Filed 10/1/26 P. v. Ornelas CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089269
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SC084411B)
v.

JUAN MARCOS ORNELAS,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Chad A. Louie,
Judge.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and
Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
In 2005, petitioner Juan Marcos Ornelas was convicted of first degree murder, and
the jury found true that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted
commission of a robbery. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On
March 8, 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.61 (former § 1170.95).2 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and denied the petition.
On appeal, Ornelas argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. He also argues that
we should independently review the record to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
I. Information, Verdict, and Sentencing
In People v. Ornelas (June 8, 2006, F047707) [nonpub. opn.] (Ornelas),3 our court
summarized the procedural history regarding the information, verdict, and sentencing as
follows:

“On August 19, 2003, an information was filed in Kern County
Superior Court, charging … Ornelas with murder involving the personal
use of a deadly weapon and committed during the commission or attempted
commission of robbery and burglary (… §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2,
subds. (a)(17)(a) & (a)(17)(g), 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 1); robbery
(§ 212.5, subd. (c); count 2); and residential burglary (§ 460, subd. (a);
count 3). Count 3 and the burglary-murder special circumstance were

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with
no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the current section 1172.6 in
this opinion.
3 On December 8, 2025, we granted Ornelas’s request for judicial notice of the
clerk’s transcript, augmented clerk’s transcript, and supplemental clerk’s transcript filed
in Ornelas, supra, F047707. Additionally, we take judicial notice of this court’s
unpublished opinion in Ornelas, supra, F047707. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (a), 452,
subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)). While we cite and quote this unpublished opinion in regard to
the background and procedural history of this case, our analysis does not rely on any facts
summarized therein. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

2.
 subsequently dismissed pursuant to section 995. The jury in [Ornelas’s]
first trial deadlocked and a mistrial was declared.

“At the outset of the second trial, count 2 was dismissed as barred by
the statute of limitations. A jury subsequently convicted [Ornelas] of first
degree murder and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance, but
not true the weapon use allegation. [Ornelas] was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole and ordered to pay various fines and
restitution, but his sentence was recalled in order to permit the trial court to
exercise its discretion, pursuant to section 190.5, subdivision (b), to
sentence [Ornelas] to 25 years to life in prison based on the fact he was
16 years old at the time of the offense. [Ornelas] was again sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole[.]” (Ornelas, supra,
F047707, fns. omitted.)
II. Factual Summary from Ornelas
In Ornelas, supra, F047707, our court also summarized the facts related to the
charges. We provide that factual summary here.
“In October of 1996, Jose Rogelio Muralles and his family lived on Myrtle
Avenue in Lamont. Muralles did housekeeping and general maintenance work at
Memorial Hospital in Bakersfield.
“At 6:00 a.m. on October 15, 1996, Muralles’s body was found in his carport. It
appeared there had been a violent struggle. Muralles had been severely beaten about the
head and face, and stabbed numerous times. He died from exsanguination due to
multiple stab wounds of the neck, torso, and hands. His wallet, which he habitually
carried in his front pants pocket, was missing. According to his wife, it should have
contained approximately $300.
“Supervising criminalist Greg Laskowski seized samples from a large area of
blood in, as well as other locations in and around, the carport. In addition, he noticed
apparent shoe prints on Muralles’s face and in the blood surrounding the body. He
followed those prints to a park about half a block away. He collected blood samples from
stains on the driveway, at the curb, and from a drinking fountain and playground area in
the park.

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 “A pen was found near Muralles’s left foot. Various items, including a possible
fingertip from a latex glove, were found underneath Muralles’s body. No latex gloves
were found in the area.
“Kern County Sheriff’s Sergeant Christopherson had contact with [Ornelas] on the
evening of the homicide. [Ornelas] had a gaping laceration, which appeared to be a knife
wound, on the outside of his left forearm; small puncture wounds, of the type seen on
Muralles’s body and possibly caused by a stun gun, on his upper back; an abrasion on the
back of his right arm; and scrapes on his left wrist. Christopherson also had contact with
Alberto Madrigal, who lived near Muralles’s residence. Madrigal had deep lacerations –
possibly to the bone – on several fingers of his right hand. He also had a cut on the
outside of the middle finger of his left hand.
“Brenda Smith, a supervising criminalist at the Kern County Regional Crime
Laboratory, performed DNA analysis on multiple samples in this case, using the short
tandem repeat (STR) method.…
“In connection with this case, Smith examined human blood found, inter alia, on
the Bakersfield Memorial Hospital pen located near Muralles’s left foot and the piece of
latex discovered under his body. She made a 13-loci comparison between this blood and
genetic samples obtained from Muralles and [Ornelas].
“The blood on the pen was a mixed sample, meaning there was more than one
contributor. The entire 13-loci profile was very consistent with being a two-person
mixture, and there was a clear major contributor and a minor contributor. Smith
determined that there was approximately a three to one mixture ratio, meaning there was
three times as much DNA from the major contributor as from the minor contributor.
Smith could not eliminate Muralles as being the major contributor to the sample, nor
could she eliminate [Ornelas] as being a possible minor contributor to the sample. Using
a likelihood ratio calculation, she looked at the possibility that either Muralles and
[Ornelas] were the sources of the DNA recovered from the sample, or the sources were

