Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Floresmata CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173684
v. (San Mateo County
SERGIO FLORESMATA, Super. Ct. No. 24SF006829A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence,
defendant Sergio Floresmata entered a plea of no contest to a charge of
firearm possession by a person with a prior violent felony conviction. On
appeal, Floresmata contends the court erred by denying a suppression motion
challenging the legality of a pat search during a traffic stop. The search
revealed a handgun in his waistband. Floresmata now argues (1) the pat
search was not supported by reasonable suspicion that he was armed and
dangerous, and (2) the traffic stop that led to the search was unduly
prolonged. We find no error and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2024, the San Mateo County District Attorney
charged Floresmata in an information with possession of a firearm with a
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prior violent felony conviction (Pen. Code,1 § 29900, subd. (a)(1); count one)
and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1);
count two). The information alleged Floresmata had prior serious or violent
felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12).
As we discuss further below, on October 8, 2024, the trial court denied
Floresmata’s motion to suppress evidence, brought under section 1538.5.
On June 13, 2025, Floresmata entered a no contest plea to the
count one charge of firearm possession by a person with a prior violent felony
conviction under section 29900, subdivision (a)(1), and he admitted one prior
strike conviction. The trial court dismissed the remaining charges and
allegations pursuant to the plea agreement.
On July 1, 2025, the court sentenced Floresmata to the stipulated term
of two years eight months in prison.
Floresmata timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Evidence Presented at the Hearing on the Motion To Suppress
On April 30, 2024, at about 1:00 p.m., Atherton Police Officer Vaneesh
Kumar initiated a traffic stop of a car with a missing front license plate (a
violation of Veh. Code, § 5200, subd. (a)). Floresmata was the driver and sole
occupant of the car. Officer Kumar had also checked on the computer system
in his car and learned Floresmata’s car registration was expired (a violation
of Veh. Code, § 4000, subd. (a)(1)). Officer Kumar asked Floresmata for his
driver’s license, and Floresmata admitted he did not have a valid driver’s
license (a violation of Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), instead providing
paperwork showing he had applied for one.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Officer Kumar returned to his car and checked Floresmata’s criminal
record with the dispatcher. He learned Floresmata previously had been
charged with robbery (§ 212.5), resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)),
and possessing a dangerous weapon (former § 12020, subd. (a)). Officer
Kumar also learned Floresmata was not on active probation or parole.
Officer Kumar testified that he returned to Floresmata’s car and asked
Floresmata if he could search the car. Floresmata agreed. According to the
parties, Floresmata stated he had been on probation a couple months earlier,
in about December or January.2 Floresmata also said he had some “weed” in
the car, which Officer Kumar believed could be a violation of Vehicle Code
section 23222.
Officer Kumar waited for his cover unit to arrive, which happened
“briefly after” he returned to Floresmata’s car and spoke with him. When the
cover unit arrived, Officer Kumar asked Floresmata to get out of the car. As
Floresmata was getting out of the car, Officer Kumar noticed Floresmata had
“large baggy clothing on like a hoody or a jacket . . . .”
Officer Kumar conducted a pat search and found a handgun in
Floresmata’s waistband. Officer Kumar restrained Floresmata, and the
officer’s partner removed the firearm from Floresmata’s front waistband.
Officer Kumar then arrested Floresmata.
The trial court found the prearrest interaction lasted about five
minutes—about four minutes from the initial traffic stop until the officer
2 In their appellate briefs, the parties refer to a video from Officer
Kumar’s body-worn camera that includes additional details of the
conversation between Floresmata and Officer Kumar. The video (and a
transcript of it) were admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing, but
they were returned to Floresmata’s trial counsel after the hearing, and they
have not been provided to this court.
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returned to Floresmata’s car after checking with dispatch, and then about
another minute of the exchange after that.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied
Floresmata’s motion to suppress. The court found Floresmata consented to
the search of his car; Officer Kumar had authority to order him out of the car
in any event; and based on what the officer knew of Floresmata by that point,
it was “reasonable under the circumstances” to conduct a pat search.
B. Standard of Review
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings,
express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining
whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v.
Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362; see People v. Romeo (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 931, 941–942.)
C. The Traffic Stop Was Not Unduly Prolonged
Floresmata contends Officer Kumar illegally prolonged the traffic stop
by asking for consent to search Floresmata’s car, a request that was followed
by the officer’s directive to Floresmata to get out of the car and then by the
pat search that discovered the handgun. We see no Fourth Amendment
violation.
During a valid traffic stop (and Floresmata does not dispute the
propriety of the initial stop here based on a Vehicle Code violation), an officer
may inquire about unrelated matters if the inquiry does not unduly prolong
the detention. (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333 (Johnson)
[“officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop” permitted “so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop”]; People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 239
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[officer could ask for consent to search “because the search, like the
questioning, did not unduly prolong the traffic stop”].) In addition, an officer
may order a driver or a passenger out of the car “as a precautionary
measure.” (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 258.)
As Floresmata notes, the United States Supreme Court held in
Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348 (Rodriguez), that, “Like a
Terry stop,[3] the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic
violation that warranted the stop, [citation] and attend to related safety
concerns . . . .” (Rodriguez, at p. 354.) But the court reiterated its earlier
holding that unrelated inquiries during a traffic stop are permissible if they
“ ‘do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ ” (Id. at p. 355, quoting
Johnson, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 333.)
