Filed 9/23/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

BRIAN HOLTZ et al., H053842
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 25CV472881)

v.

MATT MORELES, as Registrar of
Voters, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent;

SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.

In this appeal, we consider the application of the California
Constitution,1 article XIII C’s “cases of emergency” clause to the decision of a
county board of supervisors to seek voter approval of a general tax increase
by special—rather than general—election.
Section 2 of article XIII C, added by Proposition 218 in 1996, generally
requires local governments to submit any general tax increase to the

1 All further unspecified references to “article” are to the California

Constitution.
electorate for approval at a regularly scheduled general election. Section 2
contains an exception under which voter approval can be secured by special
election for “cases of emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the
governing body.” (See art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).)
In August 2025, real party in interest Santa Clara County Board of
Supervisors (Board of Supervisors or Board) invoked this emergency
provision. The Board’s resolution declared an emergency related to the
provision of county healthcare and safety net services resulting from federal
funding cuts due to Congress’s passage of H.R. 1 (signed into law in July
2025). The Board resolved to place Measure A—proposing a five-year, five-
eighths cent (0.625 percent) general sales tax—on the county’s November 4,
2025 special election ballot.
Appellants2 filed in the trial court a preelection complaint and petition
for writ of mandate challenging under article XIII C, section 2 and
Proposition 218 the validity of the emergency declaration and special election
authorization. Appellants also argued the language of the ballot question
and the impartial analysis prepared by the county counsel violated Elections
Code requirements for impartial, nonargumentative, and accurate ballot
materials.
After expedited briefing and a three-day hearing on the merits, the
trial court issued an order on the writ petition and entered judgment. The
court found the emergency declaration valid and denied the petition for writ
of mandate on that ground. As to the other claims, the order directed
modifications to the ballot measure and impartial analysis language. In a

2 Appellants Brian Holtz, Dawn R. Davis, John Inks, and Christopher

Robell (appellants) are individuals and electors in Santa Clara County.
2
November 2025 special election, Santa Clara County voters approved
Measure A.
On appeal from the order on the writ petition and judgment, appellants
contend the trial court erred in interpreting the “cases of emergency” clause
in article XIII C, section 2. Appellants maintain the court abused its
discretion by taking judicial notice of materials promulgated by the Board of
Supervisors in support of the emergency declaration and contend the
declaration was legally insufficient and invalid. In addition, appellants argue
that, although technically moot, this court should independently review the
language of the Measure A ballot question and impartial analysis for
consistency with Elections Code requirements.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in construing the phrase
“cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b), any
abuse of discretion in relation to the court’s judicial notice rulings was not
prejudicial, and the county’s declaration of emergency was not invalid. We
decline to exercise our discretion to review the fact- and context-specific
issues raised by appellants’ Elections Code claims. We therefore affirm the
trial court’s order and judgment.

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 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3
A. Special Meeting of the Board of Supervisors
On August 7, 2025,4 the Board of Supervisors held a special meeting
(August 7 board meeting) to discuss the anticipated impact on Santa Clara

3 We draw the facts recited herein from the materials filed in the trial

court’s expedited proceedings on the writ petition, of which the court took
judicial notice upon stipulation of the parties. To the extent appellants
challenge on appeal the court’s consideration of the contents of the noticed
materials for the truth of the matter therein, we address appellants’
arguments in our discussion, post (pt. II.D.).
We separately grant respondents’ unopposed request for judicial notice
of exhibits A through E, filed in this court on April 24, 2026, comprising the
certificate of election for Measure A and official final summary of results of
the November 4, 2025 special election; verified complaint in Silicon Valley
Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Sup. Ct. Santa
Clara County, No. 26CV483689), a related action discussed post; petition for
writ of mandate in this matter filed in this court on September 10, 2026, and
this court’s September 12, 2025 order denying the writ petition; and the
County Voter Information Guide for the November 4, 2025 special election.
We also grant appellants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of
exhibits 25 and 26, filed in this court on May 14, 2026, comprising the
endorsed-filed first amended complaint in the Silicon Valley Taxpayers
Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County, No. 26CV483689), and the Charter of Santa Clara County, revised
August 30, 2017. Each of these documents satisfies criteria for judicial notice
pursuant to Evidence Code, sections 452, subdivisions (b), (d), or (h), and 459,
subdivision (a).
We deny appellants’ second request for judicial notice of exhibit 27,
filed in this court shortly before oral argument on September 8, 2026.
Appellants’ second request for judicial notice contains the text of a ballot
question, Measure ER, published by the Los Angeles County Registrar-
Recorder as appearing on the statewide direct primary election on June 2,
2026. The text of Measure ER is relevant only to appellants’ effort to show
that language similar to that of Measure A has appeared in proposed
measures in other jurisdictions, such that whether that language complies
with governing law is an issue of significant public interest and likely to
recur. However, as explained post (pt. II.A.), we decline to exercise our
discretion to decide the Elections Code issues presented in this case, and the
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County of H.R. 1 and to consider recommendations related to proposed
Measure A. The agenda packet described Measure A as “a sales tax measure
for voter consideration to protect local services.”
The action items stated in the agenda packet for the August 7 board
meeting were: (1) receive a report from the Office of the County Executive
“relating to the impacts of H.R. 1 and a potential sales tax ballot measure”;
(2) adopt a resolution for an emergency declaration authorizing a special
election on the proposed sales tax and consolidating the election with the
office of the assessor special election, already set for November 4; and
(3) adopt “an urgency ordinance implementing a five-year general retail
transactions (sales) and use tax in Santa Clara County at the rate of five-
eighths of one cent, and setting an approval measure on the ballot for the
November 4[] special election.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
Included in the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting were
recommendations of the county executive and a memorandum submitted by
the County Budget Director on the fiscal impacts of H.R. 1. The county
budget director reported that, following the county’s adoption of its fiscal year
2025–2026 budget, the effects of H.R. 1 (compounded by additional state level
impacts) created “extraordinary and severe financial challenges in the next
five years” beginning “immediately with the current fiscal year (FY 2025–
2026)” and expanding annually “to nearly $1.4 billion by FY 2029–2030,”
absent ameliorative action.
The county executive’s report described the impact of H.R. 1 on county
funding for services, including cuts to Medicaid (known in California as Medi-

material presented in appellants’ second request for judicial notice is
otherwise not relevant to any aspect of our decision.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2025.

5
Cal) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (known in
California as CalFresh), elimination and reduction of funding for the county’s
public health and hospital system (comprising four county hospitals and 15
health centers), and fiscal impacts due to, inter alia, changes in eligibility for
Medicaid and other programs. The County Executive recommended a three-
pronged strategy to address the “more than $1 billion” in lost annual funding,
including seeking additional support from the state, reducing the county
budget while trying to minimize service cuts, and requesting community help
via a ballot measure proposing a local sales tax.
B. Resolution, Proposed Ballot Question, and Impartial Analysis
Following public comment, at the August 7 board meeting the Board of
Supervisors approved Resolution No. BOS-2025-79 (resolution) and Urgency
Ordinance No. NS-7.23 (ordinance) to place Measure A on the November 4
special election ballot.
Titled “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa
Clara Declaring an Emergency Under Proposition 218 and Authorizing a
Special Election,” the resolution set forth findings concerning, inter alia, the
county’s taxation authority, its provision of safety net and health care
services, the anticipated impacts of H.R. 1 on funding for those services, and
the determination of the Board of Supervisors that it was in the public
interest not to await the next regularly scheduled election but to implement
the proposed sales tax “effective beginning April 1, 2026 and lasting for a
period of five years.”
As part of the resolution, the Board declared an emergency under
article XIII C and called for a special election, stating: “BE IT RESOLVED
that the Board of Supervisors . . . finds facts constituting an emergency under
section 2 of article XIII C of the California Constitution, including but not