4.
Muralles and some unknown, unrelated individual. She calculated that, in the Hispanic
population, the DNA profile obtained from the evidence sample was approximately
98 billion times more likely to match if [Ornelas] was the source of the minor
contribution rather than some unknown, unrelated male; 23 trillion times more likely in
the Caucasian population; and 118 trillion times more likely in the African-American
population.
“With respect to the piece of latex, Smith observed a possible mixture involving a
major contributor and a very weak minor contributor. The 13-loci profile indicated it was
most likely a two-person mixture, but Smith was only able to determine the possible
mixture ratio at one location. It was approximately 15 to one. Based on the laboratory’s
validation work, this meant it was very likely that the minor contribution was weak
enough so that Smith possibly was not detecting some of the minor contributor’s
alleles.…
“Smith was able to conclude that there was a mixture of at least two sources in the
sample obtained from the latex piece; that the major contributor was male and Muralles
could not be eliminated as being a major contributor; and that the minor contribution was
very weak and [Ornelas] could not be eliminated as a possible contributor. She could not
‘see,’ in the evidence profile, all of his types that were in his known reference profile.
Because of the mixture ratio, there could be things missing, masked by major
components, or peaks that were below the minimum threshold, i.e., peaks that she did not
detect due to allelic drop-out or that were there but below the minimum threshold at
which she was allowed to say a peak was present. In short, there were locations where
[Ornelas’s] types were present; there were locations where his peaks were not present.
“Smith also compared Madrigal’s genetic profile to various evidence samples. He
could not be eliminated as a possible contributor to the DNA found on the driveway, the
curb, and the park sidewalk, all of which were single-source samples. In the Hispanic
population, the DNA profile obtained from the samples was approximately 56 billion

5.
times more likely to match if Madrigal was the contributor rather than some unknown,
unrelated male; 910 billion times more likely in the Caucasian population; and 1.3 trillion
times more likely in the African-American population. Blood on Muralles’s clothing was
mostly mixed samples, and Smith could not eliminate Madrigal as one of the
contributors. She was, however, able to eliminate [Ornelas] as a contributor to a drop of
blood on Muralles’s left shoe, samples from Muralles’s clothing, and the blood found on
the driveway, the curb, and the park sidewalk. [Ornelas] and Madrigal, but not Muralles,
were eliminated as contributors to blood found at various locations in and near the
carport.” (Ornelas, supra, F047707, fns. omitted.)
III. Section 1172.6 Petition and Evidentiary Hearing
On March 8, 2023, Ornelas filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6,
alleging he could not presently be convicted of murder because of the changes to
sections 188 and 189. The prosecutor opposed the petition. The trial court found that
Ornelas made a prima facie showing and an evidentiary hearing was set.4
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor filed a brief arguing that Ornelas
was ineligible for relief because the evidence showed that he was an aider and abettor
who acted with the intent to kill and that he was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
On November 20, 2024, the trial court held a hearing regarding the evidence it
would consider when ruling on Ornelas’s petition. The court admitted: the transcripts
from both of Ornelas’s trials; the jury instructions from the first trial; the abstract of
judgment related to Madrigal; and the abstract of judgment related to Ornelas. At a
subsequent hearing, the court stated it also considered the verdicts from both trials. No
witnesses were called and no new evidence was introduced.

4 Madrigal was convicted of first degree murder at the first trial. He also filed a
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, and the evidentiary hearings were held
concurrently. However, this appeal only involves Ornelas’s petition.

