Filed 10/7/26 P. v. Jones CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087367
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD262580)
v.
RYAN ALLEN JONES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Ryan Allen Jones, in pro. per.; and Anna M. Jauregui-Law, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Ryan Allen Jones appeals from the denial of his postconviction petition
seeking resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. Jones’s appellate
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), and Jones filed a supplemental brief. We have reviewed Jones’s
supplemental brief, and to the extent we can discern his arguments we have
considered them. We have also exercised our discretion to independently
review the record. (Id. at p. 232.) We conclude Jones has not set out
meritorious claims on appeal, and we have independently found no
reasonably arguable appellate issues. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The charges against Jones stemmed from an altercation that occurred
at a downtown San Diego trolley station in June 2015. Jones interjected
himself in a situation in which a transit system security guard was trying to
assist a man who appeared intoxicated. Jones initially behaved as if trying to
assist the security guard. Eventually, several additional security guards
arrived, as did multiple firefighters. Jones was asked to step back from the
scene. Jones admitted he was not there with the man, but he would not
comply with multiple directives to step back. A fire captain viewed Jones as
becoming aggressive. The captain loudly commanded Jones to get back and
then pushed Jones away. Jones fell backward over a bench, and at that point
he attacked one of the security guards with no visible weapon. A struggle
ensued between Jones and multiple security guards, and one of the
paramedics, who was in full uniform, tried to diffuse the situation. At that
2 Jones’s appellate counsel filed a request that this court take judicial
notice of the record in his direct appeal from the original judgment. We grant
the unopposed request and take judicial notice of the record in People v. Jones
(July 20, 2017, D070280) [nonpub. opn.]. We take our brief summary of the
factual background of Jones’s case from this court’s opinion in the prior
appeal.
2
point, Jones pulled out a knife and stabbed the firefighter multiple times.
Two other firefighters became involved, and Jones stabbed one of them.
Multiple security guards and an uninjured firefighter came in to restrain
Jones, who shouted, “I’ll kill you all.”
By amended information filed in February 2016, Jones was charged
with two counts of attempted murder with personal infliction of great bodily
injury and personal use of a deadly weapon allegations in connection with
two firefighter victims (counts 1 and 2; §§ 664, subd. (e)(1), 187, subd.(a)),
along with personal infliction of great bodily injury allegations (§§12022.7,
subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and personal use of a deadly and dangerous
weapon allegations (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). The
information also charged Jones with two counts of assault with a deadly
weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury, with personal
infliction of great bodily injury and personal use of a deadly weapon
enhancement allegations as to the same two firefighters (§ 245, subd. (c)),
along with allegations for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7,
subd.(a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and personally using a deadly and dangerous
weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). Jones was also charged with two counts of
battery, one each as to two transit system security guard victims.
The information also alleged multiple probation denial priors (§ 1203,
subd. (e)(4)), a serious prior felony for robbery (§§ 211, 667, subd. (a)(1), 668,
1192.7, subd. (c)), and a strike prior based on the same robbery (§§667,
subd. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12).
A jury convicted Jones of (1) the lesser included offenses of attempted
voluntary manslaughter, with true findings on the associated enhancement
allegations, as to the attempted murder charges; (2) both assault charges,
with true findings on the associated enhancement allegations; and (3) both
3
battery charges. Jones then admitted suffering the serious felony prior, the
strike prior, and the probation denial priors.
In April 2016, the court sentenced Jones to an upper term of 11 years
on the attempted voluntary manslaughter counts but stayed one of the counts
under section 654. The court added a two-year, eight-month consecutive term
for one assault with a deadly weapon count, plus a 10-year upper term for the
second count, which was stayed under section 654. In addition, the court
imposed a total term of five years for the weapon and great bodily injury
enhancements, plus five years for the serious felony prior. The total term
imposed was 23 years, eight months.
Jones appealed after his conviction and sentence, and this court
affirmed the judgment.
In October 2023, Jones filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. The court appointed counsel to represent him with respect to his
resentencing petition. In January 2024, the People filed a response to the
petition and explained the facts of the underlying offenses based on this
court’s prior opinion in People v. Jones, supra, D070280. The People also
included a copy of the jury instructions used at trial.
The court held a hearing on July 8, 2024, to determine if Jones
presented a prima facie case for relief. The prosecution’s position was that
Jones was ineligible for relief because attempted voluntary manslaughter is
not listed in section 1172.6 as an eligible offense and the jury was not given
instructions regarding imputing malice, since Jones was prosecuted as the
sole perpetrator. The defense asserted that attempted voluntary
manslaughter should also be considered an eligible offense under the
legislative intent of the statute, as the statute was “meant to be inclusive.”
The trial court granted Jones an evidentiary hearing.
