Filed 9/21/26 Williamson v. IE Storm Tech Leasing, Inc. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT WILLIAMSON et al., B349616

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV18855)

IE STORM TECH LEASING,
LLC, et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed.
Whitcomb Selinsky, Joseph A. Whitcomb and A. Ari
Aramesh for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Ferris & Britton and Michael R. Weinstein for Defendants
and Respondents IE Storm Tech Leasing, LLC, JC Yeh, and
Cindy Guofang Chang.
 Jassy Vick Carolan, William T. Um, Jordyn Ostroff and
Amanda A. Harris for Defendants and Respondents Steven Lee
and Bank of Hope.
_______________________________

Plaintiffs and Appellants, Robert Williamson and
Christopher Scott Yenzer, appeal from a judgment dismissing
this action for Plaintiffs’ failure to bring it to trial within five
years pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and
583.360.1 The five-year deadline expired on May 18, 2025. After
that date, Defendants and Respondents Lee and Bank of Hope
(the Lee Defendants) and Defendants and Respondents IE Storm
Tech Leasing, LLC, JC Yeh, and Cindy Guo Fan Chang (the
IEST Defendants) filed motions to dismiss. In granting the
motions, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that (1)
section 583.340, subdivision (c), tolled the deadline for a period
during which Plaintiffs argued bringing the action to trial was
impossible, impracticable, or futile; (2) the parties extended the
deadline by oral agreement pursuant to section 583.330,
subdivision (b); and (3) Defendants’ litigation conduct equitably
estopped them from seeking dismissal. Plaintiffs renew those
arguments on appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On May 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Defendants and others, including Innerline Engineering, Inc.
(Innerline). Plaintiffs concede that absent tolling or extension,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.

2
the five-year deadline to bring the action to trial expired on May
18, 2025.2
On April 1, 2021, Defendants filed notice of an automatic
stay based on a bankruptcy petition filed by Innerline. Days
later, on April 9, Defendants filed notice that the bankruptcy
court had dismissed Innerline’s petition and vacated the stay.
On April 15, 2021, by email, Plaintiffs’ counsel warned the
attorney then representing Defendants that Plaintiffs would
seek Defendants’ default if they did not timely answer the
complaint. The email cited case law for the proposition that
Innerline’s bankruptcy petition had not prevented Plaintiffs
from prosecuting the action against Defendants, and
parenthetically described one case as upholding a dismissal of an
action against a defendant for failure to bring it to trial within
the five-year deadline (notwithstanding a stay as to a separate
defendant). The email did not otherwise mention the five-year
deadline.
In July 2021, the trial court set an initial trial date in
October 2022. On August 24, 2021, Defendants filed notice of a
second stay—as to Innerline only—based on a second
bankruptcy petition filed by Innerline.
In June 2022, the trial court vacated the October 2022
trial date. One year later, the court set a new trial date of
October 28, 2024.

2 Because Plaintiffs filed the complaint after April 6, 2020,

COVID-19 emergency rules did not extend the five-year
deadline. (Cal. Rules of Court, appen. I, emergency rule 10(a)
[extending deadline by six months in civil actions filed “on or
before April 6, 2020”].)

3
 In June 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Defendants’
counsel and stated: “Plaintiffs will be filing a Motion to
Continue the trial. With multiple Defendants and a significant
amount of remaining discovery and depositions, it is apparent
that additional time is needed to continue with and finalize
discovery, as well as, address any disputed issues.” Defense
counsel indicated Defendants had no objection to Plaintiffs’
proposed trial continuance.
In July 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel circulated a proposed
stipulated order to continue trial, which stated “the parties need
additional time to prepare the case for trial” and “a trial date
before March 10, 2025 is unamenable [sic].” The proposed
stipulated order identified March 10, 2025, as the “earliest”
acceptable trial date. It did not identify any latest acceptable
date or address the May 18, 2025 deadline to bring the action to
trial. The parties did not file the proposed stipulated order.
On August 5, 2024, at a case management conference,
Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that the parties had
communicated regarding a trial continuance and that discovery,
including depositions, remained pending. “After conferring with
the parties,” the trial court vacated the October 28, 2024 trial
date on its own motion and scheduled a trial-setting conference
on that date. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer
regarding a discovery plan and to file a joint report before the
trial-setting conference.3

3 Citing a declaration from attorney Joseph Whitcomb,

Plaintiffs assert they announced ready for trial on August 5,
2024. The court’s August 5, 2024 minute order, however, does
not mention either Whitcomb’s appearance or that Plaintiffs

