Filed 10/8/26 Marriage of Post CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of REIDEL and
EDWARD LEE POST.
G066361
REIDEL POST,
(Super. Ct. No. 94D04864)
Appellant,
OPINION
v.
EDWARD LEE POST,
Respondent.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Eric J. Wersching, Judge. Dismissed.
Bisbee Law Group and Ronn Bisbee for Appellant.
Law Offices of John J. Brunelli and John J. Brunelli; Law Offices
of Thomas M. McIntosh and Thomas M. McIntosh for Respondent.
This appeal arises from a family law proceeding in which ex-wife
Reidel Post attempted to collect on a 25-year-old support arrearage by
obtaining an earnings assignment order (EAO) against Edward Post. Reidel
did so on an ex parte basis with no notice to Edward.1 The court refused to
file the requested EAO on the ground that there had been no judicial
determination of arrearages. Reidel appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the parties settled the underlying
support dispute. The parties have asked that we address the merits of the
appeal notwithstanding the settlement. Reidel argues that the issue here—
whether an EAO can issue on a pure arrearage without a noticed hearing to
determine the amount—is the cause of confusion among the trial courts.
However, we are not persuaded that the issue is likely to come up often in
light of the current state of the law, which now requires that an EAO issue
with every support judgment. Moreover, we generally avoid deciding
questions where there is no longer an actual controversy as it undermines the
safeguards inherent in an adversarial proceeding. On those grounds, we
decline to decide the merits and instead dismiss the appeal as moot.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1994, Reidel petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to
Edward. The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement, which was
reduced to a judgment in 1995 (1995 judgment). The uncontested judgment
included a division of community property, an equalization order, and orders
for child and spousal support. The child and spousal support terminated
around the year 2000.
1 As is customary in family law matters, we refer to the parties by
their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
2
Thirty years after the 1995 judgment, Reidel filed an ex parte
request to issue an EAO against Edward. Reidel declared that Edward owed
her almost $500,000 in support arrearages (about 75 percent of which was
calculated as interest on missed payments). At no point did the trial court
make any determination as to arrearages, and by all appearances, this was
the first time Reidel attempted to enforce the support order.
The trial court refused to allow Reidel to file the ex parte request
on the ground that it had made no determination of arrearages. In a
somewhat unusual move, despite not allowing Reidel to file her request, the
court issued a written denial of the request. Reidel appealed in December
2025.
While the appeal was pending, in March 2026, Reidel filed a
request for order asking the court to adjudicate support arrearages, issue an
EAO, and add a lien against Edward’s house to secure payment of the
arrearage. The matter was set for hearing on June 12, 2026.
On May 29, 2026, Edward listed his home for sale. Reidel
responded by recording a lis pendens against the house.
On the date of the hearing, the parties settled the arrearages
dispute. Edward agreed to pay Reidel $25,000 out of the proceeds of the sale
of his home, and Reidel agreed to record a satisfaction of judgment and
release the lis pendens. The stipulation and order containing the settlement
agreement included a broad release of claims, both known and unknown,
“arising out of, or in any way related to, the disputes and differences
identified in this family law case.”
The settlement then directly addressed the pending appeal:
“[Riedel] further agrees to forgo, forfeit, and/or decline any order made in the
appellate case for attorney fees. However, the appeal shall continue against
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the Superior Court to resolve an issue of law only. The parties agree that no
ruling from the appellate case shall impact [Edward] in any way. This Accord
& Satisfaction, made an order of the court, shall ensure all matters in dispute
are resolved entirely, regardless of the outcome of the appeal.”
The stipulation and order provided that the trial court
maintained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6. In its minute order approving the stipulation and
order, the trial court ordered counsel to serve a copy on this court.
Edward’s counsel moved to augment the record on July 14, 2026,
attaching the stipulation and order settling the case, together with the trial
court’s minute order ordering him to serve this court. We granted the motion
to augment. We then issued an order that the parties file letter briefs
addressing whether the appeal is moot and whether it should be dismissed.
Both parties complied, asking us to decide the issue on appeal
notwithstanding the settlement.
DISCUSSION
“When a case has settled, dismissal of the appeal is the
appropriate disposition . . . .” (Larner v. Los Angeles Doctors Hospital
Associates, LP (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1296.) “‘An appellate court will
not review questions which are moot and which are only of academic
importance.’ [Citations.] A question becomes moot when, pending an appeal
from a judgment of a trial court, events transpire that prevent the appellate
court from granting any effectual relief.” (Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 413, 419.) A settlement moots the issues on appeal because the
settlement “is decisive of the rights of the parties and bars reopening the
issues settled. Absent a fundamental defect the terms are binding on the
parties . . . . ‘[T]he merits of the original controversy are no longer in issue
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when a compromise agreement is made in good faith and without fraud,
duress or undue influence.’” (A.L.L. Roofing & Bldg. Materials Corp. v.
Community Bank (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 356, 359.)
Here, the settlement explicitly recites that any disposition on
appeal shall have no effect on the parties. It is intentionally designed to moot
the appeal. Moreover, the settlement contains a complete waiver of all claims
related to the original family law judgment, leaving the settlement
agreement as the sole vehicle providing for the rights of the parties. This
strongly counsels in favor of dismissing the appeal, which is based entirely on
the pre-existing family law judgment.
There is, however, a discretionary exception to the mootness
doctrine that the parties urge us to apply here. In particular, a “court may
excuse mootness and reach the merits of an issue that is ‘capable of repetition
yet evading review.’ Case law recognizes the need to address such issues,
particularly in ‘matters of broad public interest that are likely to recur.’”
(Bracher v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1455.) We decline to
exercise that discretion in this case for two reasons.
First, the issue here does not seem likely to recur often. The
question presented is whether an EAO can issue on arrearages—without
notice to the obligor—when there has been no judicial determination of the
amount of arrearages. (See Fam. Code, § 5253.) However, since 1990, it has
been mandatory that all support judgments include an EAO at the time the
support judgment is entered. (Fam. Code, § 5230; former Civil Code,
§ 4390.3.) Although the 1995 judgment here does not include such an order,
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given that this requirement has been in place for over 36 years, it seems to us
the present case is likely an exceptional one.2
Second, we believe it would not be prudent to wade into this issue
without the safeguards of an adversarial process between two parties with
financial stakes in the outcome. Family Code section 5253 expressly provides
a process for issuing an EAO without notice to the obligor, and as such it
raises potentially significant Due Process concerns. The parties have not
briefed those concerns extensively. Though we could order additional briefing,
we believe the wiser course of action is to avoid such weighty issues when we
do not have two financially motivated parties with directly opposing views to
forcefully articulate their positions. “‘[T]ruth,’ Lord Eldon said, ‘is best
discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.’” (United
States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 655.) Such truths are best uncovered
through the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” (Id. at p. 656.)
Without financially interested parties, we can have no assurance that such
adversarial testing will occur here.
2 The record is silent as to why the 1995 judgment did not include
an EAO.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SERVINO, J.
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