Filed 9/29/26 R.V. v. Los Angeles Unified School District CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
R.V., B344935
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV40660)
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Herman Law and Allegra P. Rineer for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Vanderford & Ruiz, Rodolfo F. Ruiz and Erin E. Uyeshima
for Defendant and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant R.V. sued respondent Los Angeles Unified School
District (LAUSD), alleging negligence and negligent supervision
arising out of his claim that, in the early 1980’s, middle school
teacher Rodolphe Demordaigle sexually abused him. R.V.
claimed that LAUSD knew or should have known of the danger
Demordaigle posed to students and failed to respond
appropriately. The trial court granted LAUSD’s motion for
summary judgment of the complaint on the ground that there
was no triable issue of material fact as to LAUSD’s knowledge
that Demordaigle posed a foreseeable danger to students. It also
granted summary adjudication of R.V.’s negligence causes of
action with respect to claims of off-campus abuse, based on
Education Code section 44808.1 We conclude R.V. raised a triable
issue of material fact and LAUSD was not immune from liability
for the off-campus abuse. We therefore reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
LAUSD hired Demordaigle as a science teacher in 1969. At
that time, Demordaigle had never been accused of sexual
misconduct or inappropriate conduct with children. He did not
have a criminal history. Demordaigle satisfied the background
check procedures necessary to be hired by LAUSD.
Demordaigle taught at Joseph Le Conte Middle School (Le
Conte) during the relevant period. According to Demordaigle,
“the subject [of taking kids on field trips] never even came up”
between Demordaigle and Le Conte’s principal, James Good.
Demordaigle testified that he obtained field trip permission slips
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Education
Code.
2
for “the 9th grade class or if [he] took a bunch of 8th graders on a
field trip in a bus.” He did not obtain permission slips for
weekend trips but had a “personal conversation with [the
children’s] parents that gave permission.”
From 1982 to 1983, R.V. was a student in Demordaigle’s
eighth grade science class at Le Conte. R.V. claims that
Demordaigle sexually abused him during that period. The first
incident occurred at Demordaigle’s home after an unofficial day
trip. Demordaigle later molested R.V. at school.
At the beginning of one week in late 1982 or early 1983,
Demordaigle “started saying that he wanted [R.V.] and [another
student] to go on—on the trip to the mountains with him.”
Demordaigle had initially asked R.V. to go alone, but R.V. said
no. Demordaigle then said he would “ ‘invite [the other student]
so [R.V.] could feel more comfortable.’ ” That Saturday,
Demordaigle and another man, possibly Demordaigle’s
roommate, took R.V. and a classmate on a trip to the mountains
to look for rocks. R.V. did not recognize the other man from
school. Demordaigle picked R.V. up from his home and obtained
permission from R.V.’s mother to take him on the trip. After
returning from the mountains, Demordaigle brought R.V. and the
other boy to his home. The other man and R.V.’s classmate went
into a bedroom. Demordaigle sexually abused R.V., then drove
him home.
The Monday after the trip, the head school counselor,
Aaron Moretzsky, pulled R.V. and the other boy aside in
Demordaigle’s classroom and said, “ ‘I never, ever want you to go
in the vehicle anywhere with the teacher. I want you to stay
away from him, other than activities in class. I never want you to
go anywhere with him. Do you guys understand that?’ ”
3
Moretzsky further stated: “ ‘We’ve been telling him to stay away
from kids on the weekends, not to take them on any trips, and
he’s not listening to us, so please stay away from him.’ ” He also
told R.V. and his classmate: “ ‘I don’t want you to tell me what
happened. I just want you to stay away from him.’ ” Moretzsky
pulled R.V. aside on a few other occasions to remind him to “ ‘stay
away’ ” from Demordaigle. R.V. did not tell Moretzsky about the
abuse. Moretzsky did not say anything about inappropriate
touching.2 Moretzsky monitored a portion of Demordaigle’s class
almost every day during the period in which the abuse allegedly
occurred. The vice principal also observed Demordaigle’s class on
a few occasions.
