Filed 9/21/26 Singleton v. Iannone CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

KELVIN SINGLETON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A173531
v.
M. IANNONE et al., (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FCS059726)
Defendants and Respondents.

Kelvin Singleton, an inmate at the California Medical Facility (CMF)
who is self-represented, brought suit against prison officials alleging they
failed to protect him from an assault by another inmate. He appeals a
judgment entered after the court granted a defense motion for summary
judgment. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On February 17, 2023, Singleton filed this lawsuit against prison
officials at California Medical Facility (CMF), alleging they failed to protect
him from an unprovoked attack on August 2, 2022, by another inmate named
D. Grogan known for being violent.1

Singleton named six defendants but ultimately served only five:
1

Captain M. Iannone, Associate Warden J. Garry, Lieutenant D. Footeman,
Lieutenant N. Daniel, and Sergeant J. Sweeten. Singleton’s allegations and

1
 Singleton alleges that prison “administration was aware [Grogan] had
a history of assaults on People of Color in a dorm setting,” and that days
before Grogan assaulted him, “prison officials was [sic] made aware of . . .
Grogan’s bizarre threatening behavior but did nothing to prevent the attack.”
He also alleges that “friendly” correctional officers him told him they thought
prison officials had “ ‘dropped the ball’ ” on this situation.
He alleges that prison officials’ prior knowledge of Grogan’s violent
propensity was based on Grogan’s “arrest history” and Grogan’s disciplinary
history of prior incidents at the prison, as well as the fact that “[o]n multiple
occasions staff had been made aware of [Grogan’s] behavior months before”
Grogan attacked Singleton “but at no time did the defendants investigate
and/or intervene to determine if a threat existed or not.”
Regarding prior incidents, he alleges that before Grogan assaulted him,
Grogan had previously engaged in a violent altercation in “ ‘C or D’ dorm;”
had then been re-housed into Y-Dorm where Grogan had then had another
violent altercation; had then been re-housed a second time, this time into R1
dorm where Grogan had then battered a black prisoner in the head with the
foot pedal of a wheelchair, “only to be re-housed right back into Y-dorm, to
eventually attack” Singleton.
Singleton alleges that he personally warned “prison staff” of Grogan’s
threats days before Grogan assaulted him but prison officials did nothing to
prevent it. In particular, he alleges that he personally “notif[ied] the
correctional officer who is directly supervised by defendants Sweeten and
Footeman” of Grogan’s violent threats, and that “[o]n multiple occasions staff
had been made aware of [Grogan’s] behavior months before” Grogan attacked

claims against the unserved defendant, Warden J. Benavidez, are not at
issue here, and we refrain from addressing them.

2
Singleton “but at no time did the defendants investigate and/or intervene to
determine if a threat existed or not.” He also alleges that he personally
“notified prison staff” that Grogan “was walking around in the early morning
hours threatening other prisoners” which he alleges “is the direct causation of
[his] serious injuries.”
Singleton also alleges that he personally had had to intervene “many
times” in situations between Grogan and prison staff or other inmates that
Grogan instigated. One such occasion was in the early morning hours of late
2020 or early 2021 when Singleton allegedly saw Grogan get up from his
bunk, put on his shoes, approach the building officer who was alone, and
threaten that if the officer ever again approached Grogan’s bunk, Grogan
would “xxxx him up.” Singleton alleges that when he saw this, he walked
over to stand “in the area of the confrontation,” and that had he not done so,
Grogan would have caused a “violent episode.”
The complaint also includes additional, more specific allegations
concerning several defendants:
He alleges that Captain M. Iannone “was aware or should have been
aware” of Grogan’s violent propensities “because as captain of the unit
Plaintiff is housed in he was to be notified of any/all violence or threats of
violence.” He also alleges that after Grogan beat the inmate in RI dorm with
a metal foot pedal from a wheelchair, Grogan appeared before one of two
prison committees on which Captain Iaonnone sits, either the Institutional
Classification Committee (ICC) or the Unit Classification Committee (UCC),
and Iaonnone “excused” Grogan from his multiple “violent incidents.” He
also alleges that Captain Iannone as well as defendant J. Garry failed to
properly supervise and train custodial staff and enforce procedures relating
to Singleton’s physical safety.

3
 He alleges that Sergeant J. Sweeten and Lieutenant D. Footeman
“were at all times in direct custody” of Grogan when Grogan “was released
from Ad/Seg from a prior battery on an inmate with a weapon and knew the
serious risks they were taking by putting the violent . . . inmate back into a
dorm living environment instead of a single cell.”2 He also alleges Sergeant
Sweeten “refus[ed] to move the violent inmate from a dorm setting after
having knowledge of the multiple violent incidents in a dorm with other
cohorts” and “failed to adequately supervise and/or train his staff in following
policy and procedures when advised in writing and/or orally of a threat of
violence in the dorm by a known violent inmate.”
His complaint alleges he filed a prison grievance after Grogan’s assault
on him, and copies of relevant documents are attached as exhibits to his
complaint. They reflect that his prison grievance was initially denied, but
then on appeal it was granted on the ground that the first-level reviewer had
not addressed his claim that staff had previously been advised of Grogan
threatening others “all to no avail.” As a result, the Office of Appeals
directed CMF to open a new Offender Grievance Tracking System log number
to investigate and review that issue. The Office of Appeals also ruled that
“both inmates were appropriately housed, taking into consideration all case
factors, according to the classification committee results occurring prior to
August 2, 2022.”
Based on these allegations, Singleton alleges two causes of action: one
for general negligence alleging defendants failed to protect him from Grogan
and another for an “intentional tort.”

2 “Ad/Seg” apparently is a reference to administrative segregation.

4
 B. Subsequent Proceedings
Over the course of approximately the next year and a half, Singleton
repeatedly asked the trial court to appoint him a lawyer.3 His numerous
filings documented the complexities of evidence being withheld in discovery,
as we discuss further below; documented recurring instances of his legal mail
being mishandled (i.e., instances of incoming legal mail never being delivered
to him at all, or delivered to him cut open with no signature and/or without
having been logged into the prison mail system; and instances in which the
outgoing legal mail he attempted to send never reached his intended
recipient); mentioned that his access to the law library had been obstructed
to an unspecified degree; and detailed a few instances in which he had missed
court appearances. In addition, as we discuss in greater detail below, the
recurring difficulties he experienced with his legal mail resulted in the loss of
an opportunity to retain a lawyer who had been willing to represent him.
The court did not appoint him a lawyer or implement any other measures to
address the difficulties Singleton brought to its attention.
Defendants then, on January 3, 2025, moved for summary judgment.4
They asserted Singleton could not prove his negligence claim because he
could not show they personally knew or should have known Grogan posed

3 Between May 8, 2023, and September 11, 2023, he filed three, self-
styled “ex parte” requests asking for a lawyer. He did so again in a motion
filed on January 16, 2024, seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a
cause of action arising from ongoing, alleged interference with his prison mail
that resulted in his inability to retain a lawyer. And he did so again in a
discovery motion he filed on June 14, 2024, asking the court to review a
confidential document in his central prison file defendants had not disclosed
or produced in discovery, which he said was potentially relevant because it
could prove their notice or knowledge of his assailant’s dangerousness.
4Singleton had also moved for summary judgment (on September 10,
2024). The court subsequently denied his motion on January 31, 2025.

