Filed 10/2/26 In re Anthony R.-F. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re ANTHONY R.-F., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G066562
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23DP0831,
v. 23DP0831A)
JUAN F. et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Daphne Grace Sykes, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie N. Lankford under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Juan F.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant S.P.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez, Supervising
Deputy, and Deborah B. Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendants S.P. (Mother) and Juan F. (Father) appeal from an
order terminating their parental rights to their son Anthony. They assert the
juvenile court erred in rejecting the parental-benefit exception to termination
and in failing to conduct a proper inquiry of Anthony’s extended relatives to
determine whether he is or may be an Indian child as required by the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).1
We affirm. The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that
the parental-benefit exception does not apply and confirms the court
conducted a proper ICWA inquiry of possible Indian ancestry.
FACTS
In June 2023, Anthony (then age two) was found unsupervised
wandering down the hallway of the motel where his family was residing. The
Orange County Social Services Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code2
section 300 petition, citing his parents’ failure to provide appropriate care
and supervision, as well as their extensive criminal histories, significant drug
use, and pattern of domestic violence. The juvenile court sustained the
petition, removed Anthony from Father’s custody, and left the child in
Mother’s care with protective orders, including that Mother undergo drug
testing and refrain from substance abuse.
1 “[W]e use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory
language” though many prefer other terms. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).)
2 All further statutory references are to this code.
2
After Mother missed numerous drug tests in October 2023 and
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine five times the
following month, Anthony was removed from her custody via a protective
custody warrant and placed with his maternal aunt. In early 2024, the
juvenile court sustained a supplemental section 300 petition, removed
Anthony from parental custody, and ordered reunification services.
Throughout the first and second reunification periods, Mother
made “minimal” progress in her case plan: she missed nearly all her drug
tests, she tested positive for methamphetamine and hydrocodone on several
occasions, and she did not complete a substance abuse program.3 In addition,
her supervised visits with Anthony, though often positive, were inconsistent
and typically brief, despite her being awarded six hours of visitation per
week.
As the case progressed, Mother repeatedly denied any Indian
ancestry. Her mother, sister, and brother also denied any Indian ancestry.
The Agency did not ask Mother’s father about potential Indian ancestry,
despite having some contact with him.
Father likewise repeatedly denied any Indian ancestry, as did his
sister Elizabeth. The Agency did not ask his sister Brenda about potential
Indian ancestry, despite having contact with her, and it did not attempt to
contact his brother Angel. Father’s parents are deceased and thus could not
be interviewed.
The juvenile court terminated services in April 2025 after
finding the parents had made minimal progress. At the section 366.26
hearing that fall, Anthony (then age five) gave somewhat conflicting
3 According to Mother, she experienced numerous medical and
transportation issues that hindered her ability to participate in services.
3
testimony but said, among other things, that he wants to reside with his
caregiver.
After considering the evidence, the juvenile court found ICWA
inapplicable and concluded the parental-benefit exception to adoption did not
apply; it therefore terminated parental rights and ordered adoption as the
permanent plan for Anthony. The court noted that although “it is clear that
these parents love their child,” the parents’ visits were “sporadic” and “not
always consistent,” and Anthony’s attachment to the parents was more akin
to the attachment a child would have to “a friendly visitor.”
DISCUSSION
I.
THE PARENTAL-BENEFIT EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY
Mother asserts the juvenile court erred in finding the parental-
benefit exception to termination does not apply. While we appreciate her
connection with Anthony, we see no reversible error.
Once reunification services are terminated, the focus of
proceedings shifts to the child’s need for permanency and stability. (In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52.) Adoption is the Legislature’s preferred
permanent plan because “‘it gives the child the best chance at [a full]
emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’” (Id. at p. 53.) Thus, if a
child will likely be adopted, a juvenile court is required to terminate parental
rights unless an exception to adoption applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
One such exception is the parental-benefit exception. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To trigger the exception, a parent must prove three
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
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the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631, 636 (Caden C.).) We
review the first two elements for substantial evidence but review the third for
abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639−640.)