Within a week of the trip to the mountains, Demordaigle
stopped at R.V.’s desk during class and rubbed his groin against
R.V.’s back. He also rubbed R.V.’s inner thigh with his hand.3
Other students were present but Moretzsky was not in the room.
R.V. testified that it was possible a teacher’s assistant was
present, but he did not recall one being there. During the next
six to eight weeks, similar incidents occurred another three to
four times while R.V. was in Demordaigle’s class.
In 1997, Demordaigle was convicted of child molestation.
The underlying misconduct involved other Le Conte students.
Before 1997, Demordaigle had not been accused of child
molestation or abuse.
2 Moretzsky died in 2011.
3 R.V. testified that Demordaigle rubbed himself against
R.V.’s back for “half a second or a second,” and rubbed the outside
of R.V.’s pants for “two, three seconds” before moving his hand.
4
The first time R.V. told anyone about the abuse was when
he contacted the law firm that represents him in this action. He
had no knowledge of any student or parent reporting
Demordaigle to the school. R.V. also had no knowledge that
Moretzsky or any member of the Le Conte administration
“covered up” information about Demordaigle abusing students.
R.V. filed this action in November 2021. The operative
complaint asserted causes of action for negligence and negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision against LAUSD. The
complaint alleged that Demordaigle’s sexual abuse of R.V. and
other students was “open and obvious and known to” LAUSD,
that the vice principal of Le Conte was aware of prior complaints
against Demordaigle, and LAUSD employees at Le Conte “knew
[of] or suspected [Demordaigle] of sexual abuse of minors,
including [R.V.]” The complaint further alleged that although
LAUSD had actual or constructive knowledge that Demordaigle
was sexually assaulting students, the school district retained
him, failed to properly supervise him, did not investigate reports
of misconduct, and failed to take corrective action.
In July 2024, LAUSD moved for summary judgment, or, in
the alternative, summary adjudication, of the operative
complaint on four grounds: 1) the negligence cause of action
failed because no LAUSD employee had a reasonable suspicion
that Demordaigle would abuse any student; 2) LAUSD was
immune from any liability arising from Demordaigle’s
misconduct off school grounds after school hours; 3) LAUSD was
immune from liability for misconduct that occurred on a field trip
or excursion; and 4) R.V.’s cause of action for negligent retention,
hiring, or supervision failed because LAUSD did not breach any
duty in its hiring, training, or supervision of Demordaigle.
5
LAUSD argued that none of its employees had a reasonable
suspicion that Demordaigle would abuse any student until he
was arrested in 1997 on an unrelated case. It asserted that
Moretzsky’s alleged statements to R.V. were inadmissible
hearsay and did not prove that Moretzsky or any other LAUSD
employee knew or reasonably should have known that
Demordaigle would sexually abuse R.V. Similarly, evidence that
Moretzsky sat in on Demordaigle’s class did not establish that
LAUSD knew Demordaigle would sexually abuse students.
LAUSD further argued that it was immune from liability for
Demordaigle’s misconduct off school grounds pursuant to
section 44808.
R.V. opposed the motion. He asserted that triable issues of
material fact existed with respect to LAUSD’s negligence. R.V.
relied on Moretzsky’s statements to R.V. and his classmate and
Moretzsky’s observation of Demordaigle’s classroom. R.V. further
asserted that section 44808 did not apply because his off-campus
injuries resulted from LAUSD’s negligence while he was on
campus. In support of the opposition, R.V. submitted the
transcripts from his deposition and the deposition of
Demordaigle.
In its reply, LAUSD contended the testimony from R.V. and
Demordaigle that Principal Good and Moretzsky knew that
Demordaigle was taking children on field trips and had asked
him to stop did not constitute evidence that they knew or
reasonably should have known that Demordaigle was abusing
children. LAUSD further argued that R.V. failed to establish
that it was not entitled to immunity under section 44808, as
there was no evidence that LAUSD assumed responsibility for
the trip or that any negligence by a school employee on school
6
premises proximately caused the abuse. LAUSD also objected to
some of the deposition testimony R.V. offered in opposition to the
motion.