6
limited to the facts reflected in the recitals above and those findings recited
in section 1 of the urgency ordinance . . ., considered concurrently with this
resolution, as well as the legislative file and materials presented by county
administration at the August 7 [board meeting] to consider adoption of this
resolution; . . . [¶] BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that due to the present
emergency the Board calls and orders a special election” (hereafter, the
emergency declaration). (Some capitalization & boldface omitted.)
As part of the resolution, the Board also approved the text of the
Measure A ballot question and directed the Registrar of Voters to print it on
the sample ballot for the November 4 special election, as follows: “To help
protect our community from severe federal cuts enacted by President Trump
and Congress; support critical local services such as trauma, emergency
room, mental health, burn, and cancer care; and reduce the risk of hospital
closures at Santa Clara Valley Healthcare and other service cuts—shall the
County of Santa Clara adopt a five-eighth cent general sales tax for 5 years,
providing $330 million annually that cannot be taken by the federal
government and is subject to independent audits/oversight?” (proposed ballot
question).
The Board concurrently approved the ordinance, titled “An Urgency
Ordinance Implementing a Five-Year General Retail Transactions (Sales)
and Use Tax in Santa Clara County at the Rate of Five-Eighths of One Cent”
(boldface & some capitalization omitted). Among the findings set forth
therein, the Board found that the county “serves as the social safety net for
the [county’s] approximately 1.9 million residents” and that the county’s
“current property taxes and other revenue sources cannot offset the expected
reductions in federal and State revenues and these deficits will result in cuts
to vital public services.” The Board also found that placing the proposed

7
sales tax on the November 4 ballot “is needed as an action to immediately
preserve public health and safety because failure to enable voters to consider
this tax in 2025 will result in a delay of up to two years in implementing any
tax to be approved by voters and during that time, the [c]ounty’s budget
deficit will require severe cuts to the services needed to protect public health,
safety, and other services.”
Subsequently, on or about August 19, the county made available on the
Registrar of Voters’ website the county counsel’s impartial analysis of
Measure A (impartial analysis),5 authored by real parties in interest Tony
LoPresti and Nick DeFiesta. The impartial analysis explained that the
Board of Supervisors “placed Measure A on the ballot after declaring a fiscal
emergency by unanimous vote.” It stated that funds generated by Measure A
“would partially offset” the loss of federal funding due to H.R. 1. The
impartial analysis further stated that Measure A was “a general tax,
meaning the [c]ounty could use the funds to support Santa Clara Valley
Healthcare hospitals and clinics, provide social services, or for any other
legitimate governmental purposes.”
C. Petition for Writ of Mandate
On August 21, four days after filing their initial complaint and petition
for writ of mandate in the trial court to challenge the proposed Measure A,
appellants filed the operative, verified first amended complaint and petition

5 Under Elections Code section 9160, if a county measure qualifies for

the ballot, “[t]he county counsel or district attorney shall prepare an
impartial analysis of the measure showing the effect of the measure on the
existing law and the operation of the measure.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) A copy of
the impartial analysis shall be made “available for public examination . . . for
a period of 10 calendar days immediately following the deadline for
submission of those materials.” (Id., § 9190, subd. (a).)
8
for writ of mandate seeking declaratory, mandatory, and injunctive relief
(petition).6
The petition asserted in the first cause of action that the Board’s
emergency declaration was not legally sufficient under Proposition 218 and
article XIII C to authorize a special election, the declared “emergency” did not
meet any related constitutional or statutory definitions of emergency, and the
trial court should issue a peremptory writ ordering respondents to remove
Measure A from the November 4 ballot. In the second through sixth causes of
action, the petition challenged the wording of the ballot question as “untrue,
partial, argumentative, and/or prejudicial” in violation of Elections Code7
sections 9051, subdivision (e) and 13119, subdivision (c), and “false and/or
misleading” under section 9190 and McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 1169. In the seventh cause of action, the petition challenged the
wording of the impartial analysis under sections 9160 and 9190 as “false,
misleading, and not impartial.”
The trial court found the petition had priority over all other civil
matters (§ 13314, subd. (a)(3)), ordered expedited briefing, and set a hearing
schedule. The parties filed written briefing, respective requests for judicial
notice, and supplemental briefs on the disputed issue of the Board of
Supervisors’ emergency declaration.

6 The petition named county elections official, Santa Clara County

Registrar Matt Moreles (Moreles) as respondent and further identified the
county (as sponsor of Measure A) and Board of Supervisors (as authors of
Measure A) (together, county parties) as real parties in interest. The petition
further identified County Counsel Tony LoPresti and Deputy County Counsel
Nick DeFiesta (as authors of the impartial analysis) as real parties in
interest. For convenience, we refer to the named respondent and real parties
in interest, together, as respondents.
7 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Elections Code.

9
 Appellants’ request for judicial notice identified 19 items. Among the
requested items, appellants sought judicial notice of the agenda packet for
the August 7 board meeting (RJN 1, or August 7 agenda packet), the official
“ ‘[s]ummary of [p]roceedings’ ” for the August 7 board meeting (RJN 2, or
August 7 summary of proceedings), a copy of the August 19 impartial
analysis for the November 4 special election on Measure A (RJN 15, or
impartial analysis), a copy of the “ ‘Detailed Description of the Sales & Use
Tax Rate’ ” information from the website of the California Department of Tax
and Fee Administration (RJN 18, or California Department of Tax summary
of sales tax rate), and a copy of the California Legislative Analyst Office
(LAO)’s report titled “ ‘Understanding California’s Sales Tax’ (2015)” from the
LAO’s website (RJN 19, or LAO report).
Respondents’ request for judicial notice consisted of five items. Among
these was a copy of the resolution, adopted by the Board of Supervisors at the
August 7 board meeting, and a copy of the Voter Information Guide for the
1996 General Election. The county parties also submitted a video recording
of the August 7 board meeting, published on the county website, and an
automatically generated transcript included “for the court’s convenience.”
D. Expedited Hearing
On August 27, shortly after setting the expedited schedule, the trial
court held the first of three, consecutive, full-day merits hearings. The court
asked the parties to discuss possible areas of agreement related to the
matters submitted for judicial notice and offered informal feedback on issues
in dispute related to the ballot question and impartial analysis. The parties
ultimately agreed to several changes in the wording of the ballot question,
which the court memorialized in its order.

10
 As to judicial notice, the parties stipulated that there was no objection
to the trial court taking judicial notice of several of the matters submitted.
These included the resolution, the August 7 agenda packet and summary of
proceedings, and the video recording of the August 7 board meeting. With
respect to the August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings,
respondents specified that they had no objection to the court taking judicial
notice as to both the “existence and contents” of the documents.
Counsel for appellants later questioned the propriety of the trial court
taking judicial notice of the “contents” of the August 7 agenda packet and
raised a hearsay objection. Appellants asserted that they had not intended
their agreement regarding judicial notice to extend to the truth of statements
contained therein. Appellants argued that treating the contents of the
judicially noticed documents as true would improperly allow the court to
consider a “trojan horse, . . . laden with hearsay.”
Respondents countered that the parties had “collectively stipulated to
the admission of these documents for all purposes, including for the truth of
the matter.” Respondents additionally maintained that the documents were
properly considered for their truth because they reflected a legislative
determination of the Board of Supervisors, and courts generally defer to the
determination of a legislative body based on legislative facts. The trial court
declined to “retread territory that’s already been determined” and pointed out
that the contents appellants contested were submitted as part of their own
request for judicial notice.
After further review, the trial court confirmed that appellants’ RJN 1
and 2 “came in, without objection, . . . offered by [appellants], coming in for
content, as well as . . . the existence.” Ultimately, the court recognized that it
was not entirely clear during the expedited proceedings whether the matters

11
submitted by appellants for judicial notice constituted legislative or
adjudicative facts and that appellants had raised objections “very late.”
On the merits of the petition, appellants asserted that there was no
precedent for a fiscal emergency to constitute an emergency under
Proposition 218 and the Board of Supervisors’ declaration was invalid. They
maintained that an “emergency” for purposes of the “cases of emergency”
clause must be founded on something apart from the conclusory declaration
of five members of the governing body, especially given the express direction
in section 5 of Proposition 218 to liberally construe its provisions to, “when in
doubt, limit local government revenue.”
The hearings concluded on the August 29 deadline requested by the
Registrar of Voters.
E. Order and Judgment
On August 29, the trial court filed its order and judgment (August 29
order). The August 29 order largely resolved the remaining contested issues
in favor of respondents by denying the writ petition, though the order
directed respondents to amend certain language in the ballot question and
impartial analysis.
The August 29 order addressed each request for judicial notice. The
trial court explained that “[i]t was not entirely clear throughout the course of
the writ proceedings what specific information derived from the RJN
documents that [appellants] wished to have the [c]ourt consider for the truth
of the matter asserted, and/or whether certain documents were merely
intended to provide “legislative facts” (e.g., for background, context, policy,
etc.) versus “adjudicative facts” directly relating to the disputed matters
herein.” As to appellants’ RJN 1 and 2, the court found that the parties had
stipulated to judicial notice “without objection” and had stipulated that the