5
any risk to him, and that his intentional tort claim failed because there was
no evidence that any of them committed an intentional tort against him.
On May 16, 2025, the trial court granted summary judgment for
defendants. On the negligence cause of action, it ruled there was no evidence
defendants had any prior knowledge of any prior violent incidents involving
Grogan, complaints about Grogan or safety concerns about him. It ruled that
the intentional tort cause of action was barred as a matter of law for the
same reason and because defendants were immune from liability on that
claim to the extent it was based on allegations they failed properly to
investigate the assault.
Singleton timely appealed the resulting judgment. .
DISCUSSION
Singleton’s briefing raises many issues, and not all of his arguments
are entirely clear. But he does challenge the summary judgment ruling, and
respondents defend the court’s ruling on the merits and urge us to affirm it.
Accordingly, we turn first to that issue.
I.
The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.
A. Summary Judgment Principles.
“ ‘ “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) provides that
summary judgment is properly granted when there is no triable issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[Citation.] As applicable here, moving defendants can meet their burden by
demonstrating that ‘a cause of action has no merit,’ which they can do by
showing that ‘[o]ne or more elements of the cause of action cannot be
separately established . . . .” [Citations.] Once defendants meet this burden,
the burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of

6
material fact.” ’ ” (Visitacion Investment, LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic
Properties, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1091-1092 (Visitacion
Investment, LLC).)
On appeal, our review is de novo. (Kumar v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.
(2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1217.) We “ ‘ “apply the same three-step
analysis as the trial court.” ’ [Citation] ‘ “ ‘First, we identify the issues
framed by the pleadings. Next, we determine whether the moving party has
established facts justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, if the moving party
has carried its initial burden, we decide whether the opposing party has
demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact issue.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[W]e must decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable
dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] Put another way, we exercise our independent
judgment, and decide whether undisputed facts have been established that
negate plaintiff's claims. [Citation.] . . . ‘[W]e exercise an independent
review to determine if the defendant moving for summary judgment met its
burden of establishing a complete defense or of negating each of the plaintiff’s
theories and establishing that the action was without merit.’ ” ’ ” (Visitacion
Investment, LLC, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
In conducting this analysis, “We consider both parties’ evidence, except
that to which an objection has been sustained, viewing the evidence ‘in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs as the losing parties, liberally construing
their evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing [the defendant’s]
showing.’ ” (Kumar v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1217.) Put another way, we must “ ‘ “ ‘accept as true the facts . . . in the
evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them’ ” ’ ” and ‘ “strictly scrutinize [the

7
moving party’s] own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in [the losing party’s] favor.” ’ ” ’ ” (Visitacion Investment, LLC¸
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
Here, defendants sought summary judgment on Singleton’s complaint
which, as noted, asserted two causes of action: negligence and a cause of
action for intentional tort. They did not seek summary adjudication of either
cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Therefore, if either
cause of action is viable then summary judgment was improperly granted.
(See Md. Casualty Co. v. Reeder (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 974, fn. 4
[respondents who sought only summary judgment not entitled on appeal to
summary adjudication of discrete issues].)
Considering the pleadings and the parties’ evidence within the three-
step framework discussed above, we conclude the court erred in granting
summary judgment for defendants because there are triable issues of fact on
Singleton’s negligence cause of action.
B. The Law of Negligence
The essential elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence
of a legal duty, breach of that duty, causation of injury and damages.
(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
618 (Regents).)
The existence of defendants’ legal duty toward Singleton is well-
established. Nearly 20 years ago, this court held that prison employees have
a special relationship with prisoners and thus owe a duty of care to protect
inmates from foreseeable violence inflicted by other inmates. (Giraldo v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 246,
cited with approval, Regents, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 621.) This duty of care is
imposed because “[i]t is manifestly foreseeable that an inmate may be at risk

8
of harm” while incarcerated, prisoners are “vulnerable” and “dependent,” and
prison officials have “control over the prisoner, who is deprived of the normal
opportunity to protect himself from harm inflicted by others.” (Id. at pp. 250-
251; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3271 [“Every employee, regardless of
their assignment, is responsible for the safe custody of the incarcerated
persons confined in the institutions of the department”].)
The existence of this legal duty does not turn on whether prison
officials could predict that a particular inmate would engage in violence
toward another inmate. The Supreme Court has made clear that “case-
specific foreseeability questions,” such as whether a defendant “was, or
should have been, on notice that a particular [third person] posed a
foreseeable risk of violence” “do not . . . inform [the] threshold determination
that a duty exists.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 630; id. at p. 629 [“the
duty analysis is categorical, not case-specific”]; see also, e.g., C.F. v.
Alternative Family Services, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1233
[existence of legal duty to protect from third party harm depends on
“ ‘whether it was foreseeable that the category of negligent conduct was likely
to result in the type of harm alleged’ ”].)
Rather, when there is a legal duty of care to protect against third party
violence, as there is in the prison context under Giraldo, the question
whether a particular third party poses a foreseeable risk of violence “is a
case-specific question, to be examined in light of all the surrounding
circumstances” that is relevant to “determining the applicable standard of
care or breach in a particular case.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 630; see
also id. at p. 633 [“The reasonableness of a [defendant’s] actions in response
to a potential threat is a question of breach” (italics added)].) “Any prior
threats or acts of violence” by the third party are relevant to the case-specific

9
foreseeability question, as well as other facts relevant to the surrounding
circumstances including the observations of others. (Id. at p. 630.)
Ordinarily, whether a particular risk is foreseeable is a question of fact
for the jury. (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 56.) “It
may be decided as a question of law only if, ‘under the undisputed facts there
is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.’ ” (Ibid.) “If any triable
issue of fact exists” as to the foreseeability of a particular risk, “it is error for
a trial court to grant a party’s motion for summary judgment.” (Ibid.)
Below in their summary judgment motion, defendants tacitly
acknowledged the existence of their legal duty to protect prisoners and
focused only on the element of breach. They argued that “because [Singleton]
cannot show that Defendants knew or should have known that Grogan posed
any risk to [Singleton], he cannot establish a breach of their duty to take
reasonable steps to protect him from foreseeable harm . . . .”
Accordingly, the question on appeal comes down to whether there are
any triable issues of fact concerning defendants’ breach of their legal duty to
protect Singleton from foreseeable violence at the hands of other another
inmate.5 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Singleton and
strictly scrutinizing defendants’ evidence, as we must, we conclude that there
are.

5 On appeal, defendants slightly change their tune. They argue there
was no triable issue of fact on the negligence claim “because the evidence
showed that no Defendant knew or should have known that Singleton was at
risk of harm from inmate Grogan or that they breached any duty to
Singleton.” (Italics added.) To the extent that statement is intended as an
argument no legal duty was owed, it is contrary to our holding in Giraldo,
and we reject it.