The trial court overruled some of LAUSD’s objections to
R.V.’s testimony recounting Moretzsky’s and Demordaigle’s
statements. The court otherwise sustained LAUSD’s evidentiary
objections.
The court further concluded LAUSD was immune from
liability for the off-campus abuse pursuant to section 44808, as
there was no evidence that LAUSD authorized the trip
beforehand, undertook to provide transportation, sponsored the
activity, or assumed responsibility with regard to it. Quoting
Blue Mountain Enterprises, LLC v. Owen (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
537, 549, the court stated: “ ‘[W]here two or more separate and
distinct [wrongful] acts are combined in the same cause of action
in a complaint, a party may present a summary adjudication
motion that pertains to some, but not all, of the separate and
distinct wrongful acts.’ ” It therefore granted summary
adjudication of R.V.’s causes of action as they related to the off-
campus abuse.
The trial court noted that it was undisputed that R.V. did
not disclose the abuse to anyone before filing his lawsuit and did
not make any complaints concerning Demordaigle. There was no
admissible evidence that anyone other than Demordaigle and
R.V. was aware of the abuse in the classroom. The court
observed that Moretzsky’s statements to R.V. after the off-
campus abuse occurred could arguably create a triable issue of
fact as to whether LAUSD had knowledge that Demordaigle
presented a risk of sexual abuse to his students. However, R.V.
provided no evidence concerning the reason Moretzsky wanted
7
R.V. to stay away from Demordaigle, or why Moretzsky and the
vice principal were observing Demordaigle’s class. The court
therefore concluded that a factfinder would have to speculate to
find that it was because they knew Demordaigle was sexually
abusing or otherwise harming students. The court therefore
granted summary judgment of the complaint.
R.V. moved for reconsideration of the order. He asserted
that additional testimony and evidence showing LAUSD’s
negligence in hiring, retaining, and supervising Demordaigle had
been left out of the opposition “[d]ue to mistake and inadvertence
by [R.V.]’s counsel.” This consisted of deposition testimony and
other evidence from an action brought by another alleged victim
of Demordaigle, A.S. The A.S. matter had been consolidated with
R.V.’s case.
After the court entered judgment in LAUSD’s favor, R.V.
filed an ex parte motion to advance the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied. R.V. timely
appealed the trial court’s order entering summary judgment
before the court decided his motion for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
LAUSD is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment or
Summary Adjudication
A. Standard of review
“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no
triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).) We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection
with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded)
and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably
8
supports. (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 612.)
In the trial court, once a moving defendant has ‘shown that one
or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately
pleaded, cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the
plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action . . . .’ ” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th
465, 476–477.) The same process and standard of review apply to
a motion for summary adjudication. (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis
Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 924.)
R.V. asks us to consider evidence obtained in the case
another Le Conte student, A.S., brought against LAUSD. R.V.
did not submit this evidence with his opposition to LAUSD’s
motion for summary judgment. Instead, he attached the evidence
to his motion for reconsideration, which is not at issue in this
appeal. We therefore do not consider it when determining
whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment or
summary adjudication. (Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc.
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, 522 [“ ‘ “ ‘[W]e take the facts from the
record that was before the trial court when it ruled on [the
summary judgment] motion’ ” ’ ”]; Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 884, 891, fn. 3 [additional evidence presented with
motion for reconsideration was “not relevant to [court’s] review of
the initial grant of summary judgment and therefore [was] not
discussed or considered”].)4
4 R.V. cites George v. Shams-Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th
134, for the proposition that we may consider evidence presented
9
B. Summary judgment of R.V.’s negligence causes
of action
“ ‘To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff
must show that the “defendant had a duty to use due care, that
he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or
legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Whether a duty
exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court,’ while
breach and causation are questions for the fact finder.” (C.F. v.
Alternative Family Services, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1208,
1229–1230 (C.F.).)
Although there is no general duty to control the conduct of
another or warn those endangered by such conduct, “ ‘a duty to
control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with
the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control
that person’s conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘Similarly, a duty to warn or
protect may be found if the defendant has a special relationship
with the potential victim that gives the victim a right to expect
protection.’ [Citation.]” (C.F., supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.)