6.
 The trial court heard oral argument on January 28, 2025. Ornelas argued that
while there was evidence that he was present at the scene, there was no evidence that he
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life or that he was
an aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill.
The prosecutor argued that Madrigal was the actual killer. He further argued that
Ornelas was an aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill and that he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. According to the
prosecutor, Ornelas knew that Madrigal “intended to commit the crime.” Ornelas
participated in the struggle between Madrigal and Muralles by helping to subdue
Muralles, and he participated in the robbery by searching Muralles’s pockets.
After hearing arguments, the trial court ruled as follows:

“The jury in 2005 has already found that the defendant,
[Ornelas], … was involved in and committed a robbery. That issue has
already been resolved.

“It’s for this [c]ourt today to determine whether or not, as a result of
him committing the robbery, and as a result of the victim, [Muralles], being
killed, whether or not there’s a current theory of liability where the
defendant, [Ornelas], could be convicted of murder as … [s]ections 188 and
189 have been amended. [¶] … [¶]

“… In this case, I do not believe [Ornelas] was [the actual killer].
The evidence does not support that. [¶] … [¶]

“In ruling on this petition, this [c]ourt is looking
at … [s]ection 189[, subdivision ](e)(3). The question for me is whether or
not [Ornelas], in committing the robbery, along with his codefendant,
[Madrigal], was a major participant in the underlying felony, that being the
robbery, and whether or not he acted with reckless indifference to human
life.… [¶] … [¶]

“I will note the evidence that I can highlight now, in my ruling,
are [sic] that [Ornelas] did have wounds on his hands and suffered a wound
to his arm. That would be consistent with him being involved with the
altercation that occurred when [Madrigal] was using a knife to stab the
victim.

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 “I’ll note that the evidence shows that [Ornelas] and [Madrigal] were
friends. They had known each other for some time. That they
were … together earlier that day and had known each other. That they both
went -- the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they both went
to the location -- I’ll note that the location was not in a public place. It was
not that they just came upon the victim, but rather, that they came, or they
went to, rather, the victim’s residence where he lived. It was either really
late at night or early in the morning, around midnight, I think the evidence
suggests, it was dark out. There was a light in the carport that had been
removed so that it would be dark, which shows a level of planning by both
defendants to rob the victim. Again, it was done in the carport at the
victim’s residence, so they went to his location to carry out their plan to rob
the victim.

“There is -- the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
after the victim had been stabbed 35 times, which in this [c]ourt’s view
would have taken some time. Again, it was a brutal, extremely violent
attack on the victim. After that occurred, [Ornelas] did not attempt to help
the victim. He didn’t call for any medical aid. The victim -- after the
defendants left, the victim was left there on the ground to die. I will note
that I did consider, as I must in a hearing like this, [Ornelas’s] age.

“I’m going to note that [Ornelas] was born January … [of] 1980.
The crime occurred on October 15th, 1996, and so it looks like he was 16
and about 9 months. [16] years old -- 16 years and 9 months old, coming
up on 17. Madrigal, who I do not have to consider his age, because I
did [sic] go through a major participant for reckless disregard for human
life analysis, I found that he was the actual killer, but Madrigal, in any
event, was born, it looks like May … [of] 1978, and so he was 18 -- about
18 and a half at the time of the murder.

“Notwithstanding [Ornelas’s] age, which the [c]ourt could consider
him to be youthful, that being 16 years, 9 months. I will note that there
is [sic] numerous case authorities indicating that a petitioner’s youth and
developmental disabilities are relevant in the inquiry as to whether a
petitioner was a major participant and understood the degree of risk to
human life.

“There’s also case authority that youth is a relevant consideration to
whether or not the petitioner acted with reckless indifference to human life
as well. And so this [c]ourt is considering [Ornelas’s] age.…

“But notwithstanding that, the totality of the evidence from the trial
transcripts does, in this [c]ourt’s view, as I just articulated, given the fact

8.
 that [Ornelas] did have wounds consistent with him being actually involved
with the stabbing. He was there when it occurred. There’s proof, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he took part in and was involved in the physical
altercation while Madrigal was stabbing the victim. The planning that was
involved between two people who knew each other, I can characterize them
as friends.

“There’s proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Ornelas] went with
[Madrigal] to commit a robbery. It was done with some level of planning.
The light was removed from the carport -- the location where the robbery
occurred, that being a carport at the victim’s own residence. As well as the
fact that after it was done, nobody, including [Ornelas], attempted to help
the victim or render aid or call for any aid.

