IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
CLARISSA CERVANTES et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
CHAD BIANCO, as Sheriff, etc., et al.,
Respondents;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY CITIZENS et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
S295866
September 24, 2026
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Burns* concurred.
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
CERVANTES v. BIANCO
S295866
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
In order to protect the integrity of elections, our Elections
Code1 carefully limits who can handle and count voted ballots.
This case presents the question of whether the Riverside County
Sheriff complied with those limitations when, in response to
allegations of discrepancies in election counts by a community
group, his department seized approximately 650,000 ballots cast
in Riverside County at the November 4, 2025 Special Election
involving Proposition 50 (Voter Information Guide, Special Elec.
(Nov. 4, 2025) text of Prop. 50; the Election Rigging Response
Act).
The alleged discrepancy in the number of votes at issue in
this case is disputed. The community group contends there is a
discrepancy of about 45,896 between handwritten ballot intake
log estimates made by polling workers, and the final count
certified by the Registrar of Voters. The Registrar of Voters, by
contrast, responds that any discrepancy in the final count is
closer to 103 votes — 0.016 percent — which the registrar
describes as within the normal bounds for differences between
preliminary and certified totals. We are not called upon to
resolve these factual contentions, and everyone agrees that —
1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Elections Code.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
even if true — the claimed discrepancy could not have affected
the outcome of the election.
Petitioners are four Riverside County residents who voted
in the November 2025 election. They allege that their ballots as
well as those of approximately 650,000 other Riverside County
voters were unlawfully seized. Petitioners request a writ of
mandate from this court directing respondent Chad Bianco, the
Riverside County Sheriff, to return these ballots and other
seized election materials to the custody of respondent Art
Tinoco, the Riverside County Registrar of Voters. Bianco
contends his actions were permissible because, in response to
the concerns raised by the community group, he was performing
a criminal investigation and had obtained search warrants.
We hold that the seizure of the ballots was unlawful.
California law long has recognized that voted ballots require
special care and handling to safeguard them from alteration or
tampering. Consistent with this principle, the Elections Code
narrowly limits the circumstances in which a court may order
the production of ballots for inspection, and even in those
narrow circumstances, requires that ballots remain in the
physical custody of the responsible elections official. Bianco’s
seizure of the ballots violated the plain language of
section 15551, subdivision (d), commanding that “[i]n no event”
shall voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections
official.”2 This provision manifests a legislative intent that
ballots remain in the elections official’s custody even in the
event of a criminal investigation. As we explain below, this clear
2
In footnote 6, post, we identify recent legislation modifying
section 15551 and conclude it does not alter the conclusions we
reach in this case.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
custodial command safeguards the integrity of our elections by
protecting ballots from alteration, tampering, or other improper
interference.
To remedy this violation, we issue a peremptory writ of
mandate directing Bianco to return the seized ballots to the
registrar’s custody and to refrain from further handling of the
ballots except as necessary to comply with our order.
While allegations of election improprieties are a very
serious matter, our Elections Code contains numerous
established mechanisms for investigating and proving
misconduct that do not compromise the integrity of voted
ballots — contrary to the means employed here.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts relating to this petition are discussed at greater
length in Bonta v. Bianco.3
Both cases arise out of the sheriff’s department’s seizure
of approximately 650,000 ballots cast in Riverside County at the
November 4, 2025 Special Election involving Proposition 50.
(Voter Information Guide, Special Elec. (Nov. 4, 2025) text of
Prop. 50, p. 18.) In response to allegations of a discrepancy
between the registrar’s official count of votes recorded at that
election and the total number of votes calculated by a group of
concerned citizens, sheriff’s department personnel secured two
search warrants in February 2026. The warrants authorized
the seizure of ballots cast at the election, as well as other
election-related materials, from the registrar. In late February
3
On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of all
pleadings and exhibits filed in Bonta v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026,
S295901). (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
2026, the sheriff’s department seized the ballots and started to
count them. Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s expressed
concerns about the seizure of ballots, the sheriff’s department
obtained a third search warrant that contemplated the
appointment of a special master who would be responsible for
counting the ballots. No special master has yet been appointed.
Shortly after the third warrant was obtained, petitioners
filed a verified petition for a writ of mandate in this court. This
petition names Bianco and Tinoco as respondents, and Secretary
of State Shirley Weber (see § 13314, subd. (a)(4)) and “Riverside
County citizens who cast ballots on Proposition 50 in the
[November 2025 election]” as real parties in interest.4
Petitioners allege that the seizure of the ballots and other
election materials violated the statutory scheme governing the
care and custody of ballots and involved an unlawful recount by
unqualified individuals. Petitioners seek a writ of mandate or
another extraordinary writ that would direct Bianco “to return
in totality the seized election materials and ballots to [the
registrar]” and “to report to this court the chain of custody of
such election materials, the personnel involved and time/dated
timeline”; prohibit “any tallying, counting or handling of ballots
by personnel other than elections staff and under procedures not
provided for in the [Elections] Code”; and require that the
“movement of election materials . . . take place with redundant
election officials and in compliance with the procedures and
transparency provided for by law.”
4
As discussed below, we conclude petitioners properly
sought writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085;
we therefore do not address whether Elections Code section
13314 also applies.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
We ordered respondents to show cause, returnable before
this court, why petitioners are not entitled to the relief they
seek.5 In his return, Bianco contends he lawfully seized the
ballots and other election materials pursuant to the search
warrants. He further maintains that the special master
procedure contemplated by the third search warrant, possibly
coupled with other safeguards, adequately addresses any
concerns that might otherwise arise from the removal of the
ballots from the registrar’s custody. Tinoco, on the other hand,
agrees with petitioners “that voted ballots and related election
materials should be maintained, preserved, transported,
inspected, retained, and administered in accordance with the
Elections Code” and “therefore does not oppose the relief
requested in the Petition.” The Secretary of State and the
Attorney General (appearing as amicus curiae in support of
petitioners) likewise both take the position that the ballots were
seized unlawfully and must be returned to the registrar.
II. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that maintaining the integrity of voted
ballots is critical to the sanctity of our elections. At the same
time, law enforcement has the important responsibility of
investigating possible criminal conduct, including crimes that
relate to elections. The central question presented in this case
is whether law enforcement may circumvent the Elections
Code’s comprehensive scheme governing the custody of ballots
during and after elections by seizing ballots pursuant to a search
warrant and thereby removing them from a local registrar’s
5
We had previously issued an order in Bonta v. Bianco
directing Bianco to pause his investigation and preserve all
seized items.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
custody. We hold that such a seizure is unlawful under the plain
language of section 15551, subdivision (d), which expressly
states that “[i]n no event” shall voted ballots “be taken from the
custody of the elections official.”6 If election misconduct is
6
After oral argument in this case, the Legislature passed
Senate Bill No. 1418 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1418),
which modified section 15551, subdivision (d)’s previous
language stating that “[i]n no event shall” packages containing
voted ballots “be taken from the custody of the elections official.”