“Public entities such as LAUSD are generally immune from
liability. (Gov. Code, § 815.) However, ‘a public school district
may be vicariously liable under [Government Code] section 815.2
with the motion for reconsideration because it forms part of the
record on appeal. George involved an appeal from an award of
sanctions and corresponding motion for reconsideration, not a
motion for summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 137–138.) It is unclear
whether the appellant submitted any new evidence in connection
with the motion for reconsideration, which argued that the
sanctions request was untimely. (Id. at p. 138.) In any event, the
opinion does not discuss whether evidence presented with a
motion for reconsideration may properly be considered when the
motion is not at issue on appeal.
10
for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring,
supervising and retaining a school employee’ who harms a
student. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012)
53 Cal.4th 861, 879 (C.A.).) This potential liability ‘arises from
the special relationship’ between schools and students, ‘which
relationship entail[s] the duty to take reasonable measures to
protect [students] from injuries at the hands of others in the
school environment.’ (Id. at p. 877.)” (Taylor v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 769, 774 (Taylor).)
“School principals and other supervisory employees, to the extent
their duties include overseeing the educational environment and
the performance of teachers and counselors, . . . have the
responsibility of taking reasonable measures to guard pupils
against harassment and abuse from foreseeable sources,
including any teachers or counselors they know or have reason to
know are prone to such abuse.” (C.A., at p. 871.)
“The negligence standard articulated by C.A. for hiring,
supervising, or retaining an assaultive employee—‘knew or
should have known’ (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875) or ‘know or
have reason to know’ (id. at p. 871)—thus imposes liability on a
school district on the basis of supervisory personnel’s constructive
knowledge that an employee is prone to harm students.
Constructive knowledge is knowledge that ‘may be shown by
circumstantial evidence “which is nothing more than one or more
inferences which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of
proven facts.” ’ [Citation.]” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 26 (Hesperia).) Constructive
knowledge exists where there is evidence a “district employee
saw [the offending employee] do anything abusive or
inappropriate, or giving rise to suspicion of abuse or
11
inappropriate behavior.” (Rancho Cucamonga Central School
Dist. v. Superior Court (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 718, 722 (Rancho
Cucamonga).)
LAUSD presented evidence that it did not have actual
knowledge that Demordaigle had sexually abused students. R.V.
testified that he did not report Demordaigle’s abuse to anyone at
the time it occurred. There is no evidence that the abuse took
place in the presence of any other LAUSD employee. Although
R.V. speculated that a teacher’s assistant could have been
present during the incidents in the classroom, he did not recall
one being there. Demordaigle did not have any criminal record at
the time and was not accused of sexual abuse until 1997.
We therefore consider whether R.V. carried his burden of
showing a triable issue of fact. As the trial court observed, R.V.’s
testimony concerning Moretzsky’s statements is the only
admitted evidence that arguably creates a triable issue of fact.
These statements were not direct evidence that LAUSD had
actual knowledge that Demordaigle had sexually abused
students. However, a trier of fact would not need to speculate to
conclude that Moretzsky’s statements demonstrated LAUSD’s
constructive knowledge of sexual abuse.
Hesperia, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 13, is instructive. The
plaintiffs in Hesperia were elementary school students who
claimed they were sexually abused by a school janitor. (Id. at
pp. 18–19.) They did not allege that the defendant district had
actual knowledge of the abuse, but that “two principals, one of
whom was also a school district director, and an assistant
principal witnessed plaintiffs sitting on [the janitor’s] lap and
[the janitor] escorting plaintiffs across campus to empty rooms,”
in violation of school policies prohibiting school employees from
12
being alone with a student in a room with a closed door or having
physical contact with student in a private setting. (Id. at p. 30;
see id. at p. 20.) The Court of Appeal concluded these allegations
established that “the District had reason to know or should have
known that [the janitor] posed a foreseeable risk of sexually
abusing plaintiffs” and were sufficient to state a claim for
negligent supervision or retention. (Id. at p. 30.)