4
 On October 18, 2024, new defense counsel substituted in
for the Lee Defendants. The same day, Plaintiffs’ counsel
circulated a proposed pretrial scheduling order that contained
blank spaces for various pretrial dates. The proposed order did
not address the trial date or the May 18, 2025 deadline to bring
the action to trial. On October 21, 2024, Defendants approved
the proposed order’s form. The parties did not file the proposed
order.
On October 28, 2024, the parties appeared at the trial-
setting conference. According to the minute order, the Lee
Defendants’ counsel “indicate[d] that he . . . may be filing a
motion for summary judgment.” The minute order further states
that “[a]fter conferring with the parties,” the trial court set a
trial date of September 29, 2025. A settled statement
subsequently certified by the trial court similarly states that on
October 28, 2024: “The Court was informed . . . [the Lee
Defendants’ counsel] may be filing a motion for summary
judgment. After conferring with the parties, the Court set . . . a
ten day Jury Trial for September 29, 2025.”4
As noted, May 18, 2025 was the last day to bring the
action to trial. On July 30, 2025 (about 2.5 months after the

announced ready for trial. The record contains no declaration
from the attorney who did appear for Plaintiffs on that date,
Danyelle Semjonovs. Semjonovs had recently circulated the
proposed stipulated order to continue trial that, as noted,
indicated the parties needed additional time to prepare for trial.
4 Plaintiffs purport to quote the settled statement as

stating: “Counsel for all parties either affirmatively assented [to
the September 29, 2025 trial date] or registered no objection.”
That language does not appear in the settled statement.

5
deadline expired), the Lee Defendants moved to dismiss the
action pursuant to sections 583.310 and 583.360. Days later, the
IEST Defendants separately moved for dismissal.
The Lee Defendants’ attorney declared that when he
substituted into the case in October 2024, “other counsel
mentioned that the proceedings had been stayed due to
Innerline’s bankruptcy proceedings, but it was not until later
that [he] learned the stay that began on August 24, 2021 was as
to Innerline only.”5 The Lee Defendants’ attorney further
declared that after Plaintiffs began taking their first depositions
in July 2025, he discovered that the five-year deadline had
expired and immediately communicated his intent to move for
dismissal to all parties. The IEST Defendants’ attorney declared
that until he received that communication, he had erroneously
believed that a COVID-19 emergency rule extended the five-year
deadline by six months.
In opposition to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs argued
that during the October 28, 2024 trial-setting conference, the
parties orally agreed to the post-deadline trial date of September
29, 2025, thereby extending the deadline to that date pursuant
to section 583.330, subdivision (b). Further, Plaintiffs argued
that section 583.340, subdivision (c), tolled the five-year deadline
for an unspecified period because at the trial-setting conference,
the trial court presented September 29, 2025, as the earliest

5 If Innerline’s bankruptcy petition had stayed the action

as to all parties (as the Lee Defendants’ counsel had erroneously
believed), the stay would have tolled the five-year deadline as to
all parties pursuant to section 583.340, subdivision (b).
Plaintiffs do not argue the stay tolled the deadline as to all
parties.

6
available date, making bringing the action to trial before that
date impossible, impracticable, or futile. Finally, Plaintiffs
argued Defendants’ conduct equitably estopped Defendants from
seeking dismissal because the Lee Defendants’ attorney
indicated during the trial-setting conference that he might file a
motion for summary judgment, and because Defendants
thereafter continued participating in discovery.
The trial court heard and granted Defendants’ motions to
dismiss. The court concluded the minute order from the October
28, 2024 trial-setting conference did not show that the parties
orally agreed to extend the May 18, 2025 deadline pursuant to
section 583.330, subdivision (b) (the court had no occasion to
address the settled statement because Plaintiffs had not yet
asked the court to certify it).
Further, the trial court found that its setting of the
September 29, 2025 trial date at the October 28, 2024 trial-
setting conference did not make bringing the action to trial
within the May 18, 2025 deadline impossible, impracticable, or
futile. The court observed that “there are procedures a plaintiff
may invoke in order to avoid a five-year dismissal,” which
procedures include moving to advance a post-deadline trial date
to a date within the deadline. Plaintiffs made no such motion.
Finally, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that
Defendants’ conduct equitably estopped them from seeking
dismissal, reasoning: “[T]he record does not indicate that any of
the Defendants selected or requested the September 29, 2025
trial date, or that any of the Defendants affirmatively accepted
the date. . . . [T]he indication [on October 24, 2024] by the then-
newly retained counsel for Defendants Bank of Hope and Lee
that he was considering a motion for summary judgment . . .