“Given the totality of the evidence, including the factors that I just
outlined on the record, I will find that there is proof, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that [Ornelas] is guilty of murder under California laws amended by
the changes to [s]ection[s] 188 and 189, made effective January 1st, 2019.
Finding more specifically, that during the course of the robbery, that
[Ornelas] was a major participant in the underlying felony, that being the
robbery of the victim, and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The evidence proves that, beyond a reasonable doubt. And so … the
petition is denied.”
IV. Current Appeal
On January 30, 2025, Ornelas timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, he
argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was a major participant in the
robbery or that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. He also argues that we
should independently review the record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient
because no live testimony was presented at the evidentiary hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6 Procedure
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 1437) “altered the substantive law of murder in two areas.” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).) First, the bill “narrowed the scope of the felony-
murder rule so that a ‘participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a

9.
[specified felony] in which a death occurs’ can be liable for murder only if ‘[t]he person
was the actual killer’; ‘[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree’; or ‘[t]he person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 467–468, quoting § 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).)
Second, the bill “eliminate[d] liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” by requiring that, “except in cases of felony
murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of
murder.” (Curiel, at p. 449, quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3).) Now, “ ‘[m]alice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Curiel, at
p. 449.)
Additionally, Senate Bill No. 1437 added former section 1170.95, now section
1172.6, to provide a procedure for those convicted of a qualifying offense “ ‘to seek
relief’ where the two substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s
conviction.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Under section 1172.6, an offender
seeking resentencing must first file a petition in the sentencing court, and the sentencing
court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or
she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c); accord, People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If the sentencing court determines the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
At this evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof [is] on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder … under California law
as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The
admission of evidence in the hearing [is] governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is

10.
admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and
matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of the case
recited in any prior appellate opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
II. Applicable Law Regarding Felony Murder
Since the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, section 189, subdivision (e)(3) provides
that a participant in a qualifying felony where a death occurs may be liable for murder if
the person was “a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” Relatedly,
section 190.2 “identifies the circumstances under which murderers and accomplices can
be punished by death or life imprisonment without parole.… For defendants who did not
kill and lacked intent to kill, section 190.2, subdivision (d) permits such punishment only
if they acted ‘with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant’ [in] a
qualifying felony like robbery.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 7; see In re
Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 674 (Scoggins).)
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), our Supreme Court sought to
clarify the circumstances under which “an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may
qualify as a major participant so as to be statutorily eligible for the death penalty.” (Id. at
p. 794.) Our Supreme Court identified the following nonexhaustive factors as relevant to
this inquiry: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that
led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Id.
at p. 803, fn. omitted.) However, “no one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Ibid.)

11.
 The following year, in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–623 (Clark),
our Supreme Court addressed the “reckless indifference” standard. The court explained
that reckless indifference to human life “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist
another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically
desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.) The court further
explained that reckless indifference has both a subjective and an objective component.
(Ibid.) Subjectively, “[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, demonstrating reckless
indifference to the significant risk of death his or her actions create.” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 801; accord, Clark, at p. 617.) Objectively, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor’s situation.’ ” (Clark, at p. 617.) That a felony involves a gun is insufficient, by
itself, to support a finding of reckless indifference. (Id. at pp. 617–618.)
In Clark, our Supreme Court provided the following nonexhaustive list of factors
to be considered in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference:
(1) knowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons; (2) physical presence at the
crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) duration of the
felony and period of interaction between the perpetrators and the victims; (4) the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her cohort’s likelihood of killing; and (5) the defendant’s
efforts to minimize the risk of violence during the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 618–623.) Like the factors considered in Banks, “ ‘[n]o one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark, at p. 618.)
Notably, Banks and Clark derived their holdings from Enmund v. Florida (1982)
458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), prevailing
Eighth Amendment cases regarding the circumstances under which the death penalty