R.V.’s testimony concerning Moretzsky’s statements
likewise creates a reasonable inference that members of the Le
Conte administration knew that Demordaigle was taking select
students on weekend trips without other employees present and
that Demordaigle refused to stop, despite repeated requests. A
trier of fact could find that Demordaigle’s insistence on
continuing to take students on unauthorized trips should have
given rise to suspicion of sexual abuse. (See, e.g., Hesperia,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 [janitor’s repeated violations of
school policy by being alone with students in rooms with closed
doors and having physical contact with students sufficient to
state claim for negligent retention].) When viewed together with
this evidence, R.V.’s testimony that Moretzsky observed
Demordaigle’s class almost every day during the period in which
the abuse allegedly occurred, and that the vice principal sat in on
several occasions, further suggests that the Le Conte
administration was concerned that Demordaigle was having
inappropriate contact with students.
Indeed, Moretzsky repeatedly instructed R.V. and the other
student who went on the trip to stay away from Demordaigle,
which indicates that he was concerned about Demordaigle’s
conduct. Moretzsky’s statement that he did not want R.V. to tell
him what had happened on the trip also supports an inference
13
that he suspected Demordaigle had engaged in serious
inappropriate behavior.5
A trier of fact could conclude that these circumstances were
sufficient to “giv[e] rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate
behavior” (Rancho Cucamonga, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 722),
and that LAUSD therefore had constructive knowledge that
Demordaigle posed a foreseeable risk of sexually abusing
students. There were triable issues of material fact on this
5 At oral argument, counsel for LAUSD argued that it was
R.V.’s burden to “present evidence that tends to exclude,
although it need not actually exclude, the possibility that”
Moretzsky’s statements and conduct did not reflect constructive
knowledge of sexual abuse. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 852.) Counsel argued that plaintiff failed
to present evidence tending to exclude the possibility that
Moretzsky was concerned about automobile accidents during
Demordaigle’s trips. The “tends to exclude” language comes from
a portion of Aguilar in which our Supreme Court discussed the
law “specifically as to an antitrust action for unlawful conspiracy
under provisions including section 1 of the Cartwright Act.” (Id.
at p. 851.)
As “a matter of substantive antitrust law,” “ ‘certain
“inferences may not be drawn from circumstantial evidence in an
antitrust case.” ’ [Citations.]” (Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 290, 328; see also Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 870, 880, 881 [statement in Aguilar that
summary judgment motion should be granted if plaintiff’s
evidence suggests “ ‘unlawful conspiracy only as likely as
permissible competition or even less likely’ ” was derived from
“limited rule concerning evidence in ‘equipoise’ . . . in the
antitrust context,” and was inapplicable in other contexts].) The
“tends to exclude” language in Aguilar does not apply to our
analysis of whether summary judgment of R.V.’s negligence
claims was proper.
14
element of R.V.’s claims. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment of the negligence causes of action in
the complaint.
C. Summary adjudication of liability with respect
to claims of off-campus abuse
The trial court separately granted summary adjudication of
the portion of R.V.’s claims arising out of the abuse that occurred
off campus. The court found that LAUSD was immune from
liability under section 44808. R.V. argues this too was error. We
conclude that section 44808 did not shield LAUSD from liability
for off-campus sexual abuse that resulted from its alleged
negligence in supervising R.V. while on campus.6
Section 44808 provides that a school district is not “liable
for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any
time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such
district, board, or person has undertaken to provide
transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises,
has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of
6 We question the trial court’s conclusion that summary
adjudication of the off-campus claims was appropriate because
the on- and off-campus abuse constituted different causes of
action. (See Hindin v. Rust (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1258
[summary adjudication improper in malicious prosecution action
that asserted two different legal theories, since action “sought to
vindicate a single primary right—the right to be free from
defending against a lawsuit initiated with malice and without
probable cause”].) Here, both claims concerned R.V.’s right to
have LAUSD employees protect him from sexual abuse by a
foreseeably dangerous person. His injuries purportedly arose
from the same employees’ alleged negligence. In any event,
because we reverse the grant of summary adjudication on the
merits we need not resolve this issue.