12
court “may consider the substance of this document for evidentiary purposes.”
(Italics omitted.)
Regarding appellants’ RJN 18 and 19, the trial court took judicial
notice of the publication of the California Department of Tax summary of
sales tax rate document on the department website but not of the truth of the
matters stated therein. The court similarly took judicial notice of the
publication of the “ ‘Understanding California’s Sales Tax’ (2015)” report on
the LAO website but not of the truth of the matters stated therein. The court
rejected appellants’ RJN 20 and 21 to take judicial notice of two statutes
(Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6051.15, 6051.2), stating the items were “late-
identified” and not included among appellants’ initial requests for judicial
notice or cited in the petition or supporting briefs.
On the merits, the August 29 order rejected appellants’ contention that
the Board of Supervisors did not declare a valid emergency within the
meaning of article XIII C, section 2 and Proposition 218. As neither
Proposition 218 nor its implementing legislation (Proposition 218 Omnibus
Implementation Act; Gov. Code, § 53750 et seq.) defined the term
“emergency,” the trial court looked to its ordinary definition as recognized in
case authority. It adopted the definition set forth in Sonoma County
Organization etc. Employees v. County of Sonoma (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 267
(Sonoma County), “long . . . accepted in California as an unforeseen situation
calling for immediate action” (id. at p. 276).
The trial court found that the Board of Supervisors’ emergency
declaration met this legal standard, judged by the facts set forth in the
resolution’s recitals, ordinance, and materials presented by county
administration at the August 7 board meeting. The court reasoned that
appellants had “stipulate[ed] to every single fact cited” by agreeing to judicial

13
notice of the existence and “truth of the matters contained” in their RJN 1. It
concluded that the findings of the Board “reasonably reflected an ‘unforeseen
situation calling for immediate action.’ ([Sonoma County], supra, 1
Cal.App.4th at p. 276.)”
The trial court further observed that appellants had provided no reason
to depart from the presumption of validity afforded to a local government
enactment. Finding no basis to invalidate the Board of Supervisors’
unanimous decision to declare an emergency on the facts presented, the court
denied the writ and declaratory and injunctive relief on appellants’ first
cause of action.
As to the remaining causes of action, the August 29 order summarized
the modifications to the ballot question sought by appellants in the second
and third causes of action. The trial court described several agreed-upon
changes, which the parties reached without waiving or conceding any legal
arguments. The court found that appellants had not met their burden to
demonstrate that the other phrases and terms challenged in the ballot
question were untrue, partial, argumentative, and/or prejudicial in favor of
Measure A. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the phrase “ ‘cannot be
taken by the federal government’ ” did display partiality. The court’s
tentative ruling on this point led the parties to agree (without waiving any
legal arguments) to modify the phrase to state, “ ‘is not available to the
federal government.’ ” Lastly, as to the seventh cause of action, the court
summarized the parties’ agreed-upon changes to certain words and phrases
in the impartial analysis and rejected appellants’ claim that the other words
and phrases were partial, false, and/or misleading.

14
 Applying these rulings, the August 29 order denied appellants’ writ as
to the second through seventh causes of action but mandated the “voluntary
modifications to the language of” Measure A.
F. Measure A Approval and Third-party Reverse Validation Action
The ballot question put to the voters at the November 4 special election
incorporated the changes set forth in the August 29 order. By majority vote,
Santa Clara County voters approved Measure A.
Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc. and other nonparties8 filed a
reverse validation action in the trial court challenging the validity of
Measure A (reverse validation action). The reverse validation action, Silicon
Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct.
Santa Clara, No. 26CV483689), was designated a related action and remains
pending in the trial court.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellants seek this court’s independent review of whether the Board’s
actions fall under the “ ‘cases of emergency’ ” exception in article XIII C,
section 2. They challenge the validity of the emergency declared by the
Board of Supervisors and contend the trial court erred in taking judicial
notice of the truth of matters asserted in the documents submitted at the
August 7 board meeting in support of the Board’s determination. Appellants
maintain that, while the election has occurred and therefore the legal issue is
moot, this court’s “articulation of the elements of a valid emergency
declaration” under article XIII C, section 2 will help local governments
implement the law and provide needed guidance in the pending reverse

8 Although Christopher Robell (a plaintiff and appellant in this action)

was originally a named plaintiff in the reverse-validation action, the
plaintiffs in that matter have since filed a first amended complaint that does
not include Robell as a plaintiff.
15
validation action as to Measure A. Appellants also assert that the ballot
question and impartial analysis issues under the Elections Code present
important questions of continuing public interest that are likely to recur
while evading timely review.
Respondents disagree with appellants’ interpretation of the challenged
constitutional provision and argue that because the November 4 special
election has already occurred, this court can no longer grant relief and the
appeal is moot. Nevertheless, respondents assert that the constitutional
issue raised by appellants is of broad public interest and likely to recur. They
agree with appellants that this court should address the meaning of “cases of
‘emergency’ ” under article XIII C, section 2 and the validity of the Board’s
action. Respondents contend that the remainder of the appeal does not raise
any exceptional issue warranting postelection review.
We first address the parties’ arguments concerning mootness and this
court’s exercise of discretion over the issues on appeal.
A. Mootness
The timing of this appeal raises questions of mootness and this court’s
ability to grant effective relief to appellants.
A court’s duty is “ ‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which
can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” (Eye Dog Foundation v.
State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.)
Generally, an appeal “should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of
events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any
effective relief.” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of

16
Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 (Cucamongans United),
citing Eye Dog Foundation, at p. 541.)
Nevertheless, courts recognize “three discretionary exceptions to the
rules regarding mootness.” (Cucamongans United, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at
p. 479.) Applying these exceptions, “courts will generally exercise their
discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the
controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for
the court’s determination.’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282 (D.P.).)
Both appellants and respondents suggest that this court should
exercise its discretion to review the principal issue on appeal concerning what
constitutes a legally sufficient “emergency” within the meaning of article XIII
C, section 2. They argue that this portion of the appeal raises a question of
broad public interest that has already recurred in subsequent litigation
between the parties.
We agree. Because a ruling on the merits interpreting the “cases of
emergency” clause of article XIII C, section 2 involves an issue of broad public
interest likely to recur and is likely to “ ‘affect future proceedings between the
parties[,] or will have some precedential consequence in future litigation
generally’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283), we will exercise our discretion
to address it.
Turning to the nonconstitutional questions raised by appellants, they
contend that the ballot question does not conform with the statutory
language of section 13119, subdivision (a), providing that “[t]he ballots used
when voting upon a measure proposed by a local governing body . . . shall
have printed on them the words ‘Shall the measure (stating the nature
thereof) be adopted?’ ”

17
 We decline to address this moot issue because it presents a specific
question of compliance with a longstanding statute 9 that does not rise to the
level of “ ‘an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur.’ ” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
As to the remaining challenges to the ballot question and impartial
analysis on grounds that the language of each violated the requirements of,
inter alia, impartiality, truthfulness, and accuracy, we similarly decline to
exercise our discretion to reach those issues. Determining whether the ballot
question violated the legal standards demands a fact-specific inquiry tethered
to its language and the Board’s findings in support of the emergency
declaration. The same is true with respect to the impartial analysis.
In contrast with cases like Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 110 and California Cannabis Coalition v. City of
Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 (California Cannabis), cited by appellants, the
issues of alleged partiality and inaccuracies in the challenged statements do
not raise questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation likely to
recur, and resolving them would not address a question of continuing public
interest. (See Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach

9 Apart from a one-word change that took place in 2017, the sentence

formulating the language to be printed on the ballots has been the same since
1911 (though the statute has experienced numerous revisions, including in
1994 when the Legislature repealed the former Elections Code and reenacted
it in a reorganized format). (See Stats. 1911, ex. Session, ch. 33, § 1
[providing that “The ballots used when voting upon said proposed ordinances
shall have printed thereon the words ‘Shall the ordinance (stating the nature
thereof) be adopted?”]; Stats. 1994, ch. 920, §§ 1, 2 [repealing, adding the
Elections Code].) In 2017, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 195,
amending certain provisions of section 13119, including, for subdivision (a),
replacing the word “ordinance” with the word “measure.” (Stats. 2017, ch.
105, § 1.)
18
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867–868 [declining to exercise discretion over
moot issues related to voter approval of city’s amendments to the local coastal
program].) Appellants furthermore have not shown the alleged, statutory
violations based on the ballot question and impartial analysis language to be
an issue likely to recur between the parties or of remaining relevance as a
material question in the reverse-validation proceeding. (Cf. D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 276.)
The availability of a statutory remedy (pursuant to section 9190) for
interested parties seeking expeditious, preelection review of deficient election
materials also undercuts appellants’ argument that an exercise of discretion
over the mooted ballot language claims is needed. We acknowledge
appellants’ concern regarding the timing challenges for litigation seeking
preelection review of ballot materials. Nevertheless, they have not shown
that the deadlines applied in this case (i.e., the deadlines set by the Registrar
of Voters) were improper or outside the scope of authority conferred by the
Elections Code. (See § 9163.) We therefore decline to exercise our discretion
to review the merits of appellants’ appeal concerning the format and text of
the ballot question and text of the impartial analysis.
We turn to the constitutionality of the county’s invocation of the “cases
of emergency” clause of article XIII C, section 2 with respect to Measure A.
B. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a constitutional provision or statute is a question
of law subject to this court’s independent review. (California Cannabis,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934; California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community
College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698.) We review the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, including rulings on requests for judicial notice, for abuse
of discretion. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229,

19
281; Vo v. Technology Credit Union (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 632, 639.) A trial
court abuses its discretion by action that is arbitrary or “ ‘that transgresses
the confines of the applicable principles of law.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.)
The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to the Board’s
emergency declaration based on the findings in its resolution recitals and
accompanying ordinance. We examine this issue further post.
C. “Cases of Emergency” Under Proposition 218 and Article XIII C
Appellants challenge the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration
as outside the purview of the “cases of emergency” clause and setting the
Measure A vote for the November 4 special election as unconstitutional.
They urge that the term “ ‘emergency’ ” in article XIII C, section 2 must be
construed to effectuate Proposition 218’s local government revenue limiting
purpose, which the Board’s emergency declaration contravened.
1. Legal Principles and Background on Proposition 218
“When, as here, the voters enacted the provision, their intent governs.”
(Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 212
(Bighorn-Desert).) To ascertain intent, we analyze the text in its relevant
context, “ascribing to words their ordinary meaning” and “taking account of
related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and
constitutional scheme.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.) “If
the provisions’ intended purpose nonetheless remains opaque, we may
consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative’s ballot materials.” (Id. at
p. 934.)
California voters passed Proposition 218 in 1996, as part of “a series of
initiatives designed to limit the authority of state and local governments to
impose taxes without voter approval.” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of

20
Redding (2018) 6 Cal.5th 1, 10 (REU Rates); see Loeber v. Lakeside Joint
School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 578.) Known as the “ ‘ “Right to
Vote on Taxes Act,” ’ ” Proposition 218 “added articles XIII C and XIII D to
the state Constitution.” (REU Rates, at p. 10.) Article XIII D sets out “the
authority of local governments to assess taxes and other charges on real
property” (REU Rates, at p. 10), while article XIII C limits “the other
methods by which local governments can exact revenue using fees and taxes
not based on real property value or ownership.” (REU Rates, at p. 10.)
Article XIII C provides that “[a]ll taxes imposed by any local
government shall be deemed to be either general taxes or special taxes.” (Id.,
§ 2, subd. (a).) It specifies that “[l]ocal governments may not impose,
increase, or extend: (1) any general tax, unless approved by a majority vote
at a general election; or (2) any special tax, unless approved by a two-thirds
vote.” (REU Rates, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 10–11, citing art. XIII C, § 2,
subds. (b), (d).) Thus, it “requires the approval of either a majority or two-
thirds of voters before new or increased local taxes take effect, depending on
the type of tax.” (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105, 1112
(Wilde).)
“ ‘General tax’ ” is defined as “any tax imposed for general
governmental purposes.” (Art. XIIIC, § 1, subd. (a).) “ ‘Special tax’ ” is
defined as “any tax imposed for specific purposes, including a tax imposed for
specific purposes, which is placed into a general fund.” (Id., subd. (d).) There
is no dispute that the sales tax increase proposed by Measure A constituted a
general tax under subdivision (b) of article XIII C, section 2 (section 2).10

10 Appellants argue that the Board could have designated Measure A as

a “ ‘special tax’ ” addressed to health care and social purposes, allowing it to
call a special election without need for a declaration of emergency, but
requiring a two-thirds voter approval threshold. (Art. XIIIC, § 2, subd. (d).)
21
 Section 2, governing voter approval for a general tax, states: “No local
government may impose, extend, or increase any general tax unless and until
that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority vote.
. . . The election required by this subdivision shall be consolidated with a
regularly scheduled general election for members of the governing body of the
local government, except in cases of emergency declared by a unanimous vote
of the governing body.” (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b), italics added.)
2. Analysis
We begin with the text of section 2. The phrase “cases of emergency”
operates as an exception to the requirement that the submission of a general
tax to the electorate for approval by majority vote occur “with a regularly
scheduled general election.” (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) The exception
requires “a unanimous vote of the governing body” (ibid.), here, the Board of
Supervisors. As “emergency” is not defined in article XIII C or in the
implementing legislation for Proposition 218 (see generally, Gov. Code,
§ 53750 et seq.), we look to its “ordinary meaning, while taking account of
related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and
constitutional scheme.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.)
The parties point to competing sources for this determination.
Respondents propose that, like the trial court, this court look to the
definition of “ ‘emergency’ ” articulated by the Court of Appeal in Sonoma
County. There, the court examined whether work stoppages by public
employees constituted an emergency that exempted the public agency
employer from its meet and confer obligation under the Meyers–Milias–
Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.). (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th

As this is not the circumstance at issue before this court, we do not further
address it.
22
at p. 270.) The court reasoned that where the term “emergency” is left
undefined by statute (id. at p. 276), California courts have agreed on a
commonly understood meaning: “[E]mergency has long been accepted in
California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action.” (Ibid.)
Sonoma County further observed that it is difficult to specifically
identify characteristics of an emergency, since “ ‘[t]he term depends greatly
upon the special circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] Not only must
urgency be present, the magnitude of the exigency must factor.” (Sonoma
County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) Among other criteria, the court
noted that “an emergency must have ‘a substantial likelihood that serious
harm will be experienced’ [citation] unless immediate action is taken” (ibid.)
and must be based on more “than simple speculation. [Citations.]
Emergency is not synonymous with expediency, convenience, or best interests
[citations], and it imports ‘more . . . than merely a general public need.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Respondents assert that public health emergencies and fiscal
emergencies have both been held to qualify as emergencies requiring
immediate action to avert serious harm. In Sonoma County, the appellate
court upheld the county’s determination of an emergency when actions taken
by employees during labor negotiations imposed on the county’s public health
facilities a “quilt-like pattern of disruption” (Sonoma County, supra, 1
Cal.App.4th at p. 278) and imperiled public health services due to
unannounced absences of workers. (Id. at p. 279.) Respondents also cite
Northgate Partnership v. City of Sacramento (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 65
(Northgate), in which the appellate court affirmed the validity of an
emergency measure adopted by the City of Sacramento, imposing a real
estate transfer tax as mitigation for the impending “ ‘extreme revenue loss’ ”

