Filed 10/8/26 P. v. Mangelli CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C103960
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 19FE014148)
v.

NICHOLAS MANGELLI,
Defendant and Appellant.

While serving a life sentence, defendant Nicholas Mangelli stabbed two other
inmates in separate incidents, killing them. A jury found defendant guilty of numerous
crimes, including assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury by a life prisoner under Penal Code 1 section 4500 (assault by a life
prisoner) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury by a prisoner
under section 4501, subdivision (b) (assault by a prisoner). He now challenges his
convictions under section 4501, contending that a person convicted under section 4500
cannot also be convicted under section 4501 for the same conduct. Defendant also argues
the trial court misunderstood its discretion when imposing his restitution fine and failed
to consider his ability to pay under People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp) before
imposing the restitution fine and certain assessments.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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 The People concede each point. As explained below, we accept the People’s
concessions. Defendant’s convictions for assault by a prisoner under section 4501,
subdivision (b) are reversed. We vacate the restitution fine, the court operations
assessment, and the court facilities assessment. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of imposing a restitution fine, a parole
revocation restitution fine, a court operations assessment, and a court facilities
assessment consistent with this opinion and our Supreme Court’s opinion in Kopp.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The prosecution charged defendant with two counts of murder, two counts of
assault by a life prisoner (§ 4500; counts 2 and 6), two counts of assault by a prisoner
(§ 4501, subd. (b); counts 3 and 7), and possessing or carrying a manufactured weapon
while a prisoner. As to both counts of murder, the prosecution alleged the special
circumstance that defendant had previously been convicted of first degree murder. The
prosecution also alleged that defendant used a deadly and dangerous weapon as to one
count of murder and both counts of assault by a life prisoner. During trial, the
prosecution added a deadly and dangerous weapon allegation to the other count of
murder. Finally, the prosecution alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike
conviction and was previously convicted of a serious felony.
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that in 2019, while in the exercise
yard, defendant stabbed a fellow inmate multiple times in the head and upper torso with a
piece of sharpened metal. The inmate died from the attack. Then, in 2022, again while
in the exercise yard, defendant and another inmate attacked a third inmate. Defendant
stabbed the victim multiple times in the face and upper torso with a sharp piece of metal.
The victim died from the attack. The parties stipulated that defendant had previously
been convicted of first degree murder and was serving a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole in California prison at the time of both incidents.

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 The jury found defendant guilty of both counts of first degree murder and guilty
on all other counts. The jury found true all allegations.
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a brief asserting that a restitution fine under
section 1202.4 would be excessive and that he lacked the ability to pay that fine.
Defendant also argued he did not have the ability to pay the court operations assessment,
court facilities assessment, criminal impact fee, or the costs to investigate and prepare the
probation report.
The trial court sentenced defendant to: (1) life without the possibility of parole for
each murder conviction and each assault by a life prisoner conviction; (2) 12 years (the
upper term, doubled due to the prior strike) for each assault by a prisoner conviction;
(3) eight years (the upper term, doubled) for the weapon possession conviction, to run
concurrently to his other sentences; (4) one year for each of the weapon enhancements
associated with the murder convictions; and (5) five years for the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement. The court stayed the sentences for both assault by a life
prisoner convictions and both assault by a prisoner convictions pursuant to section 654.
The court did not impose sentences for the weapon enhancements associated with the
assault by a life prisoner convictions, as the conduct underlying the enhancements was an
element of each offense. Defendant’s total sentence was two life without the possibility
of parole sentences plus seven years.
The trial court imposed “a minimum mandatory restitution fine pursuant to …
[s]ection 1202.4 in the amount of $2,100, that’s $300 which is the mandatory minimum
for each count of conviction.” The abstract of judgment indicates the trial court also
imposed a parole revocation restitution fine of $2,100. The court also imposed $280 for
the court operations assessment and $210 for the court facilities assessment. Defense
counsel directed the court to defendant’s argument regarding ability to pay. The court
responded, “I’m going to waive all nonmandatory fees and fines,” but “I have imposed
the fees and fines that are mandatory.”

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 Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant first argues we should vacate his assault by a prisoner (§ 4501,
subd. (b)) convictions because he was convicted of assault by a life prisoner (§ 4500) for
the same conduct. The People agree, as do we.
Section 4500 provides: “Every person while undergoing a life sentence, who is
sentenced to state prison within this state, and who, with malice aforethought, commits an
assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury is punishable with death or life
imprisonment without possibility of parole.” As relevant here, section 4501,
subdivision (b) provides: “Except as provided in [s]ection 4500, every person confined
in the state prison of this state who commits an assault upon the person of another by any
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury shall be guilty of a felony.” (Italics
added.)
In People v. Nava (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 624, a different panel of this court
considered “whether a person can be convicted under both sections 4500 and 4501 for the
same conduct,” and concluded they could not. (Nava, at p. 627; see id. at p. 629.) We
explained “that sections 4500 and 4501 describe two mutually exclusive crimes….
Section 4501’s ‘[e]xcept as provided in [s]ection 4500’ clause … prevents the two
statutes from covering the same conduct. It clarifies that when both statutes would
otherwise apply, section 4500 governs and section 4501 is inapplicable. [Citation.] So
when a defendant … is convicted as provided in section 4500, [the defendant] cannot also
be convicted as provided in section 4501 for the same conduct.” (Nava, at p. 628.)
Here, defendant was convicted under both section 4500 and section 4501 for each
in-prison assault in the case. Under Nava, the dual convictions under these statutes were
unlawful. (People v. Nava, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Accordingly, we reverse