7
does not provide a basis for estoppel: as of October 24, 2024, a
motion for summary judgment on full statutory notice could
have been heard well in advance of May 18, 202[5]. Moreover,
Defendants I.E. Storm Tech, Chang, and Yeh did not state any
intention to bring further motions. With regard to Defendants’
participation in discovery, including their service of new
discovery, such litigation activity does not operate to estop
Defendants from seeking dismissal.” (Fn. omitted.)
The trial court signed an order dismissing the action
pursuant to section 583.360, which is an appealable judgment.
(§ 581d.) Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. The trial court acted within its discretion by finding
that bringing the action to trial within the May 18,
2025 deadline was not impossible, impracticable, or
futile.
“In computing the time within which an action must be
brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded
the time during which any of the following conditions existed: [¶]
(a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended.
[¶] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined.
[¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was
impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340.)
Plaintiffs concede that absent tolling or extension, the five-
year deadline to bring the action to trial expired on May 18,
2025. Plaintiffs argue the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to toll the deadline pursuant to section 583.340,
subdivision (c), by the period of time between August 5, 2024
(when the trial court vacated the October 28, 2024 trial date and

8
scheduled a trial-setting conference on that date) and September
29, 2025 (the new, post-deadline trial date that the court set at
the trial-setting conference, without objection). Plaintiffs argue
bringing the action to trial was impracticable during this period
because on August 5, 2024, the trial court vacated the trial date
on its own motion, and because at the time of the trial-setting
conference on October 28, 2024, the court’s next available date
for trial was September 29, 2025.
“We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s
determination not to exclude periods during which plaintiffs
contend it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring the
action to trial within the meaning of section 583.340, subdivision
(c).” (Martinez v. Landry’s Restaurants, Inc. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 783, 794, citing Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins.
Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100 & fn. 8. (Gaines).) “Under that
standard, ‘[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if
arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Gaines, at p. 1100.) “ ‘The question
of impossibility, impracticability, or futility is best resolved by
the trial court, which “is in the most advantageous position to
evaluate these diverse factual matters in the first instance.” ’ ”
(Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1105 [“Our holding affords due deference
to the trial court’s unique ability to determine, based on all of
the facts before it, that [a plaintiff] did not demonstrate a
circumstance of impossibility, impracticability, or futility”].)
“ ‘ “The critical factor in applying [the impossibility,
impracticability, and futility] exceptions to a given factual
situation is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence
in prosecuting his or her case.” ’ ” (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at

9
p. 1100.) “ ‘[T]here must be “a period of impossibility,
impracticability or futility, over which plaintiff had no control,” ’
because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable delay.” (Id.
at p. 1102, original italics.) “ ‘A plaintiff has an obligation to
monitor the case in the trial court, to keep track of relevant
dates, and to determine whether any filing, scheduling, or
calendaring errors have occurred.’ ” (Id. at p. 1104, quoting
Jordan v. Superstar Sandcars (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1416,
1422 (Jordan).) “This obligation of diligence increases as the
five-year deadline approaches.” (Jordan, at p. 1422.)
Here, we conclude the trial court acted within its
discretion by finding it was not impossible, impracticable, or
futile for Plaintiffs to bring the action to trial between August 5,
2024, and the May 18, 2025 deadline, because during that
period, Plaintiffs had means, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, to bring the action to trial within the deadline.
First, Plaintiffs could have brought the action to trial
within the May 18, 2025 deadline by objecting, on August 5,
2024 (9.5 months before the deadline), to the trial court’s vacatur
of the October 28, 2024 trial date and asking the court to instead
continue trial to a date within the deadline. Although the trial
court vacated the trial date on its own motion, the record
suggests the court did so to accommodate the parties’ interests.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel had recently circulated a proposed
stipulated order to continue trial based on the parties’ need for
additional trial preparation. Nothing in the record establishes
that on August 5, 2024, the trial court’s courtroom was
unavailable between October 28, 2024, and the deadline. The
trial court presumably would have continued trial to a date
within the deadline (rather than vacating the trial date) if