23
due to the enactment of Proposition 13. (Id. at p. 68.) The court in Northgate
invoked separation of powers principles applicable to local legislative bodies
in determining facts constituting an emergency (id. at p. 69) and rejected the
argument that revenue needed for municipal expenses does not as a matter of
law constitute an emergency (id. at pp. 69–72).
Appellants dispute that this court should rely on what they
characterize as the “exceedingly broad definition” of “ ‘emergency’ ” advanced
in these cases because it would undermine Proposition 218’s purpose of
limiting local government revenue.
Proposition 218 states that “[t]he provisions of this act shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue and
enhancing taxpayer consent.” (Prop. 218, § 5, Stats. 1996; see Ballot Pamp.,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), text of Prop. 218, p. 109; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’
Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th
431, 448; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Garner (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
402, 408 (Garner).) Appellants contend that the term “ ‘emergency’ ” in
section 2, subdivision (b) must be given a restrictive definition consistent
with the initiative’s intent to limit local government revenue and enhance
taxpayer consent. They argue that Northgate is not persuasive because the
case predated the enactment of Proposition 218 and, moreover, is
distinguishable based on the inclusion of a statement of facts in the city’s
emergency tax resolution.
Appellants suggest that this court take guidance from specific
definitions of “ ‘emergency’ ” that appear in other constitutional and statutory
provisions. For example, article XIII B contains an exception to
appropriation limits based on an emergency declaration, where “ ‘emergency’
means the existence, as declared by the Governor, of conditions of disaster or

24
of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the state, or
parts thereof, caused by such conditions as attack or probable or imminent
attack by an enemy of the United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil
disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.” (Art. XIII B, § 3, subd. (c)(2).)
Appellants also cite the Emergency Services Act (Gov. Code, § 8550 et seq.),
which defines three states of emergency, including “ ‘[l]ocal emergency,’ ”11
and delimits, inter alia, who may proclaim a local emergency, the duration,
and the orders and regulations that may be promulgated as a result. (Gov.
Code, §§ 8630, 8634.) They also raise (for the first time in their reply brief)
Public Contract Code section 1102, which they maintain is a
contemporaneous statute to Proposition 218 and should be considered for its
definition of “ ‘emergency.’ ”12
We are not persuaded that appellants’ proposed definitions of “ ‘cases of
emergency’ ” best accord with the phrase’s “ordinary meaning . . . and the

11 “ ‘Local emergency’ means the duly proclaimed existence of

conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property
within the territorial limits of a county, city and county, or city, caused by
conditions such as air pollution, fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, drought,
cyberterrorism, sudden and severe energy shortage, deenergization event,
electromagnetic pulse attack, plant or animal infestation or disease, the
Governor’s warning of an earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an
earthquake, or other conditions, other than conditions resulting from a labor
controversy, which are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services,
personnel, equipment, and facilities of that political subdivision and require
the combined forces of other political subdivisions to combat, or with respect
to regulated energy utilities, a sudden and severe energy shortage or
deenergization event that requires extraordinary measures beyond the
authority vested in the Public Utilities Commission.” (Gov. Code, § 8558,
subd. (c)(1).)
12 “ ‘Emergency,’ as used in this code, means a sudden, unexpected

occurrence that poses a clear and imminent danger, requiring immediate
action to prevent or mitigate the loss or impairment of life, health, property,
or essential public services.” (Pub. Contract Code, § 1102.)
25
structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme.” (California
Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.)
Beginning with the text of the initiative “in [its] relevant context”
(California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933), there is no indication that
Proposition 218 intended to limit invocation of the “emergency” provision to
specific circumstances. On the contrary, the phrase at issue (“except in cases
of emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the governing body”) is
undeniably broad. Section 2’s text contains no preference, distinction, or
limitation as to the nature of the emergency, requiring only that it be
declared by a unanimous vote of the local governing body. (Art. XIII C, § 2,
subd. (b).)
In the absence of a special definition, we look to the term’s ordinary
meaning (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933; Bighorn-Desert,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 212). Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines
“emergency” as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting
state that calls for immediate action.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
[as of Sept. 22,
2026], archived at: .) This ordinary meaning
comports with the definition used in Sonoma County and “long . . . accepted
in California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action.”
(Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 276.) It permits a range of
possible scenarios that could be characterized as an “emergency,” depending
on the circumstances threatening harm and the factors of urgency and
magnitude. (Id. at p. 277.)
Were it the voters’ intent to limit the grounds for an emergency, the
text of Proposition 218 or its implementing legislation could easily have
stated as much or cross-referenced a preexisting definition. “[W]hen

26
construing initiatives, we generally presume electors are aware of existing
law.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934.) The definitions of
“emergency” in Article XIII B, section 3, and of a “ ‘[l]ocal emergency’ ” in the
Emergency Services Act, both predated the enactment of Proposition 218.
(See Stats. 1970, ch. 1454, p. 2846, § 2 [adding Gov. Code § 8558]; Prop. 111,
as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (June 5, 1990) [adding art. XIII B, § 3, subd.
(c)(1)].) So, too, the provision defining “emergency” for purposes of the Public
Contract Code was added in 1994 (Stats. 1994, ch. 803, § 1) and predated
Proposition 218.
Absent evidence in the text of Proposition 218 or relevant extrinsic
sources (such as the ballot pamphlet) of voters’ intent to categorically restrict
the meaning of “cases of emergencies,” we decline to read such a limitation
into the constitutional provision or borrow it from a preexisting provision.
(See Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1117 [declining to apply the defined term
“ ‘tax’ ” as used in articles XIII C and XIII D to a separate constitutional
provision, because “while we have a duty to harmonize constitutional
provisions where possible, this duty does not compel us to graft the tax
terminology of articles XIII C and XIII D onto the referendum provision when
the voters have not chosen to do so”].)
We further decide that construing “emergency” according to its
ordinary meaning is consistent with the intent of Proposition 218 to allow
rather than limit the electorate’s right to vote on taxes. (Garner, supra, 216
Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) As stated in the findings and declarations, “This
measure protects taxpayers by limiting the methods by which local
governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.” (Prop.
218, § 2, Stats. 1996; see Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), text of Prop.
218, p. 108.) Proposition 218’s “ ‘main emphasis was on plugging the loophole

27
that allowed assessments to be imposed without a vote.’ ” (Garner, at p. 409.)
Recognizing a broad interpretation of “cases of emergency” does not alter or
diminish the requirement that any general tax increase, extension, or
imposition must be “submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority
vote.” (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) Nor have appellants alleged that allowing
the up-down vote on a general tax to occur at a time other than a regularly
scheduled general election for that locality contravenes the purpose of
Proposition 218.
Appellants cite the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Learning
Resources, Inc. v. Trump (2026) 607 U.S. 229 (Learning Resources) as support
for curbing the unchecked use of broad emergency powers. (See Learning
Resources, at p. 244 [“All it takes to unlock that extraordinary power is a
Presidential declaration of emergency, which the Government asserts is
unreviewable.”].) Appellants assert that an overbroad definition of
emergency is similarly untenable in the local government context, arguing a
narrower definition for “emergency” is required than “whatever a local
government legislative body says it is.”
We are not persuaded of the relevance of Learning Resources to the
facts here. The Board of Supervisors’ exercise of the “cases of emergency”
clause to submit a general tax to the voters outside a regularly scheduled
election does not eliminate the voters’ check on the action, nor does it remove
the legislative action from the province of judicial review. (Cf. Learning
Resources, supra, 607 U.S. at pp. 244–245.) As Santa Clara County voters
indisputably were given the opportunity to vote on Measure A, the dangers of
unchecked power identified in Learning Resources are absent.
We conclude that “cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2,
subdivision (b), should be construed according to its ordinary meaning,