12.
permissibly may be imposed for felony murder. (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
384, 393.) Our Supreme Court has explained that Enmund and Tison together establish a
“ ‘spectrum of culpability,’ ” with felony murderers who “ ‘actually killed, attempted to
kill, or intended to kill’ ” at one end, and minor actors who were not present on the scene
and had no culpable mental state at the other. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 675.) We
briefly describe the facts of Enmund and Tison to give context to this spectrum.
The defendant in Enmund was a getaway driver for a robbery. He sat waiting in
his parked car a few hundred feet away from the home where his two confederates fatally
shot an elderly couple when they resisted. (Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 784, 788.)
The high court emphasized the defendant “did not kill or attempt to kill,” and the record
did not support a finding he “had any intention of participating in or facilitating a
murder.” (Enmund, at p. 798.) As such, imposition of the death penalty, which must be
based solely on a defendant’s own culpability, was constitutionally disproportionate.
(Ibid.)
The facts of Tison are starkly different. There, three brothers helped their father
and his cellmate—both convicted murderers—escape from prison, arming the prisoners
during their escape. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 139, 150–152.) When the group
eventually experienced car trouble, one of the brothers flagged down a passing car for
help while the other men laid in wait by the side of the road. (Id. at pp. 139–140.) The
group then kidnapped at gunpoint a family of four in a passing car, robbed them, and
drove them into the desert. (Id. at p. 140.) The brothers stood by while their father and
his cellmate shot the victims repeatedly. (Id. at pp. 140–141.) The group then drove off
in the family’s car. (Ibid.) Two of the brothers were convicted of the four murders and
sentenced to death.5 (Tison, at pp. 141–143.) On appeal, our Supreme Court emphasized

5 The third brother was killed during a shootout with police. (Tison, supra,
481 U.S. at p. 141.)

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that “the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a
mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment
when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result.” (Id. at
pp. 157–158.) The high court noted the brothers’ major participation in the kidnapping
and robbery implicated them in the resulting deaths, and the death penalty could properly
be imposed under such circumstances where the defendants also exhibited reckless
indifference to human life. (Id. at p. 158.)
Our Supreme Court has explained that, “[s]omewhere between [Tison and
Enmund], at conduct less egregious than the Tisons’ but more culpable than …
Enmund’s, lies the constitutional minimum for death eligibility.” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 802.)
More recently, in People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (Emanuel), our
Supreme Court clarified that, in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference, our task is “to distinguish between defendants who participate in a violent
felony posing only the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any such crime (who are not
liable for deaths that may occur during its commission) from those who knowingly
engage in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death (who are liable).” (Id.
at p. 889.) To make this determination, we first consider the relevant factors separately,
then we turn to the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 888 [“Lower courts should
take care to consider the presence or absence of evidence relating to each relevant factor
on its own merits before considering the evidence in its totality.”].)
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
As to the applicable standard for reviewing a trial court’s factual findings after it
denies a section 1172.6 petition, Ornelas argues that independent review is appropriate
when no live testimony is presented. “However, appellate courts that have considered

14.
this argument have uniformly rejected it, and we agree with their analysis.” (People v.
Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 313–314 [collecting cases].) Instead, “[w]here
the trial court’s decision on review is predominantly a question of fact, the appellate court
reviews the record for substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 314.) Notably, Ornelas does not
cite a single case holding otherwise.
Under the substantial evidence standard, “we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Ornelas Acted with
Reckless Indifference to Human Life
We next turn to whether substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that
Ornelas was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. As
Ornelas does, we first address reckless indifference.
As to most of the Clark factors, Ornelas is correct that they do not weigh in favor
of a finding of reckless indifference. The trial court found that it was Madrigal who used
the knife on Muralles, and there is no evidence that Ornelas was aware Madrigal
possessed the knife in advance of the robbery. There is also no evidence that Ornelas
participated in planning the robbery, or that he was aware Madrigal was prone to
violence. Further, while there is evidence that Muralles was stabbed 35 times, which
would have taken some time to accomplish, there is no evidence that there was a lengthy
interaction between the perpetrators and the victim.
Finally, while there is evidence that Ornelas fled the scene without rendering aid,
there is little evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, as to why he fled rather than
rendering aid. Thus, Ornelas’s post-stabbing behavior does little to support a finding of
reckless indifference. (See, e.g., Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [“when different