4
In November 2024, the prosecutor filed a return to Jones’s petition3,
and the following month Jones submitted his reply.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on Jones’s petition in December
2025. The trial court referred to the trial transcript and noted that it was
“[a] lot more interesting the first time” the court had been involved, i.e., when
the same judge had presided over the original trial. At the hearing, the
prosecution again contended that because Jones was the sole perpetrator, he
is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The defense argued that even
though Jones was convicted of attempted crimes, he should be considered to
be within the spirit of the statute: “Although his convictions do not squarely
fall within [section] 1172.6, I believe that under [People v. Luu (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted, July 16, 2025, S291235], he is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. And that the Court still must make the findings
beyond a reasonable doubt as it relates to his status as either an accomplice
or a direct perpetrator, and other that [sic] that, we will submit on the
papers.
The trial court responded by stating, “All right, and in fact, we are
giving him that evidentiary hearing today.” The court then denied the
petition, making a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones was the sole
perpetrator of the crimes for which he was convicted: “So he is, in fact,
giving—I would say, it’s a process of—it is due process, a right to be heard,
but, the unfortunate thing for him is—and I didn’t need to review the trial
transcript for this because I was at the trial, [and] he is just not a major
3 In the return, the prosecutor noted that the court could take judicial
notice of the transcripts from the trial and cited to those transcripts to
demonstrate the underlying facts of the offenses for which Jones was
convicted.
5
contributor. That’s not our issue here. He’s a sole contributor. He was the
only one. There is no aider and abettor. There is no—there’s nobody else
involved in this other than himself. So therefore, beyond a reasonable doubt,
he does not fall within [section] 1172.6. He’s not eligible for relief, so that
matter is denied.” (Italics added.)
Jones filed a notice of appeal from the court’s denial of his section
1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
Jones’s appointed appellant counsel filed a brief notifying the court that
counsel has found no arguable issues and requesting this court proceed
pursuant to Delgadillo. Acknowledging the court need not undertake
independent review of the record, counsel nevertheless requests that this
court exercise discretion to conduct an independent review. Counsel
identifies three issues “counsel considered” but did not brief. These issues
include: (1) whether the prosecution failed to satisfy its burden of proof that
Jones is guilty under the amendments to sections 188 or 189 because no
evidence was formally admitted at the evidentiary hearing; (2) whether the
court erred in failing to review the trial transcripts that were in the court’s
possession and instead rely on the court’s memory that the trial involved
offenses alleged to have been committed only by Jones, alone; and
(3) whether the matter should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing
because trial counsel was ineffective where the record could be read as
demonstrating counsel was unaware that the hearing on December 5, 2025
was the evidentiary hearing. Given appellate counsel’s submission, we
offered Jones the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. Jones accepted
the opportunity and filed a supplemental brief.
6
We have exercised our discretion to review the record. (See Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We have also considered the potential issues
identified by Jones’s appellate counsel. We have not discovered any arguable
issue that would result in a reversal or modification of the trial court’s ruling.
Competent counsel has represented Jones in this appeal.
We next consider the arguments Jones sets out in his supplemental
brief. This 26-page, single-spaced, handwritten supplemental brief includes
references to a variety of legal authorities and legal principles, however, the
exact nature of Jones’s arguments, and the relevance of these legal principles
and authorities to those arguments, is not always clear. We have done our
best to discern what appear to be Jones’s main arguments, and our review
reveals that his complaints appear to challenge what occurred at his original
trial. For example, he discusses authorities setting out the law regarding
malicious prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct. Elsewhere, Jones
claims he “had ultimately broken no law” and that there was insufficient
evidence to charge him with certain crimes. He also seems to be challenging
various sentencing decisions the trial court made.
Such arguments cannot demonstrate the trial court erred in denying
Jones’s petition for relief pursuant to section 1172.6. “The mere filing of a
section 1170.95 [now renumbered as 1172.6] petition does not afford the
petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947; see People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
428, 438 [“statute does not permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on the
basis of alleged trial error”], abrogated on other grounds by People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).) Instead, section 1172.6 is a mechanism to
provide relief for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter convictions
7
that may have been based on now invalid theories. (Lewis, at pp. 959–960.)
Thus, Jones’s appellate arguments do not demonstrate the trial court erred in
denying him relief under section 1172.6.
Jones also sets out what appears to be a claim for a violation or
violations of the Racial Justice Act (RJA), although the specific type of
violation(s) he is asserting remains unclear. What is apparent from Jones’s
briefing, however, is that he is not referring to any of the proceedings that are
the subject of this appeal when he discusses these alleged RJA violations, in
that he does not discuss anything that occurred at the evidentiary hearing on
his section 1172.6 petition. Instead, Jones seems to be challenging the
prosecution’s charging decisions and events or conduct related to the original
trial proceedings. A claim regarding the RJA in connection with trial court
proceedings is not properly before this court on appeal from a postconviction
section 1172.6 petition. Rather, under section 745, subdivision (j), an
incarcerated defendant “whose judgment is already final [is] permitted to
bring a Racial Justice Act claim [based on violations that are alleged to have
resulted in that judgment] only in . . . a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to section 1473.” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985,
1000.)
In sum, Jones’s supplemental submission also does not raise any
potentially meritorious issues for reversal of the court’s current order.
8
DISPOSITION
The order denying Jones’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
BERMÚDEZ, J.
9