As amended, section 15551, subdivision (d) now more broadly
provides that “[i]n no event” — subject only to two expressly
identified exceptions, neither of which is applicable here —
“shall any document that is or will be subject to the preservation
requirements in Section 17300 to Section 17306, inclusive, or
any certified voting technology or electronic data or portion
thereof, including source code, or any other election-related
material or equipment necessary for the conduct of an election,
be taken from the custody of the elections official.” (Stats. 2026,
ch. 341, § 2.) Senate Bill 1418 also amended section 15551,
subdivision (a). (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The Governor signed
Senate Bill 1418 on September 19, 2026, and its provisions came
into effect immediately. (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 10.) Briefing
and argument in this case were premised on the prior language
of section 15551, and the parties have not briefed the impact
Senate Bill 1418 may have on the issues presented.
We conclude that the voted ballots must be returned to the
registrar pursuant to section 15551, subdivision (d) as it stood
prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1418, and it is evident that
the current version of section 15551 is at least as protective of
ballots as preexisting law was. (See § 17302, subd. (b)(1)–(10).)
Meanwhile, petitioners have emphasized throughout this
litigation the importance of having the seized ballots returned
promptly to the registrar. Under the circumstances, although
we conclude that petitioners have not shown a ministerial duty
to return to the registrar anything other than the packages
containing voted ballots, we decline to delay the resolution of
this dispute by requesting further briefing regarding whether
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
suspected, the Elections Code provides several mechanisms for
law enforcement to review and examine ballots without
compromising their integrity. But those procedures were not
followed and the type of seizure that occurred here directly
conflicts with the Elections Code’s carefully considered and
controlling provisions. We therefore issue a writ of mandate
directing Bianco to return the ballots to the registrar forthwith.
A. General Principles
“A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is
unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “The writ
must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be
issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially
interested.” (Id., § 1086.)
To secure a writ of mandate, petitioners must show that
they have standing to pursue such relief, that they lack an
Senate Bill 1418 applies here and creates a ministerial duty to
return seized records other than the ballots. Those issues may
be addressed, if necessary, in a future proceeding.
Consistent with the parties’ presentation of the issues, our
analysis considers the language of section 15551 as it read at
the time of oral argument in this matter, which (aside from the
introduction of subdivisions pursuant to Senate Bill No. 73
(2025–2026 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2026, ch. 10) was the same as the
language in effect at the time of the seizures.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
adequate remedy at law, and that they seek to enforce a
ministerial duty capable of being enforced through a judicial
writ. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340
(Picklesimer).) We conclude each of these requirements is met
here.
B. Standing
Bianco no longer contests petitioners’ standing,7 so we
discuss it only briefly. In general, “To have standing to seek a
writ of mandate, a party must be ‘beneficially interested’
[citation], i.e., have ‘some special interest to be served or some
particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the
interest held in common with the public at large.’ ” (Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com.
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361–362.) “Nevertheless, ‘ “where the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the [petitioner]
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in
7
In his preliminary briefing, Bianco challenged petitioners’
standing based on misquoted passages from, and an incorrect
recitation of our holding in, Common Cause v. Board of
Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432 (Common Cause). The law
firm responsible for the error apologized and withdrew Bianco’s
standing argument. We disapprove of the improper use of
artificial intelligence tools, which apparently contributed to the
significant error that occurred here and remind counsel of
attorneys’ professional duties of competence and candor to the
court. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 1.1, 3.3.) We also refer
the matter to the State Bar of California to determine whether
discipline is warranted. (See canon 3D(2) of the California Code
of Judicial Ethics.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” ’ ”
(Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 166 (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition).)
We agree with petitioners that they have standing because
they seek to “ ‘ “procure the enforcement of a public duty,” ’ ”
namely, the duty to lawfully handle and preserve all ballots cast
at an election. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition, supra, 52 Cal.4th
at p. 166.) In this respect, petitioners allege that Bianco’s
seizure and retention of the ballots violate various provisions of
the Elections Code designed to ensure that ballots are safely
maintained and handled only by designated personnel in the
manner specified by statute. Enforcement of this duty
vindicates the public right to the proper handling of voted
ballots. (See Common Cause, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 439
[recognizing citizens’ public interest standing in a suit against a
county to enforce provisions of a statutory voter outreach
program].)
C. No Adequate Remedy at Law
“ ‘The writ of mandate lies generally to compel
performance of a legal duty when no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law is available.’ ” (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v.
Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 785.)
This requirement has also been satisfied by petitioners.
This case presents a question of statewide importance as to
which this court’s immediate intervention is warranted. (See,
e.g., Legislature of the State of California v. Weber (2024)
16 Cal.5th 237, 246–247; Legislature of the State of California v.
Padilla (2020) 9 Cal.5th 867, 871; Patterson v. Padilla (2019)
8 Cal.5th 220, 223.) Even assuming that petitioners could have
sought declaratory or injunctive relief in the superior court,
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
under the circumstances presented here, a writ proceeding
before this court is appropriate to secure the prompt and final
resolution of significant legal questions. (See Glendale City
Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328,
343, fn. 20; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp
(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 265; California Teachers Assn. v.
Nielsen (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 25, 28–29.)
D. Substantive Law
To obtain writ relief, petitioners must demonstrate “ ‘ “a
clear, present . . . ministerial duty on the part of the
respondent[s]” ’ ” that is capable of being enforced. (Picklesimer,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Based on our review of the
applicable statutes, we conclude Bianco violated his ministerial
duty to carry out his law enforcement responsibilities in
compliance with the robust protections for the handling of
ballots set forth in the Elections Code. One particular provision
is dispositive — section 15551, subdivision (d). Until its recent
amendment by Senate Bill 1418, this subdivision stated that
“[i]n no event shall [voted ballots] be taken from the custody of
the elections official.” Following the amendment, it continues to
provide that “[i]n no event . . . shall [election materials including
voted ballots] . . . be taken from the custody of the elections
official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The plain text of this
statute, when read in light of the overall statutory scheme,
requires that elections officials maintain custody of voted
ballots, even in the event of a criminal investigation. Bianco
therefore had no authority to seize the ballots from the
registrar’s custody, and writ relief is appropriate to direct their
return.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
1. Overview of relevant Elections Code provisions
To provide context for our analysis, we outline the most
relevant Elections Code provisions. The Elections Code sets
forth a comprehensive statutory framework for the care and
handling of ballots, including detailed procedures governing the
transportation and counting of ballots during an election; the
retention and disposal of ballots after an election; and the review
of ballots in the event of an election contest8 or criminal
prosecution. These procedures reflect a legislative intent to
ensure the integrity of the ballots through strict chain-of-
custody protocols, robust oversight, and public transparency.
The Elections Code requires that precinct workers
undergo specialized training in elections procedures and ballot
handling protocols (§ 12309.5, subd. (a)(1)–(8)) and declare
under oath that they will faithfully discharge their duties
(§ 12321, subd. (b)). As voting occurs, a voter hands their ballot,
or the envelope containing their ballot, to one of these workers,
who must put the ballot in a ballot container. (§ 14277.) After
the polls close on election day, “the precinct board shall, in the
presence of the public,” “(1) [s]eal the container used to
transport voted ballots and insure that the precinct number, or
in an election conducted using a voter center, the vote center
number, is designated on the ballot container”; “(2) [c]ertify,
sign, and seal the several packages or envelopes [of related
8
An election contest is a civil action challenging an election
on various grounds, in which a recount may occur at trial in the
presence of all parties, if necessary to determine the contest.
