that the evidence showed

Lawrence premeditated and deliberated the murder of Angel. In support, he pointed out

that the video footage showed that, after his initial altercation with the brothers inside the

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house, Lawrence left and sat in his car for several moments before deciding to return and

shoot Angel. In the alternative, the prosecutor argued that, even if the jury believed

Land’s testimony that the shooting occurred accidentally, they could still find Lawrence

guilty of first degree murder under the felony murder theory.

In response, defense counsel argued that the evidence showed that Lawrence was

not guilty of murder but of voluntary manslaughter based on either a heat of passion or an

imperfect self-defense theory. Given the video footage showing Lawrence shooting at

Calvin and Angel’s house, defense counsel conceded counts 2 and 4, the shooting and

possession counts.

C. Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found Lawrence guilty on all four counts and found true all of the

enhancement allegations except the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation,

which it found not true. In a bifurcated trial, the court found true the prior strike and

prior serious felony conviction allegations. The court sentenced Lawrence to a total term

of 46 years plus 152 years to life in prison. As relevant here, the sentence included an

indeterminate term of 25 years to life for the burglary count.

DISCUSSION

A. Second Amendment Challenge to the Possession Conviction

Lawrence argues that section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), which prohibits felons

from possessing firearms, is facially invalid under the Second Amendment because it

violates his constitutional right to bear arms in self-defense under the standard articulated

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in Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 1. We rejected the same claim in People v. Alexander (2023)

91 Cal.App.5th 469.

In Alexander, we concluded that Bruen affirmed the well-established rule that

“only law-abiding citizens are included among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms is

protected by the Second Amendment.” (Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 478,

479, citing Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 26.) We further concluded that, because

“[c]onvicted felons, by definition, are not law abiding,” section 29800, subdivision (a)(1),

does not violate the Second Amendment under Bruen’s test for assessing the

constitutionality of firearm regulations. (Ibid.) Since Alexander, several appellate courts

have either expressly agreed with its holding or upheld the constitutionality of section

29800, subdivision (a)(1), and similar statutes under similar reasoning. (E.g., People v.

Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317 [Second Dist., Div. Eight]; People v. Ceja (2023)

94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301 (Ceja) [Fourth Dist., Div. Three]; In re D.L. (2023)

93 Cal.App.5th 144, 166 [First Dist.; Div. Two].) We continue to agree with Alexander’s

holding and supporting reasoning.

In Ceja, the defendant agued, as Lawrence does here, that Alexander was wrongly

decided because there is no constitutional textual or historical justification for excluding

felons from the Second Amendment’s definition of “ ‘the people.’ ” (Ceja, supra,

94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1301.) Ceja rejected that contention, concluding that Alexander’s

holding “is highly persuasive and is supported by numerous citations to the Supreme

Court’s analysis in [District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller)],

and Bruen.” (Ibid.) We agree with Ceja on that point. Because Lawrence provides no

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persuasive reason not to follow our division’s precedent, we reject his facial

constitutional challenge to his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

B. Section 654 Challenge to the Burglary Term

Lawrence argues that the sentence imposed for his burglary conviction must be

stayed under section 654. Citing the rule that the punishment for the target offense must

be stayed when a jury is instructed on multiple theories of first degree murder but only

the felony murder theory is supported by substantial evidence, Lawrence argues that his

punishment for burglary must be stayed because there was insufficient evidence to

support a premeditation theory of first degree murder. We disagree.

“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of

law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or

omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) The purpose is

to ensure that punishment is commensurate with culpability. (People v. Latimer (1993)

5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211.)

When “felony murder was the sole theory of murder under which the case was

prosecuted,” section 654 precludes imposition of a separate term of punishment for the

underlying target offense. (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 898.) But where, as

here, the prosecution tried the murder charge under an alternative theory (i.e.,

premeditated murder), the trial court may properly impose a sentence for both the murder

and the underlying felony if the record contains substantial evidence to support the

alternative theory.