10
Plaintiffs had objected to the vacatur and brought the deadline
to the court’s attention.
Second, during the 9.5 months between the August 5, 2024
vacatur of the trial date and the May 18, 2025 deadline,
Plaintiffs could have brought the action to trial within the
deadline by moving to specially set or advance trial. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1335.) “[C]ase law establishes
that ‘ “ ‘[w]here a plaintiff possesses the means to bring a matter
to trial before the expiration of the [mandatory dismissal] period
by filing a motion to specially set the matter for trial, plaintiff’s
failure to bring such motion will preclude a later claim of
impossibility or impracticability.’ ” ’ ” (Fidelity National Home
Warranty Co. Cases (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 812, 853 (Fidelity)
[collecting cases], original italics; see also id. at pp. 852-855 [trial
court acted within its discretion by finding its setting post-
deadline trial date did not make bringing action to trial within
deadline impracticable, because plaintiffs did not object to post-
deadline date or move to advance trial].)
Plaintiffs argue a motion to specially set or advance trial
would have been futile because on October 28, 2024 (more than
six months before the May 18, 2025 deadline), the trial court
identified September 29, 2025, as the next available date for
trial. At that time, however, Plaintiffs had not brought the
deadline to the court’s attention. Plaintiffs’ duty of reasonable
diligence required them to do so. (See Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th
at p. 1104; Wale v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 129, 133
(Wale) [“ ‘[A]ll plaintiffs are under a continuing duty to correctly
compute the statutory five years and to advise the court of the
impending deadline.’ [Citation.] Negligently keeping the date a

11
secret from the court cannot excuse compliance [with the five-
year statute]”].)
Had Plaintiffs brought the deadline to the trial court’s
attention by moving to specially set or advance trial, the court
presumably would have set the matter for trial within the
deadline, even if doing so required the court to order a
continuance in another case. (See De Santiago v. D & G
Plumbing, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 365, 374 (De Santiago)
[“[Plaintiff-intervenor] had a duty to bring to the trial court’s
attention the fact that the trial court set the trial for a date after
expiration of the five-year period, and object. Upon becoming
aware of the impending expiration of the five-year period, the
trial court in all likelihood would have given the case priority for
the purpose of trying the case before the five-year period
expired”]; Jordan, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422 [“Plaintiffs
failed to establish that, had they been reasonably diligent and
requested their case be tried before the five-year period ran . . . ,
their case would not have been tried”].)
Without having brought the deadline to the trial court’s
attention, Plaintiffs were not entitled to assume the court would
deny a motion to specially set or advance trial on the ground of
courtroom unavailability. Because they made no such motion,
the trial court acted within its discretion by rejecting their claim
that bringing the action to trial within the deadline was
impossible, impracticable, or futile. (See Wale, supra, 206
Cal.App.3d at pp. 131, 133 [where trial court set post-deadline
trial date, plaintiff requested earlier date without bringing five-
year deadline to court’s attention, and “the clerk stated that no
earlier date was available,” plaintiff “was not entitled to assume

12
that a motion to specially set would have been futile,” and “[h]is
failure to so move was fatal”].)
Plaintiffs argue they brought the five-year deadline to the
trial court’s attention in April 2021. They rely on their counsel’s
April 2021 email to the attorney then representing Defendants,
which email cited authority to explain that Innerline’s
bankruptcy did not extend the time for Defendants to answer the
complaint, and parenthetically described one case as upholding a
dismissal under the five-year statute. Nothing in the record,
however, indicates the trial court received that email. In any
event, the email did not mention the May 18, 2025 deadline, and
Plaintiffs sent the email more than three years before the trial
court vacated the October 28, 2024 trial date. We conclude the
email did not satisfy Plaintiffs’ duty of reasonable diligence to
bring the deadline to the trial court’s attention during the 9.5
months between the August 5, 2024 vacatur of the trial date and
the May 18, 2025 deadline.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Coe v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 88 and Goers v. Superior Court (1976) 57
Cal.App.3d 72 is misplaced. In Coe, the trial court “knowingly”
continued trial to a date beyond the five-year deadline—
“apparently making a conscious choice at that time that this
matter would be dismissed”—and subsequently denied, for “no
good reason,” the plaintiffs’ two applications to advance trial.
(Coe, at p. 92, italics added.) In Goers, the trial court continued
a timely trial date because no courtroom or judge was available,
and although the parties agreed to extend the deadline beyond
the new trial date (apparently bringing the deadline to the trial
court’s attention), additional court-ordered continuances due to
court congestion made it impossible to bring the action to trial