Here, Floresmata contends Officer Kumar illegally prolonged the traffic
stop by asking for consent to search Floresmata’s car. We disagree. Even if
the officer’s request was unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop
(addressing Floresmata’s Vehicle Code violations), the request did not
measurably extend the duration of the stop. The trial court found the
interaction between Floresmata and Officer Kumar took only about five
minutes, and the exchange in which the officer asked for consent to search
took place during the last minute of that time period. (During the first four
minutes, the officer asked for Floresmata’s driver’s license and then
conducted a records check back at his police car, activities that Floresmata
does not contend were improper.) The officer’s request for consent to search
the car—a brief request made during a short traffic stop—was a reasonable
investigative step to take given the accumulating information known to
3 Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry).
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Officer Kumar at the point he made the request, and did not unduly prolong
the stop.
The cases cited by Floresmata on this point are distinguishable and do
not persuade us the detention here was unduly prolonged. (See People v.
Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 672–673 [officer did not perform tasks
such as checking vehicle registration, but instead “detoured from the traffic
stop’s mission almost immediately” by inquiring into multiple unrelated
matters; detention lasted for nearly 12 minutes, including while a police dog
sniffed the car]; People v. Suggs (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1360, 1362–1363, 1365
[after officer stopped defendant’s car and saw temporary registration
documents attached to car window, the initial reasonable suspicion of a
Vehicle Code violation was dispelled, and it was improper to then conduct
unrelated inquiries]; People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 932–934,
938–939 [defendant declined to consent to search of his car; police then
prolonged stop until drug-sniffing dog arrived; more than 18 minutes elapsed
from the start of the stop until the dog alerted to the presence of drugs,
providing probable cause to search the car].)
In contrast to the circumstances in these cases, the record here shows
Officer Kumar made a legitimate traffic stop to investigate a Vehicle Code
violation; he diligently investigated and discovered additional Vehicle Code
violations as the stop proceeded (see Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 357
[officer conducting a traffic stop must be reasonably diligent]); he
appropriately ran a records check on Floresmata; he asked for consent to
search Floresmata’s car, a question that did not “measurably extend the
duration of the stop” (Johnson, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 333); and the stop was in
its entirety a brief one, spanning only five minutes.
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Finally, we note (as did the trial court) that, even if Floresmata had not
consented to a search of his car, Officer Kumar could properly have ordered
Floresmata out of the car as a safety precaution. (Brendlin v. California,
supra, 551 U.S. at p. 258.) And, as we discuss in part II.D, post, once the
officer directed Floresmata to get out of the car, a pat search for weapons was
permissible on this record.
D. Reasonable Suspicion Supported the Pat Search
Floresmata argues that, even if the detention was not illegally
prolonged, the pat search conducted by Officer Kumar violated the Fourth
Amendment. We disagree.
After a lawful stop, police may conduct a limited search of a detained
person if they have reason to believe the person is armed and dangerous.
(Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27; Johnson, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 326–327 [“to
proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that
the person stopped is armed and dangerous”].) Reasonable suspicion is based
on the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th
1056, 1082.) A search must be based on “specific and articulable facts”
(Terry, at p. 21), and the applicable test is “ ‘fact driven’ ” and
“ ‘individualized.’ ” (In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 307.)
Here, Officer Kumar’s limited pat search of Floresmata was reasonable
in light of the totality of the circumstances. When Floresmata got out of the
car at Officer Kumar’s direction, the officer noticed Floresmata had “large
baggy clothing on like a hoody or a jacket . . . .” Officer Kumar also had
learned that Floresmata had previously been charged with robbery, resisting
a peace officer, and possessing a dangerous weapon. In these circumstances,
it was reasonable for Officer Kumar to be concerned about whether
Floresmata had a weapon “hidden in those areas that I can’t see.” We also
note that Officer Kumar was about to conduct a car search (based on consent)
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in Floresmata’s presence. Even though other officers had arrived, Officer
Kumar reasonably could seek to ensure he “was not permitting a dangerous
person to get behind” him. (Johnson, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 334.) The trial
court correctly found the “pat down search was reasonable under the
circumstances.”
In arguing to the contrary, Floresmata places significant reliance on
People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 485, in which our Division Two
colleagues affirmed a trial court order granting a motion to suppress a
firearm found on the defendant’s person when he was patted down after a
traffic stop. Pantoja is distinguishable. The appellate court there stated
that, under the circumstances and “deferring to the [trial] court’s implied
factual and credibility findings,” the trial court reasonably could have
discounted the officer’s testimony that the defendant’s baggy clothing
contributed to reasonable suspicion. (Id. at p. 490.) And the officer’s reliance
on his recollection of the defendant’s arrest years earlier for a weapons
offense was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. (Id. at pp. 490–491,
486.)
Here, we of course consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s order finding reasonable suspicion and denying the
suppression motion. The trial court here was not required to discount the
officer’s testimony (about Floresmata’s clothing or other matters). And, as
the Attorney General notes, the information Officer Kumar possessed about
Floresmata’s criminal history was from the records check conducted by
dispatch (rather than a vague personal recollection, as in Pantoja), and it
included the facts that Floresmata had been charged with robbery, resisting
an officer, and possession of a dangerous weapon, facts that supported the
officer’s reasonable concern for his safety. Officer Kumar also had learned
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that Floresmata had recently been on probation, suggesting the information
about his criminal activity was not stale. Finally, as to Floresmata’s
argument (based in part on Pantoja) that the fact of a person’s criminal
history cannot alone support reasonable suspicion, we need not consider that
question here, because as discussed, multiple factors combined here to
establish reasonable suspicion.
Floresmata also notes Officer Kumar did not testify about certain other
factors that might have provided additional support for a finding of
reasonable suspicion, such as that Floresmata made furtive movements or
appeared nervous or intoxicated. But this observation does not alter our
conclusion that the circumstances that were present—Floresmata’s baggy
clothing, the information about his criminal history, and the impending car
search—created reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited pat search.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STREETER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
GORDON, J.*
* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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