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inferences may be drawn from the circumstances, the defendant’s actions after the
shooting may not be very probative of his mental state”]; Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 894 [holding that, based on the circumstances, “it could be inferred that [the defendant]
was motivated to flee the scene as quickly as possible to avoid arrest, whether or not he
understood the extent of [the victim’s] injuries”].) This is especially so given that
Ornelas was only 16 years old when the crime occurred. (See, e.g., In re Moore (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 434, 453 [“It is well recognized that ‘[c]hildren “generally are less mature
and responsible than adults” ’ and ‘ “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them” ....’ [Citation.] As a
result, ‘[t]he law has historically reflected the same assumption that children
characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them.’ ”].)
However, contrary to Ornelas’s assertion, at least one Clark factor supports a
finding of reckless indifference. There is evidence that Ornelas was at the scene,
including DNA evidence and Ornelas’s own admission that he was present (although
according to Ornelas, he and Madrigal were attempting to stop the perpetrator from
attacking Muralles). There is also evidence that he had an opportunity to restrain the
crime or assist the victim. A law enforcement officer testified that on October 15, 1996
(which was shortly after the crime occurred), he interviewed Ornelas and saw that he
what appeared to be a knife wound on his left arm, scrapes on his wrists and one arm, and
numerous small puncture wounds. Moreover, a criminalist testified that there appeared to
be partial bloody shoe prints on Muralles’s face which were consistent with full shoe
prints that were located at the scene; a law enforcement officer testified, based on his
interaction with Ornelas’s mother, that Ornelas’s shoes made the same type of pattern as
the one found at the scene; and a forensic pathologist testified that the wounds on
Muralles’s face were consistent with his face being stomped on. Notably, the pathologist

16.
also testified that the wounds included “extensive bruising about both the eyes and
around the forehead area,” as well as a fractured nose.
Therefore, there is evidence that Ornelas stomped on Muralles’s face multiple
times. Given this evidence, as well as the evidence regarding Ornelas’s injuries, a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that Ornelas had the opportunity to restrain the
crime or assist the victim, but rather than doing so, he chose to assist his friend Madrigal6
and attack the victim.
In arguing to the contrary, Ornelas simply ignores the evidence showing that his
bloody shoeprints were on Muralles’s face. Thus, while he cites to multiple cases, none
involved a defendant who was not only present, but who also attacked the victim along
with the actual killer. Accordingly, his argument is not persuasive.7
Turning to the totality of the circumstances, and applying the substantial evidence
standard of review, it is true that most factors do not support a finding of reckless
indifference. However, “[i]n Tison, the high court stressed the importance of presence to
culpability.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619; see also People v. Bascomb (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 [finding the defendant acted with reckless indifference largely
on the ground that he “was willingly involved in the violent manner in which the robbery
took place”].) And here, despite his youth, Ornelas’s presence at the scene and active
participation in the violent altercation shows that he was “aware of and willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense [was] committed[.]”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) Additionally, given his participation in the violent
altercation, including the fact that he stomped on Muralles’s face multiple times, the risk

6 Ornelas testified that Madrigal was his friend.

7 He also discusses facts that do not pertain to this case. For example, he refers to
a shooting that he had no opportunity to stop, a co-defendant named “Bledsaw,” and the
asserted fact that he urged Bledsaw to flee without shooting the victim. There is no
evidence of a shooting here, or a co-defendant named Bledsaw. Accordingly, the
arguments based on these asserted facts fail.

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of death was “of such a nature and degree that … its disregard involve[d] a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor’s situation.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports the finding that Ornelas
acted with reckless indifference to human life.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Ornelas Was a Major
Participant
We next turn to whether Ornelas was a major participant in the robbery. The
analysis is similar. Again, Ornelas is correct that many of the Banks factors do not weigh
in favor of such a finding. There is no evidence that Ornelas had a role in planning the
robbery or that he supplied a weapon. Additionally, the trial court found that it was
Madrigal who used the knife on Muralles, and there is no evidence that Ornelas was
aware Madrigal possessed a knife in advance of the robbery. Further, there is no
evidence that he knew Madrigal was prone to violence. Finally, except for the fact that
he fled, there is little relevant evidence as to what Ornelas did after lethal force was used.
Thus, this factor does not support a major participant finding.
However, as discussed above, there is evidence that Ornelas was present at the
scene, that he was in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and that he
chose to facilitate the murder. Thus, reviewing the totality of the circumstances, rather
than helping Muralles, or even just standing by, he chose to assist his friend and attack
Muralles. This included stomping on Muralles’s face multiple times.8 The foregoing
evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Ornelas was a major participant in the
underlying robbery that led to Muralles’s death.

8 Once again, Ornelas failed to address this evidence in his argument.

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 DISPOSITION
The order denying Ornelas’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

GUERRA, J.

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