28
without special limitation as to the nature of “emergency.” We therefore
understand the phrase “cases of emergency” as used in article XIII C, section
2 to refer to cases of unforeseen circumstances or a combination of unforeseen
circumstances that call for immediate action. (See Merriam-Webster Dict.
Online (2026) [as
of Sept. 22, 2026], archived at: ); see also
Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 276 [defining “emergency” “as an
unforeseen situation calling for immediate action”].)
D. Validity of the Emergency Declaration and Taking of Judicial Notice
Appellants also challenge the validity of the Board of Supervisors’
emergency declaration on procedural and substantive grounds. Appellants
maintain the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion by taking judicial
notice of matters (and accepting as true the Board’s findings) in the August 7
board meeting agenda packet and summary of proceedings and by denying
several of appellants’ requests for judicial notice.
Appellants further contend that the judicially noticed material
(including the Board’s resolution), is legally insufficient for failing to
“describe, specify, name, or otherwise characterize the purported
‘emergency’ ” or estimate the emergency’s duration or state any criteria for its
termination. Appellants assert that the emergency was merely a “legal
fiction intended to circumvent the regular rule of law, including article XIII
C.” They challenge respondents’ subsequent efforts to recast the emergency
as a “ ‘fiscal emergency’ ” and/or “ ‘public health emergency’ ” and the
accuracy of the county’s characterization of its legal obligation to ensure
access to health care.
Respondents counter that the Board’s action was a lawful exercise of its
authority, amply supported by the findings in the record, and is afforded

29
deference as a policy- and fact-based legislative determination. Respondents
further assert that appellants have not shown the trial court erred in its
treatment of the materials submitted for judicial notice.
1. Additional Background
During the trial court proceedings described ante (pt. I.D.), the parties
entered into a stipulation regarding judicial notice. The stipulation included
the August 7 agenda packet (appellants’ RJN 1), to which the respondents
specified that they had no objection to the court taking judicial notice of both
the “existence and contents” of the documents. When appellants later
clarified that their request for judicial notice did not extend to the truth of
the contents, the court observed that appellants raised their objections to the
stipulation “very late.” The court ruled, with respect to the key documents at
issue, that, based on the stipulation, it could “consider the substance of th[e]
document[s] for evidentiary purposes.”
The trial court also rejected appellants’ challenge to the validity of the
emergency declaration. The court found the Board’s resolution and finding of
“ ‘facts constituting an emergency under section 2 of Article XIII C’ ” were
supported by the record. It based this determination on “the facts found in
the resolution recitals, in the attached [] ordinance implementing the general
sales tax, as well as in the legislative file and materials presented by [c]ounty
[a]dministration” at the August 7 board meeting. The court additionally cited
statements provided to the Board in the documents provided with the agenda
packet (i.e., the budget director’s memorandum to the Board regarding fiscal
impacts of H.R. 1 on the county) and included in RJN 1, as well as comments
by the Board president during deliberations at the August 7 board meeting.
The factual findings contained in the resolution recitals included, inter
alia, that: “the County’s core mission is to act as a safety net for its most

30
vulnerable residents, including low-income families, seniors, and individuals
experiencing homelessness”; “federal funding supports the delivery of the
[c]ounty’s safety net services including medical and behavioral health care,
food assistance, social services, public health programs, child welfare
services, housing, public safety, and many other critical services”; “H.R. 1
[passed the previous month] imposes significant and unprecedented cuts to
Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program”; “more than
130,000 Santa Clara County residents rely on federal food assistance and
approximately one in four Santa Clara County residents relies on Medicaid
for access to health care”; and “Medicaid is the single largest source of
revenue for Santa Clara Valley Healthcare, which is the second largest public
hospital system in California, and the largest provider of Medi-Cal and
Medicare hospital-related healthcare services to Santa Clara County
residents.”
Additional findings in the resolution addressed financial and other
impacts of H.R. 1, including: “H.R. 1 immediately freezes supplemental
Medicaid funding and prevents Santa Clara Valley Healthcare from being
able to draw down expected and needed supplemental Medicaid payments
causing a significant negative impact on the County budget immediately and
escalating over time”; “changes in federal funding made by H.R. 1 and related
impacts are projected to cause a loss of revenue to the [c]ounty in [f]iscal
[y]ear 2026-2027 of approximately $500 million, with increasing losses in
future years, growing to $1 billion in [f]iscal [y]ear 2027-2028 . . ., creating an
extraordinary fiscal crisis for the [c]ounty, and potentially dire consequences
for the neediest families in our community”; “the [c]ounty adopted its fiscal
year 2025-[20]26 budget prior to the passage and enactment of H.R. 1”; “sales
and use tax revenues are used by the [c]ounty to address vital local needs,

31
including but not limited to public safety services; trauma and emergency
medical care; mental health care and services; . . . [and] affordable
housing . . .”; and “the next regularly scheduled election of the members of
the Board is June 2, 2026, which is nearly a year after the first provisions of
H.R. 1 will be in effect, dramatically reducing funding for critical safety net
services such as those currently funded by Medicaid.”
Based on these findings, the Board declared that it “finds facts
constituting an emergency under section 2 of Article XIII C.” The Board
specified that the facts constituting the emergency “include[d] but [were] not
limited to the facts reflected in the recitals above and those findings recited
in [s]ection 1 of the [u]rgency [o]rdinance[13] . . ., considered concurrently with
this [r]esolution, as well as the legislative file and materials presented by
[c]ounty [a]dministration at the August 7 [board meeting] to consider
adoption of this resolution.” The Board additionally found that “due to the
present emergency the Board calls and orders a special election.”
The trial court’s August 29 order referred to these and other findings
articulated by the Board in the judicially noticed documents. It found that
the Board’s emergency declaration satisfied the legal standard applied in
published case authority, including Northgate and Sonoma County, and
observed that appellants had provided “no reason or evidence to depart” from
the principle that a local government enactment is presumed valid. The

13 The urgency ordinance set forth additional findings concerning the

county’s “social safety net for the approximately 1.9 million” residents and
the need to place the proposed sales tax on the November 4 ballot “as an
action to immediately preserve public health and safety because failure to
enable voters to consider this tax in 2025 will result in a delay of up to two
years in implementing any tax to be approved by voters and during that time,
the [c]ounty’s budget deficit will require severe cuts to the services needed to
protect public health, safety, and other services.”
32
court found appellants’ argument that the Board failed to deliberate about
the emergency declaration was “belied by the record” and concluded that
appellants had not shown why the court “should take the extraordinary step
of invalidating the Board’s unanimous decision to declare an emergency
following extensive fact finding.”
As previously noted (ante, pt. I.D.), the trial court partially rejected
several of appellants’ other requests for judicial notice. The court took notice
only “of the fact” of two sales tax-related reports (one published on the
California Department of Tax and Fee Administration website, and the
second on the LAO website) but did not take notice of “the truth of the
matters stated” in either document. It rejected appellants’ request to take
judicial notice of two statutes (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6051.15, 6051.2), stating
that the request came too late to be considered.
2. Legal Principles
“ ‘ “Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for
use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or
fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of
the matter.” ’ ” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1366, 1374 (Herrera).)
“ ‘Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or
required by law.’ (Evid. Code, § 450.) Matters that are subject to judicial
notice are listed in Evidence Code sections 451 and 452. A matter ordinarily
is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute.”
(Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,
113 (Fremont Indemnity).)
“ ‘Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the
truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its

33
meaning.’ [Citation.] While courts take judicial notice of public records, they
do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375; see Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 (Mangini), overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco
Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) In other words, “[a]lthough
the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of
statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not
subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.”
(Fremont Indemnity, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 113; see StorMedia Inc. v.
Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9 [“When judicial notice is
taken of a document, . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the
document are disputable.”]; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane
Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117 [“[T]he fact a court may take
judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may
take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein.”].)
As for determining the legal sufficiency of the Board’s emergency
declaration, the California Supreme Court in San Francisco Fire Fighters
noted that the Courts of Appeal have applied varying levels of deference in
reviewing municipal emergency or urgency legislation. (San Francisco Fire
Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th
653, 669 (San Francisco Fire Fighters).) One line of cases suggests that the
court “must determine for itself, based upon the evidence presented, whether
an actual emergency existed at the time of the declaration.” (Verreos v. City
and County of San Francisco (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 86, 104 (Verreos).) Other,
more recent cases, including Northgate, Sonoma County, and Crown Motors
v. City of Redding (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 173 (Crown Motors), reviewed
municipal declarations of emergency or urgency using an abuse of discretion