10
 C. Analysis
1. Defendants’ Evidence
In support of their motion, all five defendants proffered declarations
under oath as well as excerpts from Singleton’s deposition.
According to their evidence, Y-Dorm is located in Unit IV of the prison
and is a “level three housing unit that primarily housed inmates with ADA
accommodations in place.”
Associate Warden J. Garry submitted a declaration reflecting that her
only duties were administrative, she had no role in addressing prisoner
safety concerns or making housing decisions, and her only involvement with
this matter was to review and affirm the first level reviewer’s investigation
and denial of Singleton’s grievance about Grogan’s assault. She also said she
had no knowledge or reason to know that Grogan posed a danger to Singleton
or any other inmate. She said that after Grogan’s assault, “[m]ultiple
incarcerated persons and staff members” from Y-Dorm “were interviewed and
there was no information provided to confirm that staff was advised of safety
concerns” before the assault. In addition, she asserted, “Singleton was
interviewed about which staff member he told about security concerns, and
he refused to name anybody.”
The other four defendants proffered declarations reflecting that they
were assigned to Y-Dorm in various capacities, with responsibilities over
inmate safety there.6 They each stated that Grogan and Singleton “were not

6 At the time of the assault, defendant Iannone had been a captain
assigned to Unit IV, “responsible for general oversight of the unit, including
ensuring that unit staff was appropriately scheduled and trained to follow
policy” and “review[ing] inmate grievances.” Y-Dorm is part of Unit IV.
Defendant Sweeten had been a sergeant assigned as “the first-line
supervisor for Y-Dorm and . . . responsible for overseeing the general
operation of the unit, supervising correctional officers assigned to work in the

11
documented enemies,” and three of them (all but Captain Iannone) further
stated Grogan and Singleton “had no documented history of any negative
interactions with each other.” In addition, each of them stated in nearly
identical language that they did not know, and had no reason to know, that
Grogan posed a safety risk to Singleton; denied having received any “reports
or information” that Grogan posed any risk to Singleton, staff or any other
inmate in Y-Dorm; and denied having been informed by Singleton or staff
that Singleton or any other inmate had ever complained of safety concerns
about Grogan. They each said, further, that had they been informed that
Grogan had been exhibiting any threatening or violent behavior toward
inmates or staff, or been told that any inmate or staff had any safety or
security concerns about Grogan “or any information leading me to believe
that Grogan’s presence in the unit posed a risk of harm to other inmates or
staff members, I would have immediately separated Grogan and determined
whether Grogan should continue to be housed there.”7

unit, . . . assigning inmates to particular beds, and addressing any safety or
security issues that arose in the unit.”
Defendant Footeman had been a lieutenant assigned to Y-Dorm as the
second-line supervisor, responsible for “general oversight of the unit,
including handling inmate grievance investigations and responses,
coordinating responses to incidents, reviewing and approving documentation
and reports relating to incidents, serving as incident commander for various
incidents in the unit and serving as a hearing officer for inmate disciplinary
violations.”
Defendant Daniel had been an acting lieutenant, also assigned as the
second-line supervisor for Y-Dorm with the same responsibilities as
Footeman.
7Associate Warden Garry likewise said had she received any such
information, “I would have informed staff in his housing unit, who would take
appropriate action to separate Grogan and determine whether Grogan should
continue to be housed there.”

12
 In addition, one of them, Sergeant Sweeten, said he interviewed
Grogan and Singleton individually after the fight “to determine . . . if [they]
had safety concerns with each other that would require them to be separated”
and recounted the results of those discussions. Sergeant Sweeten stated that
“[b]oth Grogan and Singleton independently agreed this was an isolated
incident and signed a ‘compatibility chrono’ stating that they could continue
to program together without any lingering issues. Both inmates also stated
that they did not consider the other inmate an enemy and did not want the
other inmate added to their enemies list.”
Sergeant Sweeten also stated that he “arranged for Grogan to be
rehoused,” because “after the incident I subsequently determined that
Grogan might be at risk of harm from other inmates if he continued to be
housed on Y-Dorm.”
All five declarations also addressed inmate housing policy. Three
defendants (Associate Warden Garry, Captain Iannone and
Sergeant Sweeten) expressly disclaimed responsibility for making decisions
as to which inmates would be housed in Y-Dorm. All five defendants
explained that each prisoner is classified and assigned to a particular unit by
a classification committee that reviews each inmate’s “history and case
factors” before making a classification decision. The defendants who had
been assigned to Unit IV (Iaonnone) and/or Y-Dorm (Footeman, Daniel and
Sweeten) each asserted identically that Singleton’s “alleg[ations]” that
Grogan had previously hit another inmate with the foot pedal of his
wheelchair would not preclude Grogan from being housed in a dorm setting,
including in Y-Dorm. They asserted that, under prison regulations, an
“isolated incidence” of violence in a dorm setting that did not take place in a
cell or against a cellmate would not preclude an inmate from being housed in

13
a dorm setting. They stated that “Isolated act of violence against another
inmate do not [sic] preclude dorm housing and would not require an inmate
to be housed in a single cell without a cell mate.” They stated there was “no
indication” that Grogan had been inappropriately housed in Y-Dorm before
the assault, “even if he was involved in a prior act of violence in a dorm
setting that led to disciplinary charges and punishment.” They also stated
that “[b]ecause [Y-Dorm] is a level-three unit, prior acts of violence in prison,
including in a dorm setting, do not necessarily exclude an inmate from being
housed in Y-Dorm.” They said, “[t]here are other dorms at CMF, including R-
Dorm, which houses level-two inmates that have less strict security needs.
Thus, an inmate who was housed in R-Dorm and committed a disciplinary
violation that increased his security risk would be appropriately rehoused in
the level-three Y-Dorm.”
Defendants introduced no evidence disputing Singelton’s allegations
that Grogan had previously engaged in three violent incidents (once in “C or
D dorm,” then in Y-Dorm, and then in R1 dorm where Grogan assaulted
another inmate with the metal foot pedal of a wheelchair), nor did any of
them specifically deny knowledge of those three prior incidents. Defendants
also introduced no evidence disputing Singleton’s allegations that after each
of those prior violent incidents, Grogan had been rehoused including one
previous time out of Y-Dorm.
In addition, defendants introduced portions of Singleton’s own
deposition testimony. Singleton testified that Y-Dorm is a unit with no
prison cells but, rather, an open floor plan with about 20 double bunks; it
houses approximately 40 inmates and is staffed by a single prison guard. It
houses prisoners who are disabled and have a security classification of either