13
within the extended deadline. (Goers, at pp. 74-75.) Here, in
contrast, Plaintiffs never brought the five-year deadline to the
trial court’s attention, did not object when the court vacated the
October 28, 2024 trial date (for reasons unrelated to courtroom
availability) or when the court subsequently set a post-deadline
trial date, and did not move to specially set or advance trial.
Plaintiffs cite Chin v. Meier (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1473 for
the following propositions: “A court-ordered continuance makes
it impossible or impractical for a plaintiff to proceed to trial.
Such an occurrence is not reasonably within the plaintiff’s
control.” (Id. at p. 1478.) Chin, however, did not consider
whether a court-ordered continuance precludes a trial court from
determining, in its discretion, that bringing an action to trial
was not impossible, impracticable, or futile during the period
covered by the continuance because a reasonably diligent
plaintiff could have brought the action to trial within that period
by bringing the deadline to the court’s attention, objecting,
and/or moving to specially set or advance trial.6 “ ‘[C]ases are
not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160.)
In short, we conclude the trial court acted within its
discretion by finding that section 583.340, subdivision (c), did not
toll the May 18, 2025 deadline because bringing the action to

6 Indeed, Chin did not mention diligence, which the

Supreme Court has since recognized as “ ‘ “[t]he critical factor in
applying [the impossibility, impracticability, and futility]
exceptions to a given factual situation . . . .” ’ ” (Gaines, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 1100; see also De Santiago, supra, 155
Cal.App.4th at p. 376 [declining to follow Chin because Chin did
not consider diligence].)

14
trial between August 5, 2024, and the deadline was not
impossible, impracticable, or futile.

B. The trial court correctly concluded the parties did
not extend the May 18, 2025 deadline by oral
agreement.
“The parties may extend the time within which an action
must be brought to trial pursuant to this article by the following
means: [¶] (a) By written stipulation. . . . [¶] (b) By oral
agreement made in open court, if entered in the minutes of the
court or a transcript is made.” (§ 583.330.) Pursuant to section
583.330, subdivision (b), parties may extend the deadline by
orally agreeing in open court to “postpone trial to a specific date
beyond the statutory period.” (Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 346, 356 (Nunn).)
Here, the parties undisputedly did not execute any written
stipulation to extend the May 18, 2025 deadline to bring the
action to trial. Plaintiffs argue that during the October 28, 2024
trial-setting conference, the parties orally agreed to the post-
deadline trial date of September 29, 2025, thereby extending the
deadline to that date pursuant to section 583.330, subdivision
(b). Plaintiffs argue the alleged agreement was “entered in the
minutes of the court” on October 28, 2024, and subsequently
memorialized in the settled statement concerning that date
(satisfying the alternative statutory requirement that “a
transcript [wa]s made”).7

7 Defendants do not dispute that a settled statement can

substitute for a transcript for the purpose of satisfying section
583.330, subdivision (b). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a);
Nunn, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 356-360.)

15
 The minute order and the settled statement indicate that
the trial court set the September 29, 2025 trial date “[a]fter
conferring with the parties” (who appeared through their
counsel). Neither document, however, indicates that defense
counsel agreed to the September 29, 2025 trial date. Although
both documents indicate that counsel for the Lee Defendants
informed the trial court those defendants might file a motion for
summary judgment, they do not indicate that defense counsel
requested a later trial date to accommodate the potential motion
or that the court selected the September 29, 2025 trial date for
that purpose. In the dismissal order, the trial court found that
“as of October 24, 2024, a motion for summary judgment on full
statutory notice could have been heard well in advance of” the
May 18, 2025 deadline. Plaintiffs do not address that finding.
Even assuming, arguendo, we may infer from the trial
court’s selecting the trial date “[a]fter conferring with the
parties” that defense counsel did not object to that date, the
absence of an objection is insufficient to establish an agreement
to extend the deadline. (See Boyd v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1921)
185 Cal. 344, 347 (Boyd) [“the mere failure of the defendant to
object to setting the cause for trial . . . would n[ot] constitute a
consent or agreement to try the case at the time set”]; Randolph
v. Trustees of California State University (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th
1228, 1234 (Randolph) [“We decline to create new law that when
a minute order [setting a new, post-deadline trial date] is silent
as to any discussion relating to the trial date, a court may infer
that a defendant expressly agreed to the new trial date, thereby
entering into an oral stipulation under section 583.330,
subdivision (b)” (original italics)].)