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 Substantial evidence is “reasonable and credible evidence to allow a rational trier

of fact to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cardenas (2020)

53 Cal.App.5th 102, 119, fn. 11.) When reviewing the record for substantial evidence,

“ ‘we review the whole record’ ” in the “ ‘light most favorable to the prosecution and

presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably

have deduced from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)

Thus, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the

opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled

with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” (In re George

T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 631.) “Matters of credibility of witnesses and the weight of the

evidence are ‘ “ ‘the exclusive province’ ” ’ of the trier of fact.” (Cardenas, at p. 119,

fn. 11.)

“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought.”

(§ 187, subd. (a).) “A murder that is premeditated and deliberate is murder of the first

degree.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 118 (Jurado); § 189, subd. (a).)

Deliberation refers to “ ‘careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of

action,’ ” and premeditation means “ ‘thought over in advance.’ ” (People v.

Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419 (Halvorsen).) “[T]he requisite reflection need not

span a specific or extended period of time.” (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198,

213 (Nelson).) The key inquiry is whether the killing “occurred as the result of reflection

rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” (Ibid.)

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 In determining whether a finding of premeditation and deliberation is adequately

supported, we often consider three kinds of evidence—“preexisting motive, planning

activity, and manner of killing.” (Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 118-119; People

v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson).) But those guidelines—referred to

as the Anderson factors—“are descriptive and neither normative nor exhaustive,” so

“reviewing courts need not accord them any particular weight.” (Halvorsen, supra,

42 Cal.4th at p. 420; People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 324.)

At trial, the court instructed the jury on both felony murder and premeditated and

deliberate murder and the prosecutor argued that Lawrence was guilty of the first degree

murder of Angel under both theories. Lawrence argues that the trial evidence is

insufficient to support a finding that he acted with premeditation and deliberation under

any of the Anderson factors—motive, planning, and manner of killing. We disagree. The

surveillance footage from Calvin and Angel’s front yard, coupled with Land’s and

Calvin’s testimony about why Lawrence was angry with Calvin, and what happened

inside the house both times that Lawrence forced his way in, provide evidence of all three

factors.

The evidence of planning, in particular, supports a finding of premeditation and

deliberation. The surveillance footage showed that Lawrence walked away from the

altercation with the brothers and sat in his car before returning to the house and shooting

Angel. Specifically, the footage showed that, after arguing with Calvin in the front yard,

Lawrence retrieved his gun and forced his way inside Calvin’s house, where he could be

seen gesticulating and arguing with Calvin and Angel. After spending approximately two

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minutes inside the house with the brothers, Lawrence left the house, walked across the

street, and sat inside his car for approximately one minute. During that time, he also

spoke briefly with Land. Lawrence then exited his car and returned to the house with his

gun raised, firing two shots at the house before kicking in the door again. It was during

that second altercation with the brothers that Lawrence shot Angel. That evidence

reasonably supports an inference that Lawrence spent time reflecting after the first

altercation and developed a plan to kill one or both of the brothers. “The act of

planning—involving deliberation and premeditation—requires nothing more than a

‘successive thought[] of the mind.’ ” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658;

see People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 244 [The defendant’s acts that “occurred in

stages” demonstrated premeditation and deliberation.]; Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p.

213 [“Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment

may be arrived at quickly.”].)

The manner in which Lawrence killed Angel also reasonably supports an inference

that he was executing a deliberate, preconceived plan to kill. Cases have held that when a

defendant focuses their attack on a particularly vulnerable body part, the factfinder may

reasonably infer premeditation and deliberation. (E.g., Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p.

27 [“[P]lunging a lethal weapon into the chest evidences a deliberate intention to kill”].)

