Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Walker CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C102534
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 07F09598)
v.

WILLIE WALKER, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Willie Walker, Jr., is serving life in prison without the possibility of
parole after a jury found him guilty of murder related to the shooting death of the victim
during a robbery. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing in which the court found
defendant could still be convicted of murder because he was a major participant in the
robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. 1

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant filed the petition
under section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section
1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We
refer to the statute as section 1172.6 in this opinion.

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 On appeal, defendant claims insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
reckless indifference finding. We affirm the order denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts
In October 2007, Craig Cagley was at his friend A.B.’s apartment for a party.
(People v. Walker (Jun. 22, 2010, C062543) [nonpub. opn.].)2 After the party ended
Cagley decided to stay at the apartment because he was too intoxicated to drive. (Ibid.)
Cagley went outside to put his sweatshirt in his car and encountered defendant and
Adaryll Weaver armed with guns. (Ibid.) Cagley returned to the apartment, knocked on
A.B.’s bedroom door, and told A.B. that someone was there to see him. (Ibid.) When
A.B. opened the door, defendant and Weaver pointed their guns at his face and told him
to get down. (Ibid.)
While on the ground, defendant repeatedly hit A.B. in the face with the butt of his
gun. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) A.B. grabbed defendant’s gun and wrestled
with defendant, but Weaver struck A.B. on the head with his gun causing A.B. to
blackout. (Ibid.) When A.B. came to defendant told him to take off his clothes, pointed
his gun at A.B.’s crotch, and threatened to shoot off his penis. (Ibid.)
Defendant left the room with Cagley; Weaver remained in the room to guard A.B.
(People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) Weaver threatened A.B., asking him if he wanted
to die that night. (Ibid.) Weaver instructed A.B. to put his clothes on, get the biggest bag
he could find, and start to fill it. (Ibid.) Weaver then told A.B. to crawl to the living

2 We take judicial notice of our opinion from defendant’s prior appeal (Evid. Code,
§§ 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)). We provide this summary of facts from
the prior opinion in defendant’s direct appeal for context. In analyzing the issues, we rely
upon the 1172.6 evidentiary hearing transcript and the evidence submitted at the
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

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room to repeat the process. (Ibid.) When A.B. was too slow, he was punched, kicked,
and hit in the head with a gun, which caused A.B. to blackout again. (Ibid.) A.B. came
to in the hallway. (Ibid.) Defendant and Weaver jumped on him and demanded his
“PIN” number and wallet. A.B. crawled back to his room and gave defendant and
Weaver his wallet. (Ibid.) At some point, defendant asked him, “ ‘Do you want to die
today?’ ” (Ibid.)
Defendant and Weaver told A.B. to keep his head down, look at the wall, and then
draped a blanket over him. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) A.B. had trouble
breathing, so he turned his head, which uncovered his face. (Ibid.) He heard defendant
or Weaver say, “ ‘stay down, don’t move,’ ” and Cagley say something he could not
recall. (Ibid.) Next, A.B. saw feet walking backwards towards the door and heard a loud
pop, followed by Cagley exhaling. (Ibid.)
A.B. sustained fractures to the right side of the skull, the right back side of his
head, and chin; a broken nose; a deviated septum; a cut behind his left ear; a chipped
tooth; and post-traumatic stress disorder. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) Cagley
died from a single gunshot wound to the forehead. (Ibid.) Weaver admitted to the police
that he shot Cagley but said that it was an accident, which occurred as he and defendant
were getting ready to leave. (Ibid.)
Two months prior to the October robbery, two men entered the apartment of J.T.
through an unlocked door. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) They closed and locked
the door and one of the men said, “ ‘you don’t want to see what I have because you’ll get
dead.’ ” (Ibid.) The men ordered J.T. to his knees and told him to take off his pants.
(Ibid.)
The men kept asking him, “ ‘Where is the gun?’ ” while rummaging through the
apartment. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) The men made J.T. open his safe and
they took $2,100, which was stored inside. (Ibid.) One of the men threw CDs at J.T.,
repeatedly punched him in the face, and directed the other man to destroy J.T.’s