14
level IV (maximum security) or level III (Singleton himself is classified as a
maximum security inmate (level IV).
He testified that Grogan had been housed in Y-Dorm for several
months before Grogan attacked him. Singleton had heard by word of mouth
from other inmates and from a prison officer (he couldn’t recall which one)
that Grogan had engaged in violence twice before. One of the people involved
in the incident in R1 dorm told Singleton (at some point that it is not clear)
that he was surprised to hear Grogan was in Y-Dorm because the prison
administration had told him Grogan was going to be transferred.
Singleton testified he and Grogan were not documented enemies, but
he did have enemy concerns about Grogan. He also testified that Grogan’s
behavior was mostly directed at the African-American and Hispanic inmates
in Y-Dorm.
Singleton’s first interaction with Grogan was “months” before the
attack, when Grogan “threatened everybody in the building” because they
were cooking and he didn’t want to smell their food, including people who
were paralyzed and in a wheelchair. Grogan said he wanted to “kick their
ass.” Singleton testified he stepped in because “I’m able-bodied and I was
more or less the type of person who kept the peace in there,” he told Grogan
“look, man, we’re not doing that up in here. There’s no fighting up in here,”
other inmates “rallied with me,” and Grogan calmed down and returned to
his bunk. There was no violence and Singleton didn’t tell any prison staff
this had happened.
Singleton testified that the next incident was in April or May 2022. He
overheard Grogan loudly threatening another inmate, “which caught
everybody’s attention.” So, Singleton and other inmates in Y-Dorm “had a
little powwow about him because of his threatening behavior towards

15
everybody. [¶] And they designated me to talk to the officers about him to try
to get him removed.” He testified that Grogan was the “outsider” in Y-Dorm
and a “loose cannon,” and that all of the other inmates got along with each
other and designated Singleton as the person to speak up about Grogan’s
threatening behavior out of solidarity (“because we wanted to keep it as just .
. . one solid unit representing this whole issue”).
So, Singleton spoke with the officer on the second watch, Officer
Santos, and told him that Grogan was “still walking around here trying to
bully people and threaten people.” Singleton said, “hey man, this guy’s in
here; he’s doing this weird crap again, threatening people, man. What’s up?”
It was a brief conversation in passing, as Singleton was on his way to work.
Singleton testified he “just letting it be known that this guy was
causing problems in here,” didn’t tell Officer Santos he had safety concerns
about Grogan or that anyone was scared of Grogan, and did not ask that
Grogan be rehoused. He testified he handled it this way because all of the
inmates in Y-Dorm had agreed they would come to each other’s defense if
Grogan attacked one of them, and so their goal was just to get Grogan out of
Y-Dorm and avoid the risk of any of them getting a disciplinary write-up if
any of them tried to defend themselves or each other from Grogan. He
testified he didn’t ask Officer Santos if Grogan could be housed elsewhere
because “I can’t ask him to move him.” But he testified he brought this to
Officer Santos’ attention because “most of the time, if there was somebody
that the officers didn’t want to have in the building, they’d move him.” He
testified that moving a problematic prisoner who was causing tension with
other inmates was one way the prison staff would help keep the housing
units safe, “even if there’s a non-event.” He testified he wasn’t afraid of

16
Grogan when he spoke to Officer Santos but was just “pretty much” trying to
get ahead of a problem.8
Asked whether he had ever had a conversation with prison staff about
Grogan before, Singleton testified that he had, and that “it wasn’t a secret.”
He testified that other inmates who had been threatened by Grogan “had
talked to the . . . officers” in Y-Dorm, on both second and third watch, but also
that “there’s guys who are scared to talk [to] the administration because
they’re scared of this guy” and then added, “I’m not scared of him. I’m not
scared of none of this.”
Singleton testified that the other staff person he had talked to about
Grogan before he was assaulted was Officer Vang, the first watch officer. He
testified that this happened about two months before the attack, when
Grogan got out of his bunk one night and threatened Officer Vang during a
bed check when everyone else was asleep. Grogan threatened Officer Vang
that he would “f—you up” if Officer Vang ever tried to pull his bedsheets back
again (for the bed check), and Singleton got out of bed and ended up walking
Officer Vang to the door.
Singleton testified that another time, Grogan was ranting and raving
and Singleton got up and tried to calm Grogan down and suggested Grogan
just move to a single cell “because you’re causing too many problems,”
another white inmate got up and tried to calm him down too, and Grogan just
ranted at both of them. Singleton testified this interaction didn’t scare him,

8 Singleton testified he told Sergeant Sweeten about this conversation
with Officer Santos after the fact, after Grogan assaulted him. “So Sweeten
knew about this,” he testified.

17
and “it was nothing to me because I already knew that [Grogan] was a whole
bunch of hot air.”
He testified that the only other inmate that he was aware of who talked
to prison officers about Grogan was a “little white” inmate named Curry that
Grogan would bully; Singleton testified Curry reported the bullying to an
“officer” with whom Curry was very close.
An incomplete portion of Singleton’s deposition testimony was included
in which Singleton testified about an incident the night before Grogan
attacked him. Other inmates backed Singleton up during this interaction,
Grogan said nothing and returned to his bunk, and Grogan said nothing that
led Singleton to think Grogan was going to attack him the next day.
Singleton testified that he told Officer Santos about the incident, telling him
in passing “Hey, Santos, this guy got up late at night, man, tripping again.”
Singleton testified Grogan assaulted him one morning in the dayroom
after Singleton made a comment about a noisy ceiling fan and called Grogan
a “bitch”; Grogan then rushed at him, swinging, and they fell to the ground
tussling. Singleton testified Grogan “went wild,” and Singleton had to
struggle to prevent him from trying to gouge out Singleton’s eye while he was
on top of Singleton. An alarm was sounded, and prison officers intervened
after about three or four minutes and pulled them apart. By this point,
Singleton had been punched in the head and ended up with a black eye and
two teeth knocked out.
Singleton testified the assault caught him off guard; he testified he was
surprised because Grogan was “always walking around, threatening people,”
“just always running his mouth,” and Singleton had thought Grogan was “full
of hot air.” He also testified he had never previously seen Grogan get violent
with anyone in Y-Dorm.

18
 Singleton testified that when Sergeant Sweeten talked to him
afterwards, he told Sweeten he would sign a document indicating he felt safe
to be housed with Grogan “under the guise” that Sweeten would move Grogan
to another housing unit. He signed the document based on that
understanding, “[b]ecause I didn’t want him back in that dorm with me.” But
he testified that Grogan was moved back into the dorm that night,
Singleton’s “alarms went up” and Singleton asked another inmate to “watch
his back” while he tried to sleep. Then after a couple of hours of sleep, he told
the prison guards, “I can’t deal with this. I’m not going to ask somebody to
watch my back while I sleep with this guy still here,” said he didn’t want
Grogan there anymore and said that Sergeant Sweeten had told him he was
going to move Grogan. He testified that “[t]hey ended taking Grogan and
locking him up in ad seg.”
Singleton also testified about the defendants’ various ranks and roles.
Among other details, he testified that Associate Warden Garry was the ADA
associate warden, had a supervisory role over Y-Dorm, would sometimes do
walk-throughs and inspections of Y-Dorm, and had access to the files for all of
the inmates in that dorm.
2. Singleton’s Evidence
In opposing summary judgment, Singleton submitted a five-page
declaration, numerous documentary exhibits and discovery responses, a
complete copy of his own deposition including corrections he had made to it,
and declarations from three other prisoners housed in Y-Dorm. In support of
his own summary judgment filed months earlier, he also submitted a
declaration from a prisoner named Mark Rocha.