34
standard. (San Francisco Fire Fighters, at p. 669.) The high court in San
Francisco Fire Fighters did not endorse either approach, concluding doing so
was unnecessary under the facts of the case. (Ibid.) We also need not
determine which standard to adopt, because as we explain post, we would not
find prejudicial error under either formulation.
3. Analysis
Applying the principles governing judicial review, we agree with
appellants’ main premise in disputing the trial court’s judicial notice rulings:
even when judicial notice of a document is proper, courts do not take judicial
notice of the truth of disputable matters stated therein. (See Herrera, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375; Fremont Indemnity, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at
p. 113; accord, Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire
Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 600 (Julian Volunteer).)
California cases enforce this distinction, including in the context of
official acts and public records. Julian Volunteer is illustrative. In
proceedings arising from the dissolution of a local fire district, the trial court
took judicial notice of categories of documents submitted by the county and a
state agency, including “official reports and acts” (i.e., district and county
resolutions related to the dissolution). (Julian Volunteer, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
(Ibid.) It stated that “[a] court may take judicial notice of documents . . .
reflecting the official acts of local and state agencies, including resolutions,
minutes, and agendas.” (Ibid.) It further explained that taking notice “not
only of the fact of the document but also facts that can be deduced, and/or
clearly derived from, its legal effect, such as the names and dates contained
in the document, and the legal consequences of the document . . . is different
from taking judicial notice of the truth of specific factual representations

35
within a document.” (Id. at p. 600.) The court held that while a court may
not take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted within such documents,
that rule was inapplicable where “the judicially noticed documents were not
admitted or relied upon for the truth of particular facts contained” therein.
(Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court espoused a similar view in denying the
plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of two government reports (a 1994
United States Surgeon General’s report and a 1994 report to the California
Department of Health Services) in Mangini. (Mangini, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 1063.) While the high court declined the request based on relevance, it
also clarified that “the truth of matters asserted in those documents, and not
merely their existence” was outside the scope of proper notice. (Ibid.) The
court explained, “ ‘[T]he taking of judicial notice of the official acts of a
governmental entity does not in and of itself require acceptance of the truth
of factual matters which might be deduced therefrom, since in many
instances what is being noticed, and thereby established, is no more than the
existence of such acts and not, without supporting evidence, what might
factually be associated with or flow therefrom.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1063–1064.)
Judicial notice of the documents included in the August 7 agenda
packet and summary of proceedings was proper pursuant to Evidence Code
section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c), but only as to the existence and legal
effect of the documents—not as to the contested “factual representations”
(Julian Volunteer, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 600) therein. To the extent
that the trial court deviated from these principles in extending the taking of
judicial notice to “the substance of” the documents for what it referred to as
“evidentiary purposes,” including treating as true the facts asserted therein,
we conclude those judicial notice rulings constituted an abuse of discretion.

36
 Notwithstanding our determination that the trial court abused its
discretion in taking judicial notice of the truth of those disputed factual
assertions stated within the county’s documents, we decide any error in this
regard was not prejudicial. As the court recognized, there was substantial
uncertainty during the expedited proceedings regarding the scope and nature
of the judicial notice sought and agreed to by the parties. Respondents’
assertion that they did not object to the court taking judicial notice as to both
the “existence and contents” of appellants’ RJN 1 and 2 (August 7 agenda
packet and summary of proceedings) did little to clarify this uncertainty.
When challenged, respondents’ counsel emphasized that the documents could
properly be considered for their contents (i.e., facts stated therein) because
they reflected a legislative determination of the Board of Supervisors, and
courts generally defer to the determination of a legislative body based on
legislative facts.
The challenge the trial court faced in ascertaining how to treat the
contents of the August 7 agenda packet (including resolution findings) arises
from the parties’ attempt to address these materials exclusively through the
lens of judicial notice. We agree with respondents that the statements and
facts set forth in these documents are legislative in nature, presented not for
purposes of factfinding but as prima facie evidence of the Board’s legislative
determination. We therefore apply the principles of review articulated in
Northgate in deciding whether they served as a sufficient basis for the
Board’s action.
Northgate addressed whether a real estate transfer tax imposed by the
City of Sacramento “was a validly enacted emergency measure in force prior
to the effective date of Proposition 13, which expressly prohibits the
imposition of a tax of this nature.” (Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at

37
p. 67.) The trial court reviewed the city’s ordinance, which contained a
declaration of emergency and statement of facts constituting the emergency.
(Ibid.) The “ ‘facts constituting the emergency’ ” stated in the ordinance were
“ ‘the need immediately to provide for revenue for the usual and current
expenses of the [c]ity to mitigate the extreme revenue loss’ ” anticipated as a
result of Proposition 13. (Id. at p. 68.)
Applying a deferential standard, the appellate court in Northgate
upheld the action as a validly enacted emergency measure. (Northgate,
supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 73.) It stated, “ ‘In the absence of evidence to the
contrary it will be assumed that a municipal legislative body in enacting an
emergency ordinance acted on sufficient inquiry as to whether an emergency
existed. Its declaration is prima facie evidence of the fact. Where the facts
constituting the emergency or urgency are recited in the ordinance and are
such that they may reasonably be held to constitute an emergency, the courts
will not interfere, and they will not undertake to determine the truth of the
recited facts.’ [Citation.] Under the doctrine of separation of powers, which
applies to local legislative bodies, we may not invalidate legislation in the
absence of ‘some overriding constitutional, statutory or charter
proscription.’ ” (Id. at p. 69.)
These same principles guided the decisions in Crown Motors and
Sonoma County. In Crown Motors, the plaintiff challenged a city ordinance
prohibiting electronic reader boards, which the city adopted as an urgency
measure shortly after the plaintiff applied for a reader board use permit, thus
preventing issuance of the use permit to the plaintiff. (Crown Motors, supra,
232 Cal.App.3d at p. 175.) The city justified the urgency measure for reasons
including aesthetics, which the plaintiff maintained did not constitute a valid
ground for urgency under the relevant governing statute. (Id. at p. 178.) The

38
plaintiff also asserted there were “no facts constituting an actual urgency and
justifying an immediate ban of electronic reader boards.” (Id. at p. 179.) The
appellate court rejected both arguments. Citing Northgate, the court looked
to the factual support in the record, including a report from the planning
commission to the city council, and on that record “defer[red] to legislative
wisdom” about whether the circumstances justified the urgency provision.
(Id. at p. 180.) It concluded the city council “reasonably found an urgency”
under the statute. (Ibid.)
Like in Crown Motors, the Court of Appeal in Sonoma County accepted
the evidence cited by the county in the urgency ordinance declaring an
emergency and deferred to the county board of supervisors’ factual
determination. (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–276.) The
court concluded that the county “was not responding to fanciful speculation”
(id. p. 277) and, in the absence of contrary evidence from the plaintiff
challenging the ordinance, “was amply justified in concluding that it
confronted an ‘emergency of grave character and serious moment’ demanding
immediate action.” (Id. at p. 279.)
Appellants offer no persuasive reason for this court to depart from
these authorities. They contend that the phrase “ ‘cases of emergency’ ” in
article XIII C is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under section 5 of
Proposition 218, which provides that “ ‘[t]he provisions of this act shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government
revenue.’ ” We have already concluded this directive does not narrow the
meaning of the term “emergency” or limit the authority of the local governing
body to invoke the provision. We are aware of no legal authority (and
appellants have provided none) requiring heightened judicial scrutiny in
reviewing an authorized legislative act by the county.

39
 Appellants suggest that our review of the emergency declaration should
meet the standard articulated in Verreos, requiring “a factual and objective
determination whether an actual emergency existed” (Verreos, supra, 63
Cal.App.3d at p. 105). They also argue that the Measure A resolution and
ordinance falls short even under the more deferential standard articulated in
Northgate and Sonoma County.
We disagree that the Verreos standard governs here. As the Supreme
Court explained in San Francisco Fire Fighters, Verreos emerged from a line
of cases beginning with San Christina etc. Co. v. San Francisco (1914) 167
Cal. 762, which involved a provision of the San Francisco city charter,
invoked in the wake of the 1906 earthquake, to allow a tax levy in excess of
the maximum rate set in the charter based on “a declaration of ‘great
necessity or emergency.’ ” (San Francisco Fire Fighters, supra, 38 Cal.4th at
p. 668, quoting San Christina, at p. 768.) San Christina held that the
determination under the charter of the board of supervisors as to the
existence of a great necessity or emergency was subject to judicial review.
(San Francisco Fire Fighters, at p. 668.) Decisions following San Christina,
including Verreos, arose under the same charter provision. (Id. at p. 669; see
Verreos, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 102.)
The specific context of these cases (pertaining to a particular,
emergency provision of the San Francisco charter) and pattern of more recent
judicial decisions extending deference to the legislative findings of municipal
governing bodies exercising emergency authority (see, e.g., Northgate, supra,
155 Cal.App.3d at p. 71) counsel against adopting a per se rule that courts
must engage in independent fact finding to ascertain “whether an actual
emergency existed at the time of the declaration” (Verreos, supra, 63
Cal.App.3d at p. 104).