16
 Plaintiffs attempt to buttress the minute order and settled
statement by citing the declarations that defense counsel
submitted to support Defendants’ motions to dismiss, which
declarations described counsel’s recollection of the proceedings
on October 28, 2024. We disregard Plaintiffs’ citations to those
declarations. By allowing parties to extend the deadline by oral
agreement “made in open court” only “if [the agreement is]
entered in the minutes of the court or a transcript is made”
(§ 583.330, subd. (b)), the statute evinces the Legislature’s intent
to preclude parties from relying on declarations describing post
hoc recollections of the oral proceedings. (See Randolph, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th 1233 & fn. 3 [noting and implicitly disregarding
appellant’s citation to counsel’s declaration that parties had
orally agreed to post-deadline trial date].)
In any event, defense counsel’s declarations did not
indicate that they requested or agreed to the September 29, 2025
trial date. Instead, the declarations indicated only that defense
counsel did not object to that date. As noted, the absence of an
objection is insufficient to establish an agreement to extend the
deadline. (See Boyd, supra, 185 Cal. at p. 347; Randolph, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1234.)
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Nunn, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 346, is
misplaced. In that case, the last day to bring the action to trial
was July 18, 2019. (Id. at p. 351.) The defendants’ case
management statement advised the trial court they intended to
complete discovery “by ‘Summer 2019’ ” (possibly after the July
18, 2019 deadline for trial) and to file a motion for summary
judgment before trial. (Ibid.) The settled statement of a
telephonic case management conference stated: “The court
suggested [setting trial in] November 2019, but [defense counsel]

17
indicated November would be too early because defendants
intended to file a summary judgment motion and needed to take
the plaintiffs’ depositions before filing that motion. [¶] The court
then proposed a trial for January 13, 2020. The lawyers both
indicated to the court that they had no objection to the trial
being set on January 13, 2020.” (Id. at p. 356, italics added.)
After the deadline to bring the action to trial expired, the trial
court dismissed the action. (Id. at p. 352.)
The appellate court reversed (Nunn, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th
at p. 364), concluding the “interchange” that the settled
statement described “constitute[d] an oral agreement within the
meaning of section 583.330” (id. at p. 356). The court rejected
the defendants’ argument that they merely acquiesced in the
trial date, explaining: “The [trial] court proposed a January
2020 trial date to accommodate the interests of the [defendants],
as expressed first in their case management conference
statement and then at the telephonic conference . . . . In
particular, the [defendants’] lawyer, having just rejected the
court’s proposal of a date in November 2019 as premature,
‘indicated’ that the January 2020 date was acceptable; he had no
objection to the later date.” (Id. at p. 357, italics added; see also
id. at p. 359 [“the settled statement show[ed] that the
[defendants] explicitly asked for a trial date after November
2019 (i.e., beyond the statutory deadline)”].) “[T]he settled
statement recount[ed] words and actions by the parties that
constitute[d] objective evidence of an agreement to set the trial
for a specific date” beyond the deadline. (Id. at p. 359.)
Here, in contrast to the settled statement in Nunn, the
minute order and the settled statement recount no words or
actions by defense counsel related to the trial date. (See

18
Randolph, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1234 [“In contrast to the
settled statement in Nunn, the minute order at issue here does
not reflect any discussion regarding the trial date and,
accordingly, it does not show any mutual assent to extend the
statutory deadline to bring the action to trial”].) Neither
document indicates that the trial court proposed a post-deadline
trial date “to accommodate the interests of” Defendants, much
less that defense counsel “explicitly asked for” a post-deadline
trial date. (Nunn, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 357, 359.)
Because Nunn’s holding was based on such an affirmative
request, not on the mere absence of an objection, “Nunn does not
stand ‘for the proposition that “no objection” to a trial date that
would be after the statutory deadline[] is sufficient to create an
oral stipulation . . . .’ ” (Randolph, at p. 1234.)
Plaintiffs purport to quote Munoz v. City of Tracy (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 354 as stating: “[T]he trial court’s
announcement of a trial date, acquiesced in by the parties, is an
oral agreement in open court that extends the deadline.” That
language does not appear in Munoz. Munoz held that the
parties extended the five-year deadline pursuant to section
583.330, subdivision (a), by executing a written stipulation to
continue trial to a date beyond the deadline. (Id. at pp. 360-362.)
Munoz did not consider whether the parties made any oral
agreement that would have extended the deadline pursuant to
section 583.330, subdivision (b). As noted, “ ‘cases are not
authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (Sonic-Calabasas A,
Inc. v. Moreno, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1160.)
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded the parties did
not extend the deadline by oral agreement pursuant to section
583.330, subdivision (b).