19
 Collectively, this evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether
Grogan posed a foreseeable risk of harm to inmates in Y-Dorm, including
Singleton.
Rocha’s declaration, which states that it is based on “first hand
knowledge,” states that when Grogan was previously housed in R1 dorm,
Grogan “would always have problems with other inmates” and was involved
in fights on “multiple occasions” in which he was “always being the aggressor
physically and/or verbally.” Rocha states that he is gay, Hispanic and short
whereas Grogan is large. He recounted that in one of the violent episodes
Grogan started, Grogan became irate when Rocha was passing out food trays
and told Grogan not to stick his dirty hands in the food cart. Grogan directed
profanity at Rocha and called him a “fucking faggot,” whereupon a white co-
worker came to Rocha’s aid. Grogan attacked the coworker and ultimately
“grabbed his metal foot pedal and attacked [the co-worker] with it, striking
him in the head.” Rocha states that the building officer for the dorm
witnessed the incident, and Grogan was placed in Ad/Seg. He also states that
he was told that because Gorgan was an “enemy” to Rocha and the co-worker,
Grogan was supposed to be transferred to another prison for safety and
security reasons. Yet Rocha later learned from Singleton that Grogan had
been placed back into a dorm after getting released from Ad/Seg. He asserts
that “the [prison] Administration knew [Grogan] was violent” because of the
many fights he had in R1 dorm.
Singleton submitted evidence from three other prisoners in Y-Dorm
attesting to Grogan’s threatening behavior in Y-Dorm and their knowledge of
his violent past. All three are physically disabled and confined to a
wheelchair. Each of them stated they had been threatened by Grogan and
had also heard Grogan threatening other inmates in Y-Dorm. In addition,

20
each of them attested that “[m]ost guys in [Y-Dorm] was [sic] afraid of
Grogan because of his threats and knowing that he had beaten another
inmate in the head with a metal object.”
Singleton also introduced a copy of defendant Daniel’s interrogatory
response in which she admitted that Grogan had a prior history of in-cell
violence or violence in a dorm setting. Specifically, she admitted that Grogan
“had been violent on previous occasions.”
Singleton states in his declaration that on November 4, 2021,
approximately 90 days after Grogan had been released from Ad/Seg, he and
Grogan had a “heated argument” because Grogan was threatening some
disabled inmates. This was the incident he testified in deposition had been
his first interaction with Grogan: namely, the cooking incident in which
others had “rallied with” Singleton and Grogan had calmed down and
returned without incident to his own bunk. Singleton states in his
declaration that another inmate reported this incident to staff, and a
“confidential memorandum” was placed in Singelton’s and Grogan’s prison
files about this. Yet nobody ever interviewed Singleton about the incident.
His summary judgment papers included a copy of the notice he had
received about the confidential memorandum. It states that on November 4,
2021, a confidential memorandum had been added to his prison file and
describes the memorandum as “an investigation into potential enemy/safety
concerns.” It further states that “[d]uring the investigation, confidential
information was received alleging you were in a verbal altercation/argument
with another inmate.”
Singleton also states in his declaration that he had spoke “multiple”
times to Officer Santos about Grogan’s threatening behavior as well as to
Officer Vang. He stated he was afraid of Grogan hurting other inmates in Y-

21
Dorm and of receiving a disciplinary report that could affect his own
opportunity for parole. He also stated that during the COVID pandemic, the
prison housed level II, level III and level IV inmates which “was not
consistent with” the custody level requirements for that dorm. He also said
that he signed the compatibility chrono after the assault “because defendant
Sweeten assured me during the interview . . . that he would move inmate
Grogan out of the dorm,” and that the watch commander ended up removing
him from Y-Dorm early the following morning.
3. Analysis
Assuming defendants’ evidence was sufficient to meet defendants’
initial burden as the moving parties to show they did not breach their duty to
protect Singleton because they lacked actual or constructive knowledge that
Grogan posed a danger to Singleton in Y-Dorm, Singleton’s evidence created
triable issues of fact.
First, in opposing summary judgment, Singleton argued that there was
evidence Grogan should not have been housed in Y-Dorm to begin with. As
noted, the defendants asserted in their declarations that Grogan was not
housed inappropriately because an “isolated incident” of prior violence would
not preclude him being housed in Y-Dorm. But those statements do not carry
defendants’ burden to disprove that those prison officials who were
responsible for placing him there rather in a more restrictive setting were not
negligent, because there is no evidence that the prior RI dorm assault was an
isolated instance of violence. On the contrary, there was ample evidence—
including defendant Garry’s interrogatory admission—that it was not.
Regarding who bore responsibility for housing Grogan there, the
defendants all generally disclaimed responsibility for inmate
housing/placement decisions. But Singleton’s evidence created a triable issue

22
of fact as to whether Captain Iannone had a role in placing Grogan back into
Y-Dorm after Grogan was released from Ad/Seg. As noted, Singleton alleges
that after Grogan beat the inmate in RI dorm with a metal foot pedal from a
wheelchair, Grogan appeared before a prison committee on which Captain
Iannone sits (allegedly, either the ICC or UCC), and Iannone “excused”
Grogan from his multiple “violent incidents.” In moving for summary
judgment, Captain Iannone did not deny he sat on either committee but
stated only that “[a]s captain, I did not make classification or housing
decisions for inmates in Unit IV, but I am familiar with the requirements to
house an inmate in Y-Dorm during the time.” Strictly construing his
declaration, it shows only that he alone did not “make [the] classification or
housing decision” to house Grogan in Y-Dorm. His declaration does not
dispute Singleton’s allegation that he participated as a member of the
committee that assigned Grogan to Y-Dorm after the prior violent episodes.
There is also conflicting evidence as to whether Sergeant Sweeten had
a role in Grogan’s placement into Y-Dorm. Sergeant Sweeten stated that
“[a]s a sergeant, I did not determine which inmates would be housed in Y-
Dorm.” But Singleton’s evidence demonstrated that after Grogan assaulted
him, Sweeten promised to rehouse Grogan and that Grogan was moved the
following morning. This creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Sergeant
Sweeten had influence over inmate housing decisions in Y-Dorm even if he
lacked a formal role on the prison classification committee.
But putting aside whether the defendants’ duty to protect Singleton
and other inmates was breached by the decision to house Grogan in Y-Dorm
after Grogan’s release from administration segregation, their duty does not
begin and end with initial housing decisions and can be breached in other
ways. Defendants have a duty to protect inmates from foreseeable harm by a