Assessment of the first element—regular visitation and contact—
is “‘“quantitative and relatively straightforward.”’” (In re I.E. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 683, 691.) “‘“‘Sporadic visitation is insufficient.’’”’” (Ibid.) The
record here confirms Mother’s visits were inconsistent; she concedes her
“visitation was not perfect.” And even if that inconsistency was due to health
and transportation issues, as Mother asserts, the fact remains that when she
did visit, she was often late or stayed far less time than what the juvenile
court allotted. Substantial evidence confirms the court’s finding on this first
element.
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding on
the second element—a beneficial relationship. “To satisfy this element,
parents ‘must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional
bond with the child, or pleasant visits’ [citations], they must establish a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment between them and the child.” (In
re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 816 (Andrew M.).) The record here
confirms the bond between Mother and Anthony, though loving, did not rise
to that level. Anthony only lived with Mother until he was three years old,
and his contact with her after that was positive but sporadic. The record does
not suggest Mother had a recent, significant role in his life.
The third element—detriment—turns on “whether the harm of
severing the [parental] relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of
belonging a new family would confer.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
633.) Conversely, “does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home
5
outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a]
significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’” (Ibid.)
Mother identifies no particular harm Anthony would suffer from
the termination of parental rights, aside from the loss of the parental
relationship. “There is no question that there are benefits in continued visits
with loving parents to which the child has some substantial attachment. Yet
to justify withholding the ‘security,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘“sense of belonging a new
family would confer”’ [citation], the parents . . . must prove some type of harm
beyond the fact that their loving visits would cease.” (Andrew M., supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 820.) Mother did not do so. The juvenile court therefore did
not abuse its discretion when it found the scales tipped in favor of adoption.
II.
THE AGENCY CONDUCTED A PROPER ICWA INQUIRY
Mother and Father next contend the Agency erred by failing to
contact all known extended family members to inquire whether Anthony may
be an Indian child as required by ICWA.
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 ‘“to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families . . . .”’ (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1128–1129.) “ICWA
establish[ed] minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing
Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or
adoptive homes . . . .” (Id. at p. 1129.)
Under California law adopted pursuant to ICWA, agencies and
juvenile courts have “an affirmative and continuing duty” in every
dependency case to inquire whether the child is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.481(a), 5.668(c).)
6
As part of its initial inquiry, an agency must “ask[ ] . . . extended
family members, [and] others who have an interest in the child . . . whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); accord,
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).) The term “extended family member”
generally means “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is
the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); accord, § 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Here, Mother, her sister, her brother, her mother, Father, and his
sister Elizabeth all denied Indian ancestry. The Agency did not speak with
Anthony’s maternal grandfather, paternal aunt Brenda, or paternal uncle
Angel to make a similar inquiry. Mother and Father assert the Agency erred
by not interviewing all known relatives.
We disagree. Our Supreme Court has rejected the view that
“every possible extended family member [must be] asked about the child’s
Indian ancestry.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; see id. at p. 1167 (dis.
opn. of Groban, J.) [such a rule would be “‘absurd at best and impossible at
worst.’”].) Instead, what ICWA requires is an inquiry that “‘reliably answer[s]
the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry: Whether [the] child involved
in a proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”’” (In re E.W. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 314, 322 (E.W.).)
In other words, “[i]t is not mandatory for the Department always
to ‘inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.’ [Citation.] The law of
diminishing returns is at work. ‘The juvenile court has discretion to
determine when enough is enough.’” (In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379,
385; see In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 69−70 [although maternal
uncle was not interviewed, juvenile court reasonably relied on certain
7
relatives’ responses about Indian ancestry; focus is reliability of information,
not number of persons interviewed].) Where, as here, the parents “do not
explain how not interviewing additional relatives . . . casts any doubt on the
reliability of the answers already obtained from the parents and relatives,”
reversal is not required. (E.W., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 323.)4
4 That said, when the Agency has had contact with any extended
relative, as was the case here with Anthony’s maternal grandfather and
paternal aunt Brenda, the best practice would be for the Agency to ask that
person about potential Indian ancestry and document the response.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights is
affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SERVINO, J.
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