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C. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Defendants’ conduct did not estop them
from seeking dismissal.
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by rejecting Plaintiffs’
argument that Defendants’ conduct equitably estopped
Defendants from seeking dismissal.
“Nothing in this chapter [governing dismissal for delay in
prosecution] abrogates or otherwise affects the principles of
waiver and estoppel.” (§ 583.140.) “Equitable estoppel requires
that: (1) the party to be estopped was aware of the operative
facts and either intended that its act or omission be acted upon,
or acted in such a way that the party asserting estoppel
rightfully believed it was intended; and (2) the party asserting
estoppel was unaware of the facts and relied on the other party’s
conduct to its detriment.” (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1097.)
“The party asserting estoppel has the burden to establish these
elements.” (Ibid.) “[E]stoppel is shown only if the detrimental
reliance was reasonable.” (Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v.
Century Indemnity Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1053; see
also In re Marriage of Kelkar (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 833, 847;
Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 26 Cal.4th
1142, 1152.)
We review the trial court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ estoppel
argument for substantial evidence. (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
p. 1098.) “We may not substitute our decision for that of the
trial court. The issue is not . . . whether consideration of
appellant’s evidence could reasonably have led the lower court to
conclude respondent should be estopped from seeking dismissal.
Rather, the issue is whether, viewing the evidence and all
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to respondent,

20
there was substantial evidence upon which the court could
reasonably have found as it did [i.e., that the respondent was not
estopped from seeking dismissal].” (Brookview Condominium
Owners’ Assn. v. Heltzer Enterprises-Brookview (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 502, 511 (Brookview).)
Here, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to
prove the elements of equitable estoppel. Indeed, Plaintiffs
identify no evidence that they relied on any conduct by
Defendants in failing to bring the action to trial within the May
18, 2025 deadline. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s declarations in opposition
to the motions to dismiss did not claim that Plaintiffs
misunderstood the five-year deadline, the necessity of bringing
the action to trial within the deadline, or the means available to
them to do so—much less that any conduct by Defendants misled
Plaintiffs regarding those matters. (See Boyd, supra, 185 Cal. at
p. 347 [estoppel could not bar defendant from seeking dismissal
for failure to bring action to trial within five years absent “a
consent or agreement to try the case at the time set []or
[conduct] amount[ing] to a misleading of the plaintiff”].)
Nor did the declarations claim that Plaintiffs relied on the
specific conduct that Plaintiffs’ appellate briefs cite in support of
estoppel. As explained below, even assuming, arguendo,
Plaintiffs did rely on that conduct, the trial court reasonably
could have found that their reliance was unreasonable and did
not support estoppel. (See Jordan, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p.
1423 [“Plaintiffs have shown no conduct on the part of
defendants that would have lulled plaintiffs into a reasonable
false sense of security [regarding dismissal pursuant to the five-
year statute]. Since the evidence supports the finding of the

21
trial court, we must accept its determination that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel did not apply in this case” (italics added)].)
First, Plaintiffs argue Defendants are estopped from
seeking dismissal because on October 21, 2024 (one week before
the trial court set the September 29, 2025 trial date, without
objection), Defendants approved the form of a proposed pretrial
scheduling order that contained blank spaces for various pretrial
dates. Without explanation, Plaintiffs assert the proposed order
“contemplated trial beyond the deadline.” The proposed order,
however, did not address the trial date or the five-year deadline.
Plaintiffs could not reasonably rely on Defendants’ approval of
the proposed order’s form in failing to bring the action to trial
within the deadline.
Next, Plaintiffs argue Defendants are estopped from
seeking dismissal because the Lee Defendants indicated during
the October 28, 2024 trial-setting conference that they might file
a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs do not explain how
the Lee Defendants’ conduct could estop the IEST Defendants
(who did not reference any potential motion) from seeking
dismissal. As for estoppel against the Lee Defendants, as noted,
they did not request a later trial date to accommodate their
potential summary judgment motion, and Plaintiffs ignore the
trial court’s finding that “as of October 24, 2024, a motion for
summary judgment on full statutory notice could have been
heard well in advance of” the May 18, 2025 deadline. Because
the potential motion could have been heard within the deadline
(the Lee Defendants never suggested otherwise), Plaintiffs could
not reasonably rely on the Lee Defendants’ reference to the
potential motion in failing to bring the action to trial within the
deadline.