23
violent inmate, regardless of setting. Thus, regardless of the original
placement decision, defendants had a duty to protect the inmates in Y-Dorm
from Grogan if a foreseeable risk of violence to Y-Dorm inmates materialized
once Grogan was placed into Y-Dorm. And on this record, there is a triable
issue of fact as to whether they breached their duty to protect Singleton
because there is a triable issue of fact as to whether they knew or should
have known Grogan posed a safety risk to inmates in Y-Dorm and, in the face
of that knowledge, failed to investigate and/or take any other measures to
prevent a recurrence of violence.9
First, there is evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the
defendants with oversight responsibility for Unit IV generally (Captain
Iannone) or Y-Dorm in particular (Footeman, Daniel and Sergeant Sweeten),
including safety concerns, knew or should have known about Grogan’s
fighting and violent beating of another inmate in R1 Dorm with the metal
foot pedal of a wheelchair. None of the defendants denied knowing about this
incident or the fact that it resulted in Grogan getting placed into
administrative segregation, and Singleton specifically alleges that
Sergeant Sweeten and Lieutenant Footeman took custody of Grogan when
Grogan was released from administrative segregation following this incident.
Further, Rocha’s declaration states that the building officer for R1 Dorm

9 In analyzing this question, we focus not on whether there is evidence
Grogan posed a foreseeable risk of harm to Singleton in particular but to
inmates in Y-Dorm generally. Their duty was to protect all of the inmates in
Y-Dorm from the risks that Grogan posed, not just Singleton. Furthermore,
given the dorm setting in which they lived, and the fact that Y-Dorm was a
specialized unit intended to house disabled inmates, a jury could conclude
that the only viable way to protect all of the Y-Dorm inmates from Grogan’s
threatening behavior would have been to re-house Grogan (as had been done
several times before) rather than re-house particular inmates he had
specifically threatened.

24
witnessed the assault and that Grogan was placed into administrative
segregation as a result. The fact that the incident resulted in administrative
segregation creates an inference that it was a serious incidence of violence
and that prison officials were aware of it.10 Further, according to Rocha this
was not an isolated incident because Grogan had been the aggressor in
multiple fights in R1 Dorm in which he was always the aggressor, and at
least some of the time, his aggression was physical. The three Y-Dorm
inmates who submitted declarations all stated that “most” Y-Dorm inmates
were afraid of Grogan, in part because they knew “that he had beaten
another inmate in the head with a metal object.” Those declarations create a
reasonable inference that Grogan’s violent tendencies were widely known
among the prison population.
Singleton also states in his declaration opposing summary judgment,
based on his experience “[a]s a[n] experienced prisoner who has worked as a
program clerk,” that “every administrative staff on each watch [unit] must be
made aware of issues involving the safety and security of issues involving the
safety and security of the prison.” It is thus reasonable to infer that every
defendant who worked in Unit IV or Y-Dorm was, or should have been,

10 The incident would have been reported. Prison regulations state
that “When incarcerated persons fight, the participants must be separated at
once. The participants will be placed in detention, unless in the judgment of
a superior officer circumstances do not warrant such action. Employees who
observe the fight will prepare a written report stating clearly everything they
observed, and will submit this report to the disciplinary officer. The
employee who renders the report should, if possible, state who was the
aggressor. The report will include the time, place, names of participants,
name(s) of aggressor(s), the reason for the fight if it can be ascertained,
weapons used if any, names of witnesses, action taken if any, and
recommendations to prevent further recurrences.” (15 Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 15, § 3286,)

25
familiar with Grogan’s disciplinary history when Grogan was moved from
administrative segregation into Y-Dorm.
All of this evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the
defendants were on actual or constructive notice from the moment that
Grogan was moved into Y-Dorm that Grogan was a violent inmate prone to
acts of aggression towards other inmates. But there is more.
Singleton introduced evidence of the heated argument he had with
Grogan over the cooking incident months before the assault, and evidence
that a confidential memorandum was placed into his (and Grogan’s) prison
file about this reflecting “an investigation into potential enemy/safety
concerns” and stating that “[d]uring the investigation, confidential
information was received alleging you were in a verbal altercation/argument
with another inmate.” Combined with Singleton’s statement that “every
administrative staff on each watch [unit] must be made aware of issues
involving the safety and security of the prison,” this evidence creates an
inference that prison officials were aware that, after Grogan began living in
Y-Dorm, he continued to act in a threatening manner towards inmates with
whom he was housed, and that there was tension between Grogan and
Singleton about those threats. Singleton’s evidence also showed that he
spoke to Officer Santos on multiple occasions about Grogan and once to
Officer Vang, and that about two months before Grogan attacked him,
Grogan also threatened Officer Vang during a bed check. But according to
Singleton, nobody ever interviewed Singleton about the altercation that
resulted in a “potential enemy/safety concerns” memorandum being placed
into Singleton’s file. It is reasonable to infer that had they done so, the
officials charged with ensuring the safety of Y-Dorm inmates would have
learned even more information about the nature and extent of Grogan’s

26
threatening behavior and the extent to which the Y-Dorm inmates,
collectively, viewed it as a serious problem.11
Finally, according to a declaration attached to Singleton’s complaint by
a Y-Dorm inmate named Andre Baldwin, Grogan was a “large, burly
Caucasian [inmate] who was bigger than everyone in the dorm” and who
threatened a lot of the inmates in Y-Dorm who were disabled. The rules
violation report about the August 2, 2002 assault, also attached to the
complaint, notes that responding prison guards encountered Grogan with his
“large framed body” lying on top of Singleton and his arms wrapped
completely around Singleton’s upper torso.
In short, liberally construing Singleton’s evidence and strictly
construing defendants’ evidence, there is evidence that Grogan was a large,
burly inmate who had previously threatened and fought numerous times
with residents of R1 dorm, hit one inmate in the head with the metal pedal of
a wheelchair, was disciplined for that by being placed in administrative
segregation, was subsequently moved to Y-Dorm where many physically
disabled inmates were housed, and a few months after that began acting
belligerently towards the inmates in that dorm as well (as well as one
correctional officer). Each of the defendants denied in very conclusory
language knowing that Grogan posed a risk to Singleton, or to any other
inmate, but at most their declarations simply create a triable issue of fact as
to what each of them knew, what they were told, and whether the risk of
violence towards Singleton or any other inmate in Y-Dorm was foreseeable.

11 Defendants also conceded in their declarations that had they learned
that Grogan had been exhibiting any threatening behavior toward inmates or
staff, it would have immediately resulted in Grogan being separated from the
rest of the inmates pending an assessment of whether he could continue to be
safely housed in Y-Dorm.

27
Because Singleton is the party opposing summary judgment and we must
liberally construe his evidence, the question whether Grogan posed a
foreseeable risk of violence in Y-Dorm is a factual issue that on this record
cannot be determined as a matter of law.
In reaching this conclusion we recognize there is evidence, particularly
Singleton’s own deposition testimony, that Singleton was not personally
afraid of Grogan before Grogan attacked him and they were not documented
enemies.12 Although such evidence is relevant in assessing whether prison
officials knew or should have known Grogan posed a foreseeable risk of
violence, it does not demonstrate as a matter of law the risk was not
foreseeable under all of the circumstances. For example, a factfinder might
reasonably conclude that Singleton had an overinflated sense of personal
safety, and/or that his subjective perception of his own risk was simply
inaccurate (clearly, it was). The question of foreseeability turns on what
defendants knew or should have known about Grogan’s propensity for
violence in a dorm setting. There is evidence that Grogan had a history of
prior violence, word of his violence in R1 Dorm had spread among the prison
population, many other inmates in Y-Dorm were afraid of him, his
threatening behavior in Y-Dorm was serious enough that the inmates banded
together to try to get him moved out, Singleton himself reported Grogan’s
behavior in Y-Dorm to two prison guards who reasonably could be expected to
report that information up the chain of command, and that Singleton had
come to the aid and protection of one of them (Vang) during a tense
confrontation with Grogan. Whether Singleton was personally afraid of

12Singleton later retracted some of his deposition testimony that he
was not afraid of Grogan in corrections to his deposition that were not
explained.