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his convictions under section 4501 for assault by a prisoner. (§ 1260 [reviewing court
can modify an appealed judgment].)
Defendant next argues the trial court misunderstood its discretion by imposing a
$2,100 restitution fine under section 1202.4. The People state they are “constrained to
agree,” and we accept the People’s concession.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b) provides: “In every case where a person is
convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine ….
[¶] (1) … If the person is convicted of a felony, the fine shall not be less than three
hundred dollars ($300) and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).” As we
recently explained, this statute “provides for a restitution fine in ‘every case.’ A ‘ “case”
is a formal criminal proceeding, filed by the prosecution and handled by the court as a
separate action with its own number.’ [Citations.] The provision does not contemplate a
separate restitution fine for each individual count.” (People v. McAllister (2026)
122 Cal.App.5th 92, 96.)
Here, the trial court said it was imposing “a minimum mandatory restitution fine
… of $2,100, that’s $300 which is the mandatory minimum for each count of
conviction.” The court misunderstood its discretion because the minimum restitution fine
would be $300 for the entire case, not $300 per conviction. We agree with the parties
that the matter must be remanded for reconsideration of the appropriate restitution fine.
(See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [“ ‘Defendants are entitled to
sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing
court’ ”].) On remand, the trial court must reconsider the appropriate restitution fine
under section 1202.4 and, after doing so, calculate the appropriate parole revocation

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restitution fine. 2 (§ 1202.45, subd. (a) [parole revocation restitution fine is “same amount
as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 1202.4”].)
Finally, defendant requests that we remand for the trial court to consider whether
to impose the restitution fine, the court operations assessment, or the court facilities
assessment in light of Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1, which was decided after defendant’s
sentencing in this case. The People again concede that remand is appropriate.
In Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1, 30, our Supreme Court held that a “defendant may
challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive under the federal and
state Constitutions.” While the court did “not find a due process requirement to hold an
ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine,” it clarified “that the excessive
fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive
fines,” such as the restitution fine under section 1202.4 and the parole revocation
restitution fine under section 1202.45. (Kopp, at p. 23, see id. at pp. 13-14.) Our
Supreme Court also explained that, under section 1202.4, subdivisions (c) and (d), a
defendant “may seek to contest his[, her, or their] inability to pay the amount exceeding
the statutory minimum.” (Kopp, at pp. 23-24; see id. at p. 30; §§ 1202.4, subd. (c)
[“Inability to pay may be considered … in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in
excess of the minimum fine”], 1202.4, subd. (d) [“In setting the amount of the fine … in
excess of the minimum fine … the court shall consider any relevant factors, including,
but not limited to, the defendant’s inability to pay”].)

2 Defendant asserts that we should vacate the $2,100 parole revocation restitution
fine under section 1202.45. Though that fine is listed on the abstract of judgment, the
trial court did not orally impose it. When the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are in
conflict, the trial court’s oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186.) Accordingly, there is no parole revocation restitution fine to
vacate.

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 Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1, 31, further held that, if a defendant requests, a trial
“court must consider [the] defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations
assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1)” or a court facilities
assessment under Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1). (See Kopp, at
p. 30 [given that the Legislature has provided fee waivers to indigent civil litigants,
“equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a [criminal]
defendant’s inability to pay” before imposing either assessment].)
The record here suggests that the trial court imposed the restitution fine and
assessments at issue because, despite defendant’s argument that the restitution fine was
excessive and that defendant lacked the ability to pay the court operations assessment and
the court facilities assessment, the court believed the fine and assessments were
nonetheless mandatory. In light of Kopp, we vacate the court operations assessment and
the court facilities assessment and remand for the trial court to consider defendant’s
ability to pay with respect to these assessments. On remand, defendant may also assert
that the restitution fine violates the excessive fines clauses of the federal and state
Constitutions, and argue his inability to pay any fine in excess of $300 under
section 1202.4.

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 DISPOSITION
Defendant’s convictions for assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury by a prisoner under section 4501 are reversed. We vacate the restitution
fine, the court operations assessment, and the court facilities assessment. As modified,
the judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of imposing a
restitution fine, a parole revocation restitution fine, a court operations assessment, and a
court facilities assessment consistent with this opinion and our Supreme Court’s opinion
in Kopp. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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