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 Finally, Plaintiffs argue Defendants are estopped from
seeking dismissal because Defendants continued litigating the
case after the May 18, 2025 deadline expired. By the time
Defendants engaged in that post-deadline litigation conduct,
however, Plaintiffs already had failed to bring the action to trial
within the deadline. Plaintiffs could not have relied on that
conduct in failing to meet the deadline.
Moreover, Plaintiffs identify no evidence that Defendants
intended Plaintiffs to perceive, or that Plaintiffs reasonably
could have perceived, Defendants’ continued participation in the
litigation as a manifestation of Defendants’ intent not to seek
dismissal. Defendants moved for dismissal about 2.5 months
after the deadline expired. The defense attorneys’ declarations
explained that they did not seek dismissal earlier because (1) the
IEST Defendants’ attorney erroneously believed that a COVID-
19 emergency rule extended the five-year deadline by six
months; and (2) the Lee Defendants’ attorney, who substituted
in for previous counsel late in the litigation, erroneously believed
that Innerline’s bankruptcy had stayed the action as to all
defendants (which would have tolled the deadline). After
Plaintiffs began taking their first depositions in July 2025, the
Lee Defendants’ attorney discovered his error and immediately
communicated his intent to move for dismissal to all parties.
That evidence reasonably supports a finding that
Defendants did not intend for their continued participation in
the litigation for 2.5 months after the deadline expired to
communicate to Plaintiffs that Defendants would not seek
dismissal. To the extent Plaintiffs merely assumed Defendants
would not seek dismissal, the assumption was unreasonable.
(See Jordan, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 [“it was not

23
reasonable to assume defendants were willing to waive the
deadline. . . . Any ambiguity or confusion created by defense
counsel mentioning his unavailability [for trial] beyond the
cutoff date could have been clarified by plaintiffs’ counsel, who
was responsible for ensuring the case was tried before the five-
year period expired”].)
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff
reasonably relied on the defendant’s request for an extension of
time to answer the complaint, which request “led plaintiff to
believe that further service of process on defendant would be
duplicatory and redundant,” (id. at p. 441) “effectively prevented
plaintiff from discovering [a] defect in service” of the summons,
and thereby “resulted in plaintiff’s failure to serve summons
within the [three-year] period required by [former] section 581a.”
(Id. at pp. 433, 441.) The trial court found that the defendant’s
extension request estopped the defendant from seeking
dismissal, and the Supreme Court upheld that finding on writ
review. (Id. at p. 433.) The court distinguished cases in which
defendants requested extensions after the deadline had expired,
on the ground that in those cases, the defendants’ extension
requests “played no role in inducing plaintiff not to effect service
of summons within the statutory period.” (Id. at p. 441, fn. 17.)
Here, unlike the defendant’s extension request in Tresway,
Defendants’ conduct did not reasonably mislead Plaintiffs in a
manner that induced Plaintiffs to fail to meet the deadline.
Further, unlike the trial court in Tresway, the trial court in this
case rejected estoppel. “We may not substitute our decision for
that of the trial court.” (Brookview, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p.
511.)

24
 In short, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that Defendants’ conduct did not estop them
from seeking dismissal.

D. The general policy favoring trial on the merits does
not warrant reversal of the mandatory dismissal.
“It is the policy of the state that a plaintiff shall proceed
with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an
action . . . . Except as otherwise provided by statute or by rule of
court adopted pursuant to statute, the policy favoring the right
of parties to make stipulations in their own interests and the
policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the
merits are generally to be preferred over the policy that requires
dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the
prosecution of an action in construing the provisions of this
chapter [governing mandatory and discretionary dismissal for
delay in prosecution].” (§ 583.130.) “This statement of policy is
by its own description a general statement subject to contrary
statutory provisions.” (Scarzella v. DeMers (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 1762, 1771.)
Plaintiffs contend that even if we reject their arguments
regarding tolling, extension, and estoppel (as we have), we must
reverse the judgment of dismissal to effectuate section 583.130’s
directive that in construing the statutes governing mandatory
and discretionary dismissal for delay in prosecution, courts must
“generally” prefer the policy favoring trial on the merits over the
policy requiring dismissal.
Plaintiffs, however, cite no authority—and we are aware of
none—suggesting that the general policy favoring trial on the
merits may preclude mandatory dismissal where, as here, a
plaintiff fails to bring the action to trial within five years, the

25
five-year deadline was not tolled by statute or extended by
agreement, and estoppel does not bar the defendant from
seeking dismissal. “An action shall be dismissed by the court . . .
if the action is not brought to trial within the time prescribed in
this article [governing mandatory dismissal for failure to bring
an action to trial within five years].” (§ 583.360, subd. (a), italics
added.) “The requirements of this article are mandatory and are
not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly
provided by statute.” (§ 583.360, subd. (b), italics added.)
Section 583.130 does not expressly provide any extension,
excuse, or exception that could preclude mandatory dismissal.
In sum, we conclude the trial court properly dismissed the
action pursuant to section 583.360. “While this conclusion
brings an end to [the] suit, that is what the five-year statute is
designed to do. The five-year rule is mandatory and dismissal
for noncompliance is required.” (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p.
1105.)

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J.

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