28
Grogan is not legally dispositive as to whether it was foreseeable Grogan
might try to attack Singleton.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment.13
II.
Singleton’s Right of Access to the Courts
An indigent prisoner who files a bona fide civil lawsuit has a right to
meaningful access to the courts. (Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
786, 792 (Wantuch); accord, Jameson v. Desta (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 672,
678; Apollo v. Gyaami (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1482-1483 (Apollo);
Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 459 (Smith).) This right is
statutory; Penal Code section 2601, subdivision (d) provides that state
prisoners have the right to initiate civil actions. That right also has
constitutional underpinnings; the statute codifies the constitutional right our
Supreme Court has recognized for indigent prisoners who are defendants in
civil suits to meaningful court access. (Hulbert v. Cross (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 405, 413 (Hulbert) [for incarcerated plaintiffs Pen. Code,
§ 2601, subd. (d) “codifies” constitutional right of court access]; Smith, at
p. 465 [identifying state and federal constitutions as sources of such right in
addition to Pen. Code, § 2601]; see also, e.g., Wantuch, 32 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 792-794 [applying constitutional standards to implement statutory right
of access for incarcerated plaintiffs under Pen. Code, § 2601]; Apollo, at

13 Singleton filed a request asking us to take judicial notice of prison

records that he says reflect an altercation involving Grogan that took place in
May 2026, several years after the alleged assault at issue here. We took the
request under submission and now deny it. Such evidence was not before the
trial court and no exceptional circumstances have been shown warranting our
consideration of that material. Furthermore, such evidence is not directly
relevant to the issues we address on appeal. (See Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 745-746.)

29
pp. 1483-1484 [same]; see generally Yarbrough v. Superior Court (1985)
39 Cal.3d 197, 200-201, 203-205 (Yarbrough) [recognizing constitutional right
of access for indigent incarcerated defendants]; Payne v. Superior Court
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 908 (Payne) [same].)
Appointment of counsel may be the only way to protect an indigent
prisoner’s right of access to the courts in some circumstances, but this
method is a “last alternative.” (Yarbrough, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 200; see
also Payne, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 923.) “[T]he trial court must determine
that counsel will be helpful to the prisoner under the circumstances of the
case.” (Yarbrough, at p. 205.) Ultimately, how to protect such a prisoner’s
right of access to the courts is a matter left to the court’s discretion. (See
Payne, at p. 927.)
“ ‘The exercise of a trial court’s discretion is guided by a three-step
inquiry . . . . First, the trial court determines whether the prisoner is
indigent. Second, the court determines whether the lawsuit involves a bona
fide threat to the inmate’s personal or property interests. If both conditions
are satisfied, the trial court must consider the measures available to protect
[the inmate’s] right of meaningful access to the courts, including the
appointment of counsel.” (Smith, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 458, italics
added; accord, Crane v. Dolihite (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 772, 783; Hulbert,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 414; see also Wantuch, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 795-796.)
“In deciding the appropriate measure or measures to assure access, the
relevant circumstances include, without limitation, the practicality and
effectiveness of the various measures available to protect the right of access
to the courts.” (Smith, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.) The trial court
should consider factors such as “the nature of the action, the potential effect

30
on the prisoner’s property, the necessity for the prisoner’s presence, the
prisoner’s role in the action, the prisoner’s literacy, intelligence and
competence to represent himself or herself, the stage of the proceedings, the
access of the prisoner to a law library and legal materials, the length of the
sentence, the feasibility of transferring the prisoner to court and the cost and
inconvenience to the prison and judicial system.” (Wantuch, supra,
32 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) Measures to consider include: (1) deferring the
action until the prisoner is released14; (2) appointing counsel; (3) transferring
the prisoner to court; (4) using depositions in lieu of personal appearances; (5)
conducting proceedings by telephone, closed circuit television or other modern
electric media; and (6) “implementation of other innovative, imaginative
procedures.” (Apollo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483; Wantuch, at pp. 792-
794, 796; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.672 [remote court appearances
and trials], 3.1010 [depositions by remote electronic means].)
Although a trial court has discretion to choose from among potential
measures when the first two criteria are satisfied (i.e., indigency and a bona
fide legal claim), it cannot do nothing. “[A] trial court does not have
discretion to choose no remedy in cases where the prisoner’s civil action is
bona fide and his or her access to the courts is being impeded.” (Apollo,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1484.) Furthermore, “ ‘the trial court must
make sure that whatever method is utilized actually provides meaningful
access.’ ” (Park v. Guisti (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 197, 205 (Park).) Although
appointing counsel is the choice of last resort, in some cases it “may be the
only remedy available.” (Apollo, at p. 1484.)

14 Postponement of proceedings “is not a reasonable alternative when
the plaintiff may suffer substantial prejudice.” (Yarbrough, supra, 39 Cal.3d
at p. 206.)

31
 “Absent a truly adversary hearing” in which a prisoner’s request for
counsel is opposed, “[t]he burden is on the trial court . . . to recognize and
adhere to the guidelines” for ensuring meaningful access. (Yarbrough, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 201; accord, Apollo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487 [courts
“have an obligation to ensure [that prison] walls do not stand in the way of
affording litigants with bona fide claims the opportunity to be heard”].) “[I]t
is critically important . . . that courts promptly identify and address these
requests by indigent inmates for access.” (J.S. v. D.A. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
891, 894.)
Because we are reversing the summary judgment ruling on the merits,
it is unnecessary to address Singleton’s arguments that the trial court erred
in denying his requests for appointment of counsel. We note, however, that
the trial court issued an order on July 25, 2023, finding both that Singleton is
indigent and that he has a legitimate legal claim (and we ourselves, in
reversing summary judgment, conclude the same), thereby satisfying the first
two criteria of the three-part inquiry. And we note our concern that his
filings throughout the course of the case documented numerous ways that his
ability to prosecute this case was indeed impeded due to the constraints he
faced in prison. We encourage the court to consider this issue on remand and
fashion an appropriate remedy or remedies to protect his right of access to
the courts.
In particular (and without limitation), we are concerned that in one of
Singlton’s filings, a motion to amend the complaint filed on January 16, 2024,
he alerted the court that he had been unable to hire a lawyer due to recurring
difficulties with his prison mail. His motion sought leave to add the prison
warden as a defendant and to add a cause of action for “breach of
confidentiality,” alleging defendants interfered with his ability to