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computer. (Ibid.) One of the men then ordered J.T. into the living room and told him to
kneel down. (Ibid.) The man struck J.T. again. (Ibid.) J.T., thinking the men were
going to damage his computer, ran to the door. (Ibid.) Once outside he called for help
before getting into a fight with one of the men. (Ibid.) Both men ran away when J.T.’s
neighbor came outside. (Ibid.) J.T. did not recognize either man, but defendant’s
fingerprints were found on one of the CDs in the apartment. (Ibid.)
B. Procedural Background
In 2009, a jury found defendant guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)(1)), assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of robbery (§ 211), two counts of
burglary (§ 459), and being a felon in possession of a gun (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The
jury found true the allegation that defendant used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) with
respect to the murder and one of the robbery counts. The jury also found true the
allegation that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery and a burglary
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the
possibility of parole plus 16 years.
Defendant appealed and, in 2010, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Walker, supra, C062543.)
C. Petition For Resentencing
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95. The People responded that the trial court should deny the petition
because defendant was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. In reply, defendant conceded he was a major participant in
the robbery but claimed he did not act with reckless indifference to human life.
Defendant also acknowledged he was aware that both he and Weaver had guns, the
robbery was “longer” in duration, and there was “violence during the commission of the
robbery.”

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 In June 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the
parties’ briefs, the trial transcripts, and hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court took
the matter under submission and later filed a written order denying defendant’s petition.
The trial court found: Defendant and Weaver were both armed during the robbery
and defendant knew Weaver was armed. Both men used their guns throughout the
robbery to threaten and control the victims. Defendant threatened to kill and shoot off
A.B.’s penis, assaulted both victims, and watched Weaver use his pistol to beat A.B. in
the head.
Defendant was present at the robbery, was not a passive participant, and could
have restrained Weaver’s violence. Defendant was actively involved in controlling,
threatening, and beating the victims.
The robbery was of a “significant duration,” over 15 minutes in duration. During
that time, defendant and Weaver assaulted, threatened with death, and physically
controlled the victims. Defendant directed Cagley to stay on the ground and forced A.B.
to cover himself with a blanket so he could not see defendant and Weaver’s actions.
“The prolonged period of restraint in fact increased the manifestation of violence in the
robbery, not the mere potential for violence.”
The trial court found no indication that defendant had prior knowledge of
Weaver’s likelihood to kill, however, it found defendant used violence throughout the
robbery and took no action to minimize the risk; noting one of the victims testified
defendant was more violent than Weaver. The court also considered evidence of
defendant’s violent actions in a similar previous robbery to inform its analysis as to
whether he minimized the risk of violence.
The trial court also considered defendant’s age and maturity at the time of the
crime: defendant had just turned 22 years old. The court found defendant provided no
evidence that his youthfulness had an impact on his recklessness during the commission
of the robbery. The court found defendant’s decision-making and conduct were not

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impulsive but rather the result of a plan. Defendant had ample time and opportunity to
reflect on his choices. Defendant’s participation in a similar robbery six weeks prior
indicated he was not swept up in circumstances beyond his control that led to the victim’s
death.
The trial court concluded that defendant “chose to participate in a high risk home
invasion robbery with at least one loaded weapon. [Defendant] recklessly disregarded
the lives of the victims and did nothing to minimize the danger of lethal force being used.
As recounted above, [defendant’s] conduct was violent and there is no evidence that
petitioner’s violence throughout the robbery was a product of youthful immaturity.
Therefore, based on the totality of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt [found] that
[defendant] was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference
to human life.”
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6 & Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) amended the
felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f) [amending sections 188 and 189].) Where, like here, the trial court issues an
order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is
guilty of murder under California law as amended by the changes to section 188 or 189
made effective by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The parties may offer
evidence from a prior trial, or new or additional evidence at the hearing. (Ibid.)

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 We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing
for substantial evidence. (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “Our
job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the
trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is
to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We examine “ ‘the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier
of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. San
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit
credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Pham (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925.)
B. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
When “Senate Bill 1437 amended … section 189 to incorporate major
participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of
those requirements elucidated in” the cases People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
710.) Banks considered “under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to
kill may qualify as a major participant.” (Banks, supra, at p. 794.) Because defendant
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence related to the trial court’s finding that
he was a major participant in the underlying robbery, we focus our discussion on the
court’s findings of reckless indifference to human life under Clark.
Reckless indifference to human life is “ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.

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616.) It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a
distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.)
Recklessness has both a subjective and an objective component. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Subjectively, the defendant must consciously disregard risks
known to him. (Ibid.) Objectively, recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s conduct
“ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in
the actor’s situation would observe.’ ” (Ibid.) The fact that a robbery involved a gun or
carried a risk of death is insufficient, by itself, to support a finding of reckless
indifference. (Id. at pp. 617-618; see also In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
[“ ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force
might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life”].)
Clark identified various factors to be considered in determining whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.)
These include: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the
felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the
victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony
and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the
defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (In re Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [listing factors set forth in Clark, supra, at pp. 618-623].)
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that no one of the above major
participant or reckless indifference factors is necessary, nor is any of them necessarily
sufficient. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) There is a recognized overlap between
being a major participant and having a reckless indifference to human life. As our

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Supreme Court acknowledged in Clark, “ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the
felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(Id. at p. 615.) With these concepts in mind, we turn to defendant’s evidentiary
challenge.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Applying the Clark factors, we conclude
the totality of the record contains sufficient evidence from which the trial court could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with reckless indifference to
Cagley’s life.
The first Clark factor (knowledge of weapons and use and number of weapons)
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618) favors finding defendant recklessly disregarded the
victim’s life during the crime. The evidence shows defendant planned and intended to
use guns during the robbery. Defendant and Weaver used the guns to physically control
the victims through violence and intimidation. Weaver struck A.B. in the head with his
pistol and defendant beat and threatened to shoot both victims. “A defendant’s use of a
firearm, even if the defendant does not kill the victim ..., can be significant in the analysis
of reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.)
For the second Clark factor (presence at the scene and opportunity to prevent or
mitigate the crime or aid the victim) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619), defendant was
at the scene of the robbery and was not only an active participant in the violence against
A.B. and Cagley but instructed Weaver to control, threaten, and beat the victims.
Defendant’s actions escalated the situation and made it more likely that violence would
occur. After Cagley was shot, defendant fled the apartment.
The third Clark factor (duration of the interaction between the perpetrators and
victims) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620) further weighs against defendant. The
robbery took at least 15 minutes, in which defendant and Weaver brutally beat A.B. and

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threatened violence against both victims. It is reasonable to conclude the long period of
escalating violence during the robbery increased the risk and likelihood of violence,
which ended in Cagley’s fatal shooting.
For the fourth Clark factor (knowledge codefendant was likely to kill and
minimizing violence) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621), the trial court acknowledged
there was no indication defendant had prior knowledge of Weaver’s propensity for
violence or to kill. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that defendant did
anything to lessen the risk of violence during the crime. Rather, there is overwhelming
evidence that defendant increased the risk of violence by beating the victims and
instructing Weaver to be violent.
Defendant claims the trial court did not properly consider defendant’s age and
maturity. He argues defendant’s realization that it was a “big mistake” after Weaver
killed Cagley shows he did not appreciate the risks inherent in the robbery. We disagree.
Defendant was involved in the planning and execution of the robbery and had previously
participated in a similar robbery six weeks earlier. There is no evidence in the record that
the robbery was impulsive or that defendant was a victim of peer pressure. (People v.
Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489.)
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.

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 III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is affirmed.

/S/
RENNER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/
KRAUSE, J.

/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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