40
 Further, our Supreme Court has emphasized that the scope of judicial
review of municipal actions is dictated in part by the language of the relevant
authority. (See San Francisco Fire Fighters, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 670
[stating “the Charter provision may define the scope of the City’s discretion,
and this in turn shapes not only what is to be reviewed but how it should be
reviewed”].) As described above, the broad language of article XIII C’s “cases
of emergency” clause suggests a standard of review deferential to the
emergency determination.
In any event, based on our review of the record, the county’s actions
were valid under either standard. As appellants point out, the more
deferential standard does not absolve the county’s emergency declaration
from review. (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) Rather,
applying the principles stated in Northgate, we must evaluate whether “ ‘[(1)]
the facts constituting the emergency . . . are recited in the ordinance and [(2)]
are such that they may reasonably be held to constitute an emergency.’ ”
(Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 69.) The record in this case satisfies
that standard.
The Board’s legislative findings stating the facts constituting the
emergency are set forth in detail in the resolution recitals and in the attached
ordinance implementing the general sales tax. The video recording of the
August 7 board meeting (the fact of which the parties agreed could be
considered by the trial court) showed that after receiving public comment, the
members of the Board of Supervisors spoke their views on the circumstances
faced by the county and their reasons for voting for the resolution. On this
record, we reject as inaccurate appellants’ complaint that the resolution
failed to “describe, specify, or name” the emergency, that the declaration was

41
too vague and ambiguous to be valid, and that the Board “did not even
discuss or deliberate” the elements of the purported emergency.
Appellants attack the legal sufficiency of the Board’s emergency
declaration but do not point to any contrary evidence from the trial court’s
expedited hearing to suggest the Board’s determination was unreasonable or
without factual basis. The Board based the emergency declaration on
findings that the passage of H.R. 1 would have immediate and detrimental
impacts on funding for healthcare and social safety net support for county
residents, that those impacts could not be addressed through the fiscal year
budget (which had already been passed) or offset through state or other
federal funding, and that waiting for the next regularly scheduled county
election to present a resolution to the voters would result in “dramatically
reducing funding for critical safety net services such as those currently
funded by Medicaid.”
Absent a contrary factual showing, we treat the resolution recitals,
ordinance, and emergency declaration “ ‘ “as prima facie evidence of the
fact” ’ ” and do “ ‘ “not undertake to determine the truth of the recited
facts.” ’ ” (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) Moreover, these
findings accurately reflected the information presented to the Board in the
staff reports included in the August 7 agenda packet. Without determining
the truth of the facts stated therein, we recognize the reasonableness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom and defer to the Board’s legislative assessment
of the magnitude and urgency of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 277; Crown
Motors, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 175.) Even assuming the trial court had
to “determine for itself, based upon the evidence presented, whether an
actual emergency existed at the time of the declaration” (Verreos, supra, 63
Cal.App.3d at p. 104), appellants have pointed to nothing in the record to

42
contest the facts underlying the county’s assessment of the scale and severity
of the emergency and support a contrary determination.
Appellants argue that they demonstrated to the trial court that the
county’s “so-called ‘emergency’ ” cannot be related to the passage of H.R. 1
because, despite the statewide impacts of the federal funding cuts, no other
county responded by calling an election to increase taxes on November 4.
They also take issue with respondents’ representation to the court that the
county “ ‘is the provider of last resort’ ” and “ ‘required to ensure access to
healthcare’ ” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.14 (Italics
omitted.) They maintain that, because the statute’s phrase “lawfully resident
therein” has been construed not to extend to “citizens of other countries who
are present here on a temporary, undocumented, or illegal basis”
(Khasminskaya v. Lum (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 537, 540 (Lum)), respondents
misrepresented their legal obligation by failing to specify that any mandate
to ensure healthcare is limited to lawful county residents. Appellants
contend that if there truly were an emergency related to funding for
healthcare services, the county “should have exercised its legal authority . . .
to control its health care expenditures” by restricting services to lawful
residents. According to appellants, these shortcomings demonstrate that the
Board’s emergency declaration was “self-created.”
These arguments reflect disagreement with and criticism of the
county’s response to H.R. 1 from a policy perspective, but they do not
demonstrate the legal insufficiency of the Board’s actions. That other

14 “Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all

incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease,
or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported
and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state
hospitals or other state or private institutions.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17000.)
43
counties may have addressed H.R. 1’s funding cuts differently says nothing
about whether the facts recited in the resolution could “ ‘reasonably be held
to constitute an emergency’ ” (Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 69) in
Santa Clara County. So, too, that the county might lawfully restrict its
provision of services to those lawfully residing in the county (see Lum, supra,
47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 540–541, 544) does not undermine its determination
that a general tax measure was needed urgently to prevent more drastic
reductions in healthcare and social safety net services. Accepting arguendo
appellants’ contention that respondents exaggerated the county’s statutory
obligation by asserting in opposition to the petition that it was “the provider
of last resort for all county residents” (italics added) does not alter our
analysis of the validity of the emergency declaration.
We further conclude that appellants have not established a prejudicial
abuse of discretion in relation to the trial court’s judicial notice rulings
denying RJN 18, 19, 20, and 21. Even if the court might have considered
conclusions stated in the LAO report (see, e.g., Tomra Pacific, Inc. v. Chiang
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 463, 475 & fn. 6 [citing information from LAO
reports, judicially noticed by the court]; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 647, 657–658 [citing LAO reports documenting
abusive tax shelters]), they have not explained how the court’s failure to
consider the information on sales tax rates was prejudicial in assessing the
validity of the Board’s emergency declaration. While appellants maintain (as
to the denial of RJN 20 and 21) that the court “cannot choose to be willfully
blind to the text of current California statutes,” they overlook the court’s
broad discretion to control the proceedings before it (Code Civ. Proc., § 128).
Given the expedited and time-limited proceedings in this case, we
perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s election not to consider

44
statutes introduced late on the second day of the hearing that were not
previously cited in the parties’ papers. Moreover, appellants cited the
statutes in support of their argument that the ballot question was materially
misleading. Because this court has decided to exercise discretion to review
only the validity of the emergency declaration and related constitutional
questions, any abuse of discretion regarding consideration of the cited
Revenue and Taxation Code sections is moot as to the matters under
consideration on appeal.
D. Conclusion
We conclude that “cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2,
subdivision (b), should be construed according to its ordinary meaning,
without special limitation as to the nature of “emergency” that can be
declared. Under this definition, appellants have not shown the Board of
Supervisors’ emergency declaration to be invalid. Absent evidence to the
contrary, we accept the Board’s legislative findings set forth in its resolution
and ordinance as sufficient evidence of the facts constituting the emergency.
On this record, we conclude that the Board’s determination of emergency was
reasonable, and the resolution to place Measure A on the November 4 special
election ballot was not invalid. We decline to exercise our discretion to
review the contentions of statutory nonconformance pertaining to the specific
language and format of the ballot question and impartial analysis.
III. DISPOSITION

The August 29, 2025 order denying the petition for writ of mandate and
judgment thereon are affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their reasonable
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

45
 ______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Grover, J.

H053842
Holtz et al. v. Matt Moreles, as Registrar of Voters, etc., et al.
Trial Court: County of Santa Clara

Trial Judge: Hon. Carol W. Overton

Counsel: Jason A. Bezis for Appellants.

Tony Lopresti, County Counsel, Steve Mitra, Assistant County
Counsel, Mary Hanna-Wier, Lead Deputy County Counsel,
Susan Greenberg, Deputy County Counsel for Respondents.

H053842
Holtz et al. v. Matt Moreles, as Registrar of Voters, etc., et al.