32
communicate with both the court and an attorney named Andre Bollinger
through a pattern of systematically opening his legal mail from the court and
confidential legal mail from the attorney and/or failing to deliver his legal
mail to him. Singleton’s proposed amendment alleged that only when he
“advised that counsel would be representing [him] did the breach seriously
beg[in].” The motion sought to amend the complaint and also asked the court
to appoint counsel for Singleton to redress the legal mail situation so that an
attorney could meet with him at the prison to hand-deliver sensitive,
confidential documents to him.
According to Singleton’s statements under oath in support of that
motion,15 “I diligently sought counsel to represent me in this matter, as the
Presiding Judge recommended. Andre R. Bollinger, attorney from San Diego,
California, I found and decided to take the case. Three times he forwarded
me the contract between October 2023 and November 2023. I did not receive
the first two contracts and on November 22, 2023, I received the third
contract that was opened without my signature. This letter and [a] letter
from Solano Superior Court was [sic] opened and sitting in my cell. These
two (2) letters was [sic] not even registered as my CDCR 119. Just the two
missing contracts. [¶] On December 20, 2023, Andre R. Bollinger and I spoke
on the phone and he advised me that he could no longer represent me in this
case; that he attempted three times to get me the contract to sign and return
and that he still has not received the contract I placed in the mail on
November 24, 2023. Because the defendants and defendants counsel have
failed to correct this pattern of breaching my legal confidentiality, my efforts
to prosecute the case has been [sic] chilled and I am unable to complete the

15 His entire motion discussing the details was verified, and he also
filed a supporting, sworn declaration.

33
task of providing evidence showing liability of the defendants.” He stated
that “defendants . . . have opened up my mail numerous times outside of my
presence,” speculated that they “no doubt copied the documents,” stated that
they “failed to deliver the documents, and even given my mail to other
inmates.” His declaration attached copies of the two opened envelopes.
One of the attachments to his declaration was yet another declaration
with further specifics, including details of his efforts to get the mail situation
resolved. He also stated in that other declaration that there was no record on
the prison mailroom’s log of incoming and outgoing mail of the two pieces of
legal correspondence that had been delivered to him opened up. In
subsequent filings on February 26, 2024, he again recounted the history of
his difficulties corresponding with the court and with a potential lawyer.
Although we express no opinion as to what in the court’s discretion should
have been done to address these concerns, it does not appear appropriate to
have done nothing to address whether appointing a lawyer would be “helpful
to the prisoner under the circumstances” (Yarbrough, supra, 39 Cal.3d at
p. 205; see id. at p. 207) in light of Singleton’s frustrated attempt to find a
lawyer on his own.16 (See Apollo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1484.)
We also note that Singleton asked for the appointment of a lawyer in
connection with two significant discovery issues.
First, on September 11, 2023, he filed an ex parte motion asking for
appointment of a lawyer, principally citing “the complexities of evidence
(admissible) being withheld in discovery.” This pertained to his efforts to

16 It is difficult to envision any effective measure to address the
interference with Singleton’s inability to hire a lawyer on his own to help him
prosecute this case other than to order that one be appointed. Nonetheless,
we will not prejudge that question and leave it to the trial court in the first
instance to consider.

34
seek discovery of Grogan’s prison file: Singleton said that he had filed a
motion to compel discovery of Grogan’s prison file, because defendants had
opposed production of it on the ground that Grogan’s file contained
confidential information that posed a threat to prison security. “Because
plaintiff is unable to review these documents,” he wrote, “it is clear that
counsel, who is a ‘officer of the court,’ can review these records to gather the
needed information and evidence . . . .”
Subsequently, Singleton asked the court again for a lawyer in
connection with his efforts to obtain discovery of the confidential
memorandum placed into his prison file about his altercation with Grogan
months before the assault. He did this in a filing on June 14, 2024, in an ex
parte motion “for in camera review” of the November 4, 2021 confidential
memorandum under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, governing
motions to compel discovery. His motion was supported by a declaration
detailing his discovery of this information, explaining its potential relevance
and discussing his efforts to meet and confer with defense counsel to no
avail.17 He stated in his declaration that he believed the November 4, 2021
memorandum pertains to an argument he had with Grogan, because “Grogan
is the only inmate I have ever argued with because of his bullying the infirm
prisoners in ‘Y’ dorm.” He argued the evidence was relevant to prove
defendants had prior knowledge of Grogan’s violent propensities and also

17 In discovery almost a year earlier, Singleton had sought production
of documents relating to Grogan’s known dangerous propensities.
Specifically, he had asked for all documents relating to Grogan’s “disciplinary
behavior specifically as it relates to violent and/or assaultive behavior” on or
before the date of the assault. ) Defendants had responded in June 2023,
identifying only three rule violation reports in Grogan’s own central file
which they objected to producing on the basis of the official information
privilege and “third party privacy rights.”

35
failed to follow proper procedures in housing Grogan. His declaration stated
that in camera review of the document would enable the court to see the
evidence that he believed was relevant. In the concluding paragraph of his
supporting declaration, he once again asked for the appointment of an
attorney in connection with “this particular motion due to the alleged
confidential material that may pose a threat to institutional security, and to
safeguard my rights to prosecute this case fully and to be able to obtain the
relevant evidence needed.”
Thereafter, on January 24, 2025, while the summary judgment motion
was pending, Singleton submitted a “Motion To Reconsider Request For In
Camera Review of Memorandum in Question.” His reconsideration motion
incorporated his earlier ex parte motion by reference (identifying it by
description and filing date, accompanied by the parenthetical notation,
“Judicial Notice of Pleadings filed on 6/14/24”) and argued he had “attempted
to follow the procedures and was not given the opportunity to argue the
relevance of this evidence,” which he said was “key” to proving that
defendants were aware of Grogan’s potential danger to him. The motion
bears a clerk’s stamp indicating it was received by the court on January 24,
2025, but the motion is not listed in the register of actions nor does the
register of actions indicate any ruling on it. Thus, it appears his
reconsideration motion was not docketed.
With regard to these discovery concerns, Hulbert, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th 405 is analogous. In that case, a prisoner filed a medical
malpractice case, and the trial court denied his request to appoint counsel
and for a medical expert. On appeal, the prisoner argued the court erred in
denying his request for appointed counsel because the lawsuit involved
complexities beyond his ability to address, including the ability to procure a

36
medical expert which is something appointed counsel could do. (Id. at
pp. 417-418.) The appellate court reversed the denial of his request for the
appointment of counsel both because the court’s ruling was confusing and
also because “we cannot conclude that the trial court properly considered the
necessity of legal counsel because the trial court . . . did not consider the need
for legal counsel in connection with the need for a medical expert . . . .” (Id.
at pp. 418, 419.) The same appears to be true here. A lawyer might not have
been the only appropriate remedy to consider in the circumstances of the
discovery issues in this case; for example, appointing an investigator or
utilizing other supports might also have been considered. But Singleton’s
request for help in navigating these obstacles to discovery that resulted
principally and uniquely from his incarcerated status does not appear to have
received meaningful consideration.
We encourage the court to address these issues on remand, re-open
discovery and adopt measures that are appropriate in its discretion to ensure
Singelton has meaningful access to the courts.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Appellant
shall recover his costs.

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 STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

Singleton v. Iannone et al.(A173531)

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