15
such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such
responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.”
In Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District (1978)
22 Cal.3d 508 (Hoyem), our Supreme Court considered whether a
school district may “be held liable when, as a result of school
authorities’ negligent supervision of students on school premises,
a pupil leaves the school grounds during school hours and is
subsequently injured by a motorist.” (Id. at pp. 511–512.) Our
high court concluded that the school district’s “emphasis on the
situs of the injury [was] totally misplaced.” (Id. at p. 515.) It
observed that “no California decision suggests that when a school
district fails to properly supervise a student on school premises,
the district can automatically escape liability simply because the
student’s ultimate injury occurs off school property.” (Ibid.) The
court explained that its decision “merely reaffirm[ed] that school
districts must exercise reasonable care in supervising their pupils
while the pupils are on school premises” and that “[a] district
may be held liable if its breach of that duty proximately causes a
student’s injury.” (Id. at p. 516.)
The Supreme Court next addressed the school district’s
contention that section 44808 supported “that the off-premises
situs of plaintiff’s injuries should absolve it of all responsibility.”
(Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 516.) The court observed that,
“[a]lthough the initial portion of the statute provides that ‘no
school district shall be responsible . . . for the conduct or safety of
any pupil . . . at any time when such pupil is not on school
property,’ the section goes on explicitly to withdraw this grant of
immunity whenever the school district, inter alia, ‘has failed to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.’ ” (Id. at p. 517,
16
fn. omitted.) Because the plaintiff in Hoyem had alleged that the
school district failed to exercise reasonable care, “section 44808,
by its own terms, [did] not bar liability in the present case.”
(Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded that “the district is not
liable for an injury sustained by a truant under all
circumstances, but rather is legally responsible only for those
injuries which proximately result from the district’s failure to
exercise ‘that degree of care “which a person of ordinary
prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise
under the same circumstances.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 519; accord, Perna v.
Conejo Valley Unified School District (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 292,
294 [school district not immune when alleged failure to exercise
due care in supervising students on school premises led to off-
campus injury].)
In Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at page 772, this court
addressed whether a school district was immune from liability
under section 44808 where a student’s mother hired a school
district employee to babysit the student during winter break and
the student died as a result of injuries sustained in the
employee’s care. We reversed on the ground that “[s]ection 44808
squarely applie[d].” (Taylor, at p. 775.) We concluded that the
case was “entirely unlike Hoyem” because the mother did not
allege that the school district was negligent in supervising the
student while he was on school premises, and his “death did not
arise from a negligent act directly concerning him while on school
premises, which carried over into off campus harm.” (Id. at
p. 776.)
Most recently, in Victor Valley Union High School District
v. Superior Court (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 901 (Victor Valley), the
plaintiff alleged that a teacher transported her off campus in his
17
car on one of the three occasions when he sexually assaulted her.
(Id. at pp. 903–904.) “When leaving campus, [the t]eacher and
[s]tudent walked ‘out through the office, said goodbye to the office
lady,’ and went to the parking lot.” (Id. at p. 903.) The plaintiff
alleged the school district “breached its ‘duty to use due care to
hire, supervise, and retain [staff], and to take other reasonable
and necessary measures to supervise and protect [the student]’
from [the t]eacher’s conduct.” (Id. at p. 904.) The school district
moved for summary judgment on the ground it had complete
immunity because the sexual assaults occurred off campus.
(Ibid.) The trial court denied the motion and the district
petitioned for a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order
denying summary judgment and enter an order granting
summary judgment. (Id. at p. 905.)
The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the
circumstances of the case were comparable to those of Hoyem.
“The evidence that a teacher openly escorted a student through
campus, past another employee, into a parking lot, into his
personal vehicle, and transported her off campus, without any
measures in place to prevent such conduct could give one reason
to conclude the [d]istrict’s ‘supervisory procedures fell below that
degree of care which reasonably prudent persons would
exercise.’ ” (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 907,
quoting Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 519.) “Because the alleged
negligent act occurred on campus, the [d]istrict ha[d] not
demonstrated that it qualifie[d] for immunity.” (Victor Valley, at
p. 907.)