(See §§ 16100, 16101, 16601.) This case does not involve an
election contest.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
materials] as directed by the elections official”;9 and “(3) [b]y not
less than two of their number, deliver the ballot container and
packages to the elections official at the central counting place in
the manner prescribed by the elections official. The ballot
container and packages shall remain in their exclusive
possession until delivered to the elections official.” (§ 15201,
subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also § 15202.) Vote by mail ballots are
subject to similarly strict custody and handling requirements.
(See §§ 3017, 3019, 3025, subd. (b), 3026.)
Only designated elections personnel may count ballots
(§§ 15205, 15207; see also § 18575 [making it a felony for a
person other than an elections officer to “perform[] or discharge[]
any of the duties of an election officer in regard to the handling,
counting, or canvassing of any ballots”]), and “[a]ll proceedings
at the central counting place . . . shall be open to the view of the
public” (§ 15204). During the counting process, “no person,
except one employed and designated for the purpose by the
elections official or his or her authorized deputy, shall touch any
ballot container.” (Ibid.) “[A]s soon as” the ballots are all
counted, they “shall not thereafter be examined by any person”
but instead must “be carefully sealed in a strong envelope” with
“[t]he signatures of each member of the precinct board . . .
written across the seal.” (§ 15279.) “After ballots are counted
9
See sections 14431 (requiring the precinct board to
“enclose and seal in one or more packages” the following: “all
voted, spoiled, canceled, or unused ballots”) and 14432,
subdivisions (a)–(e) (requiring the precinct board to “enclose and
seal in one or two packages” the following: “[t]wo tally sheets, if
ballots are to be tabulated manually at the precinct”; the
“roster”; the “copy of the voter list”; the “challenge list”; and the
“assisted voter’s list”).
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
and sealed, the elections official may not open any ballots nor
permit any ballots to be opened except” under specified
circumstances not relevant here (see §§ 15303, 15304) or in the
event of a recount. (§ 15370.)10
After an election, ballots remain in the custody of the
responsible elections official, who then must destroy them at
specific junctures identified in the Elections Code. For elections
such as the November 2025 Special Election with no federal
races on the ballot, the following “shall be kept by the elections
official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date
of the election” (§ 17302, subd. (b)): “[t]he packages containing”
“[v]oted polling place ballots,” “[p]aper cast vote records,”
“[v]oted vote by mail voter ballots,” “[v]ote by mail voter
identification envelopes,” “[v]oted provisional voter ballots,”
“[v]oted conditional voter registration ballots,” “[p]rovisional
ballot voter identification envelopes,” “[s]poiled ballots,”
“[c]anceled ballots,” and “[u]nused vote by mail ballots
surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)–(10).) “If a contest is not commenced within the six-
month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent
10
Under the Elections Code, a recount can be initiated
through different channels, depending on the circumstances.
(See §§ 15610 [recount initiated by the elections official], 15620
[recount initiated by “any voter” at the voter’s expense], 15640
[recount initiated by the district attorney], and 15645 [recount
initiated by the Governor].) Statutory recounts include detailed
procedures to ensure ballot integrity and public transparency,
such as strict rules regarding the examination and touching of
ballots and requirements that recounts take place in public
view. (See, e.g., §§ 15625, subd. (a), 15629, subd. (c), 15630,
subds. (a), (b).) No such recount was initiated in this case.
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use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail
voters’ signatures is not commenced within the six-month
period . . . the elections official shall have [these] items . . .
destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain
unopened until the items are destroyed or recycled.” (§ 17302,
subd. (c).)11
Most critical here, section 15551 addresses what occurs
when an election contest or criminal prosecution is commenced
within that six-month timeframe. Prior to its recent
amendment through Senate Bill 1418, it provided in full: “(a) If
a contest or any such criminal prosecution[12] has been
commenced before the date fixed for its destruction, the package
containing the voted ballots shall be subject to the order of the
11
In non-federal elections, elections officials are also
required to keep packages containing the following materials
“for a period of six months”: two tally sheets; the copy of the
roster used as the voting record; challenge lists; and assisted
voter lists. (§ 17304, subd. (b).) If a contest or criminal
prosecution is not commenced within six months, the elections
official “may have the packages destroyed or recycled.” (Id.,
subd. (d).) In addition, “The elections official shall preserve all
rosters or combined rosters and voter lists . . . until five years
after the date of the election, after which they may be destroyed
by that official.” (§ 17300, subd. (a)(1).)
12
The phrase “such criminal prosecution” no longer appears
in section 15551 due to changes made by Senate Bill 1418. (See
Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The statute now refers to “any contest
or criminal prosecution.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.) The
background to the earlier “such criminal prosecution” (§ 15551,
former subd. (a)) language suggests that it included
prosecutions described in section 17302, subdivision (c), i.e., “a
criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or
falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters’
signatures.” (See former § 7201, as amended by Stats. 1955,
ch. 517, § 1.5, p. 993.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
court in which the contest or criminal prosecution is pending
and shall not be destroyed until after final determination of the
contest or criminal prosecution. [¶] (b) In the case of a
congressional election contest, the elections official shall hold
the ballots of that congressional district in custody subject to the
inspection of any committee of the House of Representatives
having in charge the investigation of the contest, until the final
determination of the contest by the House of Representatives.
[¶] (c) In the case of a contest in the State Legislature, the
elections official shall hold the ballots of the Senate or Assembly
district in custody subject to the inspection of any committee of
the Senate or Assembly having in charge the investigation of the
contest until the final determination of the contest or the final
adjournment of the session of the Legislature in which the
contest is filed, whichever is the later. [¶] (d) In no event shall
the package or its contents be taken from the custody of the
elections official.” (Former § 15551, italics added.) As
previously observed, the current version of section 15551,
subdivision (d), as amended by Senate Bill 1418, continues to
include language providing that “[i]n no event . . . shall
[specified election records] . . . be taken from the custody of the
elections official.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 341, § 2.)
In sum, the Elections Code contemplates that voted ballots
remain in the continuous custody and control of elections
officials from the moment the voter deposits them until the
moment they are destroyed.
2. Analysis
In petitioners’ view, section 15551’s mandate that “[i]n no
event” shall voted ballots be “taken from the custody of the
elections official” (§ 15551, subd. (d)) — when read in context of
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
the overall statutory scheme governing the handling of
ballots — means voted ballots may not be removed from the
registrar’s custody for any reason, even by law enforcement
pursuant to a criminal investigation. Thus, petitioners assert,
the sheriff’s department acted unlawfully in removing the
ballots from the registrar’s custody, notwithstanding the fact it
had obtained a search warrant to seize them.
Bianco acknowledges that section 15551 reflects “the
Legislature’s concern for ballot security and election-official
custody,” but argues that section 15551 should not be
interpreted to foreclose law enforcement from seizing ballots,
and removing them from the custody of elections officials,
pursuant to a search warrant. He emphasizes that a search
warrant is itself a kind of court order authorized by statute,
albeit one situated outside the Elections Code. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1523 et seq. [statutory scheme applicable to search warrants].)
He argues that we should harmonize a court’s authority to issue
search warrants under the Penal Code with the ballot-
protection provisions of the Elections Code in a way that
authorizes the unprecedented action he took here.
As the parties’ respective positions demonstrate, the
meaning of section 15551 is at the crux of this dispute. To
determine section 15551’s meaning, we apply general principles
of statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute,
“[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If
the statutory language permits more than one reasonable
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”
[Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative
purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California
Coastal Com. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 334, 366.)
a. Section 15551’s text
Starting with section 15551’s text, the statute specifies
only two situations in which voted ballots are “subject to the
order of the court.” (§ 15551, subd. (a).) Those situations are
(1) an election “contest,” and (2) a “criminal prosecution.” (Ibid.)
Neither circumstance is present here. No election contest has
been filed, and the issuance of a search warrant, by itself, does
not trigger a “criminal prosecution.” (§ 15551, subd. (a).) A
criminal prosecution commences only upon the occurrence of
certain events — none of which has occurred in this case — and
may only be initiated by a public prosecutor. (Pen. Code, § 804
[for statute of limitation purposes, except as otherwise provided,
the “prosecution for an offense is commenced” upon the
occurrence of an indictment, information, complaint,
arraignment, or an arrest or bench warrant specifically
identifying a defendant]; Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d
442, 451 [“[t]he prosecution of criminal offenses on behalf of the
People is the sole responsibility of the public prosecutor”]; People
v. Case (1980) 105 CalApp.3d 826, 832 [“It is a matter of common
knowledge that most search warrants are issued prior to and
independent of any pending prosecution”].)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
But even if a criminal prosecution had commenced,
allowing for a court-ordered production, section 15551’s plain
text prohibits the removal of the ballots from the registrar’s
physical custody. Section 15551, subdivision (a) identifies
limited circumstances in which a court might order the
production of ballots for inspection, i.e., election contests or
criminal prosecutions. And even in those limited circumstances,
section 15551, subdivision (d) expressly provides that “[i]n no
event” shall voted ballots be “taken from the custody of the
elections official.” This provision reflects a legislative intent
that, even in those situations in which it is necessary to view or
recount ballots as evidence, they remain in the physical custody
of the responsible elections official. This is consistent with the
overall statutory scheme in which section 15551 resides, which
is designed to ensure the integrity of ballots through continuous
custody by election professionals, bolstered by public oversight.
This interpretation of section 15551, subdivision (d)’s
plain text does not, as Bianco contends, “expressly repeal Penal
Code warrant authority” or otherwise ignore the possibility of
criminal proceedings. Instead, as the registrar explains, “rather
than overlooking the possibility of criminal proceedings, the
Legislature expressly addressed them and nevertheless
required continued custodial control by the elections official.”
Nor are we persuaded by Bianco’s strained alternative
interpretation of section 15551, subdivision (d) as only
governing the custody of ballots in those situations addressed in
section 15551, subdivisions (a) through (c). Such an
interpretation is undermined by a statutory framework that, at
all times throughout the election process, entrusts the handling
of voted ballots only to trained and sworn elections officials. It
is also difficult to fathom why the Legislature would allow law
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
enforcement to seize ballots pursuant to a search warrant before
any criminal prosecution commenced, while expressly
prohibiting ballots from being “taken” from the custody of the
responsible elections official (§ 15551, subd. (d)) when they
become the subject of a criminal prosecution (§ 15551, subd. (a)).
Nothing in the statute supports this incongruous reading. To
the contrary, allowing ballots to be seized and removed from the
custody of the responsible elections official pursuant to a
warrant or other court order not expressly mentioned in section
15551 would create a substantial gap in the otherwise
comprehensive statutory scheme for the retention and handling
of voted ballots.
Thus, based on its plain text, we conclude that section
15551 unambiguously prohibits the removal of ballots from an
elections official’s custody, notwithstanding the existence of a
search warrant authorizing their seizure.
b. Legislative history and relevant case law
Because we consider the plain text of section 15551 to be
unambiguous, it is unnecessary to take the further step of
consulting extrinsic resources to guide our interpretation.
(Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 713.) However, a
brief review of section 15551’s legislative history, and the case
law interpreting its predecessor statutes, only serves to bolster
our interpretation of the plain text.
As originally adopted, the Political Code of 1872 (since
repealed and, as relevant here, replaced by the Elections Code)
set forth detailed procedures for the collection, handling,
counting, sealing, and transport of ballots that are in many
respects analogous to the procedures in place today. (See former
Pol. Code, §§ 1185, 1186, 1198, 1225, 1226, 1228, 1252, 1253,
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
1257, 1258, 1259, 1265, 1266.) Within that code, sections 1265
and 1266 governed the retention and destruction of ballots.
Section 1265 provided that, “Upon the receipt of the [precinct]
packages the [county] Clerk must file the one containing ballots,
and must keep it unopened and unaltered for twelve months,
after which time, if there is not a contest commenced in some
tribunal having jurisdiction about such election, he must burn
the package, without opening or examining its contents.”
(Former Pol. Code, § 1265.) Section 1266 further provided that,
“If within twelve months there is such a contest commenced,
[the clerk] must keep the package unopened and unaltered until
it is finally determined, when he must, as provided in the
preceding section, destroy it, unless such package is, by virtue
of an order of the tribunal in which the contest is pending,
brought and opened before it, to the end that evidence may be
had of its contents, in which event the package and its contents
are in the custody of such tribunal.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1266.)
In Ex parte Brown (1892) 97 Cal. 83, we construed these
statutes as prohibiting a court from ordering the production of
ballots except in the limited circumstance of an election contest.
In Brown, a precinct inspector was charged with a felony offense
involving an election. (Id. at pp. 84–85.) The county registrar
was found guilty of contempt after he refused to comply with a
superior court order to produce and open in court the sealed
package of ballots that had been returned at the inspector’s
precinct. (Id. at p. 85.) The registrar then petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, arguing that the order directing him to
produce and open the ballot package was unlawful pursuant to
former Political Code sections 1265 and 1266. (Brown, at p. 85.)
We granted the writ, explaining that former Political Code
section 1266 contemplated the production of ballots in court only
20
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
in the event of an election contest, a limitation on access the
Legislature saw as essential to maintaining the ballots’
evidentiary value in such a proceeding. (Id. at pp. 88–90.)
Without this limitation, we explained, the “security and
integrity” of the ballots would be undermined because they
would be “opened, handled, and exposed to the danger of all
sorts of changes and mutilations as often as any judicial officer
may conclude that they contain evidence material to an
issue . . . before him.” (Id. at p. 89.) We further noted that it
“must be left to the legislature itself” to amend the statutory
scheme “[i]f it is thought necessary to make the ballots available
as evidence in criminal proceedings” with appropriate
“limitations and restrictions as may be deemed essential to their
integrity.” (Id. at p. 90.)
The year after our decision in Brown, the Legislature
amended former Political Code section 1265 to allow courts to
order the production of ballots in other kinds of cases, not just
those involving an election contest, but in doing so it added the
limitation that, “In no event shall the [precinct] packages, or any
of them, or the ballots contained therein, be taken from the
custody of the County Clerk.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1265, as
amended by Stats. 1893, ch. 220, § 10, p. 309.)
Over the following decades, former Political Code sections
1265 and 1266 were merged, reformulated, eventually moved to
the newly created Elections Code, and further amended.
However, the requirement that “[i]n no event” shall ballots be
“taken from the custody” of the responsible elections official has
remained constant and universally applicable. (§ 15551,
subd. (d).)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Nothing in this sequence of events suggests the
Legislature has disputed or overturned the central premise of
Brown, i.e., that in order to ensure the integrity of voted ballots,
physical custody over them must be carefully controlled, and
they may be ordered produced only in limited circumstances
specifically defined by statute. Moreover, even in those limited
circumstances where a court may order the production of ballots
for inspection, they shall not be “taken from the custody of the
elections official.” (§ 15551, subd. (d).)13
3. Bianco’s remaining counterarguments
Resisting this conclusion, Bianco argues that the Elections
Code cannot be read to displace Penal Code provisions governing
criminal investigations and that the two statutory schemes
must be harmonized. The problem with this view is that there
is a direct conflict between the Elections Code’s mandate that
ballots remain in the custody of the elections official, even in the
event of a criminal prosecution, and provisions in the Penal
Code authorizing the issuance of search warrants to seize
property that might be evidence of a crime. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1524.) Recognizing such a conflict, it is clear that the unique
scheme for the safeguarding of ballots must prevail. In the
event of a true conflict between statutes, “ ‘later enactments
supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific provisions
13
Bianco argues that Brown is not instructive here because
it pertained to a subpoena duces tecum and was decided before
the enactment of modern search warrant statutes. We fail to
see how this is relevant to Brown’s holding, which focused on the
limited statutory grounds upon which ballots might be ordered
produced, not the type of court order used to compel their
production.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
take precedence over’ the more general.” (People v. Adelmann
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1071, 1079.) “[W]hen these two rules are in
conflict, the rule that specific provisions take precedence over
more general ones trumps the rule that later-enacted statutes
have precedence.” (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior
Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 960 (Department of Public Health).)
Ultimately, “ ‘[O]ur goal is to discern the probable intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the laws in
question.’ ” (Id. at p. 961.)
We conclude that section 15551 is the more specific
statute, and its provisions governing the custody of ballots must
control. As we have observed, “the requirement that courts
harmonize potentially inconsistent statutes when possible is not
a license to redraft the statutes to strike a compromise that the
Legislature did not reach.” (Department of Public Health, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 956.) It is apparent “that the Legislature [has]
thought carefully and specifically” (id. at p. 961) about when
ballot production may occur and has limited such production to
certain defined circumstances and subject to the condition that
ballots remain in the custody of the responsible elections official.
In contrast, Penal Code section 1524 addresses the seizure of
evidence pursuant to a search warrant “at a high level of
generality.” (Department of Public Health, at p. 961.) There is
no indication that the Legislature intended for the general
warrant statutes to displace the detailed scheme for the
safekeeping of ballots, which by their unique nature require
great care and expertise in handling to protect against
alteration or tampering.
Next, Bianco argues that construing section 15551 as
limiting a court’s ability to issue search warrants would violate
separation of powers principles by allowing a legislative
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
imperative to invade the province of the judiciary. This
argument is also unpersuasive. As we have explained, “ ‘ “Of
necessity, the judicial department as well as the executive must
in most matters yield to the power of statutory enactments.
[Citations.] The power of the legislature to regulate criminal
and civil proceedings and appeals is undisputed.” ’ [Citation.]
But this power has limitations. ‘ “The sum total of this matter
is that the legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon
constitutional functions of the courts provided they do not defeat
or materially impair the exercise of those functions.” ’ ” (Le
Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1102, italics omitted.)
We assume, for sake of argument, that the Legislature has
less than plenary authority to dictate when and for what a
search warrant may issue. Even if that were the case, the
prohibition on seizing ballots in a manner that would remove
them from the custody of the responsible elections official
neither substantially impairs nor practically defeats courts’
authority to issue search warrants generally. We have
repeatedly upheld statutes that made minor changes in how
courts may exercise their powers, and we see no persuasive
reason to reach a different outcome here. (See In re McKinney
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 11 [the Legislature may place “reasonable
limitations” on the courts’ inherent power to punish contempt of
court]; Fleming v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 344, 351
[statute prohibiting the introduction of evidence based on the
use of speed traps did not violate separation of powers
principles].)14
14
The Legislature has imposed other limits on the courts’
authority to issue search warrants, including making some
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Finally, Bianco contends that precluding the seizure of
ballots pursuant to a search warrant premised on possible
misconduct by a registrar or another elections official would
result in the “absurd consequence of leaving potentially relevant
evidence exclusively in the control of an office” that is itself
being investigated. Bianco’s contention fails for two reasons.
First, Bianco presumably could have used traditional
investigatory tools, within the bounds of the law, to obtain other
evidence of election-related crime as may have existed besides
ballots. Second, to the extent it was necessary to examine the
ballots to investigate the alleged vote count discrepancy, the
Elections Code contains numerous established mechanisms that
allow for the carefully controlled inspection of ballots without
compromising their integrity.
The Elections Code contemplates the possibility of
election-related crimes and provides robust avenues to
investigate and prove these crimes in a manner that protects the
sanctity of ballots as evidence. For instance, elections officials
themselves can initiate a recount, if they have “reasonable cause
material off-limits to seizure. (Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (g) [no
“warrant shall issue for an item or items described in Section
1070 of the Evidence Code” involving disclosure of journalists’
sources]; id., subd. (h) [no “warrant shall issue for an item or
items that pertain to an investigation into a prohibited violation
as defined in [Penal Code] Section 629.51,” involving
reproductive health care services, gender-affirming health care
services, and gender-affirming mental health care services
protected under California law]; id., subd. (c) [requiring special
procedures when a warrant involves documentary evidence in
the possession of an attorney, doctor, psychotherapist, or
clergyperson who is not suspected of criminal activity]; id.,
subds. (i) & (j) [requiring special procedures when a warrant
involves attorney work product or privileged information].)
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
to believe the ballots in the precinct have been miscounted” and,
after an examination under oath, precinct or counting board
members “are unable to explain the returns of their respective
precincts.” (§ 15610, subds. (a), (b).) Perhaps more relevant
here, the district attorney may, “[w]hen requested by the board
of supervisors or the grand jury” (§ 15640, subd. (a)), petition the
court to order a recount based on probable cause that
misconduct or tabulation errors have occurred. (Id., subds. (a)–
(b).) If law enforcement officers have sufficient reason to suspect
election irregularities, they can approach the district attorney
to consider seeking a recount through this established channel
or request that the district attorney consider pursuing a
criminal prosecution, during which a court might order the
registrar to make ballots available for inspection pursuant to
section 15551, subdivision (a).
Bianco’s argument also overlooks that allowing law
enforcement unfettered access to ballots, or the ability to handle
and count them in secret based on unregulated protocols, itself
creates a substantial risk to election integrity. There is no need
to introduce this risk because the Elections Code already
contains its own comprehensive procedures for recounting and
examining ballots, including for law enforcement purposes,
without exposing them to alteration or tampering — unlike the
unlawful seizure that occurred here.
In short, Bianco’s arguments fail to persuade us that we
should interpret section 15551 in a manner inconsistent with its
plain text, which mandates that voted ballots remain in the
custody of elections officials.
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
E. Ministerial Duty
The analysis above leads to the conclusion that Bianco
violated his “ ‘ “clear, present, . . . ministerial duty” ’ ” not to
remove the voted ballots from the custody of the registrar.
(Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Government officials,
such as Bianco, have a ministerial duty to carry out their official
responsibilities in accordance with applicable law. “A
ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific act in a
manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of facts exists,
without regard to any personal judgment as to the propriety of
the act.” (Ibid.) Such a duty exists “where the law imposes upon
[an] officer specific duties which he refuses to perform because
of an erroneous conclusion as to his legal duties [citation], or
where petitioner is entitled by law to a certain action.”
(Consolidated Printing & Pub. Co. v. Allen (1941) 18 Cal.2d 63,
66.) Bianco breached this duty when his department seized the
ballots in violation of section 15551, subdivision (d). The
appropriate remedy is for Bianco to return the ballots to the
registrar’s custody forthwith, without further review or
counting of them. (See Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1113 [“As a general matter,
the nature of the relief warranted in a mandate action is
dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case”].)
F. Petitioners’ Other Requests for Writ Relief
Petitioners also seek writ relief that would order Bianco to
(1) return all other election materials, including non-ballot
materials, that were seized pursuant to the search warrants and
(2) prepare a chain-of-custody report detailing the transport,
handling, and location of the seized materials. We conclude
that, at least under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of
Senate Bill 1418, petitioners have not met their burden of
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
showing that such additional relief is warranted. (See Reilly v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 653 [the petitioner for a
writ of mandate bears the burden of pleading and proving the
facts on which the petitioner bases a claim for relief].)
The Elections Code sets forth specific procedures for the
custody and handling of ballots, which is a special category of
election material. As described above, before Senate Bill 1418
was enacted, section 15551, subdivision (a) provided, “If a
contest or any such criminal prosecution has been commenced
before the date fixed for its destruction, the package containing
the voted ballots shall be subject to the order of the court in
which the contest or criminal prosecution is pending and shall
not be destroyed until after final determination of the contest or
criminal prosecution.” (Italics added.) Section 15551, former
subdivision (d) further provided that, “In no event shall the
package or its contents be taken from the custody of the elections
official.” (Italics added.)
While packages containing voted ballots are subject to this
specific custodial protection, prior to Senate Bill 1418 no
comparable restrictions existed in the Elections Code with
respect to other election-related materials. Nor have petitioners
identified any statute or other authority that imposes a
ministerial duty to provide a chain-of-custody report for seized
materials in this scenario. It may be the case that the recent
amendments to section 15551, subdivision (d) that were
implemented through Senate Bill 1418 will alter this analysis,
but as we previously explained (see fn. 6, ante), that is
something we need not address. Furthermore, while we decline
to grant the additional writ relief requested in this case, our
holding does not preclude any orders the Attorney General
might issue on these subjects pursuant to his supervisory
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
authority under article V, section 13, of our state Constitution
and Government Code section 12560, the scope of which is
addressed in Bonta v. Bianco.
III. CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted in part and
denied in part, as follows: Let a peremptory writ of mandate
issue directing Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco to return
all packages containing the voted ballots to the custody of the
Riverside County Registrar of Voters forthwith and to refrain
from further handling of the ballots except as necessary to
comply with this order. The petition for writ relief is otherwise
denied without prejudice to petitioners’ ability to pursue
additional relief in a future proceeding. To the extent they
conflict, this order supersedes the search warrants issued by the
superior court in this matter. Each party shall bear its own
costs.
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
BURNS, J.*
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
29
CERVANTES v. BIANCO
S295866
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu
Free and fair elections are the lifeblood of democracy. And
election officials are the backbone of our electoral system. The
role of these public servants is to administer our elections
competently, impartially, and safely, in accordance with the law.
In recent years, these officials have faced increased harassment,
threats, and political pressure. (See Minkin et al., Issue One,
Turning the Tide on Turnover (Feb. 2026) pp. 1–2, 5–6; Gronke
et al., Elections & Voting Information Center, Today’s Election
Administration Landscape: Findings from the 2024 EVIC Local
Election Official Survey (Feb. 2025) pp. 6–8.) They are having
to do their jobs “in an environment marked by increasingly toxic
polarization, misinformation, and public distrust.” (Election
Reformers Network, Ethical Frontlines: Impartiality
Challenges Facing Local Election Officials (Apr. 29, 2026) p. 3.)
This case involves one such official: the Riverside County
Registrar of Voters, Art Tinoco. Petitioners named Tinoco a
respondent because of his role in turning over ballots from the
November 2025 special election to Riverside County Sheriff
Chad Bianco pursuant to a search warrant secured by Bianco.
But the Registrar has made clear that his position on the
Sheriff’s actions is the same as petitioners’, and it is the same as
the court’s holding today: “the seizure of the ballots was
unlawful.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.) I write to highlight the
important role played by the Registrar and to address the
1
CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
difficult predicament he faced as a result of the Sheriff’s
unlawful conduct.
I.
As an initial matter, it is notable that the Registrar is
represented here by private counsel and by the Riverside
County Counsel. The County Counsel represents the Riverside
County Board of Supervisors and county agencies, departments,
commissions, and officers, and of necessity has a broad
perspective on legal issues facing the county. As the Registrar’s
briefing indicates, the County Counsel has determined that the
Sheriff’s legal position in this case is “erroneous, as it cannot be
reconciled with the text and structure of [Elections Code] section
15551.” (All undesignated statutory references are to the
Elections Code.)
The Sheriff is not represented by the County Counsel in
this matter or in Bonta v. Bianco (Sept. 24, 2026, S295901)
(Bianco). Attorneys in the County Counsel’s office were copied
on a letter from the Attorney General to the Sheriff on February
26 and on emails between the Attorney General’s office and the
Sheriff on March 4 and 5. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 3, fn. 3
[taking judicial notice of all pleadings and exhibits in Bianco].)
An email on March 13 from the Sheriff to Senior Assistant
Attorney General Anthony Brady then says “we are unable to
obtain legal representation from our County Coun[se]l.” When
asked at oral argument whether the County Counsel offered a
legal opinion before the ballots were seized, Bianco’s attorney
said, “I’m not aware of that other than [the County Counsel]
wouldn’t represent the Sheriff.” When asked whether the
Sheriff sought guidance from the County Counsel, Bianco’s
attorney said, “I believe he did not.”
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
The court today holds that the Sheriff’s seizure of the
ballots was “unlawful under the plain language of section 15551,
subdivision (d).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6, italics added.) And the
court in Bianco holds that “the language of article V, section 13
[of the California Constitution] plainly confers upon the
Attorney General the authority to issue binding directions to a
sheriff regarding a criminal investigation,” as does the “plain
language” of Government Code section 12560. (Bianco, supra,
filed opn. at pp. 16, 26, italics added.) Further, “[a]ll of the
directions the Attorney General has issued to date are lawful”
“[u]nder any degree of scrutiny that reasonably might be applied
to these instructions.” (Id. at p. 27, italics added.) As these
holdings indicate, the legal issues presented by this controversy
are neither difficult nor close.
“ ‘Every citizen is presumed to know the law.’ ” (Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (2020) 590 U.S. 255, 265.) This
applies equally to our public officials and especially to law
enforcement officers. No one expects the Sheriff’s Department
to know the ins and outs of the Elections Code; elections are not
the department’s expertise, after all. But it is precisely because
elections are not the department’s expertise that the Sheriff’s
consultation with counsel would have been prudent if not
imperative before wading into a sensitive and closely regulated
area. Had the Sheriff sought and followed guidance from the
County Counsel, the past seven months of controversy and
“substantial risk to election integrity” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 26)
could have been avoided. There are lawful avenues for
investigating claims of election misconduct (id. at pp. 25–26),
but the approach taken here is not one.
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
II.
To understand how the Registrar was caught in the
middle, I add some details to the court’s recounting of what
happened. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3–5; Bianco, supra, filed
opn. at pp. 2–8.)
Tinoco was appointed Registrar of Voters by the Riverside
County Board of Supervisors in December 2023 after working in
the Registrar’s office since 2002 and serving eight years as
Assistant Registrar of Voters. Tinoco administered the
November 4, 2025 special election in Riverside County, and the
Secretary of State certified the ballots cast by county residents
on December 12, 2025. No election contest was filed (§§ 16100
et seq.); no recount was requested (§§ 15610 et seq.).
Some time later, a community group called the Riverside
Election Integrity Team (REIT) contacted the Registrar to
request ballot materials. In response, the Registrar provided
materials that could be lawfully disclosed. The REIT group said
their audit of the materials showed 45,896 fewer ballots cast
than the Registrar’s official count of 657,322.
On February 6, 2026, a REIT member, Greg Langworthy,
emailed the Sheriff’s Department about the alleged discrepancy.
He also contacted the Board of Supervisors, which scheduled a
public meeting on February 10 to examine the issue. One day
before the meeting, on February 9, the Sheriff obtained a
warrant, under seal, from the Riverside County Superior Court
authorizing seizure of all ballots cast in the county in the special
election.
At the Board of Supervisors meeting on February 10, a
video of which is available online, the Registrar appeared and
discussed the special election for more than an hour. In a
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
detailed presentation followed by questions from the Board, he
described the election procedures his office followed, and he
addressed the discrepancy alleged by REIT. He explained that
his office uses two systems to count ballots: the Election
Information Management System (EIMS), which tracks
signature-verified ballots that are legally eligible to be counted
(what the Registrar called “good” ballots), and the Liberty Vote
System, which scans and tabulates the “good” ballots and
generates election results. He then reported that for the
November 2025 special election, the EIMS system showed
657,219 ballots cast in Riverside County, and the Liberty system
showed 657,322 ballots counted — a variance of 103, or 0.016%.
He explained that the Secretary of State uses such comparisons
across all 58 counties statewide to spot anomalies between
ballots cast and counted, and that the variance was 0.069%
among large turnout counties (500,000+ voters) and 0.107% for
all counties in the special election. In addition, as part of the
Registrar’s presentation, Deputy County Counsel Stephanie
Nelson discussed the California Voting System Standards
issued by the Secretary of State and how voting systems are
tested for accuracy and security.
As to the discrepancy alleged by REIT, the Registrar said
that REIT’s tally of ballots cast did not include confidential
voters, conditional registration voters, and provisional ballots,
which together account for approximately 6,000 ballots.
Further, he explained, the REIT tally was based on handwritten
ballot statements and collection or intake forms that were filled
out before ballots were officially processed. These materials,
which are used as internal “reference guides” and are not
required by law, are “imprecise” because they reflect
preliminary hand counts and are “completed in the field by
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
election officers during long work days” and “may include
estimates or unintentional mistakes.” The Registrar said
county elections involve 921 precincts, 150 vote centers, 107 vote
dropoff sites, and over 2,500 volunteers working almost around
the clock, and “there will be some unintentional mistakes.” He
made clear that REIT’s reliance on handwritten “raw data” to
derive a count of ballots cast is “not a methodology that is
anywhere codified or law.” (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11–15
[discussing Elections Code provisions that prescribe training,
oath, custody, and transparency requirements for handling and
counting ballots].)
After the Registrar spoke, the Board heard comments for
almost an hour from Langworthy and 10 additional REIT
members or supporters. Several focused on the difference
between REIT’s count and the Registrar’s official tally, and said
the handwritten materials provided by the Registrar’s office are
accurate and reliable. One of the speakers, Shasta County
Registrar of Voters Clint Curtis, said that his office uses public
hand counts to reconcile ballots cast and ballots counted, and
that hand counts promote transparency and public confidence
whereas electronic voting systems lack transparency and can be
manipulated. As to the feasibility of hand counting in large
jurisdictions, Curtis said “we do 65,000” ballots in Shasta
County but “I could do 65 million just as easily because it’s a
matter of putting another staff member on it to make it count.
Scaling is not a problem.”
The Board received the information presented on
February 10, and several supervisors said they would study the
issue. Since then, it does not appear that the Board has found
cause to further examine the special election. On April 14, the
Board voted not to authorize the hiring or payment of outside
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Liu, J., concurring
counsel to defend the Sheriff in the two cases before us and two
others arising from his election investigation.
Petitioners assert and the Registrar confirms that
Sheriff’s Department personnel attended the Registrar’s
presentation at the February 10 meeting. On February 23, the
Sheriff’s Department obtained a second search warrant,
authorizing seizure of additional election materials from the
Registrar. “The affidavit used to obtain this warrant referred
again to the alleged vote discrepancy but did not mention the
registrar’s February 10 presentation; on the contrary, it stated
that the registrar ‘has not given a reason for the discrepancy.’ ”
(Bianco, supra, filed opn. at pp. 3–4.) Highlighting this
omission, the Attorney General stated in a February 26 letter to
the Sheriff that “[t]here . . . appear to be material omissions in
the affidavit that may have substantially interfered with the
magistrate’s inference-drawing process.”
When the Registrar learned that the Sheriff intended to
seize the ballots, he informed the Secretary of State, who in turn
contacted the Attorney General on February 24. The Attorney
General promptly directed Bianco to pause his investigation and
postpone execution of the first warrant from February 27, the
planned date, until March 6. The Sheriff instead executed the
warrant on February 26 and seized 12 pallets (around
1,000 boxes) of ballots with the Registrar’s compliance. On
March 24, the Sheriff executed the second warrant and seized
another 11 pallets of materials, again with the Registrar’s
compliance.
III.
Petitioners sued the Registrar alongside the Sheriff on the
ground that the Registrar failed to uphold his duty under section
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
15551 to maintain custody of the ballots. According to
petitioners, the Registrar “violated” that duty “when he
acquiesced to the seizure and counting of ballots by Bianco
without even a minimal effort to assert his duty in court.”
As the circumstances suggest, the Registrar was caught
between a rock and a hard place. In his briefing, he agrees with
petitioners that while election misconduct is “not beyond the
reach of a lawful criminal proceeding,” the Sheriff’s seizure of
the ballots ran afoul of the statutory framework for any such
process. He notes: “There is no evidence of suspected criminal
wrongdoing by personnel within the Riverside County Registrar
of Voters’ office. Likewise, there is no evidence that the
integrity, preservation, or security of the ballots would be
jeopardized by their continued custody by the Registrar . . . .”
Further, he says his office conducted the November 2025 special
election accurately and in accordance with the law.
At the same time, the Registrar contends he acted lawfully
in complying with the search warrants: “As Riverside County’s
chief elections official, Respondent is charged both with carrying
out duties imposed by the Elections Code and with complying
with orders and warrants issued by courts of competent
jurisdiction. When presented with judicial process purporting
to authorize the seizure of voted ballots, Respondent was not
free simply to disregard that process based on his own
assessment of the governing law.”
I agree that in the scenario here, the Registrar cannot be
faulted for complying with a facially valid search warrant.
“Importantly,” his briefing notes, “at the time the warrants were
executed, the warrant applications and supporting materials
were sealed. Accordingly, Respondent did not have access to the
8
CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
evidence or affidavits presented to the issuing court and could
not assess the factual or legal basis for the warrants.” Further,
the execution of the warrants by armed officers with enough
trucks to remove several pallets of materials did not leave the
Registrar with much choice. And the Registrar may have
believed that the Attorney General’s involvement would
facilitate the return of the seized materials. Under these
circumstances, the Registrar was not required to subject himself
to arrest and contempt of court in order to uphold his official
duties. (Cf. Ex parte Brown (1892) 97 Cal. 83, 84–85.)
But predictably the Registrar’s acquiescence led to him
being sued. One could say the Registrar does not seem to mind
since he does not oppose the relief requested by petitioners. Yet
the time and expense of defending a suit brought by concerned
voters, as well as the prospect of being held in violation of the
law, pose an unfavorable situation for any public official.
An alternative path was available to the Registrar, and it
is available to election officials who face similar dilemmas: The
Registrar could have gone to court himself to vindicate his duties
and authority under the law. Here, this could have taken the
form of a motion to quash the search warrants in the superior
court, especially since it was unclear whether the court had
considered the Elections Code before authorizing seizure of
ballots. Nor had the court been informed of the Registrar’s
presentation to the Board of Supervisors on February 10, which
was plainly material to whether there was probable cause of
criminal activity. Further, the Registrar could have filed a
petition for a writ of mandate similar to the one now before us.
The Registrar was undoubtedly a proper party to bring such
actions; his role in the statutory scheme was at stake, and no
one was in a better position to elucidate the requirements of the
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
Elections Code or to describe the ballot handling and counting
procedures as they relate to the underlying dispute.
Going forward, election officials have additional recourse.
In response to these events, the Legislature amended the
Elections Code to prohibit peace officers from interfering with
elections and to authorize enforcement actions by the Attorney
General, Secretary of State, and county elections officials
(§ 15007), to provide for civil and criminal liability for such
interference (§§ 18564.5, 18568), and to require the Attorney
General to advise election officials on how to respond to requests
from law enforcement (§ 15006). (Stats. 2026, ch. 10, §§ 1–14
(Senate Bill No. 73); see Assem. Com. on Appropriations,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 73 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended
May 11, 2026, p. 3 [describing bill as a response to the events in
Riverside County as well as “others around the country where
elections officials were presented with court orders to turn over
election materials,” and recognizing “the difficult position of
elections officials in these situations”].)
A raft of additional legislation, signed into law just days
ago, further strengthens protections against unlawful election
interference. (Stats. 2026, ch. 330, §§ 1–5 (Assembly Bill
No. 282); Stats. 2026, ch. 336, §§ 1–4 (Assembly Bill No. 1664);
Stats. 2026, ch. 340, §§ 1–4 (Senate Bill No. 884); Stats. 2026,
ch. 341, §§ 1–10 (Senate Bill No. 1418).) The Elections Code
now requires county election officials to notify the Secretary of
State “immediately, but no later than one calendar day,” after
becoming aware of a warrant or subpoena pertaining to the
search, seizure, or retention of election materials in their
custody. (§ 23, subd. (b).) It also imposes criminal liability on
“any person who seizes or causes or assists in the seizure of
ballots, election records, or certified voting technology . . . before
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CERVANTES v. BIANCO
Liu, J., concurring
election results are certified” and on “[a]ny person with
authority who directs one or more other persons subject to their
supervision or authority” to undertake such a seizure. (§ 18579,
subds. (a), (b).)
Notably, the new amendments to the Election Code
contain civil and criminal enforcement provisions that
specifically target violations of the custody requirement in
section 15551, subdivision (d). (See §§ 18564.5, subd. (a)(7),
18568, subd. (i).) The Registrar says he “intends to rely on those
statutory protections in the future to help ensure continued
compliance with the Election Code’s custodial requirements
governing election materials.”
IV.
It is a lot to ask of our election officials that they not only
do their jobs competently but also stand ready to sue anyone
who unlawfully interferes with their duties. Yet here we are.
For our democracy to flourish, our elections must be conducted
in accordance with the law.
I would underscore the seriousness of the violation here.
This is not a case involving a few documents. It involves the
unlawful removal and handling by armed deputies of over 1,000
boxes of documents — and not just any documents, but the most
precious documents of the citizenry in a democracy: their votes.
We ordered an immediate stay of this conduct shortly after
receiving the Bianco petition. Then, in light of “the November
2026 General Election nearing” (Bianco, supra, filed opn. at
p. 32), we heard argument in this case and Bianco in a special
session less than two months after briefing was completed.
Today’s unanimous opinions come 31 days after argument. This
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Liu, J., concurring
court is prepared to act with dispatch and clarity to ensure that
our elections are conducted in accordance with the law.
But it should not have come to this. Although it is the job
of courts to decide cases that come before them, we should keep
in mind that the events here are “extraordinary.” (Bianco,
supra, filed opn. at p. 32.) Court orders aside, every public
official has an independent duty to follow the law. The judiciary
serves as an essential backstop, but the rule of law depends in
the first instance on the conscientious discharge of that duty by
all officials.
LIU, J.
12
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Cervantes v. Bianco
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S295866
Date Filed: September 24, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
UCLA Voting Rights Project, Chad W. Dunn, Sonni Waknin,
Bernadette Reyes; and Xavier Becerra for Petitioners.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt, State Solicitor
General, Helen H. Hong, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General,
Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Anya M. Binsacca,
Lindsay M. Bailey, Malcolm A. Brudigam, Lisa C. Ehrlich and Anne P.
Bellows, Deputy Attorneys General, and Zachary W. Sorenson,
Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, for the California Attorney
General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Tyler Law, Robert H. Tyler, Nic Cocis; Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
and Bradley W. Hertz for Respondent Chad Bianco.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel; Strumwasser & Woocher, Fredric D.
Woocher, Dale K. Larson and Salvador E. Pérez for Respondent Art
Tinoco.
Illovsky Gates & Calia, Kevin Calia and Christopher Hales for Real
Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Chad W. Dunn
UCLA Voting Rights Project
1900 Pearl Street
Austin, TX 78705
(512) 717-9822
Bradley W. Hertz
Law Offices of Bradley W. Hertz
22815 Ventura Boulevard, #405
Los Angeles, CA 91364
(818) 593-2949
Dale K. Larson
Strumwasser & Woocher LLP
1250 6th Street, Suite 205
Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 576-1233
Kevin Calia
Illovsky Gates & Calia LLP
1611 Telegraph Avenue, Suite 806
Oakland, CA 94612
(415) 500-6640
Samuel T. Harbourt
State Solicitor General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3919