Here, Lawrence shot Angel in the stomach, a vital and vulnerable body part, at close

range. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1082 [“[F]iring a shot at a vital area of

the body at close range” is “indicative of a deliberate intent to kill.”].) Additionally, the

fact that Angel was “defenseless” and “posed no threat” to Lawrence is also “entirely

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consistent with a premeditated and deliberate murder.” (People v. Silva (2001)

25 Cal.4th 345, 369.)

As to evidence of motive, Calvin testified that Lawrence shot Angel after Angel

yelled at him to get out of the house and asked Calvin if they had a gun. If Lawrence

could become so angry at a gang associate for using his bullets that he would force his

way into that associate’s house and hold him at gunpoint, it stands to reason that he

would take similar umbrage at being yelled at, on two separate occasions, by that

associate’s younger brother, in front of the associate. On this record, a fact finder could

reasonably infer that Lawrence’s motive to kill Angel was revenge for being

disrespected. Even if that motivation “was totally unreasonable,” the

“incomprehensibility of the motive does not mean that the jury could not reasonably infer

that [Lawrence] entertained and acted on it.” (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d

1210, 1238.)

Comparing his case to People v. Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1007 (Wear),

Lawrence argues that his shooting of Angel was spontaneous and impulsive, not the

product of reflection. Although “comparison with other cases is of limited utility, since

each case necessarily depends on its own facts” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489,

516), in this instance, the comparison case is readily distinguishable and actually helps to

illustrate why this record contains sufficient evidence of the necessary mental state.

In Wear, the defendant and a friend met with the victim, an acquaintance of theirs,

to either sell him heroin or buy or steal a gun from him. (Wear, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th

at p. 1009.) Neither the defendant nor his friend brought guns to the meeting, but the

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victim brought two. (Id. at pp. 1009-1010.) After an argument ensued, the victim shot

the defendant’s friend with one of his guns. (Ibid.) The defendant then grabbed the gun

from the victim, shot him twice in the head, and fled. (Ibid.) According to eye-witness

accounts, all three shots took place in a matter of seconds. (Id. at pp. 1014-1015.)

The appellate court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a

finding that the murder was deliberate and premeditated. The court explained that “the

lack of evidence of planning, weak evidence of motive, and absence of any other

evidence suggesting premeditation and deliberation, combined with the strong evidence

that [the defendant] impulsively shot [the victim] after [the victim] shot [the defendant’s

friend], leads us to conclude that insufficient evidence supports a verdict of premeditated

murder.” (Wear, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032.) Of significance to the court’s

analysis was the fact that the defendant did not come to the meeting armed and the fact

that he shot the victim in immediate response to the shooting of his friend. (Id.

at pp. 1030-1013.)

The circumstances in this case are very different. Unlike the defendant in Wear,

who fired a gun that was not his, mere seconds after a provoking event, Lawrence shot

Angel with his own gun, which he brought into Angel’s house twice—the second time

after spending time outside to plan his next move. The fact that Lawrence had time to

reflect before returning to the house with his gun reasonably supports the inference that

he was executing a preconceived and deliberate plan to kill. Whereas the defendant’s

actions in Wear demonstrate “an unconsidered explosion of violence” that would be

inconsistent with premeditation and deliberation, Lawrence’s conduct leading up to the

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shooting “shows a calculated design to ensure death.” (People v. Horning (2004)

34 Cal.4th 871, 902-903.)

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence

to support a finding that Lawrence acted with both premeditation and deliberation when

he shot Angel. As a result, we uphold the punishment for the burglary count.

C. Clerical Error in the Abstract of Judgment

The People correctly point out that the abstract of judgment contains a clerical

error. The transcript of the sentencing hearing and the corresponding minute order reflect

that the court imposed a total indeterminate term of 152 years to life, but the abstract of

judgment identifies the total term as 156 years to life. (See People v. Leon (2020)

8 Cal.5th 831, 855 [“Any discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as

recorded in the clerk’s minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of

clerical error.”].) Because we may order the correction of such clerical errors (People v.

Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-187), we will direct the trial court to modify the

abstract of judgment.

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 DISPOSITION

The trial court shall correct the abstract of judgment to reflect a total indeterminate

term of 152 years and shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment

to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the

judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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