The court rejected the argument that the trial court’s
application of section 44808 “ ‘ma[de] no sense’ ” because the
sexual abuse occurred off campus. (Victor Valley, supra, 121
18
Cal.App.5th at p. 907.) “[A] trier of fact could determine that the
[d]istrict’s failure to have any measures in place to try to prevent
employees from transporting teenagers off campus ‘might be an
example of the [d]istrict’s negligent supervision of [the student],
or [the teacher], or both.’ The trial court’s reasoning reflects it
was focused on the [d]istrict’s alleged negligent act having taken
place on campus. Thus, far from being nonsensical, the trial
court’s analysis follows our Supreme Court’s holding in Hoyem,
which is focused on the location of the alleged negligent act.”7
(Victor Valley, at p. 908.)
Likewise, here, R.V. contends that LAUSD’s negligence in
supervising Demordaigle on campus, and its negligence in
supervising students interacting with Demordaigle on campus,
allowed him to abuse his position to invite R.V. on a weekend trip
and sexually abuse R.V. Moretzsky’s statements to R.V. after the
off-campus abuse occurred would support a finding that school
7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected its prior
decisions in Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist.
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260 (Mosley), and LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 737. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 910–911.) We express no opinion as to whether Mosley and
LeRoy are reconcilable with Hoyem.
The Fourth District also distinguished Cerna v. City of
Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, on which LAUSD relies in
this case. In Cerna, a motorist killed one child and injured others
while they crossed a street on their way to school. (Id. at
p. 1344.) The surviving victims and their families brought a
lawsuit against the school district, alleging that it was negligent
in assuring safe school access. (Ibid.) As the Victor Valley court
observed, the case did not involve an act of on-campus negligence
that resulted in injury to the plaintiffs off-campus. (Victor Valley,
supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 909–910.)
19
district employees knew Demordaigle had previously engaged in
similar “grooming” behavior on campus and had taken other
students on unauthorized weekend trips. (Cf. Taylor, supra, 112
Cal.App.5th at p. 772 [mother did not tell anyone she asked
district employee to babysit; employee’s supervisors had no prior
knowledge of the arrangement].) The evidence further indicates
that the only steps the school district had taken to address this
ongoing issue were repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, asking
Demordaigle to stop and observing his class.
A trier of fact could find that LAUSD’s failure to take
further action to address Demordaigle’s obstinate refusal to
comply with the school administration’s requests that he stop
inviting and taking students on weekend trips constituted
negligent supervision of Demordaigle and the students
interacting with him. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at
p. 908 [“trier of fact could determine that the [d]istrict’s failure to
have any measures in place to try to prevent employees from
transporting teenagers off campus ‘might be an example of the
[d]istrict’s negligent supervision of [student], or [teacher], or
both’ ”].)
In concluding that LAUSD is not entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of its immunity from liability under
section 44808, we do not condone “an expansive approach that
would expose a school district to liability for any employee’s off-
campus tort that could somehow be ‘traced back to negligent
hiring and supervision.’ ” (Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
p. 776, quoting Mosley, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) We
determine only that here, R.V. has sufficiently adduced evidence
that Demordaigle’s alleged sexual abuse of R.V. “ar[ose] from a
negligent act directly concerning him while on school premises,
20
which carried over into off campus harm” and section 44808
therefore does not immunize LAUSD from liability. (Taylor, at
p. 776; Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 907 [“Because
the alleged negligent act occurred on campus, the District has not
demonstrated that it qualifies for immunity.”]; cf. Torsiello v.
Oakland Unified School Dist. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 41, 49
[teacher did not owe student a duty of care under § 44808 when,
“after school hours and off school grounds,” teacher encountered
student, student climbed onto teacher’s car and jumped off,
injuring himself].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with
directions that the trial court vacate its order granting LAUSD’s
motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication. The
court is to enter a new order denying summary judgment and
summary adjudication. Appellant shall recover his